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The Act Against Unfair Competition

Full citation: Act Against Unfair Competition in the version published on 3 March 2010 (Federal Law Gazette [BGBl.]) Part I p. 254

Translation provided by the Federal Ministry for Justice and Brian Duffett and reproduced with kind permission.


Table of Contents 

Chapter 1 General provisions

Section 1 Purpose of the Act
Section 2 Definitions
Section 3 Prohibition of unfair commercial practices
Section 4 Examples of unfair commercial practices
Section 5 Misleading commercial practices
Section 5a Misleading by omission
Section 6 Comparative advertising
Section 7 Unconscionable pestering

Chapter 2 Legal consequences

Section 8 Elimination; cessation and desistance
Section 9 Compensation for damage
Section 10 Confiscation of profits
Section 11 Statute-barred limitation

Chapter 3 Procedural provisions

Section 12 Enforcement of claims, authorisation to publish, reduction of the pecuniary value of the dispute
Section 13 Jurisdiction as to subject-matter
Section 14 Local jurisdiction
Section 15 Conciliation boards

Chapter 4 Criminal law provisions and provisions on regulatory offences

Section 16 Advertising incurring criminal liability
Section 17 Disclosure of trade and industrial secrets
Section 18 Use of models
Section 19 Suborning and offering disclosure
Section 20 Provisions on regulatory offences

Annex


Chapter 1 General provisions

Section 1 Purpose of the Act

This Act shall serve the purpose of protecting competitors, consumers and other market participants against unfair commercial practices. At the same time, it shall protect the interests of the public in undistorted competition.

Section 2 Definitions

(1) Within the meaning of this Act the following definitions shall apply:

  1. “Commercial practice” shall mean any conduct by a person for the benefit of that persons or a third partys business before, during, or after, the conclusion of a business transaction, which conduct is objectively connected with promoting the sale or the procurement of goods or services, or with the conclusion or the performance of a contract concerning goods or services; “goods” shall be deemed to include immovable property as well, and “services” also rights and obligations;
  2. “Market participant” shall mean, in addition to competitors and consumers, any person who supplies or demands goods or services;
  3. “Competitor” shall mean any person who has a concrete competitive relationship with one or more entrepreneurs supplying or demanding goods or services;
  4. “Communication” shall mean any information that is exchanged or passed on among a finite number of participants via a publicly accessible electronic communications service; this shall not include information that is passed on to the public as part of a broadcasting service via an electronic communications network, so far as such information cannot be linked with an identifiable participant or user receiving it;
  5. “Code of conduct” shall mean an agreement or set of rules which defines the conduct of entrepreneurs who have undertaken to be bound by the code in relation to business sectors or individual commercial practices, without such obligations having been imposed by statutory or administrative provisions;
  6. “Entrepreneur” shall mean any natural or legal person engaging in commercial practices within the framework of his or its trade, business, craft or profession and anyone acting in the name of, or on behalf of, such person;
  7. “professional diligence” shall mean the standard of special skill and care towards consumers, to which an entrepreneur can reasonably be expected to conform, commensurate with good faith and having regard to market practices, in the entrepreneurs field of activity.

(2) Section 13 of the Civil Code shall apply mutatis mutandis to the term “consumer”.

Section 3 Prohibition of unfair commercial practices

(1) Unfair commercial practices shall be illegal if they are suited to tangible impairment of the interests of competitors, consumers or other market participants.

(2) Commercial practices towards consumers shall be illegal in any case where they do not conform to the professional diligence required of the entrepreneur concerned and are suited to tangible impairment of the consumers ability to make an information-based decision, thus inducing him to make a transactional decision which he would not otherwise have made. Here reference shall be made to the average consumer or, when the commercial practice is directed towards a particular group of consumers, to the average member of that group. Reference shall be made to the perspective of the average member of a group of consumers who are particularly vulnerable and clearly identifiable because of their mental or physical infirmity, age or credulity, if it is foreseeable for the entrepreneur that his commercial practice will affect the latter group only.

(3) The commercial practices towards consumers, listed in the Annex to this Act, shall always be illegal.

Section 4 Examples of unfair commercial practices

Unfairness shall have occurred in particular where a person

  1. uses commercial practices that are suited to impairing the freedom of decision of consumers or other market participants through applying pressure, through conduct showing contempt for humanity, or through other inappropriate, non-objective influence;
  2. uses commercial practices that are suited to exploitation of a consumers mental or physical infirmity, age, commercial inexperience, credulity or fear, or the position of constraint to which the consumer is subject;
  3. conceals the advertising nature of commercial practices;
  4. does not clearly and unambiguously state the conditions for taking advantage of sales promotions such as price reductions, premiums or gifts;
  5. does not clearly and unambiguously state the conditions for participation in a promotional contest or game of an advertising nature;
  6. makes consumer participation in a promotional contest or game dependent on the purchase of goods or the use of a service, unless the promotional contest or game is inherently tied to the goods or service concerned;
  7. discredits or denigrates the distinguishing marks, goods, services, activities, or personal or business circumstances of a competitor;
  8. asserts or disseminates facts about the goods, services or business of a competitor or about the entrepreneur or a member of the management of the business, such facts being suited to harming the operation of the business or the credit of the entrepreneur, to the extent that the facts are not demonstrably true; if the communications are confidential and if the person making, or receiving, the communication has a legitimate interest therein, the action shall only be unfair where facts are asserted or disseminated contrary to the truth;
  9. offers goods or services that are replicas of goods or services of a competitor if hea) causes avoidable deception of the purchaser regarding their commercial origin;b) unreasonably exploits or impairs the assessment of the replicated goods or services; orc) dishonestly obtained the knowledge or documents needed for the replicas;
  10. deliberately obstructs competitors;
  11. infringes a statutory provision that is also intended to regulate market behaviour in the interest of market participants.

Section 5 Misleading commercial practices

(1) Unfairness shall have occurred where a person uses a misleading commercial practice. A commercial practice shall be deemed to be misleading if it contains untruthful information or other information suited to deception regarding the following circumstances:

  1. the essential characteristics of the goods or services, such as availability, nature, execution, benefits, risks, composition, accessories, method or date of manufacture, delivery or provision, fitness for purpose, uses, quantity, specification, after-sale customer assistance, complaint handling, geographical or commercial origin, the results to be expected from their use, or the results or material features of tests carried out on the goods or services;
  2. the reason for purchase such as the existence of a specific price advantage, the price or the manner in which the price is calculated, or the conditions on which the goods are supplied or the services provided;
  3. the nature, attributes or rights of the entrepreneur such as his identity, assets, including intellectual property rights, the extent of his commitments, his qualifications, status, approval, affiliation or connections, awards or distinctions, motives for the commercial practice or the nature of the sales process;
  4. any statement or symbol in relation to direct or indirect sponsorship or approval of the entrepreneur or of the goods or services;
  5. the need for a service, part, replacement or repair;
  6. compliance with a code of conduct by which the entrepreneur has undertaken to be bound when he makes reference to such commitment; or
  7. the rights of consumers, particularly those based on promised guarantees or warranty rights in the event of impaired performance.

(2) A commercial practice shall also be deemed to be misleading if in connection with the marketing of goods or services, including comparative advertising, it creates a risk of confusion with other goods or services or with the trade mark or other distinguishing mark of a competitor.

(3) Information within the meaning of subsection (1), second sentence, shall also be deemed to include information forming part of comparative advertising as well as pictorial illustrations and other events that are targeted at, and are suitable for, taking the place of such information.

(4) It shall be presumed to be misleading to advertise with a price reduction in a case where the price concerned has been demanded for only an incommensurably short period of time. In the event of dispute as to whether, and for what period of time, the price was demanded, the onus of proof shall fall upon the person who advertised with the price reduction.

Section 5a Misleading by omission

(1) In assessing whether the concealment of a fact is misleading, consideration shall be given in particular to its significance for the transactional decision according to prevailing public opinion, as well as to the suitability of the concealment for influencing the decision.

(2) Unfairness shall have occurred where a person influences a consumers ability to take a decision, being a consumer within the meaning of Section 3 subsection (2), through omission of information that is material in its factual context, taking account of all its features and circumstances, including the limitations of the communication medium.

(3) Where goods or services are offered with reference to their characteristics and price in such manner appropriate to the communication medium used that an average consumer can conclude the transaction, the following information shall be deemed to be material within the meaning of subsection (2) if not already apparent from the context:

  1. all main characteristics of the goods or services to an extent appropriate thereto and to the communication medium used;
  2. the identity and the geographical address of the entrepreneur and, where applicable, the identity and geographical address of the entrepreneur on whose behalf he is acting;
  3. the final price, or in cases where the nature of the goods or services means that such price cannot be calculated in advance, the manner in which the price is calculated as well as, where appropriate, all additional freight, delivery or postal charges or, where these charges cannot be calculated in advance, the fact that such additional charges may be payable;
  4. arrangements for payment, delivery and performance, as well as complaint handling policies so far as they depart from the requirements of professional diligence; and
  5. the existence of a right of withdrawal or cancellation.

(4) Such information shall also be deemed to be material within the meaning of subsection (2) as shall not be omitted in respect of consumers or by virtue of Community Regulations pursuant to legal provisions for the implementation of Community Directives for commercial communication including advertising or marketing.

Section 6 Comparative advertising

(1) Comparative advertising shall be deemed to be any advertising which explicitly or by implication identifies a competitor, or goods or services offered by a competitor.

(2) Unfairness shall have occurred where a person conducting comparative advertising uses a comparison that

  1. does not relate to goods or services meeting the same needs or intended for the same purpose;
  2. does not objectively relate to one or more material, relevant, verifiable and representative features of the goods concerned, or to the price of those goods or services;
  3. leads in the course of trade to a risk of confusion between the advertiser and a competitor, or between the goods or services offered, or the distinguishing marks used, by them;
  4. takes unfair advantage of, or impairs, the reputation of a distinguishing mark used by a competitor;
  5. discredits or denigrates the goods, services, activities or personal or business circumstances of a competitor; or
  6. presents goods or services as imitations or replicas of goods or services sold under a protected distinguishing mark.

Section 7 Unconscionable pestering

(1) A commercial practice unconscionably pestering a market participant shall be illegal. This shall apply to advertising particularly in cases where it is apparent that the solicited market participant does not want this advertising.

(2) Unconscionable pestering shall always be assumed in the case of

  1. advertising using a medium of commercial communication not listed under numbers 2 and 3 which is suited to distance marketing and through which a consumer is persistently solicited although it appears that he does not want this;
  2. advertising by means of a telephone call, made to a consumer without his prior express consent, or made to another market participant without at least the latter’s presumed consent;
  3. advertising using an automated calling machine, a fax machine or electronic mail without the addressees prior express consent; or
  4. advertising using a communication where the identity of the sender, on whose behalf the communication is transmitted, is concealed or kept secret, or where there is no valid address to which the recipient can send an instruction to terminate transmission of communications of this kind, without costs arising by virtue thereof, other than transmission costs pursuant to the basic rates.

(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2), number 3, unconscionable pestering shall not be assumed to exist in the case of advertising using electronic mail if

  1. the entrepreneur has obtained from the customer the latters electronic mail address in connection with the sale of goods or services;
  2. the entrepreneur uses the address for direct advertising of his own similar goods or services;
  3. the customer has not objected to this use; and
  4. the customer has been clearly and unequivocally advised, when the address is recorded and each time it is used, that he can object to such use at any time, without costs arising by virtue thereof, other than transmission costs pursuant to the basic rates.

Chapter 2 Legal consequences

Section 8 Elimination; cessation and desistance

(1) Whoever uses an illegal commercial practice pursuant to Section 3 or Section 7 can be sued for elimination, and in the event of the risk of recurrence, for cessation and desistance. The cessation and desistance claim shall already pertain in the event of the risk of such contravention of Section 3 or Section 7.

(2) Where the contraventions are committed in a business by a member of the staff or by a person exercising a mandate, the claim to cessation and desistance and the claim to elimination shall be deemed to apply in relation to the owner of the business as well.

(3) The claims under subsection (1) shall vest in

  1. every competitor;
  2. associations with legal personality which exist for the promotion of commercial or of independent professional interests, so far as a considerable number of entrepreneurs belong thereto, and which distribute goods or services of the same or similar type on the same market, provided such associations are actually in a position, particularly in terms of their personnel, material and financial resources, to pursue the tasks, under their memoranda of association, of promoting commercial or independent professional interests, and so far as the contravention affects the interests of their members;
  3. qualified entities that prove that they are entered on the list of qualified entities pursuant to section 4 of the Injunctions Act or on the list of the Commission of the European Communities pursuant to Article 4 of Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the protection of consumer interests (OJ Number L 166 page 51);
  4. Chambers of Industry and Commerce or Craft Chambers.

(4) The assertion of the claims referred to in subsection (1) shall be inadmissible where such assertion is improper having regard to all the circumstances, especially where it predominantly serves the purpose of generating a claim for reimbursement of expenses or of the costs of taking legal action against the contravening party.

(5) Section 13 of the Injunctions Act shall be applied mutatis mutandis; in Section 13 subsections (1) and (3), second sentence, of the Injunctions Act the claims to cessation and desistance in this provision shall be substituted for the claim pursuant to section 1 or section 2 of the Injunctions Act. In all other respects the Injunctions Act shall not apply except in a case where section 4a of the Injunctions Act applies.

Section 9 Compensation for damage

Whoever, while acting with intent or negligently, uses an illegal commercial practice pursuant to Section 3 or Section 7 shall be obliged to compensate competitors for the damage arising therefrom. The compensation claim can be asserted against persons responsible for periodical printed matteronly in the case of contravention with intent.

Section 10 Confiscation of profits

(1) Whoever, while acting with intent, uses an illegal commercial practice pursuant to Section 3 or Section 7, thereby making a profit to the detriment of numerous purchasers, can be sued for surrender of such profit to the Federal budget by those entitled, pursuant to Section 8 subsection (3), numbers 2 to 4, to assert a cessation and desistance claim.

(2) Such payments as were made by the debtor, because of the contravention, to third parties or the state shall be deducted from the profit. So far as the debtor made such payments only at a time subsequent to satisfaction of the claim pursuant to subsection (1), the competent agency of the Federation shall reimburse the debtor the profit thus paid in the sum of the recorded payments.

(3) Where there is more than one creditor claiming the profit, sections 428 to 430 of the Civil Code shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(4) Creditors shall notify the competent agency of the Federation of the assertion of claims pursuant to subsection (1). Creditors can request reimbursement from the competent agency of the Federation for such expenses as were necessary for assertion of the claim, so far as they cannot obtain satisfaction from the debtor. The reimbursement claim shall be limited to the sum of the profit paid into the Federal budget.

(5) The competent agency within the meaning of subsections (2) and (4) shall be the Federal Office of Justice.

Section 11 Statute-barred limitation

(1) The claims under Sections 8, 9 and 12 subsection (1), second sentence, shall become statute-barred after six months.

(2) The period of statute-barred limitation shall commence when

  1. the claim arises and
  2. the creditor obtains knowledge, or should, without being grossly negligent, have obtained knowledge of the circumstances giving rise to the claim and of the debtor’s identity.

(3) Compensation claims shall become statute-barred, irrespective of knowledge or of grossly negligent ignorance, ten years after they arise, or thirty years at the latest after occurrence of the act giving rise to the damage.

(4) Other claims shall become statute-barred, irrespective of knowledge or of grossly negligent ignorance, three years after they arise.

Chapter 3 Procedural provisions

Section 12 Enforcement of claims, authorisation to publish, reduction of the pecuniary value of the dispute

(1) Parties entitled to assert a cessation and desistance claim should warn the debtor prior to initiating court proceedings and should give him the opportunity to resolve the dispute by incurring the obligation to cease and desist subject to a reasonable contractual penalty. If the warning is justified, reimbursement of the necessary expenses can be demanded.

(2) Provisional injunctions can be granted in order to secure the cessation and desistance claims specified in this Act, also without exposition and substantiation of the conditions required by sections 935 and 940 of the Civil Procedure Code.

(3) Where by virtue of this Act a court action has been brought for cessation and desistance, the court can authorise the prevailing party to publicise the judgment at the expense of the losing party if the prevailing party demonstrates a legitimate interest therein. The nature and extent of publication shall be determined in the judgment. The authorisation shall expire if it is not used within three months after entry into final and binding force. The declaration pursuant to the first sentence shall not be provisionally enforceable.

(4) In assessing the pecuniary value of the claims pursuant to Section 8 subsection (1) account shall be taken, by reducing such pecuniary value, of indications that the case is straightforward in terms of its nature and scope, or where charging one of the parties with the costs of the proceedings in relation to the full pecuniary value of the dispute does not appear to be reasonable having regard to the assets and the financial circumstances of the party concerned.

Section 13 Jurisdiction as to subject-matter

(1) The Regional Courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all civil law disputes where a claim is asserted by virtue of this Act. Section 95 subsection (1), number 5, of the Courts Constitution Act shall apply.

(2) The Land governments shall be empowered to designate by ordinance one such Regional Court as the court to hear competition disputes for the districts of several Regional Courts, provided this is conducive to the administration of justice in respect of competition disputes, especially for the purpose of ensuring consistent court decisions. The Land governments can delegate this power to the Land departments of justice.

Section 14 Local jurisdiction

1) For court actions brought by virtue of this Act jurisdiction shall lie with the court in whose districts the defendant has his or its commercial place of business or his independent professional place of business, or in the absence thereof, his or its place of residence. The defendants domestic place of abode shall be the decisive point of reference in a case where the defendant also does not have a place of residence.

(2) Moreover, for court actions brought by virtue of this Act jurisdiction shall lie solely with the court in whose district the act was committed. The first sentence shall apply to court actions brought by those entitled to assert a cessation and desistance claim, pursuant to Section 8 subsection (3), numbers 2 to 4, only if the defendant has neither a domestic commercial, or independent professional, place of business nor a place of residence.

Section 15 Conciliation boards

(1) The Land governments shall establish conciliation boards at the Chambers of Industry and Commerce for the resolution of civil law disputes where a claim is asserted by virtue of this Act (conciliation boards).

(2) Conciliation boards shall be composed of a chairperson who is qualified to hold judicial office, pursuant to the German Judiciary Act, and persons sitting as assessors. In the event of referral by a qualified entity entitled to assert a cessation and desistance claim, pursuant to Section 8 subsection (3), number 3, an equal number of entrepreneurs and consumers shall act as assessors; there shall otherwise be at least two expert entrepreneurs acting as such. The chairperson shall be experienced in the field of competition law. For each disputed case the persons sitting as assessors shall be taken by the chairperson from a list that has to be compiled annually for the calendar year. Appointment should be effected with the agreement of the parties. Sections 41 to 43 and section 44 subsections (2) to (4) of the Civil Procedure Code shall be applied mutatis mutandis to exclusion and rejection of members of the conciliation board. The Regional Court (Chamber for Commercial Matters or, in the event of there being no such chamber, the Civil Chamber) with jurisdiction in respect of the seat of the conciliation board shall give a decision on a motion of challenge.

(3) Referral can be made to a conciliation board in civil law disputes where a claim is asserted by virtue of this Act, provided that the opposing party consents thereto. So far as acts of competition concern consumers, each party can refer the matter to a conciliation board for a discussion with the opposing party regarding the dispute; such referral shall not require the consent of the opposing party.

(4) Section 14 shall be applied mutatis mutandis to the jurisdiction of the conciliation boards.

(5) The chairperson of the conciliation board can make an order for the personal appearance of the parties. The conciliation board can impose a coercive fine on a party absent without excuse. An immediate complaint, pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, can be lodged regarding the order for personal appearance and regarding the imposition of the coercive fine to the Regional Court (Chamber for Commercial Matters or, in the event of there being no such chamber, the Civil Chamber) with jurisdiction in respect of the seat of the conciliation board.

(6) The conciliation board shall strive for a friendly settlement. It can make the parties a written settlement proposal, giving its reasons for the settlement proposed. The settlement proposal and the reasons therefor may only be published with the consent of the parties.

(7) If a settlement is reached, it must be recorded in a specific document bearing the date upon which it was reached, and it must be signed by the members of the conciliation board who took part in the negotiation as well as by the parties. There can be recourse to compulsory execution in respect of a settlement concluded before the conciliation board; section 797a of the Civil Procedure Code shall be applied mutatis mutandis.

(8) The conciliation board can refuse to initiate the negotiation of a settlement if at the outset it considers the asserted claim to be ill-founded or considers itself as having no jurisdiction.

(9) The period of statute-barred limitation shall be interrupted by referral to a conciliation board as though a court action had been brought. If a settlement is not reached, the time at which the proceeding was brought to an end shall be established by the conciliation board. The chairperson shall inform the parties thereof.

(10) Where a legal dispute of the kind referred to in subsection (3), second sentence, has been brought before a court without prior referral to a conciliation board, the court can, upon application and upon setting down a new date for a hearing, enjoin the parties to refer the matter to the conciliation board in order to bring about a friendly settlement prior to such date. In proceedings concerning an application for the granting of a provisional injunction, such order shall only be admissible with the consent of the opposing party. Subsection (8) shall not be applied. Where a proceeding is pending before the conciliation board, a court action only brought by the party opposing the application after referral to the conciliation board shall not be admissible for a declaration to the effect that the asserted claim does not exist.

(11) The Land governments shall be empowered to issue, by ordinance, the requisite provisions for implementing the aforementioned provisions and for regulating proceedings before the conciliation boards, particularly regarding supervision of the conciliation boards, regarding their composition, including adequate participation of entrepreneurs who are not members of the Chambers of Industry and Commerce (section 2 subsections [2] to [6] of the Act for Temporary Regulation of the Law Governing the Chambers of Industry and Commerce, in the Federal Law Gazette, Part III, Classification Number 701-1, published revised version), and regarding the enforcement of coercive fines, as well as for making stipulations on the charging of fees by the conciliation board. In staffing conciliation boards, the proposals made by consumer associations, established for a Federal Land and supported with public funds, shall be taken into consideration in deciding on the consumers referred to in subsection (2), second sentence.

(12) Notwithstanding subsection (2), first sentence, in the Länder of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia, a person with legal knowledge and qualified to hold professional judicial office under the law of the German Democratic Republic can also be made chairperson of the conciliation board.

Chapter 4 Criminal law provisions and provisions on regulatory offences

Section 16 Advertising incurring criminal liability

(1) Whoever, with the intent of creating the impression of a particularly favourable offer, misleadingly advertises while using false information in public announcements, or in communications directed towards a wider audience, shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding two years or to a fine.

(2) Whoever in the course of trade operates to cause consumers to purchase goods, services or rights by holding out the prospect of consumers obtaining specific benefits from the promoter himself or from a third party if they cause other persons to conclude equivalent transactions where, in terms of this kind of advertising, these other persons are, in turn, to receive such benefits for corresponding advertising directed towards further purchasers shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding two years or to a fine.

Section 17 Disclosure of trade and industrial secrets

(1) Whoever as the employee of a business communicates, without authorisation, a trade or industrial secret with which he was entrusted, or to which he had access, during the course of the employment relationship to another person for the purposes of competition, for personal gain, for the benefit of a third party, or with the intent of causing damage to the owner of the business shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding three years or to a fine.

(2) Whoever for the purposes of competition, for personal gain, for the benefit of a third party, or with the intent of causing damage to the owner of the business, acquires or secures, without authorisation,

  1. a trade or industrial secreta) by using technical means;b) by creating an embodied communication of the secret; orc) by removing an item in which the secret is embodied;or
  2. without authorisation, uses or communicates to anyone a trade secret which he acquired through one of the communications referred to in subsection (1), or through an act of his own or of a third party pursuant to number 1, or which he has otherwise acquired or secured without authorisation

shall incur the same liability.

(3) An attempt shall incur criminal liability.

(4) In particularly serious cases the sentence shall consist in imprisonment not exceeding five years or a fine. A particularly serious case shall usually exist in circumstances where the perpetrator

  1. acts on a commercial basis;
  2. knows at the time of the communication that the secret is to be used abroad; or
  3. himself effects a use pursuant to subsection (2), number 2, abroad.

(5) The offence shall be prosecuted upon application only, unless the criminal prosecution authority considers that it is necessary to take ex officio action on account of the particular public interest in the criminal prosecution.

(6) Section 5, number 7, of the Criminal Code shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 18 Use of models

(1) Whoever, acting without authorisation, uses or communicates to another person models or instructions of a technical nature, particularly drawings, prototypes, patterns, segments or formulas, entrusted to him for the purposes of competition or for personal gain shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding two years or to a fine.

(2) An attempt shall incur criminal liability.

(3) The offence shall be prosecuted upon application only, unless the criminal prosecution authority considers that it is necessary to take ex officio action on account of the particular public interest in the criminal prosecution.

(4) Section 5, number 7, of the Criminal Code shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 19 Suborning and offering disclosure

(1) Whoever for the purposes of competition or for personal gain attempts to procure another person to commit a criminal offence pursuant to Section 17 or Section 18 or to incite the commission of such an offence shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding two years or to a fine.

(2) Whoever for the purposes of competition of for personal gain offers, or accepts the offer of another person, or conspires with another person, to commit, or to incite the commission of, a criminal offence pursuant to Section 17 or Section 18 shall incur the same liability.

(3) Section 31 of the Criminal Code shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(4) The offence shall be prosecuted upon application only, unless the criminal prosecution authority considers that it is necessary to take ex officio action on account of the particular public interest in the criminal prosecution.

(5) Section 5, number 7, of the Criminal Code shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 20 Provisions on regulatory offences

(1) Whoever while acting with intent or negligently and contrary to Section 7 subsection (1) in conjunction with subsection (2), number 2, advertises by means of a telephone call made to a consumer without his prior express consent shall have committed a regulatory offence.

(2) This regulatory offence can be penalised by imposition of a regulatory fine not exceeding fifty thousand euro.

(3) The Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post and Railway shall be an administrative authority within the meaning of Section 36 subsection (1), number 1, of the Regulatory Offences Act.

Annex

(to Section 3 subsection [3])

Illegal commercial practices within the meaning of Section 3 subsection (3) shall cover:

  1. the false statement by an entrepreneur that he is a signatory to a code of conduct;
  2. displaying a trust mark, quality mark or the equivalent without having obtained the necessary authorisation;
  3. making the false statement that a code of conduct has an endorsement from a public or other body;
  4. making the false statement that an entrepreneur, a commercial practice by that entrepreneur, or goods or services have been approved, endorsed or authorised by a public or private body; or making the false statement that the terms of the approval, endorsement or authorisation have been complied with;
  5. making an invitation to purchase goods or services within the meaning of Section 5a subsection (3) at a specified price when the entrepreneur does not disclose that he has reasonable grounds for believing that he will not be able to supply these, or equivalent, goods or services, or procure such supply, at such specified price for a period that is, and in quantities that are, reasonable (bait advertising). Where stocks are available for less than two days, it shall be incumbent on the entrepreneur to furnish proof of reasonableness;
  6. making an invitation to purchase goods or services within the meaning of Section 5a subsection (3) at a specified price in a situation where the entrepreneur, with the intention of promoting different goods or services instead, then demonstrates a defective example of the goods or services, or refuses to show the consumer the goods or services advertised, or refuses to take orders for the goods or services or to perform the advertised service within a reasonable time;
  7. making the false statement that certain goods or services will only be available generally or on particular terms for a very limited time, in order to elicit an immediate transactional decision from the consumer without the latter having the time and the opportunity to make an information-based decision;
  8. making after-sale customer assistance available in a language which is not the language in which the negotiations were conducted before conclusion of the transaction, if the language originally used is not an official language of the Member State where the entrepreneur is located; this shall not apply if the consumer is informed before conclusion of the transaction that such services will be made in a language different from the language originally used;
  9. making the false statement, or creating the false impression, that goods or services can be sold with legal effect;
  10. making the false statement, or creating the false impression, that legally existing rights form a distinctive feature of the offer;
  11. using editorial content for the purpose of sales promotion where the entrepreneur has paid for this promotion, without such connection being clearly identifiable from the content or by images or sounds (advertorial);
  12. making a false claim concerning the nature and extent of the risk to the personal security of the consumer or his family if the consumer does not purchase the goods or services offered;
  13. promoting goods or services similar to the goods or services of a competitor, with the intention of deceiving the consumer regarding the commercial origin of the goods or services promoted;
  14. establishing, operating or promoting a sales promotional scheme creating the impression that compensation can be obtained solely or primarily from introducing other participants into the scheme (scheme with a snowball effect or pyramidal structure);
  15. falsely claiming that the entrepreneur is about to cease trading or move premises;
  16. claiming that certain goods or services are able to facilitate winning in games of chance;
  17. making the false statement, or creating the false impression, that the consumer has already won, or will win, a prize, or that he will obtain another benefit although such prize or benefit in fact does not exist, or that in any event the possibility of obtaining a prize or other benefit is subject to the consumer paying money or incurring a cost;
  18. falsely claiming that goods or services are able to cure illnesses, dysfunction, or malformations;
  19. giving false information on market conditions or sources of supply with the intention of inducing the consumer to purchase or use goods or services at conditions less favourable than general market conditions;
  20. offering a competition or a promotional contest without awarding the prospective prizes or a reasonable equivalent;
  21. offering goods or services as being “gratis”, “free”, “without charge”, or using a similar expression, although costs are to be paid therefor; this shall not apply to the unavoidable cost of responding to the offer of goods or services or of collecting or paying for delivery of the goods or of using the services;
  22. transmitting marketing material together with a document seeking payment and creating the false impression that the goods or services marketed have already been ordered;
  23. making the false statement, or creating the false impression, that the entrepreneur is a consumer or is not acting for purposes relating to his business, trade, craft or profession;
  24. making the false statement, or creating the false impression, that after-sale customer assistance in relation to goods or services is available in a Member State of the European Union other than the one where the goods or services are sold;
  25. creating the impression that the consumer cannot leave certain premises before prior conclusion of a contract;
  26. ignoring, while conducting a personal visit to the home, a request made by the person being visited to leave or not to return, unless such visit is justified for the purpose of lawful enforcement of a contractual obligation;
  27. measures to dissuade the consumer from exercising his contractual rights in an insurance relationship by requiring him to produce such documents, on assertion of his claim, as are not needed as proof of that claim, or failing systematically to respond to correspondence asserting the said claim;
  28. including in an advertisement a direct exhortation to children to purchase the goods or services marketed or to persuade their parents or other adults to do so;
  29. demanding payment for goods or services not ordered, or demanding the return or safekeeping of items not ordered, except where they are a permissible substitute under the provisions on distance contracts; and
  30. explicitly stating that the entrepreneurs work or livelihood will be in jeopardy if the consumer does not purchase the goods or services.

The above translation was published by the Federal Ministry of Justice. Reproduced with kind permission. This HTML edition by Jens Askan Brückerhoff and © 2011 Gerhard Dannemann. The contents of this page may be downloaded and printed out in single copies for individual use only. Making multiple copies without permission is prohibited.

Act against Restraints on Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, GWB)

In the version promulgated on 26 August 1998 (Federal Gazette I p. 2546)

This translation has been established jointly by the law firm of Hengeler Mueller Weitzel Wirtz and the Federal Cartel Office, and is reproduced with kind permission.


Table of Contents 

Part I Restraints of Competition

Chapter I Cartel Agreements, Cartel Decisions and Concerted Practices

Section 1 Prohibition of Cartels
Section 2 Standards-and-Types Cartels, Condition Cartels
Section 3 Specialisation Cartels
Section 4 Cartels of Small or Medium-Sized Enterprises
Section 5 Rationalisation Cartels
Section 6 Structural Crisis Cartels
Section 7 Other Cartels
Section 8 Ministerial Authorisation
Section 9 Notification of Cartels Objection Procedure
Section 10 Application for Exemption, Granting of Exemption
Section 11 Information on Cartels, Publication
Section 12 Abuse Control, Revocation of Exemption
Section 13 Cartel Representative

Chapter II Vertical Agreements

Section 14 Prohibition of Agreements Concerning Prices or Terms of Business
Section 15 Resale Price Maintenance for Published Products
Section 16 Abuse Control of Exclusive Dealing Agreements
Section 17 Licence Agreements
Section 18 Agreements on Other Protected and Unprotected Achievements and on Seeds

Chapter III Market Dominance, Restrictive Practices

Section 19 Abuse of a Dominant Position
Section 20 Prohibition of Discrimination; Prohibition of Unfair Hindrance
Section 21 Prohibition of Boycott and Other Restrictive Practices
Section 22 Prohibition of Recommendations
Section 23 Non-Binding Price Recommendations for Branded Goods

Chapter IV Competition Rules

Section 24 Definition; Application for Recognition
Section 25 Comments by Third Parties
Section 26 Recognition
Section 27 Information on Competition Rules; Publications

Chapter V Special Provisions for Certain Sectors of the Economy

Section 28 Agriculture
Section 29 Credit and Insurance Industry
Section 30 Copyright Collecting Societies
Section 31 Sports

Chapter VI Sanctions

Section 32 Prohibition
Section 33 Liability for Damages; Claims for Injunctions
Section 34 Skimming-off Additional Proceeds

Chapter VII Control of Concentrations

Section 35 Scope of Application
Section 36 Principles for the Appraisal of Concentrations
Section 37 Concentration
Section 38 Calculation of Turnover and Market Shares
Section 39 Obligation to Notify
Section 40 Procedure of Control of Concentrations
Section 41 Prohibition of Putting a Concentration into Effect, Dissolution
Section 42 Ministerial Authorisation
Section 43 Publications

Chapter VIII Monopolies Commission

Section 44 Functions
Section 45 Members
Section 46 Decisions, Organisation, Rights and Duties of the Members
Section 47 Transmission of Statistical Data

Part II Cartel Authorities

Chapter I General Provisions

Section 48 Competence
Section 49 Federal Cartel Office and Supreme Land Authority
Section 50 Implementation of European Law – Activities of the Federal Cartel Office

Chapter II Federal Cartel Office

Section 51 Seat, Organisation
Section 52 Publication of General Instructions Issued by the Federal Ministry of Economics
Section 53 Report on Activities

Part III Procedure

Chapter I Administrative Matters

I. Proceedings Before Cartel Authorities

Section 54 Institution of the Proceedings; Parties
Section 55 Preliminary Decision on Jurisdiction
Section 56 Opportunity to Comment; Hearing
Section 57 Investigations; Taking of Evidence
Section 58 Seizure
Section 59 Requests for Information
Section 60 Preliminary Injunctions
Section 61 Completion of the Proceedings; Reasons for the Decision; Service
Section 62 Publication of Decisions Decisions of the cartel authority

II. Appeals

Section 63 Admissibility; Jurisdiction
Section 64 Suspensive Effect
Section 65 Order of Immediate Enforcement
Section 66 Time Limits and Formal Requirements
Section 67 Parties to the Appeal Proceedings
Section 68 Mandatory Representation by Lawyers
Section 69 Hearing
Section 70 Principle of Investigation
Section 71 Decision on the Appeal
Section 72 Inspection of Files
Section 73 Application of the Provisions of the Courts Constitution Act and the Code of Civil Procedure

III. Appeal on Points of Law

Section 74 Leave to Appeal; Absolute Reasons for Appeal
Section 75 Appeal from Refusal to Grant Leave
Section 76 Right to Appeal; Formal Requirements and Time Limits

IV.Common Provisions

Section 77 Capacity to Participate in the Proceedings
Section 78 Apportionment and Taxation of Costs
Section 79 Ordinances
Section 80 Chargeable Acts

Chapter II Proceedings Concerning Administrative Fines

Section 81 Provisions Concerning Administrative Fines
Section 82 Jurisdiction in Proceedings to Assess a Fine Against a Legal Person or Association of Persons
Section 83 Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal in Judicial Proceedings
Section 84 Appeal to the Federal Supreme Court on Points of Law
Section 85 Reopening of Proceedings Against an Administrative Fine
Section 86 Court Decisions Concerning Enforcement

Chapter III Civil Actions

Section 87 Exclusive Jurisdiction of the District Courts
Section 88 Joining of Actions
Section 89 Jurisdiction of one District Court for Several Court Districts
Section 90 Information to and Participation of the Federal Cartel Office

Chapter IV Common Provisions

Section 91 Cartel Division of the Court of Appeal
Section 92 Jurisdiction of a Court of Appeal or of the Supreme Court of a Land for Several Court Districts in Administrative Matters and Proceedings Concerning Administrative Fines
Section 93 Jurisdiction over Appeals
Section 94 Cartel Division of the Federal Supreme Court
Section 95 Exclusive Jurisdiction
Section 96 Civil Actions

Part IV Award of Public Contracts

Chapter I Award Procedures

Section 97 General Principles
Section 98 Contracting Entities
Section 99 Public Contracts
Section 100 Scope of Application
Section 101 Categories of Awards

Chapter II Review Procedures

I. Reviewing Authorities

Section 102 Principle
Section 103 Public Procurement Review Offices
Section 104 Public Procurement Tribunals
Section 105 Composition, Independence
Section 106 Establishment, Organisation

II. Proceedings before the Public Procurement Tribunal

Section 107 Initiation of the Proceedings, Application
Section 108 Form
Section 109 Parties to the Proceedings, Admission to the Proceedings
Section 110 Investigation Principle
Section 111 Inspection of Files
Section 112 Hearing
Section 113 Expedition
Section 114 Decision of the Public Procurement Tribunal
Section 115 Suspension of the Award Procedure

III. Immediate Complaint

Section 116 Admissibility, Jurisdiction
Section 117 Time Limit, Formal Requirements
Section 118 Effect
Section 119 Parties to the Appeal Proceedings
Section 120 Procedural Provisions
Section 121 Preliminary Decision on the Award
Section 122 End of the Award Procedure after the Decision of the Appellate Court
Section 123 Decision on the Appeal
Section 124 Binding Effect and Duty to Refer the Matter

Chapter III Other Provisions

Section 125 Damages in the Event of an Abuse of Law
Section 126 Claim to Compensation for Damage
Section 127 Empowering Provisions
Section 128 Costs of the Proceedings before the Public Procurement Tribunal
Section 129 Costs of the Public Procurement Review Offices

Part V Area of Application of the Act

Section 130 Public Undertakings; Area of Application

Part VI Transitional and Final Provisions

Section 131 Repeal, Transitional Provisions


Part I Restraints of Competition

Chapter I Cartel Agreements, Cartel Decisions and Concerted Practices

Section 1 Prohibition of Cartels

Agreements between competing undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition shall be prohibited.

Section 2 Standards-and-Types Cartels, Condition Cartels

(1) Agreements and decisions whose subject matter is merely the uniform application of standards or types may be exempted from the prohibition under Section 1.

(2) Agreements and decisions whose subject matter is the uniform application of general terms of business, delivery and payment, including cash discounts, may be exempted from the prohibition under Section 1 insofar as they do not relate to prices or price elements.

Section 3 Specialisation Cartels

Agreements and decisions whose subject matter is the rationalisation of economic activities through specialisation may be exempted from the prohibition under Section 1 provided the restraint of competition does not lead to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.

Section 4 Cartels of Small or Medium-Sized Enterprises

(1) Agreements and decisions whose subject matter is the rationalisation of economic activities through a form of cooperation among enterprises other than that described in Section 3 may be exempted from the prohibition under Section 1 provided

1. competition on the market is not substantially impaired thereby, and

2. the agreement or the decision serves to improve the competitiveness of small or medium-sized enterprises.

(2) Section 1 shall not apply to agreements and decisions whose subject matter is the joint purchasing of goods or the joint procurement of commercial services, but which do not, except in individual cases, compel the participating undertakings to purchase from that source, provided the conditions in subsection (1) nos. 1 and 2 are satisfied.

Section 5 Rationalisation Cartels

(1) Agreements and decisions which serve to rationalise economic activities may be exempted from the prohibition under Section 1 provided they are a suitable means of substantially increasing the efficiency or productivity of the participating undertakings in technical, commercial or organisational respects and of thereby improving the satisfaction of demand. The rationalisation effect should be of sufficient importance when compared with the restraint of competition connected with it. The restraint of competition shall not result in the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.

(2) If the agreement or decision aims to achieve the rationalisation in conjunction with price agreements or through the establishment of joint purchasing or selling organisations, an exemption from the prohibition under Section 1 may be granted, under the conditions of subsection (1), if the rationalisation effect cannot be achieved otherwise.

Section 6 Structural Crisis Cartels

In the event of a decline in sales due to a lasting change in demand, agreements and decisions of undertakings engaged in production, manufacturing or processing may be exempted from the prohibition under Section 1, provided the agreement or decision is necessary to systematically adjust capacity to demand, and the arrangement takes into account the conditions of competition in the economic sectors concerned.

Section 7 Other Cartels

(1) Agreements and decisions which contribute to improving the development, production, distribution, procurement, taking back or disposal of goods or services, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, may be exempted from the prohibition under Section 1 provided the improvement cannot be achieved otherwise by the participating undertakings and is of sufficient importance when compared with the restraint of competition connected with it, and the restraint of competition does not result in the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.

(2) Agreements and decisions whose subject matter is the rationalisation of economic activities through specialisation or in some other way, the joint purchasing of goods or the joint procurement of commercial services, or the uniform application of terms and conditions, may be exempted from the prohibition under Section 1 only pursuant to Section 2 (2) and Sections 3 to 5.

Section 8 Ministerial Authorisation

(1) If the conditions of Sections 2 to 7 are not satisfied, the Federal Minister of Economics may exempt agreements and decisions from the prohibition under Section 1 if, exceptionally, the restraint of competition is necessary for prevailing reasons concerning the economy as a whole and the public interest.

(2) If there is an immediate danger to the existence of a majority of the undertakings in a sector of the economy, the exemption may be granted only if other legislative or economic policy measures cannot be taken, or cannot be taken in time, and the restraint of competition is a suitable means of averting the danger. The exemption may be granted only in especially serious individual cases.

Section 9 Notification of Cartels Objection Procedure

(1) Agreements and decisions of the kind described in Sections 2 to 4 (1) as well as changes and amendments thereto must be notified to the cartel authority in order to be exempted from the prohibition under Section 1. In the cases of Section 2 (1), comments of a rationalisation association and in the cases of Section 2 (2) comments of the suppliers and purchasers concerned are to be attached to the notification. Rationalisation associations within the meaning of the Act are associations whose functions as set out in their by-laws include the task of carrying out or reviewing standardisation and type defining projects while giving the suppliers and purchasers affected by the project an opportunity to participate adequately in the process.

(2) Notifications shall include the following particulars:

1. name or other designation and place of business or registered seat of the participating undertakings;

2. legal form and address of the cartel;

3. name and address of the person appointed to represent the cartel (Section 13) or otherwise authorised by it; in the case of a legal person, name and address of the legal representative of the cartel.

The notification shall not contain or use any incorrect or incomplete information in order surreptitiously to obtain an exemption for the notifying party or for a third party, or to cause the cartel authority not to object in the cases of Sections 2 to 4 (1).

(3) Agreements and decisions of the kind described in Sections 2 to 4 (1) shall be exempt from the prohibition under Section 1 and shall take effect unless the cartel authority objects within a period of three months from receipt of the notification. The cartel authority shall object if the conditions of Sections 2 to 4 (1) are not satisfied or if the comments required under subsection (1) sentence 2 have not been submitted. The notifying undertakings shall prove that the conditions of Sections 2 to 4 (1) are satisfied and that the comments required under subsection (1) sentence 2 have been submitted. The period referred to in sentence 1 shall be one month for notifications of amendments or changes to an agreement or a decision of the kind described in Sections 2 to 4 (1) which do not alter the group of participating undertakings and which do not extend the agreement or the decision to other goods or services.

(4) The cartel authority shall be notified without undue delay by the participating undertakings pursuant to sentence 2 of agreements and decisions of the kind described in Section 4 (2). The notification shall take effect only if the by-laws or the partnership agreement are attached thereto, the information pursuant to subsection (2) nos. 1 and 2 is included, and the notification provides information on the sector of the economy concerned, on proposed institutional committees and on the current internal and external sales of the participating undertakings. Every two years after the notification the participating undertakings shall notify the cartel authority of any changes in the information specified in sentence 2, in the by-laws or the partnership agreement and in the group of participating undertakings.

(5) The termination or cancellation of agreements and decisions referred to in Sections 2 to 4 shall be communicated to the cartel authority.

Section 10 Application for Exemption, Granting of Exemption

(1) Agreements and decisions of the kind described in Sections 5 to 8 may, upon application, be exempted from the prohibition under Section 1 by a decision of the cartel authority. They shall take effect when the decision becomes final. In the cases of Section 8, comments from the domestic producers and purchasers concerned are to be attached to the application unless no such comments can be obtained.

(2) If the conditions for exemption pursuant to Sections 5 to 8 are not satisfied, the cartel authority shall, by way of a decision, reject the application referred to in subsection (1).

(3) Section 9 (2) and (5) shall apply mutatis mutandis to applications pursuant to subsection (1) sentence 1.

(4) Exemptions pursuant to Sections 5 to 8 shall be limited in time. The time period should, as a rule, not exceed five years. Exemptions may be granted subject to conditions and obligations.

(5) Exemptions may, upon application, be extended if the conditions of Sections 5 to 8 continue to be satisfied. An extension shall be granted only for those participating undertakings which have declared their consent thereto in writing to the cartel authority; the declaration shall be made independently by each undertaking and may be made only three months prior to the expiry of the exemption. Subsection (2) shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 11 Information on Cartels, Publication

(1) In respect of cartels exempted under Sections 2 to 8, the cartel authority shall, upon request, provide information on the following:

1. particulars pursuant to Section 9 (2);

2. the main content of the agreements and decisions, in particular details regarding the goods or services concerned, purpose, measures envisaged, duration, termination, rescission, and withdrawal;

3. the time limits, conditions and obligations imposed by the cartel authority.

(2) The following shall be published in the Federal Gazette [Bundesanzeiger]:

1. notifications of agreements and decisions of the kind described in Sections 2 to 4;

2. applications for exemptions for agreements and decisions of the kind described in Sections 5 to 8;

3. exemptions for agreements and decisions of the kind described in Sections 2 to 8; insofar as agreements or decisions are exempted in accordance with the notification or the application, reference to the publication of the notifications and applications shall suffice for the publication of the exemption;

4. the termination of cartels.

With regard to the content of the publication pursuant to nos. 1 and 2, subsection (1) no. 2 and Section 9 (2) no. 2 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 12 Abuse Control, Revocation of Exemption

(1) If agreements or decisions of the kind described in Sections 2 to 4 or the manner of their implementation constitute an abuse of the market position obtained as a result of the exemption from the prohibition under Section 1, the cartel authority may

1. direct the participating undertakings to discontinue the abuse objected to,

2. direct the participating undertakings to modify the agreements or decisions, or

3. prohibit the agreements and decisions.

(2) An exemption pursuant to Section 10 may be revoked, or modified by imposing conditions, or supplemented by obligations, insofar as

1. the circumstances of relevance to the exemption have substantially changed, or

2. the parties contravene an obligation attached to the exemption, or

3. the exemption is based on incorrect information or was obtained by means of deceit, or

4. the parties abuse the exemption from Section 1.

In the cases of nos. 2 to 4, the exemption may also be revoked with retroactive effect.

Section 13 Cartel Representative

(1) Cartels as well as trade and industry associations or professional organisations without legal capacity should, in their by-laws, appoint a person authorised to represent them before the cartel authority in all matters covered by this Act, as well as in appeal proceedings (Sections 63 to 73) and in proceedings involving appeals on points of law (Sections 74 to 76). The name and the address of the representative should be communicated to the cartel authority.

(2) Should there be no representative pursuant to subsection (1), a representative shall be appointed, upon application by the cartel authority, by the local court in whose district the cartel authority has its seat. The cartel authority shall make the application ex officio or upon application of a third party having a legitimate interest in the appointment of a representative. The local court shall revoke the appointment when the omission has been remedied.

Chapter II Vertical Agreements

Section 14 Prohibition of Agreements Concerning Prices or Terms of Business

Agreements between undertakings which concern goods or commercial services and which relate to markets within the area of application of this Act, shall be prohibited insofar as they restrict a party in its freedom to determine prices or terms of business in agreements which it concludes with third parties on the goods supplied, on other goods, or on commercial services.

Section 15 Resale Price Maintenance for Published Products

(1) Section 14 shall not apply insofar as an undertaking binds the purchasers of its published products by legal or economic means to stipulate certain resale prices or to impose the same commitment upon their own customers, down to the resale to the ultimate consumer.

(2) Agreements of the kind described in subsection (1) shall be made in writing insofar as they concern prices and price elements. It shall suffice for the parties to sign documents referring to a price list or price notification. Section 126 (2) of the Civil Code [Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch] shall be inapplicable.

(3) The Federal Cartel Office may, either ex officio or upon application by a purchaser so bound, declare the resale price maintenance to be of no effect and prohibit the implementation of a new and similar price maintenance scheme if

1. the resale price maintenance scheme is operated in an abusive manner, or

2. the resale price maintenance scheme or its combination with other restraints of competition is likely to increase the price of the bound goods, or to prevent their prices from decreasing, or to restrict their production or sale.

Section 16 Abuse Control of Exclusive Dealing Agreements

The cartel authority may declare agreements between undertakings in respect of goods or commercial services to be of no effect, and prohibit the implementation of new and similar commitments insofar as they impose upon one of the parties

1. restrictions on the freedom to use the goods supplied, other goods or commercial services, or

2. restrictions on the purchase of other goods or commercial services from, or their sale to, third parties, or

3. restrictions on the sale of the supplied goods to third parties, or

4. an obligation to purchase goods or commercial services which, by their nature or in commercial practice, are unrelated,

insofar as, due to the extent of such restrictions, competition in the market for these or other goods or commercial services is substantially impaired.

Section 17 Licence Agreements

(1) Agreements regarding the sale or licensing of patents or utility models granted or applied for, of topographies or protected seed varieties shall be prohibited insofar as they impose restrictions on the acquirer or licensee in its business activities which go beyond the scope of the protected right. Restrictions pertaining to the nature, extent, technical area of application, quantity, territory or time of exercise of the protected right shall not be deemed to go beyond the scope of the protected right.

(2) Subsection (1) shall not apply to commitments restricting the acquirer or licensee

1. insofar and as long as they are justified by the seller’s or licensor’s interest in a technically satisfactory exploitation of the subject matter of the protected right,

2. which impose an obligation to exchange experience or to grant non-exclusive licences in respect of inventions relating to improvements or new applications, provided such obligations correspond to similar obligations on the part of the seller or licensor,

3. not to challenge the licensed protected right,

4. to make minimum use of the licensed protected right or to pay a minimum fee,

5. to label the licensed products in a manner which does not exclude the reference to the manufacturer,

insofar as such restrictions do not exceed the term of the acquired or licensed protected right.

(3) Agreements of the kind described in subsection (1) may, upon application, be exempted from the prohibition under subsection (1) if the commercial freedom of the acquirer or licensee or other undertakings is not unfairly restricted and if competition on the market is not substantially impaired because of the extent of the restrictions. They shall be exempt from the prohibition under subsection (1) and take effect unless the cartel authority objects within a period of three months from receipt of the application. Section 10 (4) and Section 12 (2) shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(4) Sections 1 to 12 shall remain unaffected.

Section 18 Agreements on Other Protected and Unprotected Achievements and on Seeds

Section 17 shall be applied mutatis mutandis

1. to agreements on the sale or licensing of legally unprotected inventions, manufacturing methods, designs, other achievements furthering technology, achievements furthering plant cultivation in the field of plant breeding, insofar as they represent essential business secrets and are identified,

2. to mixed agreements on protected achievements within the meaning of Section 17 and unprotected achievements within the meaning of no. 1,

3. to agreements on the sale or licensing of other property rights such as trademarks, registered designs, copyrights (e.g. to software), insofar as these agreements relate to agreements on protected achievements within the meaning of Section 17, on unprotected achievements within the meaning of no. 1 or to mixed agreements within the meaning of no. 2, and contribute to the achievement of the primary purpose of the sale or licensing of industrial property rights or unprotected achievements, and to

4. agreements regarding seeds of a variety approved under the Seed Trade Act between a plant breeder and a seed multiplier or an undertaking at the seed multiplication level.

Chapter III Market Dominance, Restrictive Practices

Section 19 Abuse of a Dominant Position

(1) The abusive exploitation of a dominant position by one or several undertakings shall be prohibited.

(2) An undertaking is dominant where, as a supplier or purchaser of certain kinds of goods or commercial services, it

1. has no competitors or is not exposed to any substantial competition, or

2. has a paramount market position in relation to its competitors; for this purpose, account shall be taken in particular of its market share, its financial power, its access to supplies or markets, its links with other undertakings, legal or factual barriers to market entry by other undertakings, actual or potential competition by undertakings established within or outside the area of application of this Act, its ability to shift its supply or demand to other goods or commercial services, as well as the ability of the opposite market side to resort to other undertakings.

Two or more undertakings are dominant insofar as no substantial competition exists between them with respect to certain kinds of goods or commercial services and they jointly satisfy the conditions of sentence 1.

(3) An undertaking is presumed to be dominant if it has a market share of at least one third. A number of undertakings is presumed to be dominant if it

1. consists of three or fewer undertakings reaching a combined market share of 50 percent, or

2. consists of five or fewer undertakings reaching a combined market share of two thirds,

unless the undertakings demonstrate that the conditions of competition may be expected to maintain substantial competition between them, or that the number of undertakings has no paramount market position in relation to the remaining competitors.

(4) An abuse exists in particular if a dominant undertaking, as a supplier or purchaser of certain kinds of goods or commercial services,

1. impairs the ability to compete of other undertakings in a manner affecting competition in the market and without any objective justification;

2. demands payment or other business terms which differ from those which would very likely arise if effective competition existed; in this context, particularly the conduct of undertakings in comparable markets where effective competition prevails shall be taken into account;

3. demands less favourable payment or other business terms than the dominant undertaking itself demands from similar purchasers in comparable markets, unless there is an objective justification for such differentiation;

4. refuses to allow another undertaking access to its own networks or other infrastructure facilities, against adequate remuneration, provided that without such concurrent use the other undertaking is unable for legal or factual reasons to operate as a competitor of the dominant undertaking on the upstream or downstream market; this shall not apply if the dominant undertaking demonstrates that for operational or other reasons such concurrent use is impossible or cannot reasonably be expected.

Section 20 Prohibition of Discrimination; Prohibition of Unfair Hindrance

(1) Dominant undertakings, associations of undertakings within the meaning of Sections 2 to 8, 28 (1) as well as Section 29, and undertakings which set retail prices pursuant to Sections 15, 28 (2), 29 (2) and Section 30 (1), shall not directly or indirectly hinder in an unfair manner another undertaking in business activities which are usually open to similar undertakings, nor directly or indirectly treat it differently from similar undertakings without any objective justification.

(2) Subsection (1) shall apply also to undertakings and associations of undertakings insofar as small or medium-sized enterprises as suppliers or purchasers of certain kinds of goods or commercial services depend on them in such a way that sufficient or reasonable possibilities of resorting to other undertakings do not exist. A supplier of a certain kind of goods or commercial services shall be presumed to depend on a purchaser within the meaning of sentence 1 if this purchaser regularly obtains from this supplier, in addition to discounts customary in the trade or other remuneration, special benefits which are not granted to similar purchasers.

(3) Dominant undertakings and associations of undertakings within the meaning of subsection (1) shall not use their market position to cause other undertakings in business activities to grant them preferential terms without any objective justification. Sentence 1 shall apply also to undertakings and associations of undertakings within the meaning of subsection (2) sentence 1, in relation to the undertakings which depend on them.

(4) Undertakings with superior market power in relation to small and medium-sized competitors shall not use their market power directly or indirectly to hinder such competitors in an unfair manner. An unfair hindrance within the meaning of sentence 1 exists in particular if an undertaking offers goods or services not merely occasionally below its cost price, unless there is an objective justification for this.

(5) If on the basis of specific facts and in the light of general experience it appears that an undertaking has used its market power within the meaning of subsection (4), it shall be incumbent upon this undertaking to disprove the appearance and to clarify such circumstances in its field of business on which legal action may be based, which cannot be clarified by the competitor concerned or by an association referred to in Section 33, but which can be easily clarified, and may reasonably be expected to be clarified, by the undertaking against which action is taken.

(6)Trade and industry associations or professional organisations as well as quality-mark associations shall not refuse to admit an undertaking if such refusal constitutes an objectively unjustified unequal treatment and would place the undertaking at an unfair competitive disadvantage.

Section 21 Prohibition of Boycott and Other Restrictive Practices

(1) Undertakings and associations of undertakings shall not request another undertaking or other associations of undertakings to refuse to sell or purchase, with the intention of unfairly harming certain undertakings.

(2) Undertakings and associations of undertakings shall not threaten or cause harm, or promise or grant advantages, to other undertakings to induce them to engage in conduct which, under this Act or according to a decision issued by the cartel authority pursuant to this Act, shall not be made the subject matter of a contractual commitment.

(3) Undertakings and associations of undertakings shall not compel other undertakings

1. to accede to an agreement or decision within the meaning of Sections 2 to 8, 28 (1) or Section 29, or

2. to merge with other undertakings within the meaning of Section 37, or

3. to act uniformly in the market with the intention of restraining competition.

(4) It shall be prohibited to cause economic harm to another because he has applied for or suggested action to be taken by the cartel authority.

Section 22 Prohibition of Recommendations

(1) Recommendations which have as their object or effect a circumvention, by way of uniform conduct, of the prohibitions imposed by this Act or of decisions taken by the cartel authority pursuant to this Act, shall be prohibited. The same shall apply to any recommendations by an undertaking to the purchasers of its goods to demand or offer certain prices when reselling to third parties, to use certain methods to determine prices or to observe certain maximum or minimum prices.

(2) The prohibition in subsection (1) shall not apply to recommendations which are issued by associations of small or medium-sized enterprises exclusively to its members, provided such recommendations

1. serve to improve the parties’ competitiveness in relation to large enterprises or other forms of large-scale business, and

2. are expressly declared to be non-binding on the addressee of the recommendation, and no economic, social or other pressure is applied to enforce them.

(3) The prohibition under subsection (1) sentence 1 shall not apply to

1. recommendations whose subject matter merely is the uniform application of standards and types, if the conditions of subsection (2) no. 2 are satisfied; if the recommendations are made by a rationalisation organisation, they need not be expressly declared to be non-binding.

2. recommendations of trade and industry associations and professional organisations whose subject matter merely is the uniform application of general terms of business, delivery and payment, including cash discounts.

(4) Recommendations pursuant to subsection (3) no. 1 shall be exempt from the prohibition under subsection (1) only if they have been notified to the cartel authority by the recommending party, and if the comments of a rationalisation organisation were attached to the notification. Sentence 1 shall not apply to recommendations of a rationalisation organisation. Sentence 1 shall apply mutatis mutandis to recommendations pursuant to subsection (3) no. 2, subject to the proviso that the comments of the trade and industry associations and professional organisations concerned be attached to the notification.

(5) Notifications of recommendations of the kind described in subsection (3) shall be published in the Federal Gazette. Section 11 (1) no. 2 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the content of the publication. Furthermore, the publication shall state by whom the recommendations were notified and to whom they were addressed.

(6) The cartel authority may declare recommendations of the kind described in subsections (2) and (3) to be impermissible, and prohibit new and similar recommendations, insofar as it determines that the conditions in subsection (2) or (3) are not or no longer satisfied, or that the recommendations constitute an abuse of the exemption from the prohibition under subsection (1).

Section 23 Non-Binding Price Recommendations for Branded Goods

(1) Section 22 (1) shall not apply to non-binding price recommendations by an undertaking for the resale of its branded goods which are in price competition with similar goods of other manufacturers, provided the recommendations

1. are expressly designated as non-binding, only indicate a specific price, and no economic, social or other pressure is applied to enforce them, and

2. are issued with the expectation that the recommended price will correspond to the price likely to be charged by the majority of the addressees of the recommendation.

(2) Branded goods within the meaning of subsection (1) are products whose supply in consistent or improved quality is guaranteed by the price-recommending undertaking, and

1. which themselves or

2. whose packaging or presentation, as intended for delivery to the consumers, or

3. whose containers from which they are sold

feature a mark indicating their origin (firm’s symbol, word or pictorial symbol). Sentence 1 shall apply to agricultural products, provided that insignificant fluctuations in quality shall be disregarded if they are due to the nature of the product and cannot be remedied by the producer through measures that he may reasonably be expected to take.

(3) The Federal Cartel Office may declare recommendations of the kind described in subsection (1) to be impermissible, and prohibit new and similar recommendations, if it determines that the recommendations constitute an abuse of the exemption from Section 22 (1). An abuse exists in particular if

1. the recommendation or its combination with other restraints of competition is likely to increase the price of the goods or to prevent their prices from decreasing, or to restrict their production or sale, or

2. the recommendation is likely to deceive consumers as to the price demanded by the majority of the addressees of the recommendation, or

3. the recommended price significantly exceeds, in the majority of cases, the prices actually demanded in the entire area of application of this Act or in a substantial part thereof, or

4. certain undertakings or certain groups of purchasers are excluded from the distribution of the goods by distribution arrangements or other measures taken by the recommending undertaking without any objective justification.

Chapter IV Competition Rules

Section 24 Definition; Application for Recognition

(1) Trade and industry associations and professional organisations may establish competition rules within their sphere of business.

(2) Competition rules are provisions which regulate the conduct of undertakings in competition for the purpose of counteracting conduct which violates the principles of fair competition or effective competition based on performance, and of encouraging conduct in competition which is in line with these principles.

(3) Trade and industry associations and professional organisations may apply to the cartel authority for recognition of competition rules.

(4) Applications for recognition of competition rules shall contain:

1. the name, legal form and address of the trade and industry association or professional organisation;

2. the name and address of the person representing it;

3. a description of the subject matter and the territorial scope of the competition rules;

4. the text of the competition rules.

The following must be attached to the application:

1. the by-laws of the trade and industry association or professional organisation;

2. proof that the competition rules were established in conformity with the by-laws;

3. a list of unrelated trade and industry associations or professional organisations and undertakings at the same level of the economy as well as the suppliers’ and purchasers’ associations and the federal organisations for the relevant levels of the sector of the economy concerned.

The application may not contain or use incorrect or incomplete information in order surreptitiously to obtain recognition of a competition rule for the applicant or for a third party.

(5) Changes and amendments to recognised competition rules shall be communicated to the cartel authority.

Section 25 Comments by Third Parties

The cartel authority shall give an opportunity to comment to third-party undertakings at the same level of the economy, to trade and industry associations and professional organisations of the suppliers and purchasers affected by the competition rules, as well as to the federal organisations of the levels of the economy involved. The cartel authority may hold a public hearing on the application for recognition where everyone shall be free to raise objections against the recognition.

Section 26 Recognition

(1) Recognitions are issued by way of a decision of the cartel authority.

(2) Exercising duty-bound discretion, the cartel authority may exempt competition rules falling under Section 1 or Section 22 (1) from these prohibitions by decision pursuant to subsection (1). Insofar as such a rule violates other provisions of this Act or of the Act Against Unfair Competition, or other legal provisions, the cartel authority shall reject the application for recognition.

(3) Trade and industry associations and professional organisations shall notify the cartel authority of the cancellation of recognised competition rules which had been established by them.

(4) The cartel authority shall withdraw or revoke the recognition if it subsequently finds that the conditions for refusal of recognition pursuant to subsection (2) are satisfied.

Section 27 Information on Competition Rules; Publications

(1) The cartel authority shall, upon request, provide information on recognised competition rules by disclosing the particulars provided pursuant to Section 24 (4) sentence 1.

(2) The following shall be published in the Federal Gazette:

1. applications pursuant to Section 24 (3);

2. the setting of dates for hearings pursuant to Section 25 sentence 2;

3. the recognition of competition rules as well as any changes and amendments thereto;

4. the withdrawal or revocation of competition rules pursuant to Section 26 (4).

(3) The publication of applications pursuant to subsection (2) no. 1 shall include a note to the effect that the competition rules whose recognition has been applied for are open for public inspection at the cartel authority.

(4) Insofar as applications pursuant to subsection (2) no. 1 result in recognition, reference to the publication of the applications shall suffice for the purpose of publishing the recognition .

Chapter V Special Provisions for Certain Sectors of the Economy

Section 28 Agriculture

(1) Section 1 shall not apply to agreements between agricultural producers or to agreements and decisions of associations of agricultural producers and federations of such associations of agricultural producers which concern

1. the production or sale of agricultural products, or

2. the use of joint facilities for the storage, treatment or processing of agricultural products,

provided they do not fix prices and do not exclude competition. Agreements and decisions of federations of associations of producers shall be notified by them without undue delay to the cartel authority. Plant breeding and animal breeding undertakings as well as undertakings operating at this level of business shall also be deemed to be agricultural producers.

(2) Section 14 shall not apply to agreements concerning the sorting, labelling or packaging of agricultural products.

(3) Agricultural products shall be the products listed in Annex II to the Treaty Establishing the European Community as well as the goods arising from the treatment or processing of such products, insofar as they are commonly treated or processed by agricultural producers or their associations.

(4) Section 12 (1) shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 29 Credit and Insurance Industry

(1) Agreements, decisions and recommendations of associations of credit institutions or insurance undertakings may be exempted from the prohibition under Sections 14 and 22 (1) sentence 1. Section 7 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(2) Section 14 shall not apply to agreements between credit institutions or insurance undertakings concerning individual cases. Sections 1 and 14 shall not apply to the joint assumption of individual risks agreed in an individual case in the joint insurance business or in the syndicate business of credit institutions.

(3) Sections 9, 11, 12 (1) and Section 22 (6) shall apply mutatis mutandis to the cases referred to in subsection (1). The cartel authority should give an opportunity to comment to the business circles affected by the restraint of competition. Section 12 (1) shall apply mutatis mutandis to the cases referred to in subsection (2).

(4) Section 9 and Section 12 (1) shall apply instead of Section 10 and Section 12 (2) to agreements and decisions of the kind described in Sections 5 to 7 between credit institutions, insurance undertakings or associations of such undertakings with respect to the notification, the objection procedure and abuse control.

(5) Subsections (1) to (4) shall apply only to agreements, decisions and recommendations related to facts which are subject to approval or supervision by the Federal Banking Supervisory Office, the Federal Insurance Supervisory Office or the insurance supervisory offices of the Länder. They shall apply also to the undertakings referred to in Section 1 (2) sentence 1 of the Insurance Supervisory Act. The cartel authority shall forward one copy of the application to the competent supervisory authority. It shall take decisions pursuant to this provision in consultation with the competent supervisory authority.

Section 30 Copyright Collecting Societies

(1) Sections 1 and 14 shall not apply to the establishment of copyright collecting societies which are subject to supervision pursuant to the Act on the Administration of Copyrights and Related Rights, or to agreements and decisions by such copyright collecting societies, to the extent they are necessary for the effective administration of the rights within the meaning of Section 1 of the Act on the Administration of Copyrights and Related Rights, and have been notified to the supervisory authority. The supervisory authority shall forward the notifications to the Federal Cartel Office.

(2) If the content of an agreement pursuant to Section 16 (4) of the Act on the Administration of Copyrights and Related Rights has been determined by the Court of Appeal, the Federal Cartel Office shall have powers under this Act only insofar as the agreement is operated abusively.

Section 31 Sports

Section 1 shall not apply to the central marketing of rights to television broadcasting of sports competitions organised according to by-laws, by sports associations which, in the performance of their socio-political responsibilities, are committed also to promoting youth and amateur sports activities, and which fulfil this commitment by allocating an adequate share of the income from the central marketing of these television rights.

Chapter VI Sanctions

Section 32 Prohibition

The cartel authority may prohibit conduct by undertakings and associations of undertakings which is in contravention of this Act.

Section 33 Liability for Damages; Claims for Injunctions

Whoever violates a provision of this Act or a decision taken by the cartel authority shall, if such provision or decision serves to protect another, be obliged vis-à-vis the other to refrain from such conduct; if the violating party acted wilfully or negligently, it shall also be liable for the damages arising from the violation. The claim for injunction may also be asserted by associations for the promotion of trade interests provided the association has legal capacity.

Section 34 Skimming-off Additional Proceeds

(1) If an undertaking wilfully or negligently, as a result of conduct prohibited by a cartel authority decision pursuant to Section 32, obtains additional proceeds after being served with the decision, the cartel authority may, after the decision or a determination pursuant to Section 71 (3) has become final, order the undertaking to pay to the cartel authority an amount equivalent to such additional proceeds (skimming-off additional proceeds). Sentence 1 shall not apply insofar as such additional proceeds have been balanced by payments of damages pursuant to Section 33 or by a fine. An order to skim-off additional proceeds may be issued only within a period of three years from the date on which the decision or the determination pursuant to Section 71 (3) has become final.

(2) If skimming-off additional proceeds would result in undue hardship, the order shall be limited to a reasonable amount of money, or not be issued at all. It shall also not be issued if the additional proceeds are insignificant.

(3) The amount of the additional proceeds may be estimated. The amount of money to be paid shall be stated as a specific figure.

(4) If an undertaking which has been ordered to pay additional proceeds submits to the cartel authority a final and binding ruling obliging it to pay damages for the same abusive conduct, the cartel authority shall order that to that extent the order to pay the additional proceeds shall not be enforced. If the additional proceeds have already been paid to the cartel authority and if the undertaking proves payment of damages to the injured party on the basis of the final and binding ruling, the cartel authority shall refund to the undertaking the additional proceeds in the amount of such proven payment of damages.

Chapter VII Control of Concentrations

Section 35 Scope of Application

(1) The provisions on the control of concentrations shall apply if, in the last business year preceding the concentration,

1. the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all participating undertakings was more than DM 1,000 million, and

2. the domestic turnover of at least one participating undertaking was more than DM 50 million.

(2) Subsection (1) shall not apply:

1. insofar as an undertaking which is not controlled within the meaning of Section 36 (2) and had a worldwide turnover of less than DM 20 million in the last business year, merges with another undertaking, or

2. insofar as a market is concerned in which goods or commercial services have been offered for at least five years, and which had a sales volume of less than DM 30 million in the last calendar year.

Insofar as the concentration restricts competition in the field of publishing, producing or distributing newspapers or magazines or parts thereof, only sentence 1 no. 2 shall apply.

(3) The provisions of this Act shall not apply insofar as the Commission of the European Communities has exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to Council Regulation (EEC) no. 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, as amended.

Section 36 Principles for the Appraisal of Concentrations

(1) A concentration which is expected to create or strengthen a dominant position shall be prohibited by the Federal Cartel Office unless the participating undertakings prove that the concentration will also lead to improvements of the conditions of competition, and that these improvements will outweigh the disadvantages of dominance.

(2) If a participating undertaking is a controlled or controlling undertaking within the meaning of Section 17 of the Joint Stock Corporation Act [Aktiengesetz] or a group company within the meaning of Section 18 of the Joint Stock Corporation Act, then the undertakings so affiliated shall be regarded as a single undertaking. If several undertakings act together in such a way that they can jointly exercise a controlling influence on another undertaking, each of them shall be regarded as controlling.

(3) If a person or association of persons which is not an undertaking holds a majority interest in an undertaking, it shall be regarded as an undertaking.

Section 37 Concentration

(1) A concentration shall arise in the following cases:

1. acquisition of all or of a substantial part of the assets of another undertaking;

2. acquisition of direct or indirect control by one or several undertakings of the whole or parts of one or more other undertakings. Control shall be constituted by rights, contracts or any other means which, either separately or in combination and having regard to the considerations of fact or law involved, confer the possibility of exercising decisive influence on an undertaking, in particular through

a) ownership or the rights to use all or part of the assets of the undertaking,

b) rights or contracts which confer decisive influence on the composition, voting or decisions of the organs of the undertaking;

3. acquisition of shares in another undertaking if the shares, either separately or together with other shares already held by the undertaking, reach

a) 50 percent or

b) 25 percent

of the capital or the voting rights of the other undertaking. The shares held by the undertaking shall include also the shares held by another for the account of this undertaking and, if the owner of the undertaking is a sole proprietor, also any other shares held by him. If several undertakings simultaneously or successively acquire shares in another undertaking within the parameters mentioned above, this shall be deemed to also constitute a concentration among the acquiring undertakings with respect to those markets on which the other undertaking operates;

4. any other combination of undertakings enabling one or several undertakings to directly or indirectly exercise a competitively significant influence on another undertaking.

(2) A concentration shall also arise if the participating undertakings had already merged previously, unless the concentration does not result in a substantial strengthening of the existing affiliation between the undertakings.

(3) If credit institutions, financial institutions or insurance undertakings acquire shares in another undertaking for the purpose of resale, this shall not be deemed to constitute a concentration as long as they do not exercise the voting rights attaching to the shares and provided the resale occurs within one year. This time limit may, upon application, be extended by the Federal Cartel Office if it is substantiated that the resale was not reasonably possible within this period.

Section 38 Calculation of Turnover and Market Shares

(1) Section 277 (1) of the Commercial Code shall apply to the calculation of turnover. Revenues from the supply of goods and services between affiliated undertakings (intra-group revenues) as well as excise taxes shall not be taken into account.

(2) For trade in goods, only three quarters of the turnover shall be taken into account.

(3) For the publication, production and distribution of newspapers, magazines and parts thereof, the production, distribution and broadcasting of radio and television programmes, and the sale of radio and television advertising time, twenty times the amount of the turnover shall be taken into account.

(4) The turnover shall be replaced, in the case of credit institutions, financial institutions and building and loan associations, by the total amount of the proceeds referred to in Section 34 (2) sentence 1 no. 1 a-e of the Ordinance on the Rendering of Accounts of Credit Institutions [Verordnung über die Rechnungslegung der Kreditinstitute] of 10 February 1992 (Federal Law Gazette [Bundesgesetzblatt] I p. 203), minus value added tax and other taxes assessed directly on the basis of such proceeds. In the case of insurance undertakings, the premium income in the last completed business year shall be relevant. Premium income shall be income from insurance and reinsurance business including the portions ceded for cover.

(5) In the case of an acquisition of the assets of another undertaking, the calculation of the market shares and the turnover of the seller shall take into account only the assets sold.

Section 39 Obligation to Notify

(1) Concentrations shall be notified to the Federal Cartel Office pursuant to subsections (2) and (3) prior to being put into effect.

(2) The obligation to notify shall be:

1. upon the undertakings participating in the concentration,

2. in the cases of Section 37 (1) nos. 1 and 3, also upon the seller.

(3) The notification shall indicate the form of the concentration. Furthermore, the notification shall contain the following particulars with respect to every participating undertaking:

1. name or other designation and place of business or registered seat;

2. type of business;

3. the turnover in Germany, in the European Union and worldwide; instead of the turnover, the total amount of the proceeds within the meaning of Section 38 (4) shall be indicated in the case of credit institutions, financial institutions and building and loan associations, and the premium income in the case of insurance undertakings;

4. the market shares, including the bases for their calculation or estimate, if the combined shares of all participating undertakings amount to at least 20% in the area of application of this Act or in a substantial part thereof;

5. in the case of an acquisition of shares in another undertaking, the size of the interest acquired and of the total interest held;

6. a person authorised to accept service in Germany, if the registered seat of the undertaking is not located in the area of application of this Act.

If a participating undertaking is an affiliated undertaking, the particulars required under sentence 2 nos. 1 and 2 shall also be given with respect to the affiliated undertakings, and the particulars required under sentence 2 nos. 3 and 4 with respect to each undertaking participating in the concentration and with respect to the entirety of all undertakings affiliated to it; intra-group relationships as well as control relationships among, and interests held by, the affiliated undertakings shall be reported. The notification shall not contain or use any incorrect or incomplete information in order to cause the cartel authority to refrain from issuing a prohibition pursuant to Section 36 (1) or from issuing a notice pursuant to Section 40 (1).

(4) A notification shall not be required if the Commission of the European Communities has referred a concentration to the Federal Cartel Office and if the particulars required under subsection (3) have been provided to the Federal Cartel Office in German. The Federal Cartel Office shall inform the participating undertakings without undue delay of the time of receipt of the decision to refer.

(5) The Federal Cartel Office may request from each participating undertaking information on market shares, including the bases for their calculation or estimate, and on the turnover achieved by the undertaking in the last business year preceding the concentration in a certain kind of goods or commercial services.

(6) The participating undertakings shall notify the Federal Cartel Office without undue delay after having put the concentration into effect.

Section 40 Procedure of Control of Concentrations

(1) The Federal Cartel Office shall not prohibit a concentration notified to it unless it informs the notifying undertakings within a period of one month from receipt of the complete notification that it has initiated an examination of the concentration (main examination proceedings). The main examination proceedings should be initiated if a further examination of the concentration is necessary.

(2) In the main examination proceedings the Federal Cartel Office shall decide by way of a decision whether the concentration is prohibited or cleared. If the decision is not issued within a period of four months from receipt of the complete notification, the concentration is deemed to be cleared. This shall not apply if:

1. the notifying undertakings have consented to an extension of the time limit,

2. the Federal Cartel Office has refrained from issuing the notice pursuant to subsection (1) or from prohibiting the concentration because of incorrect particulars or because of information pursuant to Section 39 (5) or Section 50 not having been provided in time;

3. contrary to Section 39 (3) sentence 2 no. 6, a person authorised to accept service in Germany is no longer named.

(3) The clearance may be granted subject to conditions and obligations. These shall not aim at subjecting the conduct of the participating undertakings to a continued control. Section 12 (2) sentence 1 nos. 2 and 3 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(4) Prior to a prohibition, the supreme Land authorities in whose territory the participating undertakings have their registered seat shall be given an opportunity to comment.

(5) In the cases of Section 39 (4) sentence 1, the time limits referred to in subsections (1) and (2) sentence 2 shall begin to run upon receipt of the referral decision by the Federal Cartel Office.

(6) If the clearance by the Federal Cartel Office is reversed in whole or in part by a final and binding ruling, the time limit referred to in subsection (2) sentence 2 shall begin to run anew at the time at which the ruling becomes final and binding.

Section 41 Prohibition of Putting a Concentration into Effect, Dissolution

(1) The undertakings shall not, before the expiry of the time limit referred to in Section 40 (1) sentence 1 and (2) sentence 2, put into effect a concentration not cleared by the Federal Cartel Office, nor participate in putting into effect such a concentration. Legal transactions violating this prohibition shall be of no effect. This shall not apply to agreements on the transformation, integration or formation of an undertaking and to enterprise agreements within the meaning of Sections 291 and 292 of the Joint Stock Corporation Act, once they have become legally valid by entry into the appropriate register.

(2) The Federal Cartel Office may, upon application, grant derogations from the prohibition of putting a concentration into effect if the participating undertakings put forward important reasons for this, in particular to prevent serious damage to a participating undertaking or to a third party. The derogation may be granted at any time, even prior to notification, and may be made subject to conditions and obligations. Section 12 (2) sentence 1 nos. 2 and 3 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(3) A concentration which has been put into effect and which the Federal Cartel Office has prohibited or the clearance of which it has revoked, shall be dissolved unless the Federal Minister of Economics authorises the concentration pursuant to Section 42. The Federal Cartel Office shall order the measures necessary to dissolve the concentration. The restraint of competition may be removed also in other ways than by restoring the former situation.

(4) To enforce its order, the Federal Cartel Office may in particular

1. impose, once or repeatedly, a penalty payment of DM 10,000 to DM 1,000,000,

2. prohibit or limit the exercise of voting rights attaching to shares in a participating undertaking which are owned by another participating undertaking or are attributable to it,

3. appoint a trustee who shall effect the dissolution of the concentration.

Section 42 Ministerial Authorisation

(1) The Federal Minister of Economics shall, upon application, authorise a concentration prohibited by the Federal Cartel Office if, in a specific case, the restraint of competition is outweighed by advantages to the economy as a whole following from the concentration, or if the concentration is justified by an overriding public interest. In this context the competitiveness of the participating undertakings in markets outside the area of application of this Act shall also be taken into account. Authorisation may be granted only if the scope of the restraint of competition does not jeopardize the market economy system.

(2) Authorisation may be granted subject to conditions and obligations. Section 40 (3) shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(3) The application shall be submitted in writing to the Federal Minister of Economics within a period of one month from service of the prohibition. If the prohibition is appealed, the period shall run from the date when the prohibition becomes final.

(4) The Federal Minister of Economics should decide on the application within four months. Prior to the decision, an opinion of the Monopolies Commission shall be obtained, and the supreme Land authorities in whose territory the participating undertakings have their registered seat shall be given an opportunity to comment.

Section 43 Publications

The following shall be published in the Federal Gazette:

1. the notification that a concentration has been put into effect,

2. the decision issued by the Federal Cartel Office pursuant to Section 40 (2),

3. the application for ministerial authorisation,

4. the ministerial authorisation, its refusal or modification,

5. the withdrawal or revocation of clearance by the Federal Cartel Office or of the ministerial authorisation,

6. the dissolution of a concentration and other orders taken by the Federal Cartel Office pursuant to Section 41 (3) and (4).

With regard to the content of the publication, Section 39 (3) sentence 1 as well as sentence 2 nos. 1 and 2 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Chapter VIII Monopolies Commission

Section 44 Functions

(1) Every two years, the Monopolies Commission shall prepare an opinion assessing the level and the foreseeable development of business concentration in the Federal Republic of Germany, evaluating the application of the provisions concerning the control of concentrations, and commenting on other topical issues of competition policy. The opinion should cover the situation in the last two full calendar years and be completed by June 30 of the following year. The Federal Government may instruct the Monopolies Commission to prepare further opinions. Moreover, the Monopolies Commission may deliver opinions at its discretion.

(2) The Monopolies Commission shall be bound only by the mandate established by this Act, and shall be independent in pursuing its activities. If a minority holds dissenting views when an opinion is drafted, it may express them in the opinion.

(3) The Monopolies Commission shall submit its opinions to the Federal Government. The Federal Government shall without undue delay submit opinions pursuant to subsection (1) sentence 1 to the legislative bodies and present its views and comments within a reasonable period. The opinions shall be published by the Monopolies Commission. In the case of opinions pursuant to subsection (1) sentence 1, this shall be done at the time at which they are submitted by the Federal Government to the legislative body.

Section 45 Members

(1) The Monopolies Commission shall consist of five members who shall have special knowledge and experience in the fields of economics, business administration, social policy, technology or commercial law. The Monopolies Commission shall elect a chairperson from among its members.

(2) The members of the Monopolies Commission shall be appointed for a term of four years by the Federal President on a proposal by the Federal Government. Reappointments shall be permissible. The Federal Government shall hear the members of the Commission before nominating new members. The members are entitled to resign from office by giving notice to the Federal President. If a member leaves office prematurely, a new member shall be appointed for the former member’s term of office.

(3) The members of the Monopolies Commission shall not be members of the government or any legislative body of the Federation or a Land, or of the public service of the Federation, a Land or any other legal person under public law, except as university teachers or staff members of a scientific institution. Furthermore, they shall neither represent nor be bound by a permanent employment or service relationship to an industry association or an employers’ or employees’ organisation. Furthermore, they shall not have held such a position during the year preceding their appointment to the Monopolies Commission.

Section 46 Decisions, Organisation, Rights and Duties of the Members

(1) Decisions of the Monopolies Commission shall require the agreement of at least three members.

(2) The Monopolies Commission has rules of procedure and a secretariat. The function of the latter is to scientifically, administratively and technically support the Monopolies Commission.

(3) The members of the Monopolies Commission and the staff of the secretariat shall be obliged to keep secret the deliberations and the documents designated as confidential by the Monopolies Commission. The secrecy obligations shall relate also to information given to the Monopolies Commission and designated as confidential.

(4) The members of the Monopolies Commission shall receive a lump-sum compensation and they shall be reimbursed for their travelling expenses. These shall be determined by the Federal Ministry of Economics in agreement with the Federal Ministry of the Interior. The costs of the Monopolies Commission shall be borne by the Federation.

Section 47 Transmission of Statistical Data

(1) For the purpose of preparing opinions on the development of business concentration, the Monopolies Commission may be provided by the Federal Statistical Office and the Land statistical offices with such summarised data from the business statistics kept by them (statistics on the manufacturing industry, crafts, foreign trade, taxes, transport, statistics on wholesale and retail trade and on the hotel and restaurant business) as concern the percentage shares of the largest undertakings, businesses or divisions of undertakings in the respective sector of economy in the

a) value of goods produced for sale,

b) turnover,

c) number of employees,

d) total wages and salaries paid,

e) investments,

f) value of fixed assets rented or leased,

g) value added or gross proceeds,

h) number of the respective units.

The summarised data shall not concern fewer than three undertakings, businesses or divisions of undertakings. The combination or time proximity with other information provided or generally accessible shall not allow conclusions concerning summarised information with regard to less than three undertakings, businesses or divisions of undertakings. This shall apply mutatis mutandis to the calculation of summarised measures of concentration, in particular Herfindahl indexes and Gini coefficients. The Land statistical offices shall provide the Federal Statistical Office with the requisite particular data.

(2) Persons who are to receive summarised data pursuant to subsection (1) shall, prior to the transmission, be specifically committed to secrecy unless they hold a public office or have special obligations in the public service. Section 1 (2), (3) and (4) no. 2 of the Act on the Obligations of Public Servants [Verpflichtungsgesetz] shall apply mutatis mutandis. Persons specially committed pursuant to sentence 1 shall, for the purpose of the application of the provisions of the Penal Code concerning the violation of personal secrets (Section 203 (2), (4), (5); Sections 204, 205) and official secrets (Section 353b (1)), be treated like persons having special obligations in the public service.

(3) The summarised data may be used only for the purposes for which they were provided. They shall be deleted as soon as the purpose referred to in subsection (1) has been achieved.

(4) The Monopolies Commission shall take organisational and technical measures to ensure that only holders of a public office, persons having special obligations in the public service or persons committed pursuant to subsection (2) sentence 1 will receive summarised data.

(5) The transmissions shall be recorded in accordance with Section 16 (9) of the Federal Statistics Act. The records shall be kept for at least five years.

(6) When the business statistics mentioned in subsection (1) are compiled, the undertakings which are questioned shall be informed in writing that pursuant to subsection (1) the summarised data may be transmitted to the Monopolies Commission.

Part II Cartel Authorities

Chapter I General Provisions

Section 48 Competence

(1) The cartel authorities are the Federal Cartel Office, the Federal Ministry of Economics, and the supreme Land authorities competent according to the laws of the respective Land.

(2) Unless a provision of this Act assigns competence for a particular matter to a particular cartel authority, the Federal Cartel Office shall exercise the functions and powers assigned to the cartel authority by this Act if the effect of the influence on the market or of the restrictive or discriminatory conduct or of a competition rule extends beyond the territory of a Land. In all other cases, the supreme Land authority competent according to the laws of the Land shall exercise these functions and powers.

Section 49 Federal Cartel Office and Supreme Land Authority

(1) If the Federal Cartel Office institutes proceedings or conducts investigations, it shall at the same time inform the supreme Land authority in whose district the undertakings concerned have their registered seat. If a supreme Land authority institutes proceedings or conducts investigations, it shall at the same time inform the Federal Cartel Office.

(2) The supreme Land authority shall refer a matter to the Federal Cartel Office if the Federal Cartel Office is competent pursuant to Section 48 (2) sentence 1. The Federal Cartel Office shall refer a matter to the supreme Land authority if that authority is competent pursuant to Section 48 (2) sentence 2.

Section 50 Implementation of European Law – Activities of the Federal Cartel Office

(1) The functions assigned to the authorities of the member states by Articles 88 and 89 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community and by Regulations pursuant to Article 87 of this Treaty, also in conjunction with other provisions of the Treaty granting power to issue Regulations or Directives, shall be exercised by the Federal Cartel Office.

(2) To perform these functions, the Federal Cartel Office shall have the powers assigned to it for the application of this Act. It may prohibit illegal agreements, decisions and concerted practices as well as the prohibited abuse of a dominant position, and may grant exemptions. Furthermore, it may conduct the requisite investigations, also when taking part in proceedings conducted by the Commission of the European Communities. The procedural provisions of this Act shall apply. No fees to cover the administrative costs shall be charged.

(3) The Federal Cartel Office shall inform the Commission of the European Communities of any proceedings pursuant to subsections (1) and (2), and give it an opportunity to comment.

Chapter II Federal Cartel Office

Section 51 Seat, Organisation

(1) The Federal Cartel Office is an independent higher federal authority with its seat in Bonn. It is responsible to the Federal Ministry of Economics.

(2) Decisions of the Federal Cartel Office shall be made by decision divisions established in accordance with instructions to be issued by the Federal Ministry of Economics. As for other matters, the President shall determine the allocation and handling of duties in the Federal Cartel Office by rules of procedure requiring confirmation by the Federal Ministry of Economics.

(3) The decisions of the decision divisions shall be made by a chairperson and two other members.

(4) The chairperson and the other members of the decision divisions shall be civil servants appointed for life and shall be qualified to serve as judges or senior civil servants.

(5) The members of the Federal Cartel Office shall not own or manage any undertakings, nor may they be members of the management board or supervisory board of an undertaking, a cartel, or a trade and industry association or professional organisation.

Section 52 Publication of General Instructions Issued by the Federal Ministry of Economics

Any general instructions given by the Federal Ministry of Economics to the Federal Cartel Office with regard to the issuance or non-issuance of decisions pursuant to this Act shall be published in the Federal Gazette.

Section 53 Report on Activities

(1) Every two years the Federal Cartel Office shall publish a report on its activities and on the situation and development in its field of responsibilities. The report shall include the general instructions given by the Federal Ministry of Economics pursuant to Section 52. The Federal Cartel Office shall also regularly publish its administrative principles.

(2) The Federal Government shall without undue delay submit the report of the Federal Cartel Office to the Bundestag together with its comments.

Part III Procedure

Chapter I Administrative Matters

I. Proceedings Before Cartel Authorities

Section 54 Institution of the Proceedings; Parties

(1) The cartel authority shall institute proceedings ex officio or upon application. If so requested, the cartel authority may institute proceedings ex officio for the protection of a complainant.

(2) Parties to the proceedings before the cartel authority are:

1. those who have applied for the institution of proceedings;

2. cartels, undertakings, trade and industry associations or professional organisations against which the proceedings are directed;

3. persons and associations of persons whose interests will be substantially affected by the decision and who, upon their application, have been admitted by the cartel authority to the proceedings;

4. in the cases of Section 37 (1) no. 1 or 3, also the seller.

(3) The Federal Cartel Office shall also be a party to proceedings before the supreme Land authorities.

Section 55 Preliminary Decision on Jurisdiction

(1) If a party pleads that the cartel authority lacks territorial or subject matter jurisdiction, the cartel authority may issue a preliminary decision on the question of jurisdiction. Such decision may be challenged independently by way of appeal; the appeal shall have supensive effect.

(2) If a party fails to plead that the cartel authority lacks territorial or subject matter jurisdiction, an appeal cannot be based upon the contention that the cartel authority erroneously assumed it had jurisdiction.

Section 56 Opportunity to Comment; Hearing

(1) The cartel authority shall give the parties an opportunity to comment and, upon the application of a party, shall summon them to a hearing.

(2) In appropriate cases, the cartel authority may give representatives of the business circles affected by the proceedings an opportunity to comment.

(3) In the cases of Section 19, the cartel authority shall decide on the basis of a public hearing; with the consent of the parties, a decision may be taken without hearing. Upon application of a party, or acting ex officio, the cartel authority shall exclude the public from the hearing or from a part thereof if it is to be feared that public order, in particular state security or important business or operating secrets may be endangered. In the cases of Section 42, sentences 1 and 2 shall apply mutatis mutandis to proceedings before the Federal Ministry of Economics.

Section 57 Investigations; Taking of Evidence

(1) The cartel authority may conduct any investigations and collect any evidence required.

(2) Sections 372 (1), Sections 376, 377, 378, 380 to 387, 390, 395 to 397, 398 (1), Sections 401, 402, 404, 404a, 406 to 409, 411 to 414 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply mutatis mutandis to the taking of evidence by inspection, testimony of witnesses, and experts; detention shall not be ordered. The Court of Appeal [Oberlandesgericht] shall decide on appeals.

(3) The testimony of witnesses should be recorded, and the record signed by the investigating member of the cartel authority; if a recording clerk attends, he shall also sign. The records should indicate the place and the date of the hearing as well as the names of those who conducted it and of the parties.

(4) The record shall be read to the witness for his approval or be presented to be read by himself. The approval given shall be recorded and signed by the witness. If the signature is omitted, the reason for this shall be indicated.

(5) The provisions of subsections (3) and (4) shall apply mutatis mutandis to the questioning of experts.

(6) The cartel authority may request the Local Court [Amtsgericht] to administer the oath to witnesses if it considers such an oath to be necessary to obtain truthful testimony. The court shall decide whether the oath is to be administered.

Section 58 Seizure

(1) The cartel authority may seize objects which may be of importance as evidence in the investigation. The person affected by the seizure shall be informed thereof without undue delay.

(2) Within three days of the seizure, the cartel authority shall seek judicial confirmation by the Local Court in whose district the seizure took place if neither the person affected nor any relative of legal age was present at the seizure or if the person affected or, in his absence, a relative of legal age explicitly objected to the seizure.

(3) The person affected may at any time request judicial review of the seizure. He shall be informed of this right. The court having jurisdiction under subsection (2) shall rule on the request.

(4) The court decision may be appealed. Sections 306 to 310 and 311a of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 59 Requests for Information

(1) To the extent necessary to perform the functions assigned to the cartel authority by this Act, the cartel authority may

1. request from undertakings and associations of undertakings information regarding their economic situation, as well as the surrender of documents;

2. inspect and examine business documents of undertakings and associations of undertakings on their premises during normal business hours;

3. request information from trade and industry associations and professional organisations about their by-laws, their decisions, and the number and names of the members affected by the decisions.

(2) The owners of undertakings and their representatives, in the case of legal persons, partnerships or associations without legal capacity, the persons designated as representatives by law or the by-laws, as well as the persons appointed as representatives pursuant to Section 13 (2) sentence 1, shall be obliged to surrender the documents requested, to provide the information requested, to make the business documents available for inspection and examination, and to allow the examination of these business documents as well as access to offices and business premises.

(3) Persons entrusted by the cartel authority to carry out an examination may enter the offices of undertakings and associations of undertakings. The fundamental right under Article 13 of the Basic Law [Grundgesetz] is restricted to this extent.

(4) Searches may be made only by order of the Local Court judge in whose district the search is to be made. Sections 306 to 310 and 311a of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall apply mutatis mutandis to appeals from such orders. If there is danger in delay, the persons referred to in subsection (3) may conduct the necessary search during business hours without judicial order. A record of the search and its essential results shall be prepared on the spot, showing, if no judicial order was issued, also the facts which led to the assumption that there would be danger in delay.

(5) Persons obliged to provide information may refuse to answer questions if the answers would expose them or their relatives referred to in Section 383 (1) nos. 1 to 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the risk of criminal prosecution or of proceedings under the Administrative Offences Act.

(6) Requests for information made by the Federal Ministry of Economics or the supreme Land authority shall be made by written individual order, those of the Federal Cartel Office by decision. The legal basis, the subject matter and the purpose of the request shall be stated therein and an appropriate time limit shall be fixed for providing the information.

(7) Examinations shall be ordered by the Federal Ministry of Economics or the supreme Land authority by written individual order, and by the Federal Cartel Office by decision made with the consent of its President. The order or decision shall state the time, the legal basis, the subject matter and the purpose of the examination.

Section 60 Preliminary Injunctions

The cartel authority may issue preliminary injunctions to regulate matters on a temporary basis until a final decision is taken on

1. an exemption pursuant to Sections 5 to 8, 17 (3) or Section 18, its extension pursuant to Section 10 (5), its revocation or modification pursuant to Section 12 (2),

2. an authorisation pursuant to Section 42 (1), its revocation or modification pursuant to Section 42 (2) sentence 2,

3. a decision pursuant to Section 12 (1), Section 15 (3), Sections 16, 22 (6), Section 23 (3), Section 26 (4), Section 29 (3) or (4), Sections 32, 36 (1), Section 40 (3) or Section 42 (2).

Section 61 Completion of the Proceedings; Reasons for the Decision; Service

(1) Decisions of the cartel authority shall contain a statement of reasons and be served together with advice as to the available legal remedies upon the parties pursuant to the provisions of the Act on Service in Administrative Procedure. Decisions directed at undertakings with their registered seat outside the area of application of this Act shall be served by the cartel authority upon the person who was named by the undertaking to the Federal Cartel Office as authorised to accept service. If the undertaking has not named any person authorised to accept service, the cartel authority shall serve the decisions by way of publication in the Federal Gazette.

(2) If proceedings are not completed by way of a decision served upon the parties pursuant to subsection (1), the parties shall be informed in writing of the completion of the proceedings.

Section 62 Publication of Decisions Decisions of the cartel authority

1. rejecting an application for exemption of agreements and decisions of the kind described in Sections 5 to 8 or for recognition of a competition rule,

2. containing an objection by the cartel authority pursuant to Section 9 (3) or Section 29 (3) or (4),

3. issued pursuant to Section 12 (1), Section 15 (3), Sections 16, 22 (6), Section 23 (3) as well as Section 29 (3) or (4),

shall be published in the Federal Gazette and, if the decision was issued by a supreme Land authority, also in an official gazette of the Land.

II. Appeals

Section 63 Admissibility; Jurisdiction

(1) Decisions of the cartel authority may be appealed. An appeal may be based also upon new facts and evidence.

(2) The appeal shall be open to the parties to the proceedings before the cartel authority (Section 54 (2) and (3)).

(3) An appeal may also be made if the cartel authority fails to take a decision requested in an application and the applicant claims to be entitled to demand such a decision. If the cartel authority without sufficient reason has failed to rule within a reasonable period of time on an application to take a decision, this shall also be deemed a failure to act. Failure to act shall in such a case be regarded as a rejection of the application.

(4) Decisions on an appeal shall be made exclusively by the Court of Appeal for the district in which the cartel authority has its seat and, in the cases of Sections 35 to 42, exclusively by the Court of Appeal for the district in which the Federal Cartel Office has its seat, also if the appeal is directed against a decision of the Federal Ministry of Economics. Section 36 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 64 Suspensive Effect

(1) The appeal has suspensive effect insofar as the decision being appealed

1. revokes or amends an exemption pursuant to Section 12 (2) or an authorisation pursuant to Section 42 (2), or

2. is issued pursuant to Section 12 (1), Section 15 (3), Sections 16, 17 (3) sentence 3, Section 23 (3), Section 26 (4), Section 29 (3) or (4), Sections 32 or 34 (1).

(2) If an appeal is made against a decision to issue a preliminary injunction pursuant to Section 60, the appellate court may order that the appealed decision or a part thereof shall enter into force only upon completion of the appeal proceedings or upon the furnishing of security. Such order may be repealed or amended at any time.

(3) Section 60 shall apply mutatis mutandis to proceedings before the appellate court.

Section 65 Order of Immediate Enforcement

(1) In the cases of Section 64 (1), the cartel authority may order the immediate enforcement of the decision if this is required by the public interest or by the prevailing interest of a party.

(2) Orders under subsection (1) may be issued already before the appeal is filed.

(3) The appellate court may, upon application, entirely or partly restore the suspensive effect of the appeal if:

1. the conditions for issuing an order under subsection (1) were not satisfied or are no longer satisfied, or

2. there are serious doubts as to the legality of the appealed decision, or

3. the enforcement would result for the party concerned in undue hardship not demanded by prevailing public interests.

In the cases where the appeal has no suspensive effect, the cartel authority may suspend enforcement; such suspension should be made if the conditions of sentence 1 no. 3 are satisfied. The appellate court may, upon application, order the suspensive effect in full or in part if the conditions of sentence 1 no. 2 or 3 are satisfied.

(4) An application under subsection (3) sentence 1 or 3 shall be admissible already prior to the appeal being lodged. The applicant shall substantiate the facts upon which the application is based. If the decision has already been enforced at the time of the court ruling, the court may also order the enforcement measures to be lifted. Orders restoring or ordering the suspensive effect may be made contingent upon the furnishing of security or upon other conditions. A time limit may also be set.

(5) Decisions on applications pursuant to subsection (3) may be amended or repealed at any time. Insofar as applications are granted by them, they shall be final.

Section 66 Time Limits and Formal Requirements

(1) The appeal shall be filed in writing within one month with the cartel authority whose decision is being appealed. That period shall begin upon service of the decision of the cartel authority. If, in the cases of Section 36 (1), an application is made for authorisation pursuant to Section 42, the period for the appeal against the decision of the Federal Cartel Office shall begin upon service of the order issued by the Federal Minister of Economics. Receipt of the appeal by the appellate court within the time limit shall be sufficient.

(2) If no decision is taken on an application (Section 63 (3) sentence 2), the appeal shall not be subject to any time limit.

(3) The appeal shall include a statement of reasons. The time limit for filing the statement of reasons is one month; it shall begin upon the filing of the appeal and may, upon application, be extended by the presiding judge of the appellate court.

(4) The statement of reasons for the appeal shall contain:

1. a statement as to the extent to which the decision is being appealed and its modification or revocation is being sought,

2. details of the facts and evidence on which the appeal is based.

(5) The appeal and the statement of reasons for the appeal shall be signed by a lawyer admitted to practice before a German court; this shall not apply to appeals by the cartel authorities.

Section 67 Parties to the Appeal Proceedings

(1) The following are parties to the proceedings before the appellate court:

1. the appellant,

2. the cartel authority whose decision is being appealed,

3. persons and associations of persons whose interests are substantially affected by the decision and who, upon their application, have been admitted by the cartel authority to the proceedings.

(2) If an appeal is directed against a decision issued by a supreme Landauthority, the Federal Cartel Office shall also be a party to the proceedings.

Section 68 Mandatory Representation by Lawyers

In proceedings before the appellate court the parties shall be represented by a lawyer admitted to practice before a German court. The cartel authority may be represented by a member of the authority.

Section 69 Hearing

(1) The appellate court shall decide on the appeal on the basis of a hearing; with the consent of the parties, a decision may be taken without hearing.

(2) If the parties, having been summoned in time, do not appear at the hearing or are not duly represented, the case may nevertheless be heard and decided.

Section 70 Principle of Investigation

(1) The appellate court shall investigate the facts ex officio.

(2) The presiding judge shall endeavour to have formal defects eliminated, unclear motions explained, relevant motions made, insufficient factual information completed, and all declarations essential for ascertaining and assessing the facts made.

(3) The appellate court may direct the parties to file statements within a specified time on issues requiring clarification, to specify evidence, and to submit documents as well as other evidence in their possession. In the event of failure to observe the time limit, a decision may be made on the basis of the record regardless of evidence which has not been produced.

(4) If a request pursuant to Section 59 (6) or an order pursuant to Section 59 (7) is challenged by way of appeal, the cartel authority shall substantiate the factual aspects. Section 294 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure shall be applicable. No substantiation shall be required insofar as Section 20 presupposes that small or medium-sized enterprises are dependent on undertakings in such a way that sufficient or reasonable alternatives of resorting to other undertakings do not exist.

Section 71 Decision on the Appeal

(1) The appellate court shall decide by decree on the basis of its conclusions freely reached from the overall results of the proceedings. The decree may be based only on facts and evidence on which the parties had an opportunity to comment. The appellate court may proceed differently insofar as, for important reasons, in particular to safeguard manufacturing or operating or business secrets, third parties admitted to the proceedings were not allowed to inspect the files, and the content of the files was not part of the pleadings for these reasons. This shall not apply to such parties admitted to the proceedings who are involved in the disputed legal relationship in such a way that the decision can only be made uniformly also in relation to them.

(2) If the appellate court holds the decision of the cartel authority to be inadmissible or unfounded, it shall reverse the decision. If meanwhile the decision has been withdrawn or otherwise become moot, the appellate court shall declare, upon application, that the decision of the cartel authority was inadmissible or unfounded, provided the appellant has a legitimate interest in such a declaration.

(3) If a decision pursuant to Section 32 has become moot because of a subsequent change of the factual situation or for other reasons, the appellate court shall decree, upon application, whether, to what extent and up to what time the decision was well founded.

(4) If the appellate court holds the refusal or failure to issue the decision to be inadmissible or unfounded, it shall decree the obligation of the cartel authority to issue the decision applied for.

(5) The decision shall also be inadmissible or unfounded if the cartel authority has improperly exercised its discretionary powers, in particular if it has exceeded the statutory limits of its discretionary powers or if it has exercised its discretion in a manner violating the purpose and intent of this Act. The appraisal by the cartel authority of the general economic situation and trends shall not be subject to review by the court.

(6) The decree shall contain a statement of reasons and be served upon the parties together with advice as to the available legal remedies.

Section 72 Inspection of Files

(1) The parties referred to in Section 67 (1) nos. 1 and 2 and (2) may inspect the court files and may obtain certified and other copies and excerpts at their own expense from the court clerk. Section 299 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(2) The inspection of preparatory files, supplementary files, expert opinions and other information shall be allowed only with the consent of the authorities to whom the files belong or who have obtained the information. The cartel authority shall refuse to consent to an inspection of its records if this is necessary for important reasons, in particular to protect manufacturing, operating or business secrets. If inspection is refused or impermissible, the decision may be based on such records only insofar as their content formed part of the pleadings. The appellate court may, after hearing the person affected by such disclosure, order by decree the disclosure of facts or evidence, the confidentiality of which is demanded for important reasons, in particular to protect manufacturing or operating or business secrets, insofar as such facts or evidence are relevant for the decision, there is no other way to ascertain the facts and, considering all circumstances in the particular case, the significance of the matter in protecting competition outweighs the interests of the person affected in maintaining confidentiality. The decree shall contain a statement of reasons. In proceedings pursuant to sentence 4, the person affected need not be represented by a lawyer.

(3) The appellate court may permit the parties referred to in Section 67 (1) no. 3 to inspect files to the same extent, having heard those to whom the files belong.

Section 73 Application of the Provisions of the Courts Constitution Act and the Code of Civil Procedure

Unless otherwise provided for herein, the following provisions shall apply mutatis mutandis in proceedings before the appellate court:

1. the provisions in Sections 169 to 197 of the Courts Constitution Act [Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz] regarding admission of the public to proceedings, maintenance of order in court, the language to be used in court cases, judicial deliberation and voting;

2. the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding the exclusion or challenge of a judge, representation and assistance in court, service of process by the court, summons, dates of hearings and time limits, orders for the personal appearance of the parties, joining of several proceedings, taking of testimony of witnesses and experts, as well as other procedures for taking evidence, and reinstatement of prior conditions.

III. Appeal on Points of Law

Section 74 Leave to Appeal; Absolute Reasons for Appeal

(1) Appeals on points of law to the Federal Supreme Court [Bundesgerichtshof]from decrees on the merits issued by the Courts of Appeal shall be admissible if the Court of Appeal grants leave to appeal on points of law.

(2) Leave to appeal on points of law shall be granted if

1. a legal issue of fundamental importance is to be decided, or

2. a decision by the Federal Supreme Court is necessary to develop the law or to ensure uniform court practice.

(3) The decision of the Court of Appeal shall state whether leave to appeal on points of law is granted or not. If leave to appeal is refused, the reasons shall be given.

(4) No leave to appeal on points of law against a decision of an appellate court shall be required if the appeal is based on, and complains of, one of the following procedural defects:

1. if the court having made the decision was not duly constituted,

2. if a judge participating in the decision was excluded by virtue of the law from the exercise of judicial functions or was successfully challenged on grounds of prejudice,

3. if a party was denied its right to be heard,

4. if a party to the proceedings was not represented according to the provisions of the law, unless such party consented explicitly or implicitly to the conduct of the proceedings,

5. if the decision was made on the basis of a hearing at which the provisions regarding the admission of the public to the proceedings were violated, or

6. if the decision does not contain a statement of reasons.

Section 75 Appeal from Refusal to Grant Leave

(1) The refusal to grant leave to appeal on points of law may be challenged separately by way of an appeal from refusal to grant leave.

(2) The decision on the appeal from refusal to grant leave shall be made by the Federal Supreme Court by decree which shall contain a statement of reasons. The decree may be issued without hearing.

(3) The appeal from refusal to grant leave shall be filed in writing with the Court of Appeal within one month. The time period shall begin upon service of the decision being appealed.

(4) Section 64 (1) and (2), Section 66 (3), (4) no. 1 and (5), Sections 67, 68, 72 and 73 no. 2 of this Act as well as Sections 192 to 197 of the Courts Constitution Act regarding the deliberation and voting of the court shall apply mutatis mutandis to the appeal from refusal to grant leave. The appellate court shall be competent to issue preliminary injunctions.

(5) If leave to appeal on points of law is refused, the decision of the Court of Appeal shall become final and binding upon service of the decree of the Federal Supreme Court. If leave to appeal on points of law is granted, the time period for filing the appeal shall begin upon service of the decree of the Federal Supreme Court.

Section 76 Right to Appeal; Formal Requirements and Time Limits

(1) The cartel authority as well as the parties to the appeal proceedings shall be entitled to file an appeal on points of law.

(2) The appeal on points of law may be based only on the contention that the decision rests upon a violation of the law; Sections 550, 551 nos. 1 to 3, 5 to 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply mutatis mutandis. The appeal on points of law cannot be based upon the contention that the cartel authority erroneously, contrary to Section 48, assumed it had jurisdiction.

(3) The appeal on points of law shall be filed in writing with the Court of Appeal within one month. The time period shall begin upon service of the decision being appealed.

(4) The Federal Supreme Court shall be bound by the findings of fact in the decision being appealed unless admissible and well-founded reasons for an appeal on points of law have been put forth in respect of these findings.

(5) As for other matters, Section 64 (1) and (2), Section 66 (3), (4) no. 1 and (5), Sections 67 to 69, 71 to 73 shall apply mutatis mutandis to appeals on points of law. The appellate court shall be competent to issue preliminary injunctions.

IV.Common Provisions

Section 77 Capacity to Participate in the Proceedings

In addition to natural and legal persons, associations of persons without legal capacity shall have the capacity to participate in proceedings before the cartel authority, in appeal proceedings and in appeal proceedings on points of law.

Section 78 Apportionment and Taxation of Costs

In appeal proceedings and in appeal proceedings on points of law, the court may order that the costs necessary for the due pursuit of the matter shall be reimbursed, in whole or in part, by one of the parties if equity so requires. If a party caused costs to be incurred due to an unfounded appeal or by gross fault, the costs shall be imposed upon that party. As for other matters, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding the taxation of costs and the enforcement of court decisions allocating costs shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 79 Ordinances

The details of the proceedings before the cartel authority shall be determined by the Federal Government in ordinances [Rechtsverordnungen] requiring the approval of the Bundesrat.

Section 80 Chargeable Acts

(1) In proceedings before the cartel authority, fees shall be imposed to cover administrative expenses. The following acts shall be subject to fees (chargeable acts):

1. notifications pursuant to Section 9 (1), Section 22 (4), Section 28 (1) sentence 2, Section 29 (3) or (4), Section 30 (1) sentence 2 in conjunction with sentence 1 as well as Section 39 (1);

2. official acts on the basis of Sections 10, 12, 15 to 18, 22 (6), Section 23 (3), Sections 24, 26, 29, 32, 36 and 60;

3. the furnishing of copies from the files of the cartel authority.

In addition, the costs of public notices shall be charged as expenditures. The fee for the notification of a concentration pursuant to Section 39 (1) shall be credited against the fee for the prohibition of a concentration pursuant to Section 36 (1).

(2) The amount of the fees shall be determined according to the personnel and material expenses of the cartel authority, account being taken of the economic significance of the subject matter of the chargeable act. However, the fee rates shall not exceed

1. DM 100,000 in the cases of Sections 36, 39, 40, 41 and 42;

2. DM 50,000 in the cases of Sections 10, 29 (1) – also in conjunction with (3) – and Section 32;

3. DM 15,000 in the cases of Sections 9 and 29 (4),

4. DM 10,000 in the cases of Section 15 (3), Sections 16, 17 (3), Sections 18, 22 (6), Section 23 (3), Section 26 (1) and Section 29 (2) – also in conjunction with (3) -;

5. DM 5,000 in the cases of Section 28 (1) sentence 2 and Section 30 (1) sentence 2;

6. DM 2,500 in the cases of Section 22 (4);

7. DM 500 in the cases of Section 8 (3) sentences 5 to 7 of the Act Regulating the Transportation of Persons and Section 12 (7) of the General Railway Act;

8. DM 35 for the issuance of certified copies (subsection (1) no. 3);

9. a) in the cases of Section 12 (2), the amount charged for the exemption;

b) in the cases of Section 12 (1) and Section 29 (3) and (4), the amount for the notification (nos. 2 to 5), DM 15,000 for decisions in relation to agreements or decisions of the kind described in Section 4 (2), and DM 500 for decisions in relation to agreements or decisions of the kind described in Section 28 (1);

c) in the cases of Section 26 (4), the amount for the decision pursuant to Section 26 (1) (no. 4);

d) in the cases of Section 60, one fifth of the fee in the main issue.

If the personnel and material expenses of the cartel authority are unusually high in a particular case, taking into account the economic importance of the chargeable act concerned, the fee may be increased up to twice its amount. For reasons of equity, the fee determined according to sentences 1 to 3 may be reduced to a minimum of one tenth of its amount.

(3) As regards payment for several similar official acts or similar notifications by the same person liable to pay the fee, provision may be made for lump-sum fee rates which allow for the minor extent of administrative effort involved.

(4) Fees shall not be charged

1. for oral and written information and suggestions;

2. if they would not have arisen had the matter been handled correctly;

3. in the cases of Section 42 if the preceding decision of the Federal Cartel Office pursuant to Section 36 (1) has been reversed.

(5) If an application is withdrawn before a decision is made thereon, one half of the fee shall be paid. The same shall apply if an application is withdrawn within three months from its receipt by the cartel authority.

(6) The person liable to pay the fees shall be

1. in the cases of subsection (1) sentence 2 no. 1: whoever has submitted a notification;

2. in the cases of subsection (1) sentence 2 no. 2: whoever has, by making an application, caused the cartel authority to act, or the person against whom the cartel authority has issued a decision;

3. in the cases of subsection (1) sentence 2 no. 3: whoever caused the copies to be made.

The person liable to pay the fees is also whoever, by declaration made before the cartel authority or communicated to it, assumed the obligation to pay the fees, or is liable by virtue of the law for the fee owed by another person. Several persons owing fees shall be jointly and severally liable.

(7) The claim to payment of fees shall become statute-barred four years after the assessment of the fees. The claim to reimbursement of expenditures shall become statute-barred four years after they have arisen.

(8) The Federal Government is authorised to regulate, by way of ordinances which require the approval of the Bundesrat, the fee rates and the collection of the fees from persons liable to pay fees under the provisions in subsections (1) to (6), as well as the reimbursement of expenditures for the publications referred to in Section 11 (2), Section 22 (5), Section 27 (2) to (4), Sections 43 and 62. For this purpose, it may also make regulations which concern the exemption of legal persons under public law from costs, the statute of limitations, and the collection of costs.

(9) The Federal Government shall regulate, by way of ordinances requiring the approval of the Bundesrat, the details of reimbursement of the costs incurred in proceedings before the cartel authority according to the principles of Section 78.

Chapter II Proceedings Concerning Administrative Fines

Section 81 Provisions Concerning Administrative Fines

(1) An administrative offence is committed by whoever wilfully or negligently

1. violates a provision in Sections 1, 14, 17 (1) sentence 1, also in conjunction with Section 18, Section 19 (1), Section 20 (1), also in conjunction with (2) sentence 1, Section 20 (3) sentence 1, also in conjunction with sentence 2, Section 20 (4) sentence 1 or (6), Sections 21, 22 (1) or Section 41 (1) sentence 1 concerning the prohibitions of agreements or contracts referred to therein, of the abuse of a dominant position, the hindrance or different treatment of undertakings or other conduct restricting competition, or concerning the prohibition of recommendations or of putting a concentration into effect,

2. contrary to Section 9 (2) sentence 2, also in conjunction with Section 29 (3) sentence 1 or (4), Section 24 (4) sentence 3 or Section 39 (3) sentence 4, provides or uses information,

3. contrary to Section 9 (4) sentence 1 or Section 28 (1) sentence 2, does not notify agreements and decisions or fails to notify them correctly or completely or in time,

4. contrary to Section 9 (4) sentence 3 or Section 39 (6), fails to make a notification or does not make a notification correctly or completely or in time,

5. acts contrary to an enforceable obligation pursuant to Section 10 (4) sentence 3, Section 12 (2) sentence 1, in each case also in conjunction with Section 17 (3) sentence 3, Section 40 (3) sentence 1 or Section 42 (2) sentence 1,

6. acts contrary to an enforceable order pursuant to

a) Section 12 (1) no. 1, also in conjunction with Section 29 (4), Section 15 (3), Sections 16, 22 (6), Section 23 (3) sentence 1, Sections 32, 41 (4) no. 2 or Section 50 (2) sentence 2, or

b) Section 39 (5),

7. contrary to Section 39 (1), fails to notify concentrations or to notify concentrations correctly, completely or in time,

8. contrary to Section 59 (2), fails to provide information or to provide information correctly, completely or in time, fails to surrender documents or to surrender documents completely or in time, fails to present business documents for the purpose of inspection and examination or to present them completely or in time, or fails to allow examination of such business documents as well as access to offices and business premises, or

9. acts contrary to a preliminary injunction pursuant to Section 60 or 64 (3) or to an order pursuant to Section 65.

(2) The administrative offence may be punished in the cases of subsection (1) nos. 1, 2, 5, 6a and 9 by a fine of up to DM 1 million, and in excess of this amount up to three times the additional proceeds obtained as a result of the violation, in all other cases by a fine of up to DM 50,000. The amount of the additional proceeds may be estimated.

(3) Proceedings for administrative offences as defined in subsection (1) shall become statute-barred in accordance with the provisions of the Administrative Offences Act also if the offence is committed by dissemination of printed material. Administrative offences as defined in subsection (1) no. 1 shall become statue-barred after five years.

(4) The administrative authority within the meaning of Section 36 (1) no. 1 of the Administrative Offences Act is

1. the authority competent pursuant to Section 48, insofar as administrative offences pursuant to subsection (1) are concerned,

2. the Federal Cartel Office, insofar as proceedings pursuant to Section 50 are concerned.

(5) Agreements and decisions of the kind described in Section 1 which have been notified pursuant to Section 9 shall not be proceeded against as an administrative offence as long as the cartel authority has not objected pursuant to Section 9 (3). The same shall apply to agreements and decisions with respect to which an application has been made pursuant to Section 10, as long as the cartel authority has not rejected the application pursuant to Section 10 (2).

Section 82 Jurisdiction in Proceedings to Assess a Fine Against a Legal Person or Association of Persons

The authority competent pursuant to Section 48 shall be exclusively competent in proceedings to assess a fine against a legal person or association of persons (Section 30 of the Administrative Offences Act) in cases arising from

1. a criminal offence which also fulfils the elements of Section 81 (1) no. 1, or

2. a wilful or negligent administrative offence pursuant to Section 130 of the Administrative Offences Act, where a punishable breach of duty also fulfils the elements of Section 81 (1) no. 1.

This shall not apply if the proceedings pursuant to Section 30 of the Administrative Offences Act are referred by the authority to the public prosecutor.

Section 83 Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal in Judicial Proceedings

(1) The Court of Appeal in whose district the competent cartel authority has its seat shall decide in judicial proceedings concerning an administrative offence pursuant to Section 81; it shall also decide on an application for judicial review (Section 62 of the Administrative Offences Act) in the cases of Section 52 (2) sentence 3 and Section 69 (1) sentence 2 of the Administrative Offences Act. Section 140 (1) no. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in conjunction with Section 46 (1) of the Administrative Offences Act shall not be applicable.

(2) The decisions of the Court of Appeal shall be made by three members including the presiding judge.

Section 84 Appeal to the Federal Supreme Court on Points of Law

The Federal Supreme Court shall decide on appeals on points of law (Section 79 of the Administrative Offences Act). If the decision being appealed is reversed without a decision being taken on the merits of the case, the Federal Supreme Court shall refer the case back to the Court of Appeal whose decision has been reversed.

Section 85 Reopening of Proceedings Against an Administrative Fine

Reopening proceedings on a decision of the cartel authority imposing an administrative fine (Section 85 (4) of the Administrative Offences Act), shall be decided by the court having jurisdiction pursuant to Section 83.

Section 86 Court Decisions Concerning Enforcement

The court decisions which become necessary for enforcement (Section 104 of the Administrative Offences Act) shall be made by the court having jurisdiction pursuant to Section 83.

Chapter III Civil Actions

Section 87 Exclusive Jurisdiction of the District Courts

(1) The District Courts [Landgerichte] shall have exclusive jurisdiction in civil actions arising from this Act or from cartel agreements and cartel decisions, regardless of the amount in dispute. Sentence 1 shall apply also if the decision in a civil action depends, in whole or in part, on a decision to be taken pursuant to this Act.

(2) Such actions shall be regarded as commercial matters within the meaning of Sections 93 to 114 of the Courts Constitution Act.

Section 88 Joining of Actions

Another cause of action may be joined with one arising under this Act or arising from cartel agreements and cartel decisions (Section 87) if the former has a legal or direct economic connection with the claim to be asserted before the court having jurisdiction pursuant to Section 87; this shall apply also if another court has exclusive jurisdiction over the other cause of action.

Section 89 Jurisdiction of one District Court for Several Court Districts

(1) The Land governments are authorised to refer, by way of ordinances, civil actions for which the District Courts have exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to Section 87 to one District Court for the districts of several District Courts if such centralisation serves the administration of justice in cartel matters, in particular to ensure the uniformity of court practice. The Land governments may delegate this authority to their judicial administrations.

(2) The jurisdiction of one District Court for several districts or for the entire territory of several Länder may be established by treaties between the Länder.

(3) The parties may be represented before the courts referred to in subsections (1) and (2) also by lawyers admitted to practice before the court which in the absence of subsections (1) and (2) would have jurisdiction over the legal action.

Section 90 Information to and Participation of the Federal Cartel Office

(1) The court shall inform the Federal Cartel Office of all legal actions arising from this Act or from cartel agreements and cartel decisions. The court shall, upon request, transmit to the Federal Cartel Office copies of all briefs, records, orders and decisions.

(2) The President of the Federal Cartel Office may, if he considers it to be appropriate to protect the public interest, appoint from among the members of the Federal Cartel Office and, if the legal action concerns one of the undertakings referred to in Section 29, also from among the members of the competent supervisory authority, a representative authorised to submit written statements to the court, to point out facts and evidence, to attend hearings, to present arguments there, and to address questions to parties, witnesses and experts. Written statements made by the representative shall be communicated to the parties by the court.

(3) If the significance of the legal action does not extend beyond the territory of a Land, the supreme Land authority shall take the place of the Federal Cartel Office for the purposes of subsection (1) sentence 2 and subsection (2).

(4) Subsections (1) and (2) shall apply mutatis mutandis to legal actions which have as their subject matter the enforcement of a price set pursuant to Section 15 against a purchaser bound thereby or against another undertaking.

Chapter IV Common Provisions

Section 91 Cartel Division of the Court of Appeal

The Courts of Appeal shall establish cartel divisions. They shall decide on legal matters assigned to them pursuant to Section 57 (2) sentence 2, Section 63 (4), Sections 83, 85 and 86, and on appeals from final judgments and other decisions in civil actions pursuant to Section 87 (1).

Section 92 Jurisdiction of a Court of Appeal or of the Supreme Court of a Land for Several Court Districts in Administrative Matters and Proceedings Concerning Administrative Fines

(1) Where several Courts of Appeal exist in a Land, the legal matters for which the Court of Appeal has exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to Section 57 (2) sentence 2, Section 63 (4), Sections 83, 85 and 86, may be assigned by the Land governments by way of ordinancesto one or several of the Courts of Appeal or to the Supreme Court of a Land [Oberstes Landesgericht], if such centralisation serves the administration of justice in cartel matters, in particular to ensure the uniformity of court practice. The Land governments may delegate this authority to their judicial administrations.

(2) The jurisdiction of one Court of Appeal or of the Supreme Court of a Land for individual districts or for the entire territory of several Länder may be established by treaty between the Länder.

Section 93 Jurisdiction over Appeals

Section 92 (1) and (2) shall apply mutatis mutandis to decisions on appeals from final judgments and from other decisions in civil actions pursuant to Section 87 (1). The parties may be represented before the Courts of Appeal referred to in sentence 1 in conjunction with Section 92 (1) and (2) also by lawyers admitted to practice before the Court of Appeal which would have jurisdiction over the judicial remedy in the absence of sentence 1.

Section 94 Cartel Division of the Federal Supreme Court

(1) The Federal Supreme Court shall establish a cartel division; it shall decide on the following judicial remedies:

1. in administrative matters, on appeals on points of law from decisions of the Courts of Appeal (Sections 74, 76) and on appeals from refusal to grant leave to appeal (Section 75);

2. in proceedings concerning administrative fines, on appeals on points of law from decisions of the Courts of Appeal (Section 84);

3. in civil actions arising from this Act or from agreements or decisions of the kind described in Sections 1 to 8,

a) on appeals on points of law from final judgments of the Courts of Appeal,

b) on appeals on points of law from final judgments of the District Courts in the case of Section 566a of the Code of Civil Procedure,

c) on appeals from decisions of the Courts of Appeal in the cases of Section 519b (2), Section 542 (3) in conjunction with Section 341 (2) and Section 568a of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(2) In proceedings concerning administrative fines, the cartel division shall constitute a division for criminal matters within the meaning of Section 132 of the Courts Constitution Act, in all other cases it shall constitute a division for civil matters.

Section 95 Exclusive Jurisdiction

The jurisdiction of the courts which are competent under this Act shall be exclusive.

Section 96 Civil Actions

Sections 87 to 90 and 91 to 95 shall apply mutatis mutandis to civil actions arising from Articles 85 or 86 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community or from Articles 53 or 54 of the Treaty on the European Economic Area; if the decision in a legal action depends, in whole or in part, on the applicability of Article 85 or Article 86 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community or Article 53 or Article 54 of the Treaty on the European Economic Area, Section 87 (1) shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Part IV Award of Public Contracts

Chapter I Award Procedures

Section 97 General Principles

(1) Contracting entities shall procure goods, works and services in accordance with the following provisions through competition and by way of transparent award procedures.

(2) The participants in an award procedure shall be treated equally unless discrimination is expressly required or allowed by this Act.

(3) The interests of small and medium-sized undertakings shall primarily be taken into account in an appropriate manner by subdividing contracts into trade-specific and partial lots.

(4) Contracts shall be awarded to skilled, efficient and reliable undertakings; contractors may be expected to meet other or further requirements only if federal law or the laws of a Land provides for this.

(5) The economically most advantageous tender shall be accepted.

(6) The Federal Government is empowered to more precisely define, by ordinance with the approval of the Bundesrat, the procedure to be followed in awarding contracts, in particular concerning the notice, the course and the categories of awards, the selection and examination of undertakings and tenders, the conclusion of the contract as well as other issues relating to the award procedure.

(7) The undertakings have a right to the provisions concerning the award procedure being complied with by the contracting entity.

Section 98 Contracting Entities

Contracting entities within the meaning of this Part are:

1. regional or local authorities as well as their special funds,

2. other legal persons under public or private law which were established for the specific purpose of meeting non-commercial needs in the general interest if they are, for the most part, financed individually or jointly through a participation or in some other way by entities within the meaning of no. 1 or 3, or if such entities supervise their management or have appointed more than half of the members of one of their management or supervisory boards. The same shall apply if the entity which individually or together with others provides, for the most part, such financing, or has appointed the majority of the members of a management or supervisory board, falls under sentence 1,

3. associations whose members fall under no. 1 or 2,

4. natural or legal persons under private law which operate in the fields of drinking water, energy, transport or telecommunications, if these activities are exercised on the basis of special or exclusive rights granted by a competent authority, or if contracting entities falling under nos. 1 to 3 can individually or jointly exercise a controlling influence upon these persons,

5. natural or legal persons under private law in cases where they receive funds for civil engineering projects, for building hospitals, sports, leisure or recreational facilities, school, university or administrative buildings, or for related services and procedures relating to a public offer of a reward from entities falling under nos. 1 to 3, which are used to finance more than 50% of these projects,

6. natural or legal persons under private law who have concluded a works contract with entities falling under nos. 1 to 3, if consideration for such building work consists, instead of remuneration, of the right to exploit the building works, if appropriate plus payment of a price, with respect to contracts awarded to third parties (works concession).

Section 99 Public Contracts

(1) Public contracts are contracts for pecuniary interest concluded between contracting entities and undertakings whose subject matter is supplies, works or services, and procedures relating to a public offer of a reward intended to lead to service contracts.

(2) Supply contracts are contracts for the procurement of goods involving in particular a purchase or hire purchase or leasing, or a lease with or without a purchase option. The contracts may also include ancillary services.

(3) Works contracts are contracts either for the execution or the simultaneous design and execution of works or a work which is the result of civil engineering or building construction work and is to fulfil a commercial or technical function, or for the execution of a work by a third party corresponding to the requirements specified by the contracting entity.

(4) Service contracts are contracts for performances which are not covered by subsections (2) or (3) and are not reward procedures.

(5) Procedures relating to a public offer of a reward within the meaning of this Part are only such reward procedures which are intended to give the contracting entity a plan on the basis of a comparative evaluation by a jury with or without the award of prizes.

Section 100 Scope of Application

(1) This Part shall apply only to contracts which reach or exceed the contract values fixed by ordinance pursuant to Section 127 (thresholds).

(2) This Part shall not apply to employment contracts and to contracts

a) which are awarded in pursuance of an international agreement relating to the stationing of troops and which are subject to special procedural rules;

b) which are awarded in pursuance of an international agreement concluded between the Federal Republic of Germany and one or more countries which are not parties to the Treaty on the European Economic Area and which cover a project which is to be jointly implemented and financed by the signatory states and is subject to different procedural rules;

c) which are awarded pursuant to the particular procedure of an international organisation;

d) which are declared secret in accordance with the legal and administrative provisions in the Federal Republic of Germany, or whose execution must be accompanied by special security measures in accordance with these provisions, or when the protection of the basic interests of state security so requires;

e) which are covered by the scope of application of Article 223 (1)b of the Treaty establishing the European Community;

f) which are awarded by contracting entities which operate in the fields of drinking water, energy, transport or telecommunications, in accordance with more precise definitions in an ordinance pursuant to Section 127 in the field in which they operate themselves;

g) which are awarded to a person who is a contracting entity within the meaning of Section 98 no. 1, 2 or 3 and has an exclusive right to render the performance by virtue of a law or ordinance;

h) for the acquisition or rental, by whatever financial means, of land, existing buildings, or other immovable property or concerning rights thereto;

i) for services by affiliated undertakings specified by ordinance pursuant to Section 127 for contracting entities which operate in the fields of drinking water, energy, transport or telecommunications;

j) for broadcasting time;

k) for voice telephony, telex, radiotelephony, paging and satellite services;

l) for arbitration and conciliation services;

m) for financial services in connection with the issue, sale, purchase or transfer of securities or other financial instruments, and central bank services;

n) for research and development services other than those where the benefits accrue exclusively to the contracting entity for its use in the conduct of its own affairs on condition that the service provided is wholly remunerated by the contracting entity.

Section 101 Categories of Awards

(1) Public supply, works and service contracts shall be awarded through open procedures, restricted procedures or negotiated procedures.

(2) Open procedures are procedures whereby an unlimited number of undertakings is publicly invited to submit a tender.

(3) Restricted procedures are procedures whereby a public invitation to participate is made and a limited number of undertakings from among the candidates is invited to submit a tender.

(4) Negotiated procedures are procedures whereby the contracting entity consults undertakings of its choice, with or without any prior public invitation to participate, to negotiate the terms of the contract with one or more of them.

(5) Contracting entities shall apply the open procedure unless otherwise allowed by this Act. Contracting entities within the meaning of Section 98 no. 4 may freely choose among the three procedures.

Chapter II Review Procedures

I. Reviewing Authorities

Section 102 Principle

Without prejudice to review by the supervisory authorities and public procurement review offices, any award of public contracts shall be subject to review by the public procurement tribunals.

Section 103 Public Procurement Review Offices

(1) The Federation and the Länder may establish public procurement review offices responsible for reviewing whether contracting entities within the meaning of Section 98 nos. 1 to 3 comply with the award provisions to be applied by them. They may also be established at specialised and legal supervisory authorities.

(2) The public procurement review office reviews, upon application or ex officio, compliance with the award provisions to be applied by contracting entities within the meaning of Section 98 nos. 1 to 3. It may oblige the authority conducting the award procedure to set aside unlawful measures and to take lawful measures, advise these authorities and undertakings as to the application of the award provisions, and act in a conciliatory capacity.

(3) To safeguard rights under Section 97 (7), an appeal against a decision by the public procurement review office may be lodged only with the public procurement tribunal. A review by the public procurement review office is not a precondition for bringing the matter before the public procurement tribunal.

Section 104 Public Procurement Tribunals

(1) For contracts attributable to the Federation, the federal public procurement tribunals shall review the awarding of public contracts, and the Land public procurement tribunals for contracts attributable to the Länder.

(2) Rights under Section 97 (7) as well as other claims against contracting entities for the performance or omission of an act in award procedures may be asserted, if not before the public procurement review offices, then only before the public procurement tribunals and the appellate court. The jurisdiction of the civil courts over damage claims and the powers of the cartel authorities shall remain unaffected.

Section 105 Composition, Independence

(1) The public procurement tribunals shall exercise their functions independently and on their own responsibility within the limits of the law.

(2) The public procurement tribunals shall take their decisions through a chairperson and two associate members, one of whom shall serve in an honorary capacity. The chairperson and the full-time associate member shall be civil servants appointed for life with the qualification to serve in the higher administrative service, or comparably expert employees. Either the chairperson or the full-time associate member shall be qualified to serve as a judge; generally this should be the chairperson. The associate members should have in-depth knowledge of the practice of awarding public contracts, and honorary associate members should also have several years of practical experience in the field of the awarding of public contracts.

(3) The tribunal may assign the case to the chairperson or to the full-time associate member without a hearing by a final decision, for him to decide alone. Such an assignment shall be possible only if the case involves no major difficulties as to the facts or the legal issues, and the decision will not be of fundamental importance.

(4) The members of the tribunal shall be appointed for a term of office of five years. They take their decisions independently and are bound only by law.

Section 106 Establishment, Organisation

(1) The Federation shall establish the necessary number of public procurement tribunals at the Federal Cartel Office. The establishment and composition of the public procurement tribunals as well as the allocation of duties shall be determined by the President of the Federal Cartel Office. Honorary associate members and their substitute members shall be appointed by him on a proposal by the central organisations of the chambers under public law. The President of the Federal Cartel Office shall issue rules of procedure, after obtaining approval from the Federal Ministry of Economics, and publish these in the Federal Gazette.

(2) The establishment, organisation and composition of the authorities (reviewing authorities) of the Länder mentioned in this Chapter shall be determined by the authorities competent under the laws of the Länder or, in the absence of any such determination, by the Land government, which may delegate this power. In appointing the members of the public procurement tribunals, it shall be ensured that at least one member is qualified to serve as a judge and that, if possible, there is in-depth knowledge of the practice of awarding public contracts. The Länder may establish joint reviewing authorities.

II. Proceedings before the Public Procurement Tribunal

Section 107 Initiation of the Proceedings, Application

(1) The public procurement tribunal shall initiate review proceedings only upon application.

(2) Every undertaking which has an interest in the contract and claims that its rights under Section 97 (7) were violated by non-compliance with the provisions governing the awarding of public contracts has the right to file an application. In doing so, it must be shown that the undertaking has suffered a loss, or may be about to suffer a loss, in consequence of the alleged violation of provisions governing the awarding of public contracts.

(3) The application is inadmissible if already during the award procedure the applicant became aware of the violation of provisions governing the awarding of public contracts and did not object to the contracting entity without undue delay. The application is also inadmissible if violations of provisions governing the awarding of public contracts which were apparent were not challenged by the end of the period specified in the notice for the submission of a tender or application to the contracting entity.

Section 108 Form

(1) The application shall be submitted in writing to the public procurement tribunal and reasons shall be given without undue delay. It should state a certain request. An applicant without a domicile or habitual residence, seat or headquarters within the area of application of this Act shall appoint an authorised receiving agent within the area of application of this Act.

(2) The reasons shall designate the respondent, contain a description of the alleged violation of rights with a description of the facts as well as the designation of the available evidence, and show that an objection was made to the contracting entity; it should name the other parties, if known.

Section 109 Parties to the Proceedings, Admission to the Proceedings

The parties to the proceedings are the applicant, the contracting entity, and the undertakings whose interests are severely affected by the decision and which are therefore admitted by the public procurement tribunal to the proceedings. The decision to admit a party to the proceedings shall be final.

Section 110 Investigation Principle

(1) The public procurement tribunal shall investigate the facts ex officio. In its entire activities, it shall take care not to unduly impede the course of the award procedure.

(2) Unless it is clearly inadmissible or unfounded, the public procurement tribunal shall serve the application upon the contracting entity after receipt thereof, and request from the contracting entity the files which document the award procedure (award files). If a public procurement review office has been established, the public procurement tribunal shall send one copy of the application to the public procurement review office. The contracting entity shall make the award files available to the tribunal immediately. Sections 57 to 59 (1) to (5) shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 111 Inspection of Files

(1) The parties may inspect the files at the public procurement tribunal and may obtain certified and other copies and excerpts from the clerk’s office at their own expense.

(2) The public procurement tribunal shall refuse the inspection of documents where this is necessary for important reasons, in particular for the protection of secrets or to protect manufacturing, operating or business secrets.

(3) Every party shall indicate the secrets named in subsection (2) when sending its files or statements, and shall mark them in the documents. If this is not done, the public procurement tribunal may assume that the party consents to the inspection.

(4) Refusal to allow an inspection of the files may be challenged only in connection with an immediate complaint in the main issue.

Section 112 Hearing

(1) The public procurement tribunal shall decide on the basis of a hearing which should be limited to one date. All parties shall have an opportunity to comment. With the consent of the parties or in the case of the inadmissibility or clear unfoundedness of the application, a decision may be taken on the basis of the documents.

(2) The case may be discussed and decided also if the parties do not appear or are not duly represented at the hearing.

Section 113 Expedition

(1) The public procurement tribunal shall take its decision and give reasons in writing within a period of five weeks of receipt of the application. In the case of particular difficulties regarding the facts or the law, the chairperson may in exceptional cases by statement to the parties extend this period by the required time. He shall give reasons in writing for this order.

(2) The parties shall co-operate in clearing up the facts in a manner appropriate to a course of action designed to further and quickly conclude the proceedings. Time limits may be set for the parties, after the expiry of which further arguments may be disregarded.

Section 114 Decision of the Public Procurement Tribunal

(1) The public procurement tribunal shall decide whether the applicants’ rights were violated, and shall take suitable measures to remedy a violation of rights, and to prevent any impairment of the interests affected. It shall not be bound by the applications and may also independently bring an influence to bear on the lawfulness of the award procedure.

(2) An award already made cannot be cancelled. If the review procedure becomes obsolete by the granting of an award, by cancellation, or by the discontinuance of the award procedure or in any other way, the public procurement tribunal shall determine on the application of a party whether there has been a violation of rights. Section 113 (1) shall be inapplicable in this case.

(3) The public procurement tribunal shall decide by administrative act. Decisions shall be enforced, also against public authorities, in accordance with the administrative enforcement acts of the Federation and the Länder. Section 61 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 115 Suspension of the Award Procedure

(1) After service of an application for a review on the contracting entity, it must not make the award prior to the decision of the public procurement tribunal and before the expiry of the period for a complaint pursuant to Section 117 (1).

(2) The public procurement tribunal may allow the contracting entity, upon application, to award the contract after the expiry of two weeks after the announcement of this decision if, taking into account all interests which may be impaired as well as the interests of the general public in the quick conclusion of the award procedure, the negative consequences of delaying the award until the end of the review outweigh the advantages involved. The appellate court may, upon application, reinstate the prohibition of the award pursuant to subsection (1); Section 114 (2) sentence 1 shall remain unaffected. If the public procurement tribunal does not allow the award, the appellate court may, upon application by the contracting entity, allow the immediate award subject to the conditions in sentence 1. Section 121 (2) sentence 1 and 2 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the proceedings before the appellate court. No immediate complaint pursuant to Section 116 (1) shall be admissible against decisions taken by the public procurement tribunal under this subsection.

(3) If during the award procedure any rights of the applicants under Section 97 (7) are jeopardised in some other way than by the imminent award, the tribunal may, on a specific application, intervene in the award procedure through further preliminary measures. In doing so, it shall apply the evaluation criterion of subsection (2) sentence 1. This decision shall not be separately challengeable.

III. Immediate Complaint

Section 116 Admissibility, Jurisdiction

(1) Decisions of a public procurement tribunal shall be subject to an immediate complaint. It shall be open to the parties to the proceedings before the public procurement tribunal.

(2) An immediate complaint shall be admissible also if the public procurement tribunal does not decide upon an application for a review within the period set out in Section 113 (1); in this case the application shall be deemed to have been rejected.

(3) The immediate complaint shall be decided exclusively by the Court of Appeal having jurisdiction at the seat of the public procurement tribunal. An award division shall be set up at every Court of Appeal.

(4) Legal matters pursuant to subsections (1) and (2) may be assigned to other Courts of Appeal or the Supreme Court of a Land by ordinance issued by the Land governments. The Land governments may delegate this power to the Landjudicial administrations.

Section 117 Time Limit, Formal Requirements

(1) An immediate complaint shall be filed in writing with the appellate court within a non-extendable time limit of two weeks beginning upon service of the decision, in the case of Section 116 (2) upon the expiry of the time period.

(2) Reasons for the immediate complaint shall be given when it is filed. The statement of reasons for the complaint shall contain:

1. a statement as to the extent to which the decision of the public procurement tribunal is challenged, and a deviating decision is applied for,

2. details of the facts and evidence on which the complaint is based.

(3) The complaint shall be signed by a lawyer admitted to practice before a German court. This shall not apply to complaints by legal persons under public law.

(4) At the same time as the filing of the complaint, the other parties to the proceedings before the public procurement tribunal shall be informed by the complainant by way of the transmission of a copy of the complaint.

Section 118 Effect

(1) The immediate complaint shall have a suspensive effect upon the decision of the public procurement tribunal. The suspensive effect shall lapse two weeks after the expiry of the time limit for the complaint. If the public procurement tribunal refuses, upon application, to review the award, the appellate court may, upon application by the complainant, extend the suspensive effect up to the time of the decision on the complaint.

(2) In its decision on the application pursuant to subsection (1) sentence 3, the court shall consider the prospects of success of the complaint. It shall reject the application if, taking into account all interests which may be impaired as well as the interests of the general public in the quick conclusion of the award procedure, the negative consequences of delaying the award up to the time of the decision on the complaint outweigh the advantages involved.

(3) If the public procurement tribunal grants the application for a review by prohibiting the award, the award shall not be made as long as the appellate court does not reverse the decision of the public procurement tribunal pursuant to Section 121 or Section 123.

Section 119 Parties to the Appeal Proceedings

The parties to the proceedings before the public procurement tribunal are the parties to the proceedings before the appellate court.

Section 120 Procedural Provisions

(1) The parties shall be represented before the appellate court by a lawyer admitted to practice before a German court, acting as their representative. Legal persons under public law may be represented by civil servants or by employees qualified to serve as a judge.

(2) Section 69, Section 70 (1) to (3), Section 71 (1) and (6), Section 72, Section 73 with the exception of the reference to Section 227 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, Section 111 and Section 113 (3) sentence 1 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 121 Preliminary Decision on the Award

(1) Upon application by the contracting entity, the court may, considering the prospects of success of the immediate complaint, allow the continuation of the award procedure and the award. The court may allow the award also if, taking into account all interests which may be impaired as well as the interests of the general public in a quick conclusion of the award procedure, the negative consequences of delaying the award up to the time of the decision on the complaint outweigh the advantages involved.

(2) The application shall be made in writing and reasons shall be given at the same time. The facts to be put forth as reasons for the application, as well as the reason for the urgency of the matter, shall be substantiated. The appeal proceedings may be suspended until a decision on the application is made.

(3) The decision shall be made and reasons shall be given without undue delay and in no case later than five weeks after receipt of the application; in the event of particular difficulties as to the facts or legal difficulties, the chairperson may in exceptional cases extend the period by the required time by declaration to the parties with reasons. The decision may be made without a hearing. The reasons shall explain the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the award proceedings. Section 120 shall apply.

(4) No appeal is admissible against a decision made pursuant to this provision.

Section 122 End of the Award Procedure after the Decision of the Appellate Court

If an application of the contracting entity pursuant to Section 121 is rejected by the appellate court, the award procedure shall be deemed to have ended upon the expiry of 10 days after service of the decision unless the contracting entity takes the measures to restore the lawfulness of the procedure which follow from the decision; the procedure must not be continued.

Section 123 Decision on the Appeal

If the court considers the appeal to be well founded, it shall reverse the decision of the public procurement tribunal. In this case, the court shall decide on the matter itself or oblige the public procurement tribunal to decide again on the matter with due consideration of the court’s opinions as to the law. Upon application, it shall state whether the rights of the undertaking having applied for the review were violated by the contracting entity. Section 114 (2) shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 124 Binding Effect and Duty to Refer the Matter

(1) If damages are claimed because of a violation of the provisions governing the award of public contracts, and proceedings were conducted before the public procurement tribunal, the court of general jurisdiction shall be bound by the final decision of the public procurement tribunal and the decision of the Court of Appeal, and of the Federal Supreme Court on the complaint in the case of a referral pursuant to subsection (2).

(2) If a Court of Appeal wishes to deviate from a decision of another Court of Appeal or of the Federal Supreme Court, it shall refer the matter to the Federal Supreme Court. The Federal Supreme Court shall decide instead of the Court of Appeal. The duty to refer the matter shall not apply in proceedings pursuant to Section 118 (1) sentence 3 and to Section 121.

Chapter III Other Provisions

Section 125 Damages in the Event of an Abuse of Law

(1) If an application pursuant to Section 107 or the immediate complaint pursuant to Section 116 is unjustified ab initio, the applicant or the complainant shall be obliged to compensate the opponent and the parties for the damage incurred by them due to the abuse of the right to file an application or a complaint.

(2) An abuse shall exist in particular

1. if a suspension or further suspension of the award procedure is achieved through incorrect statements made intentionally or with gross negligence;

2. if the review is applied for with the intention of obstructing the award procedure or of harming competitors;

3. an application is made with the intention of subsequently withdrawing it for payment of money or other benefits.

(3) If the temporary measures taken by the public procurement tribunal in accordance with a specific application pursuant to Section 115 (3) were unjustified ab initio, the applicant shall compensate the contracting entity for the damage arising from the enforcement of the measures that were ordered.

Section 126 Claim to Compensation for Damage

If the contracting entity violates a provision intended to protect undertakings, and if the undertaking would have had a real chance without this violation of being granted the award upon an assessment of the tenders, which, as a consequence of that infringement, was adversely affected, the undertaking may demand compensation for the costs of preparing the tender or of participating in an award procedure. Further damage claims shall remain unaffected.

Section 127 Empowering Provisions

The Federal Government may by ordinance issue rules with the approval of the Bundesrat

1. to implement the thresholds of the directives of the European Communities concerning the coordination of procedures to award public contracts in German law;

2. to more precisely define the activities in the fields of drinking water or energy supply, transport or telecommunications insofar as this is necessary to perform obligations arising from the directives of the European Communities;

3. to more precisely define the affiliated undertakings to whose services to contracting entities operating in the field of drinking water or energy supply, transport or telecommunications this Part is not applicable pursuant to the directives of the European Communities;

4. to more precisely define the contracts of undertakings of drinking water or energy supply, transport or telecommunications to which this Part is not applicable pursuant to the directives of the European Communities;

5. to precisely delimit the competence of the public procurement tribunals of the Federation and the Länder as well as of the public procurement tribunals of the Länder in relation to each other;

6. concerning a procedure whereby contracting entities may obtain a certificate by independent auditors to the effect that their award conduct is in compliance with the provisions of this Act and of the provisions issued on the basis of this Act;

7. concerning a corrective mechanism pursuant to Chapter 3 and a voluntary conciliation procedure of the European Commission pursuant to Chapter 4 of Directive 92/13/EEC of the Council of the European Communities of 25 February 1992 (OJ EC No. L 76 p. 14);

8. concerning the information to be transmitted by the contracting entities, the public procurement tribunals and the appeal courts to the Federal Ministry of Economics in order to fulfil obligations arising from directives of the Council of the European Communities.

Section 128 Costs of the Proceedings before the Public Procurement Tribunal

(1) Costs (fees and expenses) to cover the administrative expense shall be charged for official acts of the public procurement tribunals. The Administrative Cost Act shall apply.

(2) The amount of the fees shall be determined according to the personnel and material expenses of the public procurement tribunal, account being taken the economic significance of the subject matter of review. The fee shall amount to at least DM 5,000; this amount may for reasons of equity be reduced to a minimum of one tenth of its amount. The fee should not exceed the amount of DM 50,000, but may be increased up to an amount of DM 100,000 in individual cases if the expense or the economic significance is unusually high.

(3) A party to the proceedings shall bear the costs insofar as the party is unsuccessful. Several debtors shall be jointly and severally liable. If the application becomes obsolete by withdrawal or otherwise before the decision of the public procurement tribunal, half of the fee shall be payable. For reasons of equity, payment of the fee may be waived entirely or partially.

(4) Insofar as an action before the public procurement tribunal is successful, or the public procurement review office grants an application, the expenses necessary to appropriately pursue the matter shall be refunded. Insofar as a party to the proceedings is unsuccessful, that party shall bear the respondent’s expenses necessary for appropriately pursuing the matter or legally defending itself. Section 80 of the Administrative Procedure Act and the corresponding provisions of the administrative procedure acts of the Länder shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 129 Costs of the Public Procurement Review Offices

For the official acts of the public procurement review offices of the Federation which go beyond the reviewing activities specified in Section 103 (2) sentence 1 and the measures of the public procurement review offices involved therein, costs to cover the administrative costs shall be charged. Section 128 shall apply mutatis mutandis. The fee shall amount to 20 percent of the minimum fee pursuant to Section 128 (2); if the expense or the economic significance is unusually high in an individual case, the fee may be increased up to the amount of the full minimum fee.

Part V Area of Application of the Act

Section 130 Public Undertakings; Area of Application

(1) This Act shall apply also to undertakings which are entirely or partly in public ownership or are managed or operated by public authorities. The provisions of the Parts I to III of this Act shall not be applicable to the German Federal Bank and to the Reconstruction Loan Corporation.

(2) This Act shall apply to all restraints of competition having an effect within the area of application of this Act, also if they were caused outside the area of application of this Act.

(3) The provisions of the Energy Industry Act shall not preclude the application of Sections 19 and 20.

Part VI Transitional and Final Provisions

Section 131 Repeal, Transitional Provisions

(1) The Act Against Restraints of Competition as published on 20 February 1990 (Federal Law Gazette I, p. 235), last amended by Articles 1,2 (3) of the Act of 26 August 1998 (Federal Law Gazette I, p. 2512) , is repealed.

(2) Agreements and decisions within the meaning of Section 5c of the Act Against Restraints of Competition in the version referred to in subsection (1) shall be exempt from the prohibition under Section 1 until the expiry of two years after the entry into force of this Act.

(3) Agreements and decisions for which an authorisation was granted pursuant to Section 5 (2) or (3), Section 6 (2) or Section 7 of the Act Against Restraints of Competition in the version referred to in subsection (1) shall be exempt from the prohibition under Section 1 until the expiry of one year after the entry into force of this Act. If the authorisation was granted for a shorter time period, the exemption shall expire on the expiry of that shorter time period.

(4) Agreements within the meaning of Sections 20 and 21 of the Act Against Restraints of Competition in the version referred to in subsection (1) which impose obligations upon the acquirer or licensee as regards the determination of prices for the protected object shall be exempt from the prohibition under Section 17 (1) until the expiry of one year after the entry into force of this Act.

(5) Competition rules recognised by the cartel authority pursuant to Sections 28 to 31 of the Act Against Restraints of Competition in the version referred to in subsection (1) shall be exempt from the prohibition under Section 1 until the expiry of one year after the entry into force of this Act.

(6) Section 1 shall not be applicable to agreements between airlines which took effect before the entry into force of this Act, until the expiry of two years after the entry into force of this Act, if and insofar as they deal with transportation services beyond the borders of the territory in which the Treaty Establishing the European Community is applicable.

(7) Agreements, decisions and recommendations of the kind described in Section 29 which took effect before the entry into force of this Act shall also remain effective thereafter. The cartel authority shall declare them to be of no effect within a period of two years after the entry into force of this Act if they no longer satisfy the conditions of this Act. Section 29 (5) sentence 4 shall be applicable.

(8) Sections 103, 103a and 105 of the Act Against Restraints of Competition in the version referred to in subsection (1), as well as those other provisions which refer to them, shall continue to apply insofar as they concern the public supply of water. The same shall apply in this respect to provisions to which the above provisions refer.

(9) Sections 23 to 24a of the Act Against Restraints of Competition in the version referred to in subsection (1), as well as those other provisions which refer to them, shall continue to apply to concentrations reaching the thresholds of Section 35 (1) which were put into effect and not notified or not finally reviewed by the Federal Cartel Office before the entry into force of this Act. The same shall apply in this respect to provisions to which the above provisions refer.

The above translation was provided by the law firm of Hengeler Mueller Weitzel Wirtz and the Federal Cartel Office. Reproduced with kind permission. This HTML edition by Lawrence Schäfer and © 2000 Gerhard Dannemann. The contents of this page may be downloaded and printed out in single copies for individual use only. Making multiple copies without permission is prohibited.

Insolvency Statute (Insolvenzordnung, InsO)

Insolvency Statute – Contents

  1. Part One: General Provisions
    1. Section 1: Objectives of the Insolvency Proceedings
    2. Section 2: Jurisdiction of the Local Court as Insolvency Court
    3. Section 3: Local Jurisdiction
    4. Section 4: Applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung)
    5. Section 4a: Deferment of the Cost of the Insolvency Proceedings
    6. Section 4b: Repayment and Adjustment of the Deferred Amounts
    7. Section 4c: Rescission of Deferment
    8. Section 4d: Legal recourse
    9. Section 5: Principles of the Insolvency Proceedings
    10. Section 6: Immediate Appeal
    11. Section 7: Appeal on Points of Law
    12. Section 8: Service
    13. Section 9: Publication
    14. Section 10: Hearing of the Debtor
  2. Part Two: Opening of Insolvency Proceedings. Involved Assets and Parties
    1. Chapter One: Prerequisites of Opening and Opening Proceedings
      1. Section 11: Admissibility of Insolvency Proceedings
      2. Section 12: Corporations under Public Law
      3. Section 13: Request to Open Insolvency Proceedings
      4. Section 14: Request by the Creditor
      5. Section 15: Entitlement to Request the Opening of Insolvency Proceedings for Assets Owned by Corporations and for the Assets Owned by Companies without Legal Personality
      6. Section 16: Reason to Open Insolvency Proceedings
      7. Section 17: Illiquidity
      8. Section 18: Imminent Illiquidity
      9. Section 19: Overindebtedness
      10. Section 20: Obligation of Disclosure During the Opening Proceeding, Reference to Discharge of Residual Debt
      11. Section 21: Decisions Ordering Arrestment
      12. Section 22: Legal Status of the Temporary Insolvency Administrator
      13. Section 23: Publication of Restriction on Property Transfers
      14. Section 24: Effects of Restrictions on Property Transfers
      15. Section 25: Repeal of Measures of Arrestment
      16. Section 26: Refusal for Lacking Assets
      17. Section 27: Order Opening the Insolvency Proceedings
      18. Section 28: Requirements Incumbent on the Creditors and Debtors
      19. Section 29: Docketing of Meetings
      20. Section 30: Publication of the Order Opening the Insolvency Proceedings.
      21. Section 31: Commercial Register, Register of Cooperatives and Register of Associations
      22. Section 32: Land Register
      23. Section 33: Ship/Aircraft Register
      24. Section 34: Appeal
    2. Chapter Two: Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings. Classification of Creditors
      1. Section 35: Definition of the Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings
      2. Section 36: Objects not Subject to Attachment
      3. Section 37: Joint Marital Property of a Community
      4. Section 38: Definition of the Creditors of the Insolvency Proceedings
      5. Section 39: Lower ranking Creditors of the Insolvency Proceedings
      6. Section 40: Claims to Maintenance
      7. Section 41: Immature Claims
      8. Section 42: Claims Subject to a Resolutory Condition
      9. Section 43: Liability Incumbent on Several Persons
      10. Section 44: Rights of Obligors Liable Jointly and Severally and of Guarantors
      11. Section 45: Conversion of Claims
      12. Section 46: Recurring Payments
      13. Section 47: Right to Separation
      14. Section 48: Right to Separation Extending to the Consideration Received as a Substitute for the Object of Separation
      15. Section 49: Separate Satisfaction from Immovables
      16. Section 50: Separate Satisfaction of Pledgees
      17. Section 51: Other creditors with a Claim to Separate Satisfaction
      18. Section 52: Elimination of Creditors with a Right to Separate Satisfaction
      19. Section 53: Creditors of the Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings
      20. Section 54: Costs of the Insolvency Proceedings
      21. Section 55: Other Debts incumbent on the Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings
    3. Chapter Three: Insolvency Administrator Bodies Representing the Creditors
      1. Section 56: Designation of an Insolvency Administrator
      2. Section 57: Election of a Different Insolvency Administrator
      3. Section 58: Supervision by the Insolvency Court
      4. Section 59: Dismissal of the Insolvency Administrator
      5. Section 60: Liability of the Insolvency Administrator
      6. Section 61: Nonperformance of Debts incumbent on the Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings
      7. Section 62: Period of Limitation
      8. Section 63: Remuneration of the Insolvency Administrator
      9. Section 64: Determination by the Insolvency Court
      10. Section 65: Empowerment to issue an Order
      11. Section 66: Rendering of Accounts
      12. Section 67: Establishment of the Creditors’ Committee
      13. Section 68: Election of Different Members
      14. Section 69: Duties Incumbent on the Creditors’ Committee
      15. Section 70: Dismissal
      16. Section 71: Liability of the Members of the Creditors’ Committee
      17. Section 72: Decisions of the Creditors’ Committee
      18. Section 73: Remuneration of the Members of the Creditors’ Committee
      19. Section 74: Convening the Creditors’ Assembly
      20. Section 75: Request to Convene a Creditors’ Assembly
      21. Section 76: Decisions of the Creditors’ Assembly
      22. Section 77: Determination of Voting Right
      23. Section 78: Repeal of a Decision taken by the Creditors’ Assembly
      24. Section 79: Information to the Creditors’ Assembly
  3. Part Three: Effects of the Opening of Insolvency Proceedings
    1. Chapter One: General Effects
      1. Section 80: Right to Manage and Transfer the Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings Vested in the Insolvency Administrator
      2. Section 81: Transfers of Property by the Debtor
      3. Section 82: Performance in Favour of the Debtor
      4. Section 83: Decedent’s Estate. Continued Community
      5. Section 84: Liquidation of a Company or a Community
      6. Section 85: Joinder of Pending Actions as Plaintiff
      7. Section 86: Joinder of Certain Pending Actions as Defendant
      8. Section 87: Claims Held by the Creditors of the Insolvency Proceedings
      9. Section 88: Execution prior to the Opening of Insolvency Proceedings
      10. Section 89: Prohibition of Execution
      11. Section 90: Prohibition of Execution under Debts incumbent on the Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings
      12. Section 91: Exclusion of other Acquisition of Rights
      13. Section 92: General Damage
      14. Section 93: Unlimited Liability of Partners
      15. Section 94: Preservation of the Right to Set Off a Claim
      16. Section 95: Acquisition of the Right to Set Off a Claim During the Proceedings
      17. Section 96: Prohibition of Set-Off
      18. Section 97: The Debtor’s Obligation to Disclosure and Cooperation
      19. Section 98: Imposition of the Duties of the Debtor
      20. Section 99: Interception of the Debtor’s Mail
      21. Section 100: Maintenance Payments using the Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings
      22. Section 101: Members of the Body Representing the Debtor. Employees
      23. Section 102: Restriction of a Basic Right
    2. Chapter Two: Performance of Transactions. Cooperation of the Works Council
      1. Section 103: Option to be Exercised by the Insolvency Administrator
      2. Section 104: Fixed-date Transactions. Financial Futures
      3. Section 105: Severable Contracts
      4. Section 106: Priority Notice
      5. Section 107: Retention of Title
      6. Section 108: Continuity of Severable Contracts
      7. Section 109: Debtor’s Status as Tenant or Lessee
      8. Section 110: Debtor’s Status as Landlord or Lessor
      9. Section 111: Sale of Property Let by the Debtor
      10. Section 112: Prohibition to Terminate Tenancy or Lease Contracts
      11. Section 113: Termination of a Service contract
      12. Section 114: Emoluments from a Service contract
      13. Section 115: Expiry of Mandates
      14. Section 116: Expiry of Management Contracts
      15. Section 117: Expiry of Proxies
      16. Section 118: Liquidation of Companies
      17. Section 119: Invalidity of Agreements Derogating from the Foregoing Provisions
      18. Section 120: Termination of Plant Agreements
      19. Section 121: Plant Modifications and Conciliatory Proceeding
      20. Section 122: Judicial Approval of a Plant Modification
      21. Section 123: Scope of the Social Plan
      22. Section 124: Social Plan Established prior to the Opening of Insolvency Proceedings
      23. Section 125: Reconciliation of Interests and Dismissals Protection
      24. Section 126: Judicial Orders Deciding on Dismissal Protection
      25. Section 127: Action brought by the Employee
      26. Section 128: Sale of Plant
    3. Chapter Three: Contest of the Debtor’s Transactions in Insolvency Proceedings
      1. Section 129: Policy
      2. Section 130: Congruent Coverage
      3. Section 131: Incongruent Coverage
      4. Section 132: Transactions Immediately Disadvantaging the Creditors of the Insolvency Proceedings
      5. Section 133: Wilful Disadvantage
      6. Section 134: Gratuitous Benefit
      7. Section 135: Loans Replacing Equity Capital
      8. Section 136: Silent Partnership
      9. Section 137: Payments on Bills of Exchange and Cheques
      10. Section 138: Persons with a Close Relationship to the Debtor
      11. Section 139: Calculation of Time Periods prior to the Request to Open Insolvency Proceedings
      12. Section 140: Date of Performance of Transaction
      13. Section 141: Executable Deed
      14. Section 142: Cash Transactions
      15. Section 143: Legal Consequences
      16. Section 144: Claims of the Party to the Contested Transaction
      17. Section 145: Transactions Contested and Enforced against Legal Successors
      18. Section 146: Limitation of the Right to Contest
      19. Section 147: Transactions carried out subsequent to the Opening of Insolvency Proceedings
  4. Part Four: Management and Disposition of the Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings
    1. Chapter One: Arrestment of the Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings
      1. Section 148: Transfer of the Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings
      2. Section 149: Objects of Value
      3. Section 150: Sealing
      4. Section 151: Record of the Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings
      5. Section 152: Record of Creditors
      6. Section 153: Survey of Property
      7. Section 154: Deposit with the Registry of the Insolvency Court
      8. Section 155: Accounting under Commercial and Fiscal Laws
    2. Chapter Two: Decision on Disposition
      1. Section 156: Report Meeting
      2. Section 157: Decision on the Further Proceedings
      3. Section 158: Measures taken prior to the Decision
      4. Section 159: Disposition of the Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings
      5. Section 160: Transactions of Particular Importance
      6. Section 161: Provisional Prohibition of the Transaction
      7. Section 162: Sale of Plant to Persons with Specific Interests
      8. Section 163: Sale of Plant below Value
      9. Section 164: Legal Validity of the Transaction
      10. Chapter Three: Objects Subject to a Right to Separate Satisfaction
      11. Section 165: Disposition of Immovables
      12. Section 166: Disposition of Movables
      13. Section 167: Notification of the Creditor
      14. Section 168: Notification of Envisaged Sale
      15. Section 169: Protection of the Creditor Against Delayed Disposition
      16. Section 170: Distribution of Proceeds
      17. Section 171: Calculation of the Contribution to Costs
      18. Section 172: Other Use of Movables
      19. Section 173: Disposition by the Creditor
  5. Part Five: Satisfaction of the Creditors of the Insolvency Proceedings. Discontinuation of the proceedings
    1. Chapter One: Determination of Claims
      1. Section 174: Filing of Claims
      2. Section 175: Schedule
      3. Section 176: Proceedings of the Verification Meeting
      4. Section 177: Subsequent Filings
      5. Section 178: Prerequisites and Effects of Determination of Claims
      6. Section 179: Denied Claims
      7. Section 180: Competence for the Determination of Claims
      8. Section 181: Scope of Determination
      9. Section 182: Value of Action
      10. Section 183: Effect of the Decision
      11. Section 184: Action to Enforce a Claim Denied by the Debtor
      12. Section 185: Special Jurisdiction
      13. Section 186: Restitutio in Integrum
    2. Chapter Two: Distribution
      1. Section 187: Satisfaction of the Creditors of the Insolvency Proceedings
      2. Section 188: Distribution Record
      3. Section 189: Consideration of Denied Claims
      4. Section 190: Consideration of Creditors with a Right to Separate Satisfaction
      5. Section 191: Consideration of Conditional Claims
      6. Section 192: Subsequent Consideration
      7. Section 193: Amendments to the Distribution Record
      8. Section 194: Objections to the Distribution Record
      9. Section 195: Determination of a Fraction
      10. Section 196: Final Distribution
      11. Section 197: Final Meeting
      12. Section 198: Deposit of Retained Funds
      13. Section 199: Surplus Resulting from Final Distribution
      14. Section 200: Termination of the Insolvency Proceedings
      15. Section 201: Rights of the Creditors of the Insolvency Proceedings subsequent to Termination
      16. Section 202: Jurisdiction for Actions to Enable Execution
      17. Section 203: Judicial Order to Hold Delayed Distribution
      18. Section 204: Appeal
      19. Section 205: Implementation of a Delayed Distribution
      20. Section 206: Exclusion of the Creditors of the Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings
    3. Chapter Three: Discontinuation of Insolvency Proceedings
      1. Section 207: Discontinuation for Lacking Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings
      2. Section 208: Notification of Lacking Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings
      3. Section 209: Satisfaction of the Creditors of the Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings
      4. Section 210: Prohibition of Execution
      5. Section 211: Discontinuation upon Notification of Lacking Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings
      6. Section 212: Discontinuation for Subsequent Lack of Grounds to Open Insolvency Proceedings
      7. Section 213: Discontinuation with the Creditor’s Consent
      8. Section 214: Discontinuation Procedure
      9. Section 215: Publication and Legal Effects of Discontinuation
      10. Section 216: Appeal
  6. Part Six: Insolvency Plan
    1. Chapter One: Establishment of the Plan
      1. Section 217: Policy
      2. Section 218: Submission of the Insolvency Plan
      3. Section 219: Breakdown of the Plan
      4. Section 220: Declaratory Part
      5. Section 221: Constructive Part
      6. Section 222: Formation of Groups
      7. Section 223: Rights of Creditors Entitled to Separate Satisfaction
      8. Section 224: Rights of the Creditors of the Insolvency Proceedings
      9. Section 225: Rights of Lower-ranking Creditors of the Insolvency Proceedings
      10. Section 226: Equal Treatment of Parties Involved
      11. Section 227: Debtor’s Liability
      12. Section 228: Modification of Conditions under Property Law
      13. Section 229: Survey of Assets. Earnings and Finance Plan
      14. Section 230: Further Attachments
      15. Section 231: Refusal of the Plan
      16. Section 232: Comments on the Plan
      17. Section 233: Suspension of Disposition and Distribution
      18. Section 234: Laying Out of Plan
    2. Chapter Two: Acceptance and Confirmation of the Plan
      1. Section 235: Discussion and Voting Meeting
      2. Section 236: Coincidence with the Verification Meeting
      3. Section 237: Voting Right of the Creditors of the Insolvency Proceedings
      4. Section 238: Voting Right of Creditors Entitled to Separate Satisfaction
      5. Section 239: Voting List
      6. Section 240: Modification of the Plan
      7. Section 241: Separate Voting Meeting
      8. Section 242: Voting in Writing
      9. Section 243: Voting by Groups
      10. Section 244: Necessary Majorities
      11. Section 245: Prohibition to Obstruct
      12. Section 246: Consent of Lower-ranking Creditors of the Insolvency proceedings
      13. Section 247: Debtor’s Consent
      14. Section 248: Confirmation by the Court
      15. Section 249: Conditioned Plan
      16. Section 250: Contravention of procedural Provisions
      17. Section 251: Protection of Minorities
      18. Section 252: Publication of Decision
      19. Section 253: Appeal
    3. Chapter Three: Effects of the Confirmed Plan. Surveillance of Implementation of the Plan
      1. Section 254: General Effects of the Plan
      2. Section 255: Proviso of Revival
      3. Section 256: Denied Claims. Remaining Claims
      4. Section 257: Execution under the Plan
      5. Section 258: Termination of the Insolvency proceedings
      6. Section 259: Effects of Termination
      7. Section 260: Surveillance of Implementation of the Plan
      8. Section 261: Tasks and Rights of the Insolvency Administrator
      9. Section 262: Obligation to Disclosure incumbent on the Insolvency Administrator
      10. Section 263: Transaction requiring Consent
      11. Section 264: Loan Ceiling
      12. Section 265: Lower-ranking Status of New Creditors
      13. Section 266: Consideration of Lower-ranking Status
      14. Section 267: Publication of Surveillance
      15. Section 268: Termination of Surveillance
      16. Section 269: Costs of Surveillance
  7. Part Seven: Personal Management
    1. Section 270: Prerequisites
    2. Section 271: Subsequent Order
    3. Section 272: Repeal of the Order
    4. Section 273: Publication
    5. Section 274: Legal Status of the Custodian
    6. Section 275: Consent of the Custodian
    7. Section 276: Consent of the Creditors’ Committee
    8. Section 277: Ordering the Requirement of Consent
    9. Section 278: Funds for the Debtor’s Livelihood
    10. Section 279: Mutual Contracts
    11. Section 280: Liability. Contest of the Debtor’s Transactions in Insolvency Proceedings
    12. Section 281: Notification of Creditors
    13. Section 282: Disposition of Securities
    14. Section 283: Satisfaction of the Creditors of the Insolvency Proceedings
    15. Section 284: Insolvency Plan
    16. Section 285: Lacking Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings
  8. Part Eight: Discharge of Residual Debt
    1. Section 286: Policy
    2. Section 287: Debtor’s Request
    3. Section 288: Right of Proposal
    4. Section 289: Decision by the Insolvency Court
    5. Section 290: Refusal of Discharge of Residual Debt
    6. Section 291: Notification of Discharge of Residual Debt
    7. Section 292: Legal Status of Trustee
    8. Section 293: Trustee’s Remuneration
    9. Section 294: Equal Treatment of Creditors
    10. Section 295: Obligations of the Debtor
    11. Section 296: Contravention of Obligations
    12. Section 297: Insolvency Offences
    13. Section 298: Coverage of the Trustee’s Minimum Remuneration
    14. Section 299: Expiry before Date
    15. Section 300: Decision on Discharge of Residual Debt
    16. Section 301: Effect of Discharge of Residual Debt
    17. Section 302: Excepted Claims
    18. Section 303: Retraction of Discharge of Residual Debt
  9. Part Nine: Consumer Insolvency Proceedings and other Minor Proceedings
    1. Chapter One: Scope of Application
      1. Section 304: Principle
    2. Chapter Two: Plan for the Settlement of Debts
      1. Section 305: Debtor’s Request to open Insolvency Proceedings
      2. Section 305: a Failure of Out-of-Court Debt Settlement
      3. Section 306: Suspension of Proceedings
      4. Section 307: Service on the Creditors
      5. Section 308: Acceptance of the Plan for the Settlement of Debts
      6. Section 309: Replacement of Approval
      7. Section 310: Costs
    3. Chapter Three: Simplified Insolvency Proceedings
      1. Section 311: Initiation of the Proceedings concerning Opening of Insolvency Proceedings
      2. Section 312: General Procedural Simplifications
      3. Section 313: Trustees
      4. Section 314: Simplified Distribution
  10. Part Ten: Special Types of Insolvency Proceeding
    1. Chapter One: Insolvency Proceeding of a Decedent’s Estate
      1. Section 315: Local Jurisdiction
      2. Section 316: Admissibility of the Opening of Insolvency Proceedings
      3. Section 317: Persons Entitled to Request the Opening of Insolvency Proceedings
      4. Section 318: Entitlement to Make the Request for the Joint Marital Property
      5. Section 319: Request Deadline
      6. Section 320: Reasons for Opening
      7. Section 321: Execution following Succession
      8. Section 322: Contestable Transactions on the Part of’ the Heir
      9. Section 323: The Heir’s Expenses
      10. Section 324: Debts incumbent on the Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings
      11. Section 325: Obligations incumbent on the Estate
      12. Section 326: The Heirs’ Claims
      13. Section 327: Lower-ranking Obligations
      14. Section 328: Restituted Objects
      15. Section 329: Revisionary Succession
      16. Section 330: Purchase of a Decedent’s Estate
      17. Section 331: Simultaneous Insolvency of the Heir
    2. Chapter Two: Insolvency Proceedings relating to the Joint Marital Property with Continued Community
      1. Section 332: Transfer to Insolvency Proceedings opened for an Estate
    3. Chapter Three: Insolvency Proceedings relating to the Jointly Administered Joint Marital Property of a Community
      1. Section 333: Right to file a Request. Grounds for Opening Proceedings
      2. Section 334: Personal Liability of the Spouses
  11. Part Eleven: Entering into Force
    1. Section 335: Referral to Introductory Act

Part One: General Provisions

Section 1: Objectives of the Insolvency Proceedings

The insolvency proceedings shall serve the purpose of collective satisfaction of a debtor’s creditors by liquidation of the debtor’s assets and by distribution of the proceeds, or by reaching an arrangement in an insolvency plan, particularly in order to maintain the enterprise. Honest debtors shall be given the opportunity to achieve discharge of residual debt.

Section 2: Jurisdiction of the Local Court as Insolvency Court

(1) The Local Court in whose district a Regional Court is located shall have exclusive jurisdiction for insolvency proceedings as the insolvency court for the district of such Regional Court.

(2) The governments of the Länder shall be empowered to designate other or additional Local Courts as insolvency courts by means of a legal ordinance for the purposes of expedient furtherance or expedited conduct of proceedings, and to determine different districts of insolvency courts. The governments of the Länder may delegate such power to the judicial administrations of the Länder.

Section 3: Local Jurisdiction

(1) The insolvency court in whose district the debtor has his usual venue shall have exclusive local jurisdiction. If the centre of the debtor’s self-employed business activity is located elsewhere, the insolvency court in whose district such place is located shall have exclusive jurisdiction.

(2) If several courts have jurisdiction, the court first requested to open the insolvency proceedings shall exclude any other jurisdiction.

Section 4: Applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung)

Unless this statute provides otherwise the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply to the insolvency proceedings mutatis mutandis.

Section 4a: Deferment of the Costs of the Insolvency Proceedings

(1) If the debtor is an individual and if he has made a request for discharge of residual debt, the cost of the insolvency proceedings shall be deferred on request until such time as discharge of residual debt is awarded, insofar as his assets are likely not to be sufficient to cover these costs. Deferment in accordance with the first sentence shall also cover the costs of the proceedings regarding the plan for the settlement of debts and the proceedings for discharge of residual debt. The debtor shall enclose with the request a declaration as to whether one of the grounds for refusal contained in section 290 subs. 1 Nos. 1 and 3 pertains. Deferment shall be ruled out if such a reason pertains.

(2) If the cost of the proceedings are deferred to the debtor, on request a lawyer of his choice shall be appointed who is willing to represent him if representation by counsel appears to be necessary in spite of the duty of assistance incumbent on the court.

Section 121 subs. 3 to 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(3) The effect of deferment shall be as follows:

1. the Federal or Land cash office may claim

a) court costs in arrears and those arising,

b) the claims of the appointed lawyer which transfer to the cash office against the debtor only in accordance with the provisions made by the court;

2. the appointed lawyer is unable to assert claims for fees against the debtor. Deferment shall be effected separately in respect of each stage of the proceedings. Until such time as a decision is made regarding deferment, the effects specified in the first sentence shall apply on an interim basis. Section 4b subs. 2 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 4b: Repayment and Adjustment of the Deferred Amounts

(1) If the debtor is unable once discharge of residual debt has been awarded to pay the deferred amount from his income and his assets, the court may extend deferment and set the monthly instalments to be paid. Section 115 subs. 1 and 2, as well as section 120 subs. 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(2) The court may alter the ruling regarding the deferment and the monthly instalments at any time insofar as any personal or economic circumstances relevant to the deferment have undergone major changes. The debtor shall be obliged to report to the court a major change in these circumstances without delay. Section 120 subs. 4 first and second sentences of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply mutatis mutandis. A change placing the debtor at a disadvantage shall be ruled out if four years have passed since termination of the proceedings.

Section 4c: Rescission of Deferment

The court may rescind deferment if

1. the debtor intentionally or with gross negligence has provided incorrect information regarding circumstances relevant to the opening of the insolvency proceedings or to the deferment, or has not submitted a declaration required by the court regarding his circumstances;

2. the personal or economic preconditions for deferment did not apply; in such a case, rescission shall be ruled out if four years have passed since termination of the proceedings;

3. the debtor is more than three months in arrears in respect of payment of a monthly instalment or of the payment of another amount and such arrears are his fault;

4. the debtor is not in suitable gainful employment and, if he is unemployed, is not looking for employment or rejects acceptable employment; section 296 subs. 2 second and third sentences shall apply mutatis mutandis;

5. discharge of residual debt is refused or revoked.

Section 4d: Legal recourse

(1) Immediate complaint shall be available to the debtor against refusal to defer or rescission of deferment, as well as against refusal to appoint a lawyer.

(2) If deferment is approved, the state cash office shall be entitled to file an immediate complaint. The latter may only be based on the fact that deferment should have been rejected given the personal or economic circumstances of the debtor.

Section 5: Principles of the Insolvency Proceedings

(1) The insolvency court shall investigate ex officio all circumstances relevant to insolvency proceedings. In particular, the court may hear witnesses and experts for this purpose.

(2) The court may take decisions without an oral hearing. If an oral hearing takes place, section 227 subs. 3 first sentence of the Code of Civil Procedure shall not apply.

(3) Tables and records may be prepared and processed using computer equipment.

Section 6: Immediate Appeal

(1) Decisions of the insolvency court may be only appealed if this statute provides for an immediate appeal.

(2) The period within which an immediate appeal has to be brought shall begin on the day when the court promulgates its decision or when a decision is served on the parties if not promulgated.

(3) The decision regarding the appeal shall only be effective when it becomes final. However, the court hearing the appeal may order immediate effectiveness of the decision.

Section 7: Appeal on Points of Law

An appeal on points of law may lie against the decision on the immediate appeal.

Section 8: Service

(1) Documents shall be served ex officio. They may be served by mail. The documents to be served shall not require certification.

(2) Service shall not be made to persons with unknown residence. If such persons have a representative empowered to receive any documents to be served, the documents shall be served on such representative.

(3) The insolvency court may instruct the insolvency administrator to serve the documents.

Section 9: Publication

(1) Publication shall by made by notification in the gazette or in an electronic information and communication system intended for the court; such publication maybe restricted to excerpts. Documents to be published shall mention the debtor’s particulars with special reference to his address and his branch of business. Such publication shall be deemed to have been effected when two additional days following the day of publication have expired.

(2) The insolvency court may occasion additional and repeated publications. The Federal Ministry of Justice shall be empowered to govern the details of publication in an electronic information and communication system by means of an ordinance which shall require the approval of the Bundesrat. In doing so, in particular deletion periods shall be provided for, as shall regulations ensuring that the publications

1. remain intact, complete and up-to-date,

2. can be traced to their source at any time,

3. cannot be copied by third parties in accordance with the state-of-the-art of existing technology.

(3) Publication shall suffice as evidence of service on all parties to the proceedings even if any provision additionally orders individual service.

Section 10: Hearing of the Debtor

(1) If any provision requires a hearing of the debtor such hearing may be waived if the debtor is resident in a foreign country and such hearing would unreasonably delay the proceedings, or if the debtor’s residence is unknown. In such a case a representative or relation of the debtor should be heard.

(2) If the debtor is not an individual subs. 1 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the hearing of persons entitled to represent the debtor or holding his shares.

Part Two: Opening of the Insolvency Proceedings. Involved Assets and Parties.

Chapter One: Prerequisites of Opening and Opening Proceedings

Section 11: Admissibility of Insolvency Proceedings

(1) Insolvency proceedings may be opened for the assets owned by any individual or corporation. An unincorporated association in this respect shall be deemed equivalent to a corporation.

(2) Insolvency proceedings may also be opened for:

1. the assets owned by a company without legal personality (general commercial company, limited partnership, professional partnership, company under the Civil Code, shipping company, EEIG);

2. under sections 315 to 334, the estate of a deceased person, the joint marital property of a continued community or the marital property of a community jointly administered by both spouses.

(3) After liquidation of a corporation or a company without legal personality, insolvency proceedings may be opened as long as the assets have not been distributed.

Section 12: Corporations under Public Law

(1) Insolvency proceedings may not be opened for the assets owned by

1. the Federation or a Land;

2. a corporation under public law supervised by a Land if the law of the Land exempts such corporation from insolvency proceedings.

(2) If the law of a Land exempts the assets owned by a corporation from insolvency proceedings under subs. 1 No. 2, the employees of such corporation in case of its illiquidity or overindebtedness may apply to the Land for benefits due to them in case of insolvency proceedings opened under the provisions of the Third Book of the Social Code (Drittes Buch Sozialgesetzbuch) governing insolvency substitute benefits from the Employment Office and under the provisions of the Act to Improve Occupational Pensions (Gesetz zur Verbesserung der betrieblichen Altersversorgung) from the institution ensuring insolvency insurance.

Section 13: Request to Open Insolvency Proceedings

(1) Insolvency proceedings shall be opened on request only. Such request may be filed by the creditors and by the debtor.

(2) Such request may be withdrawn until the insolvency court opens the insolvency proceedings or the request has been refused with final effect.

Section 14: Request by the Creditor

(1) A creditor’s request shall be admissible if he has a legal interest in the opening of the insolvency proceedings and shows his claim, and the reason why insolvency proceedings should be opened, to the satisfaction of the court.

(2) If a request is admissible the insolvency court shall hear the debtor.

Section 15: Entitlement to Request the Opening of Insolvency Proceedings for the Assets Owned by Corporations and for those Owned by Companies without Legal Personality

(1) As well as the creditors, any member of the board of directors of a corporation or, in the case of a company without legal personality or of a partnership limited by shares, any general partner, and any liquidator shall be entitled to request the opening of insolvency proceedings for the assets owned by such corporation or company without legal personality.

(2) If such request is not filed by all members of the board of directors, all general partners or all liquidators, it shall be admissible if the reason why insolvency proceedings should be opened is shown to the satisfaction of the court. The insolvency court shall hear the other members of the board of directors, general partners or liquidators.

(3) If in the case of a company without legal personality none of the general partners is an individual, subs. 1 and 2 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the members of the board of directors, to the general partners and to the liquidators of the partners empowered to represent the company. The same shall apply if the grouping of companies continues in this way.

Section 16: Reason to Open Insolvency Proceedings

The opening of insolvency proceedings shall require the existence of a reason to open such proceedings.

Section 17: Illiquidity

(1) Illiquidity shall be the general reason to open insolvency proceedings.

(2) The debtor shall be deemed illiquid if he is unable to meet his mature obligations to pay. Illiquidity shall be presumed as a rule if the debtor has stopped payments.

Section 18: Imminent Illiquidity

(1) If the debtor requests the opening of insolvency proceedings imminent illiquidity shall also be a reason to open.

(2) The debtor shall be deemed to be faced with imminent illiquidity if he is likely to be unable to meet his existing obligations to pay on the date of their maturity.

(3) If in the case of a corporation, or of a company without legal personality, the request is not filed by all members of the board of directors, all general partners or all liquidators, subs. 1 shall only apply if the person or persons filing the request are empowered to represent the company or the partnership.

Section 19: Overindebtedness

(1) Overindebtedness shall be also a reason to open insolvency proceedings for a corporation.

(2) Overindebtedness shall exist if the assets owned by the debtor no longer cover his existing obligations to pay. In the assessment of the debtor’s assets, however, the continuation of the enterprise shall be taken as a basis if according to the circumstances such continuation is deemed highly likely.

(3) If none of the general partners of a company without legal personality is an individual, subs. 1 and 2 shall apply mutatis mutandis. This shall not apply if the general partners include another company with an individual as general partner.

Section 20: Obligation of Disclosure during the Opening Proceeding, Reference to Discharge of Residual Debt

(1) If the request to open insolvency proceedings is admissible the debtor shall disclose to the insolvency court such information as is necessary for a decision on the request. Sections 97, 98 and 101 subs. 1 first and second sentences, and subs. 2, shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(2) If the debtor is an individual, he shall be informed that he may obtain discharge of residual debt in accordance with sections 286 to 303.

Section 21: Decisions Ordering Arrestment

(1) The insolvency court shall take all measures appearing necessary in order to avoid any detriment to the financial status of the debtor for the creditors until the insolvency court decides on the request. The debtor shall be entitled to file an immediate complaint against the ordering of the measure.

(2) In particular, the court may

1. designate a temporary insolvency administrator to whom sections 8 subs. 3, as well as sections 56 and 58 to 66 shall apply mutatis mutandis;

2. impose a general prohibition of transfers on the debtor or order that the debtor’s transfers of property shall require the consent of the temporary insolvency administrator in order to become effective;

3. order a restriction or temporary restriction on measures of execution against the debtor unless immovables are involved;

4. order a temporary interception of the debtor’s mail in respect of which sections 99 and 101 subs. 1 first sentence shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(3) If other measures prove to be insufficient the court may sub poena the debtor and have him detained after hearing him. If the debtor is not an individual the same shall apply to his directors or general partners. Section 98 subs. 3 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the ordering of detention.

Section 22: Legal Status of the Temporary Insolvency Administrator

(1) If the insolvency court designates a temporary insolvency administrator and imposes a general prohibition of transfers on the debtor the right to manage and transfer the debtor’s property shall be vested in the temporary insolvency administrator. In such cases the temporary insolvency administrator shall:

1. see to the arrestment and preservation of the debtor’s property;

2. continue an enterprise operated by the debtor until the insolvency court decides on the opening of the insolvency proceedings, unless the insolvency court consents to a close-down of such enterprise in order to avoid a considerable loss of the debtor’s property;

3. verify whether the debtor’s property will cover the costs of the insolvency proceedings; in addition, the insolvency court may charge him as an expert with verification of whether a reason to open insolvency proceedings exists, and which prospects exist for the continuation of the debtor’s enterprise.

(2) If the insolvency court designates a temporary insolvency administrator without imposing a general prohibition of transfers on the debtor the court shall determine the duties of such temporary insolvency administrator. Such duties may not exceed the duties under subs. 1 second sentence.

(3) The temporary insolvency administrator shall be entitled to enter the debtor’s business premises and to investigate there. The debtor shall grant the temporary insolvency administrator inspection of his books and business documents. The debtor must disclose to him any necessary information; sections 97, 98 and 101 subs. 1 first and second sentences and subs. 2 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 23: Publication of Restriction on Property Transfers

(1) The decision ordering any of the restrictions on property transfers mentioned at section 21 subs. 2 No. 2 and designating a temporary insolvency administrator shall be published. It shall be individually served on the debtor, on any person with an obligation to the debtor, and on the temporary insolvency administrator. At the same time the debtor’s obligors shall be required to meet their obligations to the debtor exclusively in compliance with the order.

(2) If the debtor is registered in a Commercial Register, in a Register of Cooperatives, in a Register of Partnerships or in a Register of Associations the registry of the insolvency court shall send a copy of such order to the registering court.

(3) Sections 32 and 33 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the registration of restrictions on property transfers in the land register, the register of ships and the register of ships under construction, as well as in the register of liens on aircraft.

Section 24: Effects of Restrictions on Property Transfers

(1) Sections 81 and 82 shall apply mutatis mutandis to any contravention of the restrictions on property transfers mentioned at section 21 subs. 2 No. 2.

(2) If the right to transfer the debtor’s property has been vested in a temporary insolvency administrator, section 85 subs. 1 first sentence and section 86 shall apply mutatis mutandis to pending actions.

Section 25: Repeal of Measures of Arrestment

(1) If the measures of arrestment are repealed, section 23 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the publication of the repeal of a restriction on property transfer.

(2) If the right to transfer the debtor’s property has been vested in a temporary insolvency administrator he shall settle any costs incurred using the property administered by him and meet any obligation entered into by him before his designation is repealed. The same shall apply to obligations under continuing obligations if the temporary insolvency administrator has received the consideration under such contract for the property administered by him.

Section 26: Refusal for Lacking Assets

(1) The insolvency court shall refuse a request to open insolvency proceedings if the debtor’s assets will probably be insufficient to cover the costs of the proceedings. Such refusal shall be excluded if a sufficient amount of money is advanced, or the costs have been deferred in accordance with Section 4a.

(2) The court shall enter any debtor for whom a request to open insolvency proceedings has been refused for lacking assets into a record (record of debtors). The provisions governing the record of debtors under the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply mutatis mutandis; the entry shall however be cancelled after a period of five years.

(3) Anyone advancing an amount of money under subs. 1 second sentence may claim reimbursement of the advanced amount by any person who, in contravention of the provisions of company law, as well as in contravention of his duties and wrongfully, has not requested the opening of insolvency proceedings. Failing agreement as to whether such person has acted in contravention of his duties and wrongfully in refraining from such request, the burden of proof shall shift to him. The claim shall be subject to limitation after five years.

Section 27: Order Opening the Insolvency Proceedings

(1) If insolvency proceedings are opened the insolvency court shall designate an insolvency administrator. Sections 270 and 313 subs. 1 shall remain unaffected.

(2) The order opening the insolvency proceedings shall specify:

1. the business name or name and first names, branch of business or occupation, commercial establishment or place of abode of the debtor;

2. the name and address of the insolvency administrator;

3. the hour when the insolvency proceedings were opened.

(3) If the order does not specify the hour when the insolvency proceedings were opened the moment of opening shall be deemed the noon of the day when the order was issued.

Section 28: Requirements Incumbent on the Creditors and Debtors

(1) In the order opening the insolvency proceedings the creditors shall be required to file their claims in compliance with section 174 with the insolvency administrator within a definite period of time. Such period of time shall be fixed to extend over not less than two weeks and not more than three months.

(2) In the order opening the insolvency proceedings the creditors shall be required immediately to inform the insolvency administrator which security interests they claim to have in personal property or rights of the debtor. Details are to be provided of the object of the claimed security interest, the nature and causal origin of the security interest, as well as the secured claim. Any person who by fault omits to provide this information, or provides it late, shall be liable for the consequent damage.

(3) In the order opening the insolvency proceedings, those persons having obligations to the debtor shall be required no longer to fulfil these obligations to the debtor, but to the administrator.

Section 29: Docketing of Meetings

(1) In the order opening the insolvency proceedings the insolvency court shall docket meetings for:

1. a creditors’ assembly deciding on the continuation of the insolvency proceedings based on the insolvency administrator’s report (report meeting); such meeting shall be docketed within six weeks and must not be docketed more than three months later;

2. a creditors’ assembly verifying the filed claims (verification meeting); the period of time between expiry of the period to file claims and the verification meeting shall extend over not less than one week and not more than two months.

(2) The meetings may coincide.

Section 30: Publication of the Order Opening the Insolvency Proceedings

(1) The registry of the insolvency court shall publish the order opening the insolvency proceedings immediately. Notwithstanding Section 9 remaining unaffected, the notification is to be published in extract form in the Federal Bulletin.

(2) The order shall be served individually on the debtor’s creditors and obligors and on the debtor himself.

Section 31: Commercial Register, Register of Cooperatives, Register of Partnerships and Register of Associations

If the debtor is registered in a Commercial Register, in a Register of Cooperatives, in a Register of Partnerships or in a Register of Associations, the registry of the insolvency court shall send to the registering court:

1. a copy of the order opening the insolvency proceedings if insolvency proceedings have been opened;

2. a copy of the order refusing the opening of insolvency proceedings if the opening of insolvency proceedings has been refused for lacking assets, and if the debtor is a corporation or a company without legal personality liquidated by such refusing order.

Section 32: Land Register

(1) The opening of insolvency proceedings shall be entered in the Land Register:

1. for any parcel of real estate with the debtor registered as owner;

2. for the debtor’s registered rights to real estate or to registered rights if the type of such rights and the circumstances give rise to the suspicion that the creditors of the insolvency proceedings would be placed at a disadvantage without such entry.

(2) If the insolvency court is aware of such parcels of real estate or such rights it shall request entry by the Land Register ex officio. Such entry may also be requested from the Land Register Office by the insolvency administrator.

(3) If the administrator releases or sells a parcel of real estate or a right for which the opening of the insolvency proceedings has been registered, the insolvency court shall request the Land Register to delete such entry. Such deletion may also be requested from the Land Register Office by the administrator.

Section 33: Ship/Aircraft Register

Section 32 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the registration of the opening of insolvency proceedings in the register of ships and the register of ships under construction, as well as in the register of liens on aircraft. In such a case the parcels of real estate shall be replaced by the ships, ships under construction and aircraft entered in such registers, and the land register by the registering court, respectively.

Section 34: Appeal

(1) If the opening of the insolvency proceedings is refused the requesting party, and the debtor if the request was refused under section 26, may bring an immediate appeal.

(2) If the insolvency proceedings are opened the debtor may bring an immediate appeal.

(3) As soon as a decision repealing the order opening insolvency proceedings has become effective such termination of the insolvency proceedings shall be published. Section 200 subs. 2 second and third sentences shall apply mutatis mutandis. The legal effects of transactions executed by the insolvency administrator or by third parties with respect to him shall remain unaffected by such termination.

Chapter Two: Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings. Classification of Creditors

Section 35: Definition of the Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings

The insolvency proceedings shall involve all of the assets owned by the debtor on the date when the proceedings were opened and those acquired by him during the proceedings (assets involved in the insolvency proceedings).

Section 36: Objects not Subject to Attachment

(1) Objects not subject to execution shall not form part of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings. Sections 850, 850a, 850c, 850e, 850f subs. 1 and sections 850g to 850i of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(2) However, the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings shall involve

1. the debtor’s business records; any legal obligation governing storage of such documents shall remain unaffected;

2. objects not subject to execution under section 811 subs. 1 Nos. 4 and 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(3) Objects forming part of the debtor’s usual household and used in his household shall not form part of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings if their disposition would obviously yield not more than proceeds largely disproportionate to their value.

(4) The insolvency court shall have jurisdiction in respect of rulings as to whether an object is subject to coercive execution in accordance with the provisions specified in subs. 1 second sentence. Instead of a creditor, the insolvency administrator shall be entitled to make a request. The first and second sentences shall apply mutatis mutandis in respect of the opening proceedings.

Section 37: Joint Marital Property of a Community

(1) If the joint marital property of a community is administered by one spouse only and insolvency proceedings are opened for the assets owned by such spouse, the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings shall involve the joint marital property. The joint marital property shall not be distributed among the spouses. Insolvency proceedings opened for the assets owned by the other spouse shall leave the joint marital property unaffected.

(2) If the joint marital property is administered by both spouses insolvency proceedings opened for the assets owned by any spouse shall leave the joint marital property unaffected.

(3) Subs. 1 shall apply to a continued community with the proviso that the spouse administering the joint marital property alone shall be replaced by the surviving spouse, and the late spouse by his descendants, respectively.

Section 38: Definition of the Creditors of the Insolvency proceedings

The assets involved in the insolvency proceedings shall serve to satisfy the liquidated claims held by the personal creditors against the debtor on the date when the insolvency proceedings were opened (creditors of the insolvency proceedings).

Section 39: Lower-ranking Creditors of the Insolvency proceedings

(1) The following claims shall be satisfied ranking below the other claims of creditors of the insolvency proceedings in the order given below, and according to the proportion of their amounts if ranking with equal status:

1. the interest accruing on the claims of the creditors of the insolvency proceedings from the opening of the insolvency proceedings;

2. the costs incurred by individual creditors of the insolvency proceedings due to their participation in the proceedings;

3. fines, administrative penalties, coercive penalty payments, as well as such incidental legal consequences of a criminal or administrative offence binding the debtor to pay money;

4. claims to the debtor’s gratuitous performance of a consideration;

5. claims to the refund of loans borrowed from a partner and replacing equity capital, or claims having the same rank as these.

(2) Claims which the creditor and the debtor agreed to be non-privileged in insolvency proceedings shall be satisfied after the claims mentioned at subs. 1 if the agreement does not provide otherwise.

(3) Interest accruing on the claims of non-privileged creditors of the insolvency proceedings, and the costs incurred by such creditors due to their participation in the proceedings shall rank with equal status as the claims of such creditors.

Section 40: Claims to Maintenance

Claims to maintenance under family law against the debtor may be filed in insolvency proceedings for the period after the opening of such proceedings only to the extent to which the debtor would be held liable as the heir of the obligated person. Section 100 shall remain unaffected.

Section 41: Immature Claims

(1) Immature claims shall be deemed to be mature.

(2) If such claims do not bear interest they shall be discounted at the statutory rate of interest. Thereby they shall be reduced to the amount corresponding to the full amount of such claim if the statutory rate of interest for the period from the opening of the insolvency proceedings to its maturity is added.

Section 42: Claims Subject to a Resolutory Condition

Claims subject to a resolutory condition shall be taken into account in the insolvency proceedings as claims not subject to a resolutory condition as long as such condition is not accomplished.

Section 43: Liability Incumbent on Several Persons

A creditor holding claims against several persons for the whole of one single payment may file the full amount in insolvency proceedings against any debtor until he is fully satisfied if he had a claim to such full amount on the date when the insolvency proceedings were opened.

Section 44: Rights of Obligors Liable Jointly and Severally and of Guarantors

Obligors liable jointly and severally and guarantors may file a claim to be acquired by them in the future against the debtor by satisfaction of the creditor only if the creditor does not file his claim.

Section 45: Conversion of Claims

Non-liquidated claims or contingent claims shall be filed at the value estimated for the date when the insolvency proceedings were opened. Claims expressed in foreign currency or in a mathematical unit shall be converted into German currency according to the exchange value applicable at the time of the opening of the proceedings at the place of payment.

Section 46: Recurring Payments

Claims to recurring payments with a definite amount and for a definite period shall be filed with the amount resulting from the addition of all open payments reduced by the discount mentioned at section 41. If the period of such payments is indefinite section 45 first sentence shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 47: Right to Separation

Anyone entitled to claim the separation of an object from the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings under a right in rem or in personam shall not form part of the creditors of the insolvency proceedings. Entitlement to separation of such object shall be governed by the legal provisions applying outside the insolvency proceedings.

Section 48: Right to Separation Extending to the Consideration received as a Substitute for the Object of Separation

If, prior to opening of the insolvency proceedings by the debtor, or subsequent to the opening, an object for which separation might have been claimed has been sold by the insolvency administrator without entitlement, anyone with a right to separation may claim assignment of the right to its consideration as long as such consideration has not been paid He may claim such consideration from the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings to the extent to which such consideration continues to exist in a distinct form among the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings.

Section 49: Separate Satisfaction from Immovables

Creditors with a right to satisfaction from objects subject to execution into immovables (immovable objects) shall be entitled to separate satisfaction under the provisions of the Act Governing Auctions and Sequestrations of Immovables (Gesetz über die Zwangsversteigerung und die Zwangsverwaltung).

Section 50: Separate Satisfaction of Pledgees

(1) Creditors holding a contractual pledge, a pledge acquired by attachment or a legal lien in an object forming part of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings shall be entitled to separate satisfaction in respect of main claim, interest and costs from the pledged object under sections 166 to 173.

(2) The landlord’s or lessor’s legal lien may not be claimed in insolvency proceedings for rent or lease payments covering an earlier period than the last twelve months foregoing the opening of the insolvency proceedings, and for any damages to be paid due to the termination of such lease by the insolvency administrator. Liens held by lessors of agricultural land shall not be subject to such restriction with respect to the lease payment.

Section 51: Other Creditors with a Claim to Separate Satisfaction

The following creditors shall be deemed equal with those specified under section 50:

1. creditors to whom the debtor has assigned a movable item or a right in order to secure a claim;

2. creditors with a right to withhold an object in consideration of their improvement of the object as far as their claim from such improvement does not exceed the still existing improvement;

3. creditors with a right to withhold an object under the provisions of the Commercial Code;

4. the Federation, the Länder, the communes and commune associations with regard to objects subject to custom duties and tax under legal provisions to secure the payment of public dues.

Section 52: Elimination of Creditors with a Right to Separate Satisfaction

Creditors with a right to separate satisfaction shall be deemed creditors of the insolvency proceedings if they also have a personal claim against the debtor. However, they shall be entitled to proportionate satisfaction of their claim from the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings only to the extent that they waive their right to separate satisfaction, or that such separate satisfaction has failed.

Section 53: Creditors of the Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings

The assets involved in the insolvency proceedings shall be used to settle in advance the costs of the insolvency proceedings and the other debts incumbent on the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings.

Section 54: Costs of the Insolvency Proceedings

The following shall be deemed costs of the insolvency proceedings:

1. the court fees in respect of the insolvency proceedings;

2. the remuneration earned and the expenses incurred by the temporary insolvency administrator, by the insolvency administrator and by the members of the creditors’ committee.

Section 55: Other Debts incumbent on the Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings

(1) The following debts shall be deemed as further debts incumbent on the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings:

1. debts created by activities of the insolvency administrator or in another way by the administration, disposition and distribution of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings without belonging to the costs of the insolvency proceedings;

2. obligations under mutual contracts claimed to be performed to the credit of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings or to be settled after the opening of the insolvency proceedings;

3. obligations due to restitution for unjust enrichment of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings.

(2) Obligations created by a temporary insolvency administrator in whom the right to transfer the debtor’s property was vested after the opening of the insolvency proceedings shall be deemed as debts incumbent on the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings. The same shall apply to obligations under a continuing obligation if the temporary insolvency administrator has received the consideration to the credit of the assets administered by him.

(3) If in accordance with subs. 2 reasoned wage claims in accordance with section 187 of the Third Book of the Social Code transfer to the Federal Employment Service, the Federal Service may only claim these as a creditor of the insolvency proceedings. The first sentence shall apply mutatis mutandis in respect of the claims specified in section 208 subs. 1 of the Third Book of the Social Code to the extent that these are upheld against the debtor.

Chapter Three: Insolvency Administrator Bodies Representing the Creditors

Section 56: Designation of the Insolvency Administrator

(1) The insolvency court shall designate an independent individual suited to the case at hand, particularly experienced in business affairs and independent of the creditors and of the debtor as insolvency administrator.

(2) The insolvency administrator shall receive a letter documenting his designation. Upon termination of his office he shall return such letter to the insolvency court.

Section 57: Election of a Different Insolvency Administrator

During the first meeting of creditors subsequent to the designation of the insolvency administrator the creditors may elect a different person to replace him. The different person shall be elected if in addition to the majority specified in section 76 subs. 2, the majority of the voting creditors has also voted for him. The court may refuse designation only of a person unqualified to assume such an office. Any creditor of the insolvency proceedings may bring an immediate appeal against a refusal of designation.

Section 58: Supervision by the Insolvency Court

(1) The insolvency administrator shall be subject to supervision by the insolvency court. The court may require him at any time to give specific information or to report on the progress of the proceedings and on the management.

(2) If the insolvency administrator does not fulfil his duties, subsequent to a warning the court may impose an administrative fine on him. An individual administrative fine may not exceed the sum of fifty thousand Deutsche Mark. The administrator may bring an immediate appeal against the decision.

(3) Subs. 2 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the implementation of the obligation to return assets in respect of an administrator who has been dismissed.

Section 59: Dismissal of the Insolvency Administrator

(1) The insolvency court may dismiss the insolvency administrator for an important reason. Such dismissal may be ordered ex officio or at the request of the administrator, of the creditors’ committee or of the creditors’ assembly. The court shall hear the administrator before taking its decision.

(2) The administrator may bring an immediate appeal against his dismissal. The administrator himself, the creditors’ committee or any creditor of the insolvency proceedings, if the creditors’ assembly requested the administrator’s dismissal, may bring an immediate appeal against an order refusing the dismissal of the administrator.

Section 60: Liability of the Insolvency Administrator

(1) The insolvency administrator shall be held liable to damages for all parties to the proceedings if he wrongfully violates the duties incumbent on him under this statute. He shall ensure the careful action of a proper and diligent insolvency administrator.

(2) If for the fulfilment of the duties incumbent on him as administrator he has to employ any not obviously unqualified wage-earners of the debtor within the scope of their former activities, pursuant to section 278 of the Civil Code, the administrator shall not be responsible for errors made by these persons, but shall be responsible for supervising them, as well as for decisions of particular importance.

Section 61: Nonperformance of Debts incumbent on the Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings

If a debt incumbent on the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings created by a legal transaction of the insolvency administrator cannot be fully satisfied from the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings the administrator shall be held liable to damages for the creditor with a claim to the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings. This shall not apply if the administrator in creating such debt could not be aware of the probable insufficiency of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings for performance.

Section 62: Period of Limitation

A claim to damages arising from a breach of duty on the part of the insolvency administrator shall be subject to limitation after three years beginning on the date when the injured party becomes aware of the damage and of the circumstances’ warranting the administrator’s liability to damages. Such claim shall be subject to limitation at the latest after three years beginning on the date of termination of the insolvency proceedings or when the order discontinuing such proceedings became final. The second sentence shall apply to violation of duties committed under delayed distribution (section 203) or under surveillance of implementation of the plan (section 260) with the proviso that termination of the insolvency proceedings shall be replaced by the execution of delayed distribution or the termination of surveillance, respectively.

Section 63: Remuneration of the Insolvency Administrator

(1) The insolvency administrator shall be entitled to remuneration in consideration of execution of his office, and to reimbursement of his adequate expenses. The ordinary rate of such remuneration shall be calculated based on the value of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings when they are terminated. The scope and complexity of the administrator’s execution of his office shall be taken into account by derogating from the ordinary rate.

(2) If the costs of the proceedings have been deferred in accordance with section 4a, the insolvency administrator shall have a claim against the state cash office in respect of his payment and his expenses insofar as the insolvency assets are insufficient therefor.

Section 64: Determination by the Insolvency Court

(1) The insolvency court shall determine by means of an order the insolvency administrator’s remuneration and the expenses to be reimbursed to him.

(2) Such order shall be published and individually served on the administrator, the debtor and the members of the creditors committee if appointed. The determined amounts shall not be published; the public notification should point out that the complete order may be consulted in the registry.

(3) The administrator, the debtor and any creditor of the insolvency proceedings may bring an immediate appeal against the order. Section 567 subs. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply accordingly.

Section 65: Empowerment to Issue an Order

The Federal Ministry of Justice shall be empowered to arrange the details of remunerations and refunding of the costs of the insolvency administrator by means of an ordinance.

Section 66: Rendering of Accounts

(1) Upon expiry of his office the insolvency administrator shall render account to an assembly of creditors.

(2) Prior to such assembly of creditors the insolvency court shall verify the administrator’s rendering of accounts. The court shall lay out the administrator’s final account with supporting documents, with a remark indicating verification of the account and with any comments of the creditors’ committee if appointed to the parties’ inspection; it may set a deadline for the creditors’ committee to make a statement. The period between the laying out of such documents and the date of the creditors’ assembly shall extend for at least one week.

(3) The creditors’ assembly may charge the administrator with intermediate accounts to be rendered on certain dates during the proceedings. Subs. 1 and 2 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 67: Establishment of the Creditors’ Committee

(1) Prior to the first creditors’ assembly the insolvency court may establish a creditors’ committee.

(2) Such creditors’ committee shall represent the creditors with a right to separate satisfaction, the creditors of the insolvency proceedings holding the maximum claims and the small sum creditors. The committee shall include a representative of the debtor’s employees if the latter are involved as creditors of the insolvency proceedings holding considerable claims.

(3) Persons not holding the status of creditors may also be appointed as members of the creditors’ committee.

Section 68: Election of Different Members

(1) The creditors’ assembly shall decide on the establishment of a creditors’ committee. If the insolvency court has already established a creditors’ committee the creditors’ assembly shall decide whether it is to be maintained in office.

(2) It may vote the dismissal of members designated by the insolvency court or the appointment of additional members to the creditors’ committee.

Section 69: Duties Incumbent on the Creditors’ Committee

The members of the creditors’ committee shall support and monitor the insolvency administrator’s execution of his office. They shall demand information on the progress of business affairs, have the books and business documents inspected and the monetary transactions and the available cash verified.

Section 70: Dismissal

The insolvency court may dismiss a member of the creditors’ committee for an important reason. Such dismissal may be ordered ex officio or at the request of such member of the creditors’ committee or of the creditors’ assembly. The court shall hear such member of the creditors’ committee prior to issuing such order; he may bring an immediate appeal against the decision.

Section 71: Liability of the Members of the Creditors’ Committee

The members of the creditors’ committee shall be held liable to damages for the creditors with a right to separate satisfaction and for the creditors of the insolvency proceedings if they wrongfully violate the duties incumbent on them under this statute. Section 62 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 72: Decisions of the Creditors’ Committee

A decision of the creditors’ committee shall be valid if the majority of members attended the meeting voting on such decision and backed such decision with the majority of voting members.

Section 73: Remuneration of the Members of the Creditors’ Committee

(1) The members of the creditors’ committee shall be entitled to remuneration in consideration of execution of their offices and to reimbursement of their adequate expenses. The time and scope of execution of their office on the part of the members shall be taken into account.

(2) Section 63 subs. 2, as well as sections 64 and 65 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 74: Convening the Creditors’ Assembly

(1) The creditors’ assembly shall be convened by the insolvency court. All creditors with a right to separate satisfaction, all creditors of the insolvency proceedings, the insolvency administrator, the members of the Creditors’ Assembly and the debtor shall be entitled to attend such assembly.

(2) The time, place and agenda of the creditors’ assembly shall be published. Such publication may be waived if a creditors’ assembly adjourns its transactions.

Section 75: Request to Convene a Creditors’ Assembly

(1) A creditors’ assembly shall be convened if requested by

1. the insolvency administrator;

2. the creditors’ committee;

3. at least five creditors with a right to separate satisfaction or non-lower-ranking creditors of the insolvency proceedings whose rights to separate satisfaction and claims together are assessed by the insolvency court to represent one fifth of the sum resulting from the value of all rights to separate satisfaction and of the claims of all non-lower-ranking creditors of the insolvency proceedings.

4. one or more creditors with a right to separate satisfaction or non-lower-ranking creditors of the insolvency proceedings whose rights to separate satisfaction and claims together are assessed by the insolvency court to represent two fifths of the sum mentioned at No. 3.

(2) The period between reception of such request and the date of the creditors’ assembly shall extend no longer than three weeks.

(3) If the insolvency court refuses an order convening a creditors’ assembly the requesting party may bring an immediate appeal.

Section 76: Decisions of the Creditors’ Assembly

(1) The creditors’ assembly shall be presided by the insolvency court.

(2) A decision of the creditors’ assembly shall be valid if the sum of the claims held by backing creditors exceeds one half of the sum of claims held by the creditors with voting rights. For creditors with a right to separate satisfaction to whom the debtor is not personally liable, the claim shall be replaced by the value of such right.

Section 77: Determination of Voting Right

(1) A voting right shall be vested in claims filed by the creditor and not disputed by the insolvency administrator or by a creditor with a voting right. lower-ranking creditors shall have no voting rights.

(2) Creditors with disputed claims shall have a voting right to the extent to which the administrator and the attending creditors with a right to vote have agreed such vote during the creditors’ assembly. If the parties ‘cannot reach an agreement the decision of the insolvency court shall prevail. The insolvency court may modify its decision at the request of the administrator or of a creditor attending the creditors’ assembly.

(3) Subs. 2 shall apply mutatis mutandis to

1. creditors holding claims subject to a condition precedent;

2. creditors with a right to separate satisfaction.

Section 78: Repeal of a Decision taken by the Creditors’ Assembly

(1) If a decision taken by the creditors’ assembly is against the common interest of the creditors of the insolvency proceedings, the insolvency court shall repeal such decision at the request of a creditor with a right to separate satisfaction, of a non-lower-ranking creditor of the insolvency proceedings or of the insolvency administrator if such request is brought during the creditors’ assembly.

(2) Such repeal of a decision shall be published. Any creditor with a right to separate satisfaction and any non-lower-ranking creditor may bring an immediate appeal against a repeal. The requesting party may bring an immediate appeal against an order refusing such repeal.

Section 79: Information to the Creditors’ Assembly

The creditors’ assembly may require the insolvency administrator to give specific information and a report on the progress of the proceedings and on the management. If a creditors’ committee has not been appointed the creditors’ assembly may have the administrator’s monetary transactions and the available cash verified.

Part Three: Effects of the Opening of Insolvency Proceedings

Chapter One: General Effects

Section 80: Right to Manage and Transfer the Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings Vested in the Insolvency Administrator

(1) Upon the opening of the insolvency proceedings the debtor’s right to manage and transfer the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings shall be vested in the insolvency administrator.

(2) An existing prohibition of transfers imposed on the debtor and purporting to protect only certain persons (section 135 and 136 of the Civil Code) shall have no binding effect on the proceedings. The provisions governing the effects of an attachment by way of execution shall remain unaffected.

Section 81: Transfers of Property by the Debtor

(1) If the debtor after the opening of the insolvency proceedings transfers an object forming part of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings such transfer shall be legally invalid. Sections 892 and 893 of the Civil Code, 16 and 17 of the Act Governing Rights in Registered Ships and Ships under Construction (Gesetz über Rechte an eingetragenen Schiffen und Schiffsbauwerken) and 16 and 17 of the Act Governing Rights in Aircraft (Gesetz über Rechte an Luftfahrzeugen) shall remain unaffected. The consideration shall be restituted to the other party to the transfer from the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings if such assets received enrichment by it.

(2) With respect to an assignment of future claims to emoluments due to the debtor under a service contract or to recurring emoluments replacing them subs. 1 shall also apply to the extent to which such assignment covers any emoluments to be received by the debtor subsequent to termination of the insolvency proceedings. The debtor’s right to assign such emoluments to a trustee for the purpose of collective satisfaction of the creditors of the insolvency proceedings shall remain unaffected.

(3) If the debtor transferred an object forming part of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings on the day when the insolvency proceedings were opened such transfer shall be presumed to have been effected after the opening of the insolvency proceedings.

Section 82: Performance in Favour of the Debtor

If the debtor received performance to settle an obligation after the opening of the insolvency proceedings although such obligation had to be performed to the credit of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings the performing party shall be discharged of his obligation if he was unaware of the opening of the proceedings at the time of his performance. If such party performed his obligation prior to publication of the order opening the proceedings he shall be presumed to have been unaware of the opening of the proceedings.

Section 83: Decedent’s Estate. Continued Community

(1) If the debtor prior to the opening of the insolvency proceedings succeeded or during the insolvency proceedings succeeds to a decedent’s estate or to a legacy only the debtor shall be entitled to accept or disclaim such estate or legacy. The same shall apply to the disclaimer of a continued community.

(2) If the debtor is a limited heir the insolvency administrator may not transfer any object forming part of the decedent’s estate if such transfer would be invalid under section 2115 of the Civil Code with respect to the revisionary heir if the revisionary heir succeeds to the decedent’s estate.

Section 84: Liquidation of a Company or a Community

(1) If a community, another ownership in common or a company without legal personality exists between the debtor and third parties, any distribution or other liquidation shall be effected outside the insolvency proceedings. The third parties may claim separate satisfaction from the debtor’s share determined under such distribution or liquidation to settle any claims arising from the community, ownership in common or company without legal personality.

(2) An agreement excluding the right to liquidate a community for ever, for a limited period or for a period of notice to be given shall have no binding effect upon the insolvency proceedings. The same shall apply to a clause in the decedent’s will with a similar content and binding on the community of heirs, and to a similar agreement among the members of a community of heirs.

Section 85: Joinder of Pending Actions as Plaintiff

(1) Actions affecting the property forming part of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings and pending for the debtor as plaintiff on the date when the insolvency proceedings are opened may be joined by the insolvency administrator with their existing status. If such joinder is delayed section 239 subs. 2 to 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(2) If the administrator refuses such joinder the debtor and the defendant may continue the action.

Section 86: Joinder of Certain Pending Actions as Defendant

(1) Actions pending against the debtor as defendant on the date when the insolvency proceedings are opened may be joined by the insolvency administrator or continued by the plaintiff if they cover:

1. the separation of an object from the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings;

2. separate satisfaction, or;

3. a debt incumbent on the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings.

(2) If the administrator acknowledges such claim immediately the plaintiff may claim reimbursement of the costs incurred for such action only as a creditor of the insolvency proceedings.

Section 87: Claims held by the Creditors of the Insolvency Proceedings

The creditors of the insolvency proceedings shall only be permitted to enforce their claims under the provisions governing the insolvency proceedings.

Section 88: Execution prior to the Opening of Insolvency Proceedings

If a creditor of the insolvency proceedings during the last month preceding the request to open the insolvency proceedings or after such request acquired by virtue of execution a security attaching the debtor’s property forming part of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings such security shall become legally invalid when the insolvency proceedings are opened.

Section 89: Prohibition of Execution

(1) Individual creditors of the insolvency proceedings may not execute into the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings or into the debtor’s other property during the insolvency proceedings.

(2) Even creditors without the status of creditors of the insolvency proceedings may not execute during the proceedings into future claims to emoluments due to the debtor under a service contract or into recurring emoluments replacing them. This shall not apply to execution under a claim for maintenance or under a claim arising from wilful tort into the amount of emoluments not subject to attachment by other creditors.

(3) The insolvency court shall decide on any relief to be granted against execution under subs. 1 or 2. Prior to its decision the court may issue a restraining order; in particular, it may order a temporary suspension of such execution with or without providing a security and its continuation subject to a security.

Section 90: Prohibition of Execution under Debts incumbent on the Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceeding

(1) Execution in respect of debts incumbent on the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings not caused by a transaction of the administrator shall be inadmissible for a period of six months from the opening of the insolvency proceedings.

(2) The following liabilities shall not be considered as such debts incumbent on the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings:

1. obligations under a mutual contract for whose performance the administrator opted;

2. obligations under a continuing obligation for the period after the first date when the administrator might have terminated such contract;

3. obligations under a continuing obligation insofar as the administrator receives its consideration for the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings.

Section 91: Exclusion of other Acquisition of Rights

(1) After the opening of the insolvency proceedings rights in objects forming part of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings cannot be acquired with legal effect even if such acquisition of rights is not based on the debtor’s transfer or effected by way of execution.

(2) Sections 878, 892 and 893 of the Civil Code, 3 subs. 3, 16 and 17 of the Act Governing Rights in Registered Ships and Ships Under Construction, 5 subs. 3, 16 and 17 of the Act Governing Rights in Aircraft and 20 subs. 3 of the Maritime Distribution Statute (Schiffahrtsrechtliche Verteilungsordnung) shall remain unaffected.

Section 92: General Damage

Rights held by the creditors of the insolvency proceedings for reimbursement of damage suffered jointly by such creditors due to a reduction of the property forming part of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings before or after the opening of the insolvency proceedings (general damage) may be claimed only by the insolvency administrator during the insolvency proceedings. If such rights are sought against the administrator they may be claimed only by another, newly appointed insolvency administrator.

Section 93: Personal Liability of Partners

If insolvency proceedings have been opened for the assets owned by a company without legal personality or by a partnership limited by shares, only the insolvency administrator may claim a partner’s personal liability to the company’s debts during the insolvency proceedings.

Section 94: Preservation of the Right to Set Off a Claim

If by force of law or on the basis of an agreement a creditor of the insolvency proceedings had a right to set off a claim on the date when the insolvency proceedings were opened such right shall remain unaffected by the proceedings.

Section 95: Acquisition of the Right to Set Off a Claim During the Proceedings

(1) If on the date when the insolvency proceedings were opened one or more of the claims to be set off against each other were conditioned, were immature or did not cover similar types of performance such set-off may not be effected before its conditions are met. Sections 41 and 45 shall not apply. Set-off shall be excluded if the claim against which a set-off is to be effected will be unconditioned and mature before it may be set off.

(2) Set-off shall not be excluded by the claims being expressed in different currencies or mathematical units if these currencies or mathematical units are freely exchangeable at the place of payment of the claim against which a set-off is to be effected. They shall be converted according to the exchange value applicable to this place at the time of receipt of the declaration of set-off.

Section 96: Prohibition of Set-Off

(1) Set-off shall be prohibited if

1. a creditor of the insolvency proceedings has become an obligor to the credit of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings only after the opening of the insolvency proceedings;

2. a creditor of the insolvency proceedings acquired his claim from another creditor only after the opening of the insolvency proceedings;

3. a creditor of the insolvency proceedings acquired the opportunity to set off his claim by a transaction subject to contest;

4. a creditor with a claim to be satisfied from the debtor’s free property is an obligor to the credit of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings.

(2) Subs. 1 as well as section 95 subs. 1 third sentence shall not oppose the set-off of claims and benefits from transfer, payment or assignment agreements introduced into a system serving to implement such agreements where set-off is effected at the latest on the day of opening of the insolvency proceedings. A system within the meaning of the first sentence shall be a written agreement in accordance with Article 2 (a) of Directive 98/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems (OJ EC No. L 166 p. 45) reported to the Commission of the European Communities by the Deutsche Bundesbank or the competent authority of another member state or contracting party of the Agreement on the European Economic Area. Systems from third states shall be deemed equivalent to the systems named in the second sentence where they largely meet the preconditions stipulated in Article 2 (a) of Directive 98/26/EC.

Section 97: The Debtor’s Obligation to Disclosure and Cooperation

(1) The debtor shall disclose any circumstances relating to the insolvency proceedings to the insolvency court, the insolvency administrator, the creditors’ committee and, if so ordered by the insolvency court, to the creditors’ assembly. He shall also disclose any facts able to bring about his criminal prosecution for commission of a criminal or administrative offence. However, any fact disclosed by the debtor under his obligation in accordance with the first sentence may not be used against the debtor without his consent in trial or proceedings under the Administrative Offences Act (Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten) brought against the debtor or a relation mentioned at section 52 subs. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

(2) The debtor shall support the administrator in the latter’s execution of his duties.

(3) Under an order issued by the court the debtor shall be obligated to be available at any time to meet his obligations to disclosure and cooperation. He shall forbear any activity contradicting the execution of such duties.

Section 98: Imposition of the Duties of the Debtor

(1) If necessary to provide truthful statements the insolvency court shall order the debtor’s affidavit for the records that he disclosed any demanded facts truly, correctly and completely. Sections 478 to 480 and 483 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(2) The court may sub poena the debtor and detain him after hearing him

1. if the debtor refuses to give information or to provide an assurance under oath or to support the fulfilment of the duties of the insolvency administrator,

2. if the debtor attempts to evade the execution of his obligations to disclosure and cooperation, in particular by preparing his flight, or

3. if such subpoena and detainment are necessary to avoid the debtor’s activities contradicting the execution of his obligations to disclosure and cooperation, in particular to secure the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings.

(3) Sections 904 to 910 and 913 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply mutatis mutandis in respect of the ordering of detention. The order imposing detention shall be rescinded ex officio as soon as the preconditions for the ordering of detention no longer exist. Immediate appeal shall be available against the ordering of detention, as well as against refusal of an application for rescission of the order imposing detention if its conditions no longer exist.

Section 99: Interception of the Debtor’s Mail

(1) If such measure seems necessary in order to investigate or prevent the debtor’s transactions disadvantaging the creditors the insolvency court at the insolvency administrator’s request or ex officio shall, by order and giving grounds, order redirection to the administrator of certain or all mail consignments destined for the debtor. Such order shall be issued after the debtor is heard unless this would endanger the purpose of the order due to the particular circumstances of the case. If the debtor is not previously heard, grounds for this must be given in the order and the hearing carried out immediately afterwards.

(2) The administrator shall be entitled to open any mail consignment redirected to him. Mail consignments with a content unrelated to the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings shall be forwarded to the debtor immediately. Any other mail consignments may be inspected by the debtor.

(3) The debtor may bring an immediate appeal against the ordering of interception of his mail. After hearing the administrator the insolvency court shall repeal such order if its conditions have ceased to exist.

Section 100: Maintenance Payments using the Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings

(1) The creditors’ assembly shall determine whether and to what extent the debtor and his family are to be granted maintenance using the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings.

(2) Until the creditors’ assembly reaches a decision, with the agreement of the creditors’ committee if appointed, the insolvency administrator may grant necessary maintenance to the debtor. In the same way it shall be possible to grant maintenance to the debtor’s minor unmarried children, spouse, former spouse and the other parent of his child regarding a claim under sections 1615 1 and 1615 n of the Civil Code.

Section 101: Members of the Body Representing the Debtor. Employees

(1) If the debtor is not an individual, sections 97 to 99 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the members of the body representing or supervising the debtor, as well as to his general partners who are entitled to represent him. In addition; sections 97 subs. 1 and 98 shall apply mutatis mutandis to persons who left a position mentioned in the first sentence no earlier than two years before the opening of the insolvency proceedings was requested. Section 100 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the general partners of the debtor who are entitled to represent him.

(2) Section 97 subs. 1 first sentence shall apply mutatis mutandis to the debtor’s employees and previous employees, insofar as these did not leave earlier than two years prior to the opening of the insolvency proceedings was requested.

Section 102: Restriction of a Basic Right

Section 21 subs. 2 No. 4, as well as sections 99 and 101 subs. 1 first sentence shall authorize a limitation of the basic right of privacy (letters, telecommunications) (Article 10 of the Basic Law).

Chapter Two: Performance of Transactions. Cooperation of the Works Council

Section 103: Option to be Exercised by the Insolvency Administrator

(1) If a mutual contract was not (or not completely) performed by the debtor and its other party at the date when the insolvency proceedings were opened the insolvency administrator may perform such contract replacing the debtor and claim the other party’s consideration.

(2) If the administrator refuses to perform such contract the other party shall be entitled to its claims for non-performance only as a creditor of the insolvency proceedings. If the other party requires the administrator to opt for performance or non-performance the administrator shall state his intention to claim performance without negligent delay. If the administrator does not give his statement he may no longer insist on performance.

Section 104: Fixed-date Transactions Financial Futures

(1) If the delivery of goods with a market or stock exchange price was agreed to take place exactly on a definitely fixed date or within a definitely fixed period, and if such date or expiry of the period occurs after the insolvency proceedings were opened performance may not be claimed, but only claims for non-performance.

(2) If financial performance with a market or stock exchange price was agreed to take place at a fixed date or within a fixed period, and if such date or expiry of the period occurs after the insolvency proceedings were opened performance may not be claimed, but only claims for non-performance. In particular the following shall be regarded as financial performance

1. the delivery of precious metals,

2. the delivery of securities or comparable rights if it is not intended to obtain a participation in a company in order to establish a long-term association,

3. performances in specie which have to be effected in foreign currency or in a mathematical unit,

4. performances in specie the amount of which is indirectly or directly determined by the exchange rate of a foreign currency or mathematical unit, by the interest rate prevailing for claims or by the price of other goods or services,

5. options and other rights to deliveries or performances in specie in the meaning of Nos. 1 to 4.

If transactions on financial performances are combined in a framework contract for which agreement has been reached that in the case of violations of the contract it may only be terminated uniformly, the totality of these transactions shall be regarded as a mutual contract in the meaning of sections 103 and 104.

(3) Such claim for non-performance shall cover the balance between the agreed price and the market or stock exchange price prevailing at the place of performance on the second workday after the insolvency proceedings were opened for a contract with the agreed period of performance. The other party may bring such claim only as a creditor of the insolvency proceedings.

Section 105: Severable Contracts

If the contractual performances due to the parties are severable, and if the other party already had performed part of the services incumbent on it on the date when the insolvency proceedings were opened such other party shall be deemed a creditor of the insolvency proceedings for the amount of its claim to consideration corresponding to the part of the services already performed by it, even if the insolvency administrator claims performance of the services not yet performed. The other party shall not be entitled to claim restitution for non-performance of its claim to the consideration of the part of services transferred to the debtor’s assets before the insolvency proceedings were opened.

Section 106: Priority Notice

(1) If a priority notice was entered into the Land Register in order to secure a claim to grant or terminate a right in the debtor’s real estate or in a right registered for the debtor, or in order to secure a claim to modify the contents or priority of such right the creditor may claim satisfaction of his claim from the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings. The same shall apply if the debtor undertook additional obligations with respect to the creditor and ‘such obligations have not been met or have not been completely met.

(2) Subs. 1 shall apply mutatis mutandis to a priority notice entered into the register of ships and the register of ships under construction, or into the register of liens on aircraft.

Section 107: Retention of Title

(1) If the debtor, before the insolvency proceedings were opened, has sold a movable article while retaining title and transferring its possession to the purchaser the purchaser may claim performance of the sales contract. The same shall apply if the debtor has undertaken additional obligations with respect to the purchase and such obligations have not been met or have not been completely met.

(2) If the debtor, before the insolvency proceedings were opened, has purchased a movable article in which the has seller retained title and whose possession was transferred to the debtor by the seller, the insolvency administrator, required by the seller to opt for performance or non-performance, need not submit his declaration pursuant to section 103 subs. 2 until without negligent delay after the report meeting. This shall not apply if in the period preceding the report meeting a considerable reduction is to be expected in the value of the movable article and the creditor has notified the administrator of this circumstance.

Section 108: Continuity of Continuing Obligations

(1) Contracts concluded by the debtor for the lease and tenancy of immovables or premises and for services to be performed for the debtor shall continue to exist, but to the credit of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings. This shall also apply in respect of rental and lease contracts concluded by the debtor as landlord or lessor relating to other effects assigned as a security to a third party who had financed their acquisition or production.

(2) Claims arising before the insolvency proceedings were opened may be brought by the other party only as a creditor of the insolvency proceedings.

Section 109: Debtor’s Status as Tenant or Lessee

(1) A contract for the tenancy or lease of immovables or premises concluded by the debtor as tenant or lessee may be terminated by the insolvency administrator with the legal period of notice irrespective of any agreed period of notice. If the dwelling of the debtor is the subject-matter of the lease agreement, termination shall be replaced by the right of the insolvency administrator to declare that claims becoming due on expiry of the period specified in the first sentence may not be asserted in the insolvency proceedings. If the administrator terminates under the first sentence, or if he submits the declaration in accordance with the second sentence, the other party may claim damages as a creditor of the insolvency proceedings for premature termination of such contract or in respect of the consequences of the declaration.

(2) If the debtor had not yet entered into possession of the immovables or premises when the insolvency proceedings were opened the administrator and the other party may withdraw from such contract. If the administrator withdraws from the contract the other party may claim damages as a creditor of the insolvency proceedings for premature termination of the contract. At the other party’s request each party shall state within two weeks whether it intends to withdraw from the contract; if any of the parties does not give their statement they shall lose the right to withdraw.

Section 110: Debtor’s Status as Landlord or Lessor

(1) If the debtor as landlord or lessor of immovables or premises assigned his future claim to tenancy or lease fees to a third party before the insolvency proceedings were opened the validity of such assignment shall be limited to tenancy or lease fees to be received for the current month of the opening of the insolvency proceedings. If the insolvency proceedings were opened after the fifteenth day of a month the validity of such assignment shall also be valid in respect of the following month.

(2) In particular, collection of the tenancy or lease fees shall be deemed an assignment for the purpose of subs. 1. An assignment under contract shall be deemed equivalent to a transfer effected by way of execution.

(3) The tenant or lessee may set off any claim entitling him against the debtor against the claim to tenancy or lease fees covering the period mentioned at subs. 1. Sections 95 and 96 Nos. 2 to 4 shall remain unaffected.

Section 111: Sale of Property Let by the Debtor

If the insolvency administrator sells immovables or premises let by the debtor, and if the purchaser replaces the debtor as a party of the tenancy or lease, the purchaser may terminate the tenancy or lease with the legal period of notice. Such notice may be given only for the first date of the legal period of notice. Section 57c of the Act on Forced Sale and Sequestration (Gesetz über die Zwangsversteigerung und die Zwangsverwaltung) shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 112: Prohibition to Terminate Tenancy or Lease Contracts

Tenancy or lease contracts concluded by the debtor as tenant or lessee may not be terminated by the other party after the opening of the insolvency proceedings was requested:

1. because of default in the payment of tenancy or lease fees arising before the opening of the insolvency proceedings was requested,

2. because of degradation of the debtor’s financial situation.

Section 113: Termination of a Service Contract

(1) A contract entitling the debtor to services may be terminated by the insolvency administrator and by the other party irrespective of any agreed duration of such contract or agreed exclusion of the right to routine termination. If no shorter period has been agreed, the period of notice shall be three months to month’s end. If the administrator terminates such contract the other party may claim damages as a creditor of the insolvency proceedings for premature termination of the service contract.

(2) If an employee intends to invoke the invalidity of the insolvency administrator’s termination of his contract he shall even bring an action with the Labour Court within three weeks of his reception of such termination if he invokes the invalidity of such termination for other reasons than those given at section 1 subs. 2 and 3 of the Dismissals Protection Act (Kündigungsschutzgesetz). Section 4 fourth sentence and section 5 of the Dismissals Protection Act shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 114: Emoluments from a Service Contract

(1) If the debtor prior to the opening of the insolvency proceedings assigned or pledged a future claim to emoluments due to him under a service contract or to recurring emoluments replacing them, the validity of such assignment or pledge shall be limited to the emoluments to be received by the debtor prior to the end of two years following the end of the current calendar month on the date of the opening of the proceedings.

(2) Against the claim to emoluments covering the period mentioned at subs. 1 the obligated person may set off any claim entitling; him against the debtor. Sections 95 and 96 Nos. 2 to 4 shall remain unaffected.

(3) If future emoluments were transferred prior to the opening of the insolvency proceedings by way of execution, the validity of such transfer shall be limited to emoluments to be received by the debtor for the current calendar month on the date of the opening of the proceedings. If the insolvency proceedings were opened after the fifteenth day of the month, the validity of such transfer shall extend to the subsequent calendar month. Section 88 shall remain unaffected; Section 89 subs. 2 second sentence shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 115: Expiry of Mandates

(1) Any mandate ordered by the debtor referring to the property forming part of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings shall expire upon the opening of the insolvency proceedings.

(2) If suspension of such mandate would cause a risk the mandatory shall continue to perform the mandated transaction until the insolvency administrator is able to otherwise take care of such transaction himself. For this purpose the mandate shall be deemed to continue. The mandatory may claim reimbursement of his expenses incurred for such continuation as a creditor of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings.

(3) As long as the mandatory is not at fault in being unaware of the opening of insolvency proceedings he shall benefit from the presumption that the mandate continues. The mandatory shall rank among the creditors of the insolvency proceedings with his reimbursement claims arising from such continuation.

Section 116: Expiry of Management Contracts

If anyone is obligated under a service or work contract with the debtor to manage a business transaction for the latter, section 115 shall apply mutatis mutandis. The provision governing reimbursement claims arising from a continuation of such management contract shall also apply to claims to remuneration.

Section 117: Expiry of Proxies

(1) A proxy granted by the debtor with respect to the property forming part of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings shall expire upon the opening of the insolvency proceedings.

(2) As far as a mandate or a management contract is deemed to continue under section 115 subs. 2 the related authority shall also be deemed to continue.

(3) As long as the authorised person is not at fault in being unaware of the opening of insolvency proceedings he shall not be held liable under section 179 of the Civil Code.

Section 118: Liquidation of Companies

If a company without legal personality or a partnership limited by shares is liquidated by the opening of insolvency proceedings for the property owned by one partner the managing partner shall rank among the creditors of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings with his claims arising from the provisional continuation of urgent business transactions. As long as the managing partner is not at fault in being unaware of the opening of insolvency proceedings he shall rank among the creditors of the insolvency proceedings with his claims arising from the continuation of business transactions. Section 84 subs. 1 shall remain unaffected.

Section 119: Invalidity of Agreements Derogating from the Foregoing Provisions

Agreements excluding or limiting the application of sections 103 to 118 in advance shall be invalid.

Section 120: Termination of Plant Agreements

(1) If a plant agreement provides for benefits incumbent on the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings the insolvency administrator shall consult the works council about agreement on a reduction of such benefits. Such plant agreement may be terminated by giving three months’ notice even if a longer period of notice has been agreed.

(2) The right to terminate a plant agreement for an important reason without a period of notice shall remain unaffected.

Section 121: Plant Modifications and Conciliatory Proceeding

In insolvency proceedings opened for the property owned by the entrepreneur, section 112 subs. 2 first sentence of the Industrial Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) shall 1 apply with the proviso that the conciliatory proceedings shall only be preceded by an attempt on the part of the president of the Land Employment Office to settle the matter if both the insolvency administrator and the works council request such an attempt.

Section 122: Judicial Approval of a Plant Modification

(1) If a plant modification is envisaged, and if the insolvency administrator and the works council cannot reach an agreement pursuant to section 112 of the Industrial Constitution Act on reconciliation of interests within three weeks from the beginning of negotiations or written request to begin negotiations although the administrator has provided comprehensive information in good time to the works council, the administrator may request a decision on the part of the Labour Court approving such plant modification without prior proceedings under section 112 subs. 2 of the Industrial Constitution Act. Section 113 subs. 3 of the Industrial Constitution Act shall not be applied in this respect. The administrator’s right to bring about a reconciliation of interests pursuant to section 125 or to file a request for a court decision pursuant to section 126 shall remain unaffected.

(2) The Court shall approve such plant modification if the economic condition of the enterprise, also taking into account the social concerns of the employees, warrants the execution of such plant modification, without previous proceedings in accordance with section 112 subs. 2 of the Industrial Constitution Act. The provisions contained in the Labour Court Act (Arbeitsgerichtsgesetz) on decisions by order shall apply mutatis mutandis; the insolvency administrator and the works council shall be the parties involved in the proceedings. Pursuant to section 61 a subs. 3 to 6 of the Labour Court Act, the application is to be dealt with as a matter of priority.

(3) No complaint to the Regional Labour Court may be brought against the court order. A complaint may be made to the Federal Labour Court if this is permitted in the order of the Labour Court; section 72 subs. 2 and 3 of the Labour Court Act shall apply mutatis mutandis. The appeal is to be filed with the Federal Labour Court with grounds within a month of receipt of the decision of the Labour Court in its final form.

Section 123: Scope of the Social Plan

(1) A social plan established subsequent to opening of insolvency proceedings may provide for a total amount of up to two and one half month’s wages (section 10 subs. 3 of the Dismissals Protection Act) of the dismissed employees to recompense for or to attenuate their economic disadvantages under the envisaged plant modification.

(2) The obligations under such social plan are obligations incumbent on the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings. However, if no insolvency plan comes into being, no more than one third of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings available for distribution among the creditors of the insolvency proceedings without such social plan may be used for the settlement of social plan claims. If the total amount of all social plan claims exceeds such limit each claim shall be reduced on a proportionate basis.

(3) As soon as adequate cash funds are available in the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings the insolvency administrator shall make advance payments on social plan claims with the consent of the insolvency court. No execution into the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings for social plan claims shall be permitted.

Section 124: Social Plan Established prior to the Opening of Insolvency Proceedings

(1) A social plan established prior to the opening of insolvency proceedings, but not earlier than three months before the opening of insolvency proceedings was requested, may be revoked by both the insolvency administrator and the works council.

(2) If such social plan is revoked the employees entitled to claims under the social plan may be taken into account when a social plan is established during the insolvency proceedings.

(3) Benefits received by an employee on his claim under a revoked social plan before the opening of insolvency proceedings may not be claimed to be restituted due to the revocation. Upon the establishment of a new social plan such benefits received by a dismissed employee shall be set off against the calculation of the total amount of social plan claims under section 123 subs. 1 up to two and a half months’ wages.

Section 125: Reconciliation of Interests and Dismissals Protection

(1) If a plant modification is envisaged (section 111 of the Industrial Constitution Act) and if the insolvency administrator and the works council reach an agreement on reconciliation of interests in which the employees who are to receive notice are listed by name, section 1 of the Dismissals protection Act shall be applied, subject to the following provisos:

1. it shall be presumed that termination of the employment of the employees who are listed by name depends on urgent requirements of the plant which stand in the way of further employment on this site or of further employment under unchanged working conditions;

2. the social selection of the employees shall only be examined on the basis of duration of service, age and maintenance obligations, and in this respect only for gross errors; it shall not be regarded as grossly in error if a balanced personnel structure is maintained or created.

The first sentence shall not apply if the circumstances have changed considerably since the reconciliation of interests was brought into being.

(2) Reconciliation of interests pursuant to subs. 1 shall replace the statement of the works council pursuant to section 17 subs. 3 second sentence of the Dismissals Protection Act.

Section 126: Judicial Orders Deciding on Dismissal Protection

(1) If the plant did not elect a works council or if for other reasons reconciliation of interests pursuant to section 125 is not achieved within three weeks of opening of the negotiations or written request to open negotiations, in spite of the fact that the administrator provided comprehensive information in good time to the works council, the insolvency administrator may request a decision on the part of the Labour Court to the effect that termination of contracts covering certain employees designated in his request is conditioned by urgent operational requirements and justified under social aspects. The social selection of the employees shall only be examined on the basis of duration of service , age and maintenance obligations.

(2) The provisions of the Labour Court Act governing decisions by order shall apply mutatis mutandis. The insolvency administrator, the works council and those designated employees not recognizing the termination of their contracts as justified shall be parties to the proceedings. Section 122 subs. 2 third sentence and subs. 3 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(3) Section 12 a subs. 1 first and second sentences of the Labour Court Act shall apply mutatis mutandis to the costs incurred by the parties concerned during the first stage of proceedings. During proceedings before the Federal Labour Court the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure governing the reimbursement of costs shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 127: Action brought by an Employee

(1) If the insolvency administrator gives notice to an employee listed in the application pursuant to section 126 subs. 1, and if the employee files an action to determine that employment has not been terminated by dismissal, or that the change in the working conditions is socially unjustified, the legally binding decision in proceedings pursuant to section 126 shall be binding on the parties. This shall not apply if the circumstances have changed considerably since the last oral hearing.

(2) If the employee has already filed an action prior to the decision taken in proceedings pursuant to section 126 becoming legally binding, at the request of the administrator the proceedings on the action shall be suspended until this time.

Section 128: Sale of plant

(1) Application of sections 125 to 127 shall not be excluded by the plant modification on which the reconciliation of interests or application for determination is based not being carried out until subsequent to sale of plant. The plant buyer shall be a party to the proceedings pursuant to section 126.

(2) In the case of a transfer of plant, the presumption in accordance with section 125 subs. 1 first sentence No. 1 or the court decision pursuant to section 126 subs. 1 first sentence shall also imply that termination of employment does not occur because of the transfer of plant.

Chapter Three: Contest of Transactions in Insolvency Proceedings

Section 129: Policy

(1) Transactions made prior to the opening of insolvency proceedings and disadvantaging the creditors of the insolvency proceedings may be contested by the insolvency administrator under sections 130 to 146.

(2) An omission shall be deemed equivalent to an active transaction.

Section 130: Congruent Coverage

(1) A transaction granting or facilitating a creditor of the insolvency proceedings with a security or satisfaction may be contested

1. if it was made during the last three months prior to the request to open insolvency proceedings, if the debtor was illiquid on the date of the transaction, and if the creditor was aware of his illiquidity on this date, or

2. if it was made after the request to open insolvency proceedings, and if the creditor was aware of the debtor’s illiquidity on the date of the transaction, or of the request to open insolvency proceedings.

(2) Awareness of circumstances pointing directly to illiquidity or to a request to open insolvency proceedings shall be considered equivalent to awareness of illiquidity or of the request to open insolvency proceedings.

(3) A person with a close relationship to the debtor existing on the date of such transaction (section 138) shall be presumed to have been aware of the debtor’s illiquidity or of the request to open insolvency proceedings.

Section 131: Incongruent Coverage

(1) A transaction granting or facilitating a creditor of the insolvency proceedings a security or satisfaction without his entitlement to such security or satisfaction, or to the kind or date of such security or satisfaction, may be contested if such transaction was made

1. during the last month prior to the request to open insolvency proceedings or after such request;

2. within the second or third month prior to the request to open insolvency proceedings, and the debtor was illiquid on the date of the transaction;

3. within the second or third month prior to the request to open insolvency proceedings, and the creditor was aware of the disadvantage to the creditors of the insolvency proceedings arising from such transaction on its date.

(2) For application of subs. 1 No. 3, awareness of circumstances pointing directly to the disadvantage shall be considered equivalent to awareness of the disadvantage to the creditors of the insolvency proceedings. A person with a close relationship to the debtor on the date of such transaction (section 138) shall be presumed to have been aware of the disadvantage to the creditors of the insolvency proceedings.

Section 132: Transactions Constituting a Direct Disadvantage to the Creditors of the Insolvency Proceedings

(1) Legal transactions on the part of the debtor constituting a direct disadvantage to creditors of the insolvency proceedings may be contested if they were made

1. during the last three months prior to the request to open insolvency proceedings, if the debtor was illiquid on the date of such transaction, and if the other party was aware of such illiquidity on this date, or

2. subsequent to the request to open insolvency proceedings, and if at the time when the legal transaction was made the other party was aware of such illiquidity or of the request to open insolvency proceedings.

(2) Legal transactions constituting a direct disadvantage to creditors of the insolvency proceedings shall be deemed equivalent to any other transaction of the debtor divesting the debtor of a right or barring the debtor’s claim to such right for the future or maintaining a property claim against the debtor or rendering such claim enforceable against the debtor.

(3) Section 130 subs. 2 and 3 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 133: Wilful Disadvantage

(1) A transaction made by the debtor during the last ten years prior to the request to open insolvency proceedings, or subsequent to such request, with the intention to disadvantage his creditors may be contested if the other party was aware of the debtor’s intention on the date of such transaction. Such awareness shall be presumed if the other party knew of the debtor’s imminent illiquidity, and that the transaction constituted a disadvantage for the creditors.

(2) An onerous contract entered into by the debtor with a person with a close relationship to him (section 138) directly constituting a disadvantage for the creditors of the insolvency proceedings may be contested. Such contest shall be excluded if the contract was entered into earlier than two years prior to the request to open insolvency proceedings, or if the other party was not aware of the debtor’s intention to disadvantage the creditors on the date of such contract.

Section 134: Gratuitous Benefit

(1) A gratuitous benefit granted by the debtor may be contested unless it was made earlier than four years prior to the request to open insolvency proceedings.

(2) If such benefit comprises a usual casual gift of minor value the gift may not be contested.

Section 135: Loans Replacing Equity Capital

A transaction may be contested which, in consideration of a partner’s claim to restitution of his loan replacing equity capital or in consideration of an equivalent claim,

1. provided a security if such transaction was made during the last ten years prior to the request to open insolvency proceedings or subsequent to such request;

2. provided satisfaction if such transaction was made during the last year prior to the request to open insolvency proceedings or subsequent to such request.

Section 136: Silent Partnership

(1) A transaction may be contested by means of which a part or all of a silent partner’s interest was restituted to him or by means of which a part or all of a silent partner’s share in accrued losses was waived if the basic agreement was made during the last year prior to the request to open insolvency proceedings for the property owned by the manager of the business or subsequent to such request. This shall also apply if such agreement resulted in the liquidation of the silent partnership.

(2) Contention shall be excluded if a reason to open insolvency proceedings became existent only subsequent to the agreement.

Section 137: Payments on Bills of Exchange and Cheques

(1) The debtor’s payment on bills of exchange may not be claimed to be restituted by the recipient under section 130 if the law governing bills of exchange would have barred the recipient’s claims arising from the bill against other indorsers, the drawer or drawee if he had refused the debtor’s payment.

(2) However, the amount paid on a bill shall be restituted by the last indorser or, if he indorsed the bill on account of a third party, by such party if the last indorser or the third party was aware or, due to gross negligence, unaware of the debtor’s illiquidity or of the request to open insolvency proceedings on indorsing the bill or having it indorsed. Section 130 subs. 2 and 3 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(3) Subs. 1 and 2 shall apply mutatis mutandis to payments on cheques on the part of the debtor.

Section 138: Persons with a Close Relationship to the Debtor

(1) If the debtor is an individual, persons with a close relationship to the debtor shall be:

1. the debtor’s spouse even if the marriage was contracted only after the transaction or as dissolved during the last year prior to the transaction;

2. the ascendants or descendants of the debtor or of the spouse designated at No. 1, the brothers and sisters related by consanguinity and affinity to the debtor and the spouse designated at No. 1, and the spouses of such persons;

3. persons living in the debtor’s household or having lived in the debtor’s household during the last year prior to the transaction.

(2) If the debtor is a corporation or a company without legal personality, the persons with a close relationship to the debtor shall be:

1. the members of the body representing or supervising the debtor, as well as his general partners and persons holding more than one quarter of the debtor’s capital;

2. a person or a company having on the basis of a comparable association with the debtor under company law or under a service contract the opportunity to become aware of the debtor’s financial circumstances;

3. a person having a personal relationship detailed at subs. 1 with a person named at No. 1 or 2; this shall not apply if the persons named at No. 1 or 2 are legally bound to secrecy regarding the debtor’s affairs.

Section 139: Calculation of Time Periods prior to the Request to Open Insolvency Proceedings

(1) The periods of time given in sections 88 and 130 to 136 shall commence on the beginning of the day corresponding by its number to the day when the request to open insolvency proceedings was received by the insolvency court. During a month lacking such day the time period shall commence on the beginning of the following day.

(2) If several requests to open insolvency proceedings have been received, the first admissible request containing grounds for opening insolvency proceedings shall be relevant even if the proceedings were opened due to a subsequent request. A request refused with final effect shall be taken into account only if such request was refused due to lacking assets involved in the insolvency proceedings.

Section 140: Date of Performance of Transaction

(1) A transaction shall be deemed performed on the date when its legal effects become existent.

(2) If legal effectiveness of a transaction requires registration in the Land Register, in the ship or shipbuilding register or in the register of liens on aircraft, such transaction shall be deemed performed as soon as the other conditions of its legal effectiveness are met, the debtor’s declaration of intent has become binding upon him, and the other party has requested registration of such transaction. If the registration of a priority notice was requested in order to secure the claim on the change in rights, the first sentence shall apply with the proviso that such request for priority notice shall replace the request to register the transaction.

Section 141: Executable Deed

Contestation shall not be excluded if an executable deed was acquired for the transaction, or if the transaction was performed by way of execution.

Section 142: Cash Transactions

Payments on the part of the debtor in return for which his property benefitted directly from an equitable consideration may only be contested under the conditions of section 133 subs. 1.

Section 143: Legal Consequences

(1) Any property of the debtor sold, transferred or relinquished under the transaction subject to contest must be restituted to the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings. The provisions governing the legal consequences of unjust enrichment with the recipient being aware of a lacking legal justification shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(2) The recipient of a gratuitous benefit shall restitute such benefit only to the extent of his enrichment. This shall not apply if he is aware or must be aware under the circumstances that the gratuitous benefit places the creditors at a disadvantage.

Section 144: Claims of the Party to the Contested Transaction

(1) If the recipient of a benefit under a transaction subject to contest restitutes the property received, his claim shall revive.

(2) Considerations shall be refunded from the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings to the extent to which such consideration continues to exist in a distinct form among the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings, or to which such assets were augmented by its value. Further claims of the recipient of a benefit under a transaction which is subject to contest in respect of restitution of his consideration may be brought by such recipient only as a creditor of the insolvency proceedings.

Section 145: Transactions Contested and Enforced against Legal Successors

(1) A transaction may be contested against the heir or other comprehensive legal successor of the other party to such transaction.

(2) A transaction may be contested against another legal successor if such legal successor

1. was aware of the circumstances giving rise to the enrichment of his predecessor being subject to contention, on the date of his enrichment;

2. belonged to the persons with a close relationship to the debtor (section 138) on the date of his enrichment unless he was unaware of the circumstances giving rise to the enrichment of his predecessor being subject to contest on such date;

3. received the enrichment by way of a gratuitous transfer.

Section 146: Limitation of the Right to Contest

(1) The right to contest a transaction shall be subject to limitation after two years from the opening of the insolvency proceedings.

(2) Even if the right to contest has become subject to limitation, the insolvency administrator may refuse performance of an obligation in consideration of a benefit under a transaction subject to contest,

Section 147: Transactions carried out subsequent to the Opening of Insolvency Proceedings

(1) Transactions carried out after the opening of the insolvency proceedings and having legal effect under sections 892 and 893 of the Civil Code, 16 and 17 of the Act Governing Rights in Registered Ships and Ships Under Construction and 16 and 17 of the Act Governing Rights in Aircraft may be contested in accordance with the provisions governing the contest of transactions carried out before the insolvency proceedings were opened.

(2) The limitation period under section 146 subs. 1 shall begin on the date when the transaction became legally effective.

Part Four: Management and Disposition of the Assets involved in the Insolvency Proceedings

Chapter One: Arrestment of the Assets involved in the Insolvency Proceedings

Section 148: Transfer of the Assets involved in the Insolvency Proceedings

(1) Subsequent to the opening of the insolvency proceedings the insolvency administrator shall immediately assume possession and management of the whole property forming part of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings.

(2) Using an executable duplicate of the order opening the insolvency proceedings the administrator shall be entitled to enforce by way of execution the dereliction of the chattels held in the debtor’s custody. Section 766 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply with the proviso that the enforcement judge shall be replaced by the insolvency court.

Section 149: Objects of Value

(1) The creditors’ committee may determine the agency and conditions of deposit or investment of currency, securities and objects of value. If a creditors’ committee has not been appointed, or has not yet taken a decision to this effect the insolvency court may give such orders.

(2) If a creditors’ committee has been appointed the insolvency administrator shall only be entitled to receive currency, securities or objects of value from the agency of the deposit or investment if a member of the creditors’ committee also signs the receipt. The administrator’s orders to such agency shall require the cosignature of a member of the creditors’ committee in order to become legally effective.

(3) The creditors’ assembly may decide otherwise.

Section 150: Sealing

In order to secure property forming part of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings the insolvency administrator may have seals applied by the sheriff or any other legally authorised person. The document evidencing such sealing or the removal of seals shall be deposited by the administrator with the registry of the court for the parties’ inspection.

Section 151: Record of the Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings

(1) The insolvency administrator shall establish a record of each object forming part of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings. The debtor shall attend the establishment of such record if his attendance does not delay the proceedings to their detriment.

(2) The value of each object shall be indicated. If the value depends on whether the debtor’s enterprise is continued or closed down, both amounts shall be indicated. An expert may be charged with the assessment of objects whose value may be assessed only with particular difficulty.

(3) At the administrator’s request the insolvency court may waive the establishment of the record; grounds are to be given for the request. If a creditors’ committee was appointed the administrator may submit such request only with the consent of the creditors’ committee.

Section 152: Record of Creditors

(1) The insolvency administrator shall establish a record of all the debtor’s creditors of whom he is aware by inspection of the debtor’s records and business documents, by any other indication of the debtor, by filing their claims or in any other way.

(2) The record shall itemize the creditors with a claim to separate satisfaction and each category of lower-ranking creditors of the insolvency proceedings. The address of each creditor as well as the reason and the amount of claim shall be indicated. For creditors with a claim to separate satisfaction also the object subject to the claim of separate satisfaction and the amount of their probable nonsatisfaction shall be indicated; section 151 subs. 2 second sentence shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(3) In addition, the record shall indicate any situation enabling the set-off of claims against each other. The amount of the obligations incumbent on the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings shall be estimated if the debtor’s property is disposed of in an expeditious way.

Section 153: Survey of Property

(1) As of the date when the insolvency proceedings were opened the insolvency administrator shall establish an ordered survey indicating the objects forming part of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings and the debtor’s obligations and balancing them. Section 151 subs. 2 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the assessment of the value of objects; section 152 subs. 2 first sentence shall apply mutatis mutandis to the itemization of the debtor’s obligations.

(2) After the establishment of the survey of property the insolvency court, at the administrator’s or a creditor’s request, may order the debtor’s affidavit regarding the completeness of the survey of property. Sections 98 and 101 subs. 1 first and second sentences shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 154: Deposit with the Registry of the Insolvency Court

The record of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings, the record of creditors and the survey of property shall be deposited with the registry of the insolvency court for the parties’ inspection at the latest one week prior to the report meeting.

Section 155: Accounting under Commercial and Fiscal Law

(1) The debtor’s obligations under commercial and fiscal law to keep and render accounts shall remain unaffected. With respect to the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings such obligations shall be incumbent on the insolvency administrator.

(2) A new financial year shall begin when the insolvency proceedings are opened. However, the period elapsed prior to the report meeting shall not be taken into account in legal periods provided for the establishment or publication of financial statements.

(3) Section 318 of the Commercial Code shall apply to the appointment of the balance sheet auditor in the insolvency proceedings with the proviso that such auditor shall be appointed exclusively by the Register Court at the administrator’s request. If an auditor was appointed for the financial year prior to the opening of the insolvency proceedings the validity of such appointment shall remain unaffected by the opening of the insolvency proceedings.

Chapter Two: Decision on Disposition

Section 156: Report Meeting

(1) At the report meeting the insolvency administrator shall report on the economic situation of the debtor and its causes. He shall assess any prospects of maintaining the debtor’s enterprise as a whole or in part, indicate any possibility of drawing up an insolvency plan and describe the effects of each solution on the satisfaction of the creditors.

(2) The debtor, the creditors’ committee, the works council and the spokesmen of officers shall be given the opportunity to make their statements on the administrator’s report at the report meeting. If the debtor is a trader, craftsman or farmer, the competent official professional representative body of industry, trade, the craft or of agriculture may also be given the opportunity to express their views at the report meeting.

Section 157: Decision on the Further Proceedings

At the report meeting the creditors’ assembly shall decide whether the debtor’s enterprise should be closed down or temporarily continued. The assembly may commission the administrator to draw up an insolvency plan and determine the plan’s objective for him. The assembly may modify its decisions at subsequent meetings.

Section 158: Measures prior to the Decision

(1) If the insolvency administrator intends to close the debtor’s enterprise prior to the report meeting he shall obtain the consent of the creditors’ committee if appointed.

(2) Before the creditors’ committee takes its decision or, if such committee has not been appointed, before closing down the enterprise the administrator shall inform the debtor thereof. At the request of the debtor and after hearing the administrator the insolvency court shall refuse such close-down of the enterprise if the close-down can be suspended until the report meeting without considerably reducing the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings.

Section 159: Disposition of the Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings

After the report meeting the administrator shall immediately liquidate the property forming the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings, unless such disposition contradicts any decisions taken by the creditors’ assembly.

Section 160: Transactions of Particular Importance

(1) The insolvency administrator shall obtain the consent of the creditors’ committee if he intends to engage in transactions which are of particular importance to the insolvency proceedings. If no creditors’ committee has been appointed, he shall obtain the consent of the creditors’ assembly.

(2) Consent under subs. 1 shall be required in particular

1. if such transaction purports to sell the enterprise, plant, the entire stock, a part of real property to be disposed of by private sale, the debtor’s shares in another enterprise if such shares are intended to bring about a permanent affiliation to such other enterprise or the entitlement to receive recurring earnings;

2. if such transaction purports to enter into a loan contract with considerable burdens on the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings;

3. if such transaction purports to bring or join a court action amounting to a considerable value in dispute, to refuse the bringing of such action, or to negotiate a settlement or compromise to settle or avoid any such action.

Section 161: Provisional Prohibition of the Transaction

In any of the cases covered by section 160 the insolvency administrator shall inform the debtor before the creditors’ committee or assembly take a decision if such information is possible without delaying the insolvency proceedings to their detriment. If the creditors’ assembly has not given its consent, at the request of the debtor or of a majority of creditors qualifying under section 75 subs. 1 No. 3 and after hearing the administrator the insolvency court may provisionally prohibit the transaction and convene a creditors’ assembly for a decision to be taken on the transaction.

Section 162: Sale of Plant to Persons with Specific Interests

(1) The sale of the enterprise or plant shall require the approval of the creditors’ assembly if the purchaser or a person holding at least one fifth of the purchaser’s capital

1. belongs to the persons with a close relationship to the debtor (section 138);

2. is a creditor with a right to separate satisfaction or a creditor of the insolvency proceedings with non-lower ranking claims whose rights to separate satisfaction and claims are assessed by the insolvency court to reach a total of one fifth of the sum of the value of all rights to separate satisfaction and of the amounts of the claims of all creditors of the insolvency proceedings with non-lower ranking claims.

(2) A person shall also be deemed to hold, shares of the purchaser for the purpose of subs. 1 if an enterprise controlled by the person or a third party holds shares of the purchaser on behalf of the person or of the controlled enterprise.

Section 163: Sale of Plant below Value

(1) At the request of the debtor or of a majority of creditors qualifying under section 75 subs. 1 No. 3 and after hearing the insolvency administrator the insolvency court may order that the envisaged sale of the enterprise or of plant shall require the approval of the creditors’ assembly if the requesting party proves to the satisfaction of the court that a sale to another purchaser would be more beneficial to the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings.

(2) If the requesting party has incurred costs for such request, he shall be entitled to reimbursement of such costs by the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings as soon as the court issues its order.

Section 164: Legal Validity of the Transaction

A contravention of sections 160 to 163 shall leave the validity of the acts of the insolvency administrator unaffected.

Chapter Three: Objects Subject to a Right to Separate Satisfaction

Section 165: Disposition of Immovables

The insolvency administrator may initiate with the competent court auctions or sequestrations of immovables forming part of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings even if such immovables are subject to a right to separate satisfaction.

Section 166: Disposition of Movables

(1) The insolvency administrator may dispose of a movable item subject to a right to separate satisfaction without restriction if he holds its possession.

(2) The insolvency administrator may collect or in another way dispose of a claim assigned by the debtor in order to secure a claim. This shall not apply if the claim has been assigned to the participant in a system in accordance with section 96 subs. 2 second or third sentence in order to safeguard his claims from the system or to the central bank of a Member State of the European Union or a Contracting Party of the Agreement on the European Economic Area or to the European Central Bank.

Section 167: Notification of the Creditor

(1) If the insolvency administrator is entitled to dispose of a movable item under section 166 subs. 1 he shall notify the condition of the movable item to the creditor with a right to separate satisfaction at the latter’s request. Instead of such notification the administrator may allow the creditor to inspect the object.

(2) If the administrator is entitled to collect a claim under section 166 subs. 2 he shall notify the claim to the creditor with a right to separate satisfaction at the latter’s request. Instead of such notification he may allow the creditor to inspect the debtor’s books and business documents.

Section 168: Notification of Envisaged Sale

(1) Before the insolvency administrator sells an object with regard to which he is entitled to disposition under section 166 to a third party he shall notify how such envisaged sale is to be carried out to the creditor with a right to separate satisfaction. He shall give the creditor the opportunity of pointing out within a week another means of selling the object which would be more beneficial to the creditor.

(2) If such notification is given, within a week or in good time before the sale, the administrator shall take advantage of such opportunity or recompense the creditor as if he had taken advantage of it.

(3) Such other opportunity of disposition may also consist in the object’s devolution to the creditor himself. An opportunity to sell shall also be deemed more beneficial if savings are made on expenses.

Section 169: Protection of the Creditor Against Delayed Disposition

If an object with regard to which the insolvency administrator is entitled to disposition under section 166 is not disposed of by him, the creditor shall be paid the current interest due to him from the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings beginning from the report meeting. If the insolvency court issued an order under section 21 prohibiting the creditor to dispose of the object before the insolvency proceedings were opened the interest due shall be paid at the latest from the date three months after such order by the court. The first and second sentences shall not apply to the extent to which, in view of the amount of the creditor’s claim, the value and any other right encumbering the object will probably not be sufficient in order to satisfy the creditor by the proceeds of the disposition.

Section 170: Distribution of Proceeds

(1) Subsequent to disposition of a movable item or a claim by the insolvency administrator the costs of determining and disposing of the object shall be credited to the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings in advance using the proceeds. The remaining amount shall be used without delay to satisfy the creditor with a right to separate satisfaction.

(2) If the insolvency administrator transfers an object with regard to which he is entitled to disposition under section 166 to the creditor to be disposed of by the latter, the creditor shall contribute an amount covering the costs of determination and turnover tax (section 171 subs. 2 third sentence) in advance to the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings using the proceeds gained by him.

Section 171: Calculation of the Contribution to Costs

(1) The costs of determination comprise the costs of the actual identification of the object and of the determination of any rights encumbering the object. Such costs shall be rated as a lump sum of four percent of the proceeds.

(2) The costs of disposition shall be rated as a lump sum of five percent of the proceeds. If the costs actually incurred which were necessary for the disposition were considerably lower or considerably higher, these costs shall be taken as a basis. If disposition entails the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings incurring turnover tax, this amount shall be charged in addition to the lump sum pursuant to sentence one or the costs actually incurred pursuant to sentence two.

Section 172: Other Use of Movables

(1) The insolvency administrator may use a movable item with regard to which he is entitled to disposition for the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings if the loss in value accruing from such use is recompensed by current payments to the creditor beginning from the opening of the insolvency proceedings. Such obligation to recompensing payments shall only exist to the extent to which the loss in value accruing from such use impairs the security of the creditor with a right to separate satisfaction.

(2) The administrator shall be entitled to combine, merge and transform such object with other property so long as such change of the condition of the object does not impair the security of the creditor with a right to separate satisfaction. If the creditor’s right devolves to other property the creditor shall transfer such new security to the administrator to the extent to which its value exceeds the previous value.

Section 173: Disposition by the Creditor

(1) If the insolvency administrator is not entitled to dispose of a movable item or a claim subject to a claim to separate satisfaction the creditor’s right to dispose of such object shall remain unaffected.

(2) At the administrator’s request and after hearing the creditor the insolvency court may determine a period of time during which the creditor has to dispose of the object. Upon expiry of such period of time the administrator shall be entitled to its disposition.

Part Five: Satisfaction of the Creditors of the Insolvency Proceedings. Discontinuation of the Proceedings

Chapter One: Determination of Claims

Section 174: Filing of Claims

(1) The claim of a creditor of the insolvency proceedings must be filed in writing with the insolvency administrator. Such filing shall be accompanied by copies of the documents evidencing the claim.

(2) Upon its filing the reason and the amount of the claim shall be indicated, as shall the facts from which in the view of the creditor it emerges that it is based on an unauthorised act on the part of the debtor committed with intent.

(3) Lower-ranking creditors shall file their claims only if specifically requested by the insolvency court to do so. Upon filing such claims their lower-ranking status shall be indicated, and the creditor’s lower rank shall be designated.

Section 175: Schedule

(1) The insolvency administrator shall enter any registered claim into a schedule with the indications under section 174 subs. 2 and 3. Such schedule shall be deposited with the registry of the insolvency court, together with the applications and enclosed certificates for the parties’ inspection within the first third of the period of time between the expiry of the filing period and the verification meeting.

(2) If a creditor has registered a claim from an unauthorised act committed with intent, the insolvency court shall indicate to the debtor the legal consequences of section 302 and the possibility of an objection.

Section 176: Proceedings of the Verification Meeting

During the verification meeting the filed claims shall be verified in accordance with their amount and rank. Claims denied by the insolvency administrator, by the debtor or by a creditor of the insolvency proceedings shall be discussed individually.

Section 177: Subsequent Filings

(1) During the verification meeting verification shall also include claims filed after expiry of the filing period. However, if the insolvency administrator or a creditor of the insolvency proceedings objects to the verification of such claims, or if a claim is filed only after the verification meeting, the insolvency court shall either docket a special verification meeting or order verification in written proceedings, and burden the defaulter with the costs. The first and second sentences shall apply mutatis mutandis to subsequent amendments to filed claims.

(2) If the insolvency court requested lower-ranking creditors to file their claims in accordance with section 174 subs. 3, and if the period of time determined for such filings expires later than one week prior to the verification meeting, the court shall either docket a special verification meeting or order verification in written proceedings, and burden the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings with its costs .

(3) The date of the special verification meeting shall be published. The creditors of the insolvency proceedings filing claims, the insolvency administrator and the debtor shall receive individual summons to such meeting. Section 74 subs. 2 second sentence shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 178: Prerequisites and Effects of Determination of Claims

(1) A claim shall be deemed to have been determined if no denial is made by the insolvency administrator or by a creditor of the insolvency proceedings during the verification meeting, or in the written proceedings (section 177) or if any denial made by a party is removed. The debtor’s denial shall not bar determination of a claim.

(2) For each filed claim the insolvency court shall enter in the schedule the extent to which a claim was determined with its amount or rank, or which party objected to its determination. An objection on the part of the debtor shall also be entered in the schedule. Determination shall be marked on bills of exchange and any other debt instruments by the registrar of the insolvency court.

(3) For claims determined with their amount and rank, entry into the schedule shall have the legal effect of a final judgment with respect to the insolvency administrator and all creditors of the insolvency proceedings.

Section 179: Denied Claims

(1) If a claim was denied by the insolvency administrator or by a creditor of the insolvency proceedings, initiation of proceedings to determine such claim against the denying party shall be left to the creditor.

(2) If such claim is based on an executable deed or a final judgment, following up the denial shall be incumbent on the denying party.

(3) The insolvency court shall provide the creditor whose claim was denied a certified extract from the schedule. In the case mentioned at subs. 2 the denying party shall also receive such extract. The creditors whose claims have been determined shall not be notified; the creditors’ attention shall be drawn to this prior to the verification meeting.

Section 180: Competence for the Determination of Claims

(1) An action for the determination of a claim shall be brought under the provisions governing ordinary civil proceedings. The Local Court where the insolvency proceedings are or were pending shall have exclusive jurisdiction for such action. If the subject matter of the action does not fall under the jurisdiction of the Local Courts, the Regional Court in whose district the insolvency court is located shall have exclusive jurisdiction.

(2) If an action concerning such claim was pending on the date when the insolvency proceedings were opened, determination of the claim shall be initiated by the joinder of such action.

Section 181: Scope of Determination

Determination of a claim with its grounds, amount and rank may only be applied for to the extent indicated when it was filed or during the verification meeting.

Section 182: Value of Action

The value of an action to determine a claim whose legal validity was denied by the insolvency administrator or by a creditor of the insolvency proceedings shall depend on the amount to be expected for the claim as a result of distribution of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings.

Section 183: Effect of the Decision

(1) A decision with final and binding effect determining a claim or sustaining an objection shall be effective with respect to the insolvency administrator and all creditors of the insolvency proceedings.

(2) The prevailing party shall request amendment of the schedule with the insolvency court.

(3) If only individual creditors have pursued the action, but not the insolvency administrator, these creditors may claim reimbursement of their costs from the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings to the extent to which such assets have benefitted from the judicial decision.

Section 184: Action to Enforce a Claim Denied by the Debtor

If the debtor denied a claim during the verification meeting or in the written proceedings (section 177) the creditor may bring an action against the debtor in order to determine such claim. If an action concerning such claim was pending on the date when the insolvency proceedings were opened the creditor may continue such action against the debtor.

Section 185: Special Jurisdiction

If an action for the determination of a claim could not be brought under the provisions governing ordinary civil proceedings its determination shall be initiated with any other court having jurisdiction or with the competent administrative agency. Sections 180 subs. 2 and sections 181, 183 and 184 shall apply mutatis mutandis. If another court has jurisdiction to determine such claim section 182 shall also apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 186: Restitutio in Integrum

(1) If the debtor did not attend the verification meeting the insolvency court, at his request, shall grant him restitutio in integrum. Sections 51 subs. 2, 85 subs. 2 and 233 to 236 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(2) The writs concerning a request of restitutio in integrum shall be served on the creditor whose claim is to be subsequently contested. Contestation in such writs shall be deemed equivalent to denial during the verification meeting if restitutio in integrum is granted.

Chapter Two: Distribution

Section 187: Satisfaction of the Creditors of the Insolvency Proceedings

(1) Satisfaction of the creditors of the insolvency proceedings may be initiated only after the general verification meeting.

(2) Funds may be distributed among the creditors of the insolvency proceedings as soon as sufficient cash is available in the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings. Lower-ranking creditors of the insolvency proceedings shall not be considered for advance distributions.

(3) Distributions shall be carried out by the insolvency administrator. Before each distribution he shall obtain the consent of the creditors’ committee if appointed.

Section 188: Distribution Record

Prior to distribution the insolvency administrator shall establish a record of the claims to be considered in respect of distribution. Such record shall be deposited with the registry of the insolvency court for the parties’ inspection. The administrator shall publish the total amount of claims and the amount available for distribution from the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings.

Section 189: Consideration of Denied Claims

(1) An insolvency creditor whose claim has not been determined and is not based on an executable deed or a final judgment shall, at the latest within a limitation period of two weeks from publication, prove to the insolvency administrator that and for which amount he has brought an action to determine the claim or joindered the proceedings to a previously pending action.

(2) If proof is provided in good time, the share allocated to such claim shall be retained from distribution as long as such action is pending.

(3) If proof is not provided in good time, the claim shall not be taken into account in distribution.

Section 190: Consideration of Creditors with a Right to Separate Satisfaction

(1) A creditor with a right to separate satisfaction shall, at the latest within the limitation period under section 189 subs. 1, prove to the insolvency administrator that and for which amount he has waived separate satisfaction or his claim was not met by such separate satisfaction. If proof is not provided in good time, the claim shall not be taken into account in distribution.

(2) The creditor shall be deemed to have met his obligation under subs. 1 in order to share in advance distribution if he, at the latest within such limitation period, proves to the insolvency administrator that disposition of the object subject to a right to separate satisfaction is being initiated, and which amount of his claim is likely not to be satisfied. In such a case the share covering the amount of his claim shall be retained in distribution. If the conditions under subs. 1 are not met at final distribution the retained share shall be free to flow into the final distribution.

(3) If only the insolvency administrator is entitled to dispose of an object subject to a right to separate satisfaction, subs. 1 and 2 shall not apply. In the case of advance distribution, if the administrator has not yet disposed of the object, he shall estimate the extent to which the creditor’s claim will not be met by separate satisfaction and retain the share covering such claim.

Section 191: Consideration of Claims Subject to a Condition Precedent

(1) The full amount of claims subject to a condition precedent shall be taken into account in the case of advance distribution. The share covering the claim shall be retained in distribution.

(2) Claims subject to a condition precedent shall not be taken into account during final distribution if the possibility of accomplishment of the condition is so distant that the claim is valueless on the date of distribution. In such a case the share retained under subs. 1 second sentence shall be free to flow into final distribution.

Section 192: Subsequent Consideration

Creditors not taken into account in advance distribution and who meet the conditions under sections 189 and 190 shall in the next distribution be advanced an amount from the remainder of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings placing them on an equal footing with the other creditors.

Section 193: Amendments to the Distribution Record

The insolvency administrator shall append any amendment to the record required under sections 189 to 192 within three days of the expiry of the limitation period mentioned at section 189 subs. 1.

Section 194: Objections to the Distribution Record

(1) In the case of advance distribution, a creditor shall bring his objection to the record to the notice of the insolvency court within one week after expiry of the limitation period mentioned at section 189 subs. 1.

(2) A judicial decision overruling objections shall be served on the creditor and the insolvency administrator. The creditor may bring an immediate appeal against such a decision.

(3) A judicial decision ordering an correction to the record shall be served on the creditor and the administrator and deposited with the registry of the insolvency court for the parties’ inspection. The administrator and the creditors of the insolvency proceedings may bring an immediate appeal against such a decision. The period of such appeal shall begin on the day of the deposit of the decision.

Section 195: Determination of a Fraction

(1) At the proposal of the insolvency administrator, the creditors’ committee shall determine the fraction to be paid in the case of advance distribution. If no creditors’ committee has been appointed, the insolvency administrator shall identify such fraction.

(2) The administrator shall bring such fraction to the notice of those creditors who have been taken into account.

Section 196: Final Distribution

(1) Final distribution shall take place as soon as the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings have been disposed of, with the exception of current income.

(2) Final distribution shall require the consent of the insolvency court.

Section 197: Final Meeting

(1) While consenting to final distribution the insolvency court shall docket a meeting for the final creditors’ assembly. During such meeting

1. the insolvency administrator’s final account shall be discussed,

2. objections to the final record may be brought, and

3. the creditors shall decide on any objects forming part of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings not apt to be disposed of.

(2) The period of time extending between the publication of the date of the meeting and such meeting shall not fall below one month and not exceed two months.

(3) Section 194 subs. 2 and 3 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the decision of the insolvency court on objections raised by a creditor

Section 198: Deposit of Retained Funds

Funds to be retained in final distribution shall be deposited with suitable agency by the insolvency administrator on account of the parties involved.

Section 199: Surplus Resulting from Final Distribution

If the claims of all creditors of the insolvency proceedings can be satisfied in final distribution the insolvency administrator shall transfer any remaining surplus to the debtor. If the debtor is not an individual the insolvency administrator shall transfer to any person owning a share of the debtor’s capital the share of such surplus devolving to such person under liquidation outside the insolvency proceedings

Section 200: Termination of the Insolvency Proceedings

(1) As soon as final distribution has been carried out, the insolvency court shall decide on termination of the insolvency proceedings.

(2) Such decision and the reason underlying such termination shall be published. Section 9 remaining unaffected, the notification shall be published in extract form in the Federal Bulletin. Sections 31 to 33 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 201: Rights of the Creditors of the Insolvency Proceedings subsequent to Termination

(1) Subsequent to termination of the insolvency proceedings, the creditors of these proceedings may enforce the remainder of their claims against the debtor without restriction.

(2) Creditors of the insolvency proceedings who have determined claims which have not been denied by the debtor during the verification meeting may enforce such claims against the debtor by way of execution on the legal basis of their entry into the schedule as under an executable judgment. A claim with an overruled objection shall be equivalent to a claim not denied. The application for the issuance of an executable copy of the schedule may not be filed until the insolvency proceedings have been terminated.

(3) Provisions on discharge of residual debt shall remain unaffected.

Section 202: Jurisdiction for Execution

(1) Under the circumstance of section 201, the Local Court where the insolvency proceedings are or were pending shall have exclusive jurisdiction for any action

1. brought to obtain the clause of execution;

2. brought to deny the accomplishment of the prerequisites to grant such clause after it was obtained;

3. brought to enforce any objection to the claim itself.

(2) If the subject matter of such action does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Local Courts, exclusive jurisdiction shall be vested in the Regional Court in whose district the insolvency court is located.

Section 203: Order to Carry Out Delayed Distribution

(1) At the request of the insolvency administrator or of a creditor of the insolvency proceedings or ex officio the insolvency court shall order delayed distribution if after the final meeting

1. retained funds become available for distribution.

2. funds paid from the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings flow back to them, or

3. objects forming part of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings are identified.

(2) Termination of the insolvency proceedings shall not bar issuance of an order to carry out delayed distribution.

(3) The court may refrain from issuing such order and transfer the available amount or identified object to the debtor if such proceedings appear to the court to be adequate given the low value of the amount or of the object and the costs of delayed distribution. It may condition its order on the advancement of funds covering the costs of such delayed distribution.

Section 204: Appeal

(1) The decision refusing to carry out delayed distribution shall be served on the requesting party. Such party may bring an immediate appeal against the decision.

(2) The decision ordering delayed distribution shall be served on the insolvency administrator, the debtor and any creditor requesting such delayed distribution. The debtor may bring an immediate appeal against the decision.

Section 205: Implementation of Delayed Distribution

Once delayed distribution has been ordered, the insolvency administrator shall distribute the available amount or the proceeds from disposition of the identified object on the basis of the final record. He shall render account of such distribution to the insolvency court.

Section 206: Exclusion of Creditors of the Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings

Creditors of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings of whose claims the insolvency administrator has become aware

1. only after determination of the fraction in advance distribution,

2. only after the final meeting had been closed during final distribution, or

3. if delayed distribution was ordered, only after its publication

may claim satisfaction only from the funds remaining as assets involved in the insolvency proceedings.

Chapter Three: Discontinuation of Insolvency Proceedings

Section 207: Discontinuation for Lacking Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings

(1) If after the insolvency proceedings have been opened it is found that the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings are insufficient to cover the costs of the proceedings, the insolvency court shall discontinue such proceedings. Discontinuation shall not be ordered if sufficient funds are advanced or if the costs are deferred in accordance with section 4a; section 26 subs. 3 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(2) The creditors’ assembly, the insolvency administrator and the creditors of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings shall be heard prior to discontinuation.

(3) Any cash funds available in the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings shall be used by the administrator prior to discontinuation of the proceedings in order to settle the costs of the proceedings, and among such costs firstly expenses in proportion to their amounts. The administrator shall no longer be under an obligation to dispose of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings.

Section 208: Notification of Lacking Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings

(1) If the costs of the insolvency proceedings are covered but the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings are insufficient to settle the other mature obligations incumbent on the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings, the insolvency administrator shall notify the insolvency court of lacking assets involved in the insolvency proceedings. The same shall apply if it is likely that the assets will be insufficient to meet the other existing obligations incumbent on the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings on the date of their maturity.

(2) The court shall publish the notification of lacking assets involved in the insolvency proceedings. Such notification shall be served separately on the creditors of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings.

(3) The duty incumbent on the insolvency administrator to administer and dispose of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings shall also continue subsequent to the notification of lacking assets.

Section 209: Satisfaction of the Creditors of the Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings

(1) The insolvency administrator shall settle the obligations incumbent on the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings in the following order, and equal-ranking obligations in proportion to the amounts:

1. the costs of the insolvency proceedings;

2. obligations incumbent on the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings which became legally effective after the notification of lacking assets involved in the insolvency proceedings without falling under the costs of the proceedings;

3. the other obligations incumbent on the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings, including lastly the maintenance granted pursuant to sections 100 and 101 subs. 1 third sentence.

(2) The following obligations shall also be deemed obligations incumbent on the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings in the meaning of subs. 1 No. 2

1. under a mutual contract for whose performance the administrator opted subsequent to notifying lacking asset involved in the insolvency proceedings;

2. under a continuing obligation for the period after the first date on which the administrator was entitled to terminate such contract after notifying lacking assets involved in the insolvency proceedings;

3. under a continuing obligation to the extent that the administrator has claimed its consideration to the benefit of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings after notifying lacking assets involved in the insolvency proceedings.

Section 210: Prohibition of Execution

As soon as the insolvency administrator has notified lacking assets involved in the insolvency proceedings, execution in respect of an obligation incumbent on the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings in the meaning of section 209 subs. 1 No. 3 shall be inadmissible.

Section 211: Discontinuation upon Notification of Lacking Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings

(1) As soon as the insolvency administrator has distributed the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings under section 209, the insolvency court shall discontinue the insolvency proceedings.

(2) The administrator shall render separate account of his activities after the notification of lacking assets involved in the insolvency proceedings.

(3) If objects forming part of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings are identified after discontinuation of such proceedings the court, at the request of the administrator or of a creditor of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings, or ex officio, shall order delayed distribution. Sections 203 subs. 3, as well as 204 and 205 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 212: Discontinuation for Subsequent Lack of Grounds to Open Insolvency Proceedings

At the debtor’s request the insolvency proceedings shall be discontinued if it is ensured that he, after such discontinuation, will no longer be subject to (imminent) illiquidity or overindebtedness if the insolvency proceedings were opened due to overindebtedness. Admissibility of such a request shall require the debtor to show to the satisfaction of the court that there is no reason to open insolvency proceedings.

Section 213: Discontinuation with the Creditors’ Consent

(1) At the debtor’s request the insolvency proceedings shall be discontinued if he, after expiry of the filing period, submits declarations of consent on the part of all creditors of the insolvency proceedings who have filed claims. For creditors whose claims are denied by the debtor or by the insolvency administrator, and in the case of creditors with a right to separate satisfaction, the insolvency court shall decide on its own discretion on the requirement for consent to be given by such creditors or a security to be provided to them.

(2) The proceedings may be discontinued at the debtor’s request even prior to expiry of the filing period if no other creditors are known than those whose declarations of consent were submitted by the debtor.

Section 214: Discontinuation Procedure

(1) A request to discontinue insolvency proceedings under sections 212 or 213 shall be published. It shall be deposited with the registry of the court for the parties’ inspection; in the case mentioned at section 213 it shall be accompanied by the creditors’ declarations of consent. The creditors of the insolvency proceedings may object to such a request within one week after publication, either in writing or for the records of the court registry.

(2) Before deciding on the discontinuation of insolvency proceedings the court shall hear the requesting party, the insolvency administrator and the creditors’ committee, if appointed. If a creditor objects to such a request, he shall also be heard by the court.

(3) Prior to discontinuation, the administrator shall settle any claims on the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings which have not been denied and provide a security for claims which have been denied.

Section 215: Publication and Legal Effects of Discontinuation

(1) A decision discontinuing insolvency proceedings under sections 207, 211, 212 or 213 and the reason underlying such discontinuation shall be published. The date when such discontinuation will become effective (section 9 subs. 1 third sentence) shall be brought to the notice of the debtor, the insolvency administrator and the members of the creditors’ committee in advance. Sections 200 subs. 2 second and third sentence shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(2) Upon discontinuation of the insolvency proceedings the right to dispose freely of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings shall be transferred back to the debtor. Sections 201 and 202 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 216: Appeal

(1) If the insolvency proceedings are discontinued under sections 207, 212 or 213 each creditor may bring an immediate appeal, and also the debtor may bring an immediate appeal if his insolvency proceedings were discontinued under section 207.

(2) If a request is rejected under sections 212 or 213, the debtor may bring an immediate appeal.

Part Six: Insolvency Plan

Chapter One: Establishment of the Plan

Section 217: Policy

Counter to the provisions of this statute, the satisfaction of creditors entitled to separate satisfaction and of the creditors of the insolvency proceedings, the disposition of the assets involved in insolvency proceedings and their distribution to the parties concerned, as well as the debtor’s liability subsequent to termination of the insolvency proceedings, may be settled in an insolvency plan.

Section 218: Submission of the Insolvency Plan

(1) The insolvency administrator and the debtor shall be entitled to submit an insolvency plan to the insolvency court. Submission by the debtor may be connected with a request to open insolvency proceedings. A plan received by the court after the final creditors’ assembly shall not be taken into account.

(2) If the creditors’ assembly has charged the administrator with the establishment of an insolvency plan, the administrator shall submit such plan to the court within a reasonable period of time.

(3) The establishment of the plan by the administrator shall be commented by the creditors’ committee, if appointed, by the works council, by the spokesmen of officers and by the debtor as advisors.

Section 219: Breakdown of the Plan

The insolvency plan shall consist of a declaratory and a constructive part. It shall be accompanied by the attachments mentioned at sections 229 and 230.

Section 220: Declaratory Part

(1) The declaratory part of the insolvency plan shall describe the measures taken or still to be taken after opening the insolvency proceedings in order to create the basis for the envisaged establishment of the rights held by the parties involved.

(2) The declaratory part shall contain all other information on the basis and effects of the plan which are relevant to the decision of the creditors on approval of the plan, and for its confirmation by the court.

Section 221: Constructive Part

The constructive part of the insolvency plan shall determine the transformation of the legal position of the parties involved, by the insolvency plan.

Section 222: Formation of Groups

(1) While determining the rights held by the parties involved in the insolvency plan, groups shall be formed where creditors are concerned with differing legal status. A distinction shall be made between

1. the creditors entitled to separate satisfaction if their rights are encroached upon by the plan;

2. the non-lower ranking creditors;

3. each class of lower-ranking creditors of the insolvency proceedings unless their claims are deemed to be waived pursuant to section 225.

(2) Creditors with equal rights may form groups where creditors with equivalent economic interests are set together. Such groups shall be adequately separated from each other. The criteria of their separation shall be indicated in the plan.

(3) Employees shall form a separate group if they are claiming major amounts as creditors of the insolvency proceedings. Separate groups may be formed for minor creditors.

Section 223: Rights of Creditors Entitled to Separate Satisfaction

(1) If the insolvency plan does not provide otherwise, the plan shall not affect the right of creditors entitled to separate satisfaction to achieve satisfaction from objects subject to rights of separation. Any derogating provision shall be ruled out in respect of securities provided to

1. the participant in a system in accordance with section 96 subs. 2 second or third sentence to safeguard his claims from the system, or

2. the central bank of a Member State of the European Union or the European Central Bank.

(2) If the plan provides otherwise the plan in its constructive part shall, for creditors entitled to separate satisfaction, indicate the fraction by which their rights will be reduced, detail; the period of respite for their claims, or provide for any other provisions binding upon them.

Section 224: Rights of the Creditors of the Insolvency Proceedings

For the non-lower ranking creditors the constructive part of the insolvency plan shall indicate the fraction by which their claims will be reduced, detail the period of respite for their claims, announce the securities for them or provide for any other provisions to which they are to be subjected.

Section 225: Rights of Lower-ranking Creditors of the Insolvency Proceeding

(1) The claims of lower-ranking creditors of the insolvency proceedings shall be deemed waived unless the insolvency plan provides otherwise.

(2) If the insolvency plan provides otherwise, the constructive part, for each group of lower-ranking creditors, shall give the indications required under section 224.

(3) The debtor’s liability for fines and his obligations equal to such penalties under section 39 subs. 1 No. 3 subsequent to termination of the insolvency proceedings can neither be excluded nor limited by a plan.

Section 226: Equal Treatment of Parties Involved

(1) Within each group all parties involved shall be offered equal rights.

(2) Any distinct treatment of the parties forming one group shall require the consent of all parties concerned. In such a case the insolvency plan shall be accompanied by each party’s statement of consent

(3) Any agreement concluded by the insolvency administrator, the debtor or any other person and individual parties. providing for an advantage not envisaged under the plan in consideration of such parties’ conduct in votes or otherwise with respect to the insolvency proceedings shall be void.

Section 227: Debtor’s Liability

(1) If the insolvency plan does not provide otherwise the debtor shall be discharged of his residual obligations held by the creditors of the insolvency proceedings by the satisfaction of such creditors under the constructive part.

(2) If the debtor is a company without legal personality or a partnership limited by shares, subs. 1 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the partners’ personal liability.

Section 228: Modification of conditions under Property Law

If rights in objects are to be created, modified, transferred or waived, any legal declarations necessary from the parties involved may be included in the constructive part of the insolvency plan. If registered rights in real estate or in registered rights are involved, such rights shall be detailed in compliance with section 28 of the Land Register Code. The second sentence shall apply mutatis mutandis to rights registered in the register of ships and the register of ships under construction, or in the register of liens on aircraft.

Section 229: Survey of Assets. Earnings and Finance Plan

If it is envisaged that the creditors will be satisfied from the earnings derived from the debtor’s enterprise continued by the debtor or by a third party the insolvency plan shall be accompanied by a survey of assets listing the values of assets and obligations to be balanced should the plan become effective. In addition, the plan shall indicate the expenses and earnings to be expected during the period of the creditors’ satisfaction, and by which succession of earnings and expenses the liquidity of the enterprise will be maintained during such period.

Section 230: Further Attachments

(1) If the insolvency plan provides for the debtor to continue his enterprise, and if the debtor is an individual, the plan shall be accompanied by the debtor’s statement of willingness to continue the enterprise under the plan. If the debtor is a company without legal personality or a partnership limited by shares, the plan shall be accompanied by a similar statement by the partners with personal liability. The debtor’s statement under the first sentence shall not be required from a debtor submitting the plan himself.

(2) If it is envisaged that creditors will acquire shares, membership rights or interests in a corporation, an unincorporated association or in a company without legal personality, the plan shall be accompanied by the declaration of consent of each such creditor.

(3) If a third party has agreed to enter into obligations to the creditors if the plan is confirmed, the plan shall be accompanied by the statement of such third party.

Section 231: Refusal of the Plan

(1) The insolvency court shall refuse the insolvency plan ex officio

1. if the provisions governing the right to submit a plan and its contents are not complied with, and the submitting party is unable to correct such defect or does not correct it within a reasonable period of time fixed by the court;

2. if a plan submitted by the debtor obviously has no chance of being accepted by the creditors or confirmed by the court, or

3. if the claims provided for the parties under the constructive part of a plan submitted by the debtor obviously cannot be satisfied.

(2) If in the insolvency proceedings the debtor has already submitted a plan which has been refused by the creditors, not confirmed by the court or withdrawn by the debtor after publication of the date of the discussion meeting, the court shall refuse a new plan by the debtor if such refusal is requested by the insolvency administrator with the consent of the creditors’ committee, if appointed.

(3) The submitting party may bring an immediate appeal against the order refusing the plan.

Section 232: Comments on the Plan

(1) If the insolvency plan is not refused, the insolvency court shall forward it to the following for their comments:

1. the creditors’ committee, if appointed, the works council and the spokesmen of officers;

2. the debtor if the insolvency administrator submitted the plan, and

3. the administrator if the debtor submitted the plan.

(2) The court may also give an opportunity to the official representative body of industry, trade, the craft or of agriculture competent for the debtor or to other expert organisations to express their views.

(3) The court shall set the deadline for submission of the comments.

Section 233: Suspension of Disposition and Distribution

To the extent to which continued disposition and distribution of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings would impair the implementation of an insolvency plan which has been submitted, the insolvency court at the request of debtor or the insolvency administrator shall order suspension of disposition and distribution. The court shall overrule or stop such suspension if it entails the risk of considerable disadvantage to the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings or if the administrator with the consent of the creditors’ committee or assembly requests continuation of disposition and distribution.

Section 234: Laying Out of the Plan

The insolvency plan with its attachments and any comments received shall be laid out for the parties’ inspection in the registry of the court.

Chapter Two: Acceptance and Confirmation of the Plan

Section 235: Discussion and Voting Meeting

(1) The insolvency court shall docket a meeting to discuss the insolvency plan and the voting rights of the creditors and subsequently to vote on the plan (discussion and voting meeting). Such meeting shall not be docketed later than one month.

(2) The date of the discussion and voting meeting shall be published. Publication shall indicate the availability of the plan and of any comments received for inspection in the registry of the court. Section 74 subs. 2 second sentence shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(3) Creditors of the insolvency proceedings who have filed claims, creditors entitled to separate satisfaction, the insolvency administrator, the debtor, the works council and the spokesmen of officers shall receive individual summons. A copy of the plan, to be provided at the request of the submitting party, or a summary of its essential contents, shall be sent with the summons.

Section 236: Coincidence with the Verification Meeting

The discussion and voting meeting may not be docketed prior to the verification meeting. Both meetings, however, may be docketed to coincide.

Section 237: Voting Right of the Creditors of the Insolvency Proceedings

(1) Section 77 subs. 1 first sentence, as well as subs. 2 and 3 No. 1, shall apply mutatis mutandis to the voting right of the creditors of the insolvency proceedings while voting on the insolvency plan. Creditors entitled to separate satisfaction may only vote as creditors of the insolvency proceedings if the debtor is personally liable to them and if they waive their right to separate satisfaction or are not satisfied under such right; as long as their non-satisfaction has not been determined, they shall be taken into account with the probable value of their non-satisfaction.

(2) Creditors whose claims are not impaired by the plan shall have no voting right.

Section 238: Voting Right of Creditors Entitled to Separate Satisfaction

(1) If the legal status of creditors entitled to separate satisfaction is covered in the insolvency plan, the rights of such individual creditors shall be discussed at the meeting. A voting right shall be vested in rights to separate satisfaction denied by neither the insolvency administrator, the creditors entitled to separate satisfaction nor the creditors of the insolvency proceedings. Sections 41 and 77 subs. 2, as well as 3 No. 1 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the voting right of denied, suspended or immature rights.

(2) Section 237 subs. 2 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 239: Voting List

The registrar of the court registry shall record in a list the voting rights of creditors resulting from the meeting.

Section 240: Modification of the Plan

The submitting party shall be entitled to modify the contents of individual provisions of the insolvency plan in accordance with the results of the discussion meeting. A vote may be taken at the same meeting on the modified plan.

Section 241: Separate Voting Meeting

(1) The insolvency court may docket a separate meeting for the vote on the insolvency plan. In this case, the period of time between the discussion meeting and the voting meeting shall not extend beyond one month.

(2) The creditors with voting rights and the debtor shall be summoned to the voting meeting. If the plan has been modified, such modification shall be specifically indicated.

Section 242: Voting in Writing

(1) If a separate voting meeting is docketed, the voting right may be exercised in writing.

(2) The insolvency court shall send the voting slip to the creditors with voting rights after the discussion meeting while informing them of their voting right. Voting in writing shall not be counted unless received by the court not later than one day prior to the voting meeting; this shall be referred to when the voting slip is forwarded.

Section 243: Voting by Groups

Each group of creditors with voting rights shall vote on the insolvency plan separately.

Section 244: Necessary Majorities

(1) Acceptance of the insolvency plan by the creditors shall require that, in each group,

1. the majority of creditors with voting rights backs the plan, and

2. the sum of claims held by creditors backing the plan exceeds half of the sum of claims held by the creditors with voting rights.

(2) Creditors who hold a right jointly or whose rights constituted a uniform right until the reason to open insolvency proceedings came into effect shall be counted as one creditor in the vote. The same shall apply if a right is the object of a pledge or a usufruct.

Section 245: Prohibition to Obstruct

(1) Even if the necessary majorities have not been achieved, a voting group shall be deemed to have consented if

1. the creditors forming such group presumably suffer no loss by the insolvency plan compared with their situation without such plan,

2. the creditors forming such group participate to a reasonable extent in the economic value devolving on the parties under the plan, and

3. the majority of the voting groups have backed the plan with the necessary majorities.

(2) A reasonable participation of the creditors forming a group for the purpose of subs. 1 No. 2 shall exist if under the plan

1. no other creditor will receive economic values exceeding the full amount of his claim;

2. neither a creditor with a lower-ranking claim to satisfaction without a plan, compared with the creditors forming his group, nor the debtor nor a person holding the debtor’s shares receives an economic value, and

3. no creditor to be satisfied on an equal footing with the creditors forming his group without a plan receives an advantage with respect to such creditors.

Section 246: Consent of Lower-ranking Creditors of the Insolvency Proceeding

The following supplemental provisions shall apply to acceptance of the insolvency plan by the lower-ranking creditors of the insolvency proceedings:

1. The groups ranking as mentioned at section 39 subs. 1 No. 1 or 2 shall be deemed to have given their consent if the relevant claims to interest or costs are waived under the plan or are deemed to be waived under section 225 subs. 1, and if even the main claims of the creditors of the insolvency proceedings in respect of their principal amounts cannot be satisfied to the full under the plan.

2. The consent of the groups ranking behind section 39 subs. 1 No. 3 shall be deemed to have been given if none of the creditors of the insolvency proceedings receives an advantage under the plan compared with the creditors forming such groups.

3. If none of the creditors forming a group votes at all, the consent of this group shall be deemed to have been given.

Section 247: Debtor’s Consent

(1) The debtor’s consent to the plan shall be deemed to have been given if he does not oppose the plan in writing or for the records of the registry of the court at the latest in the voting meeting.

(2) An opposing opinion under subs. 1 shall be deemed to be irrelevant if

1. the debtor is presumably not placed at a disadvantage by the plan compared with his situation without a plan, and

2. no creditor receives an economic value exceeding the full amount of his claim.

Section 248: Confirmation by the Court

(1) After acceptance of the insolvency plan by the creditors (sections 244 to 246) and after obtaining the debtor’s consent the plan shall require confirmation by the insolvency court.

(2) Before the court takes its decision confirming the plan it shall hear the insolvency administrator, the creditors’ committee, if appointed, and the debtor.

Section 249: Conditioned Plan

If the insolvency plan provides for the performance of specific contributions or for the implementation of other measures before confirmation the plan may not be confirmed unless such conditions are met. Confirmation shall be refused ex officio if such conditions are not met even after expiry of an adequate period of time fixed by the insolvency court.

Section 250: Contravention of Procedural Provisions

Confirmation shall be refused ex officio if

1. the provisions governing the contents and the procedural handling of the insolvency plan, as well as its acceptance by the consent of the creditors and of the debtor, were not complied with regarding an essential aspect and such defect cannot be corrected, or

2. acceptance of the plan has been effected by improper means, in particular by an advantage favouring one creditor.

Section 251: Protection of Minorities

(1) At the request of a creditor, confirmation of the insolvency plan shall be refused if the creditor

1. opposed the plan in writing or for the records of the registry of the court at the latest in the voting meeting, and

2. is presumably placed at a disadvantage by the plan compared with his situation without a plan.

(2) Such request shall be admissible only if the creditor shows to the satisfaction of the court that he is placed at a disadvantage under the plan.

Section 252: Publication of Decision

(1) The order confirming the insolvency plan or refusing its confirmation shall be announced at the voting meeting or at a special meeting to be docketed as soon as possible. Section 74 subs. 2 second sentence shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(2) If the plan is confirmed, a copy of the plan or a summary of its essential contents shall be communicated to those creditors of the insolvency proceedings who have filed claims and to creditors entitled to separate satisfaction with reference to its confirmation.

Section 253: Appeal

The creditors and the debtor may bring an immediate appeal against the order confirming the insolvency plan or refusing its confirmation.

Chapter Three: Effects of the Confirmed Plan. Surveillance of Implementation of the Plan

Section 254: General Effects of the Plan

(1) As soon as the order confirming the insolvency plan becomes final its effects under the constructive part shall become binding upon all the parties involved. If the constructive part is to create, modify, transfer or waive rights in objects or if shares in a company with limited liability are to be transferred, the declarations of intent on the part of the parties involved which are included in the plan shall be deemed to have been given in the form required by law. The same shall apply to the undertakings included in the plan on which the creation, modification, transfer or waiving of rights in objects or transfer of shares is based. The first and second sentences shall also apply to creditors of the insolvency proceedings who have not filed their claims, and to parties opposing the plan.

(2) The plan shall leave unaffected the rights entitling the creditors of the insolvency proceedings against the debtor’s co-obligors and guarantors as well as the rights of such creditors to objects not forming part of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings or deriving from a priority notice covering such objects. The debtor, however, shall be discharged by the plan of his co-obligor’s, guarantor’s or any other redressing party’s claims against himself in the same way as he is discharged of the claims of the creditors of the insolvency proceedings.

(3) If a creditor has received better satisfaction than warranted under the plan, he shall not be held liable to restitution.

Section 255: Proviso of Revival

(1) If the claims held by creditors of the insolvency proceedings were suspended or partly waived on the basis of the constructive part of the insolvency plan such suspension or waiver shall be no longer binding upon a creditor on whose claims the debtor defaults to a considerable extent in performance of the plan. Such default to a considerable extent shall be construed only if the debtor has not paid a mature debt although reminded by the creditor in writing with a period of grace of at least two weeks.

(2) If new insolvency proceedings are opened for the debtor’s assets before the plan has been performed to the full, a suspension or waiver shall be no longer binding upon any of the creditors of the insolvency proceedings.

(3) The plan may provide otherwise. However, the plan may not derogate from subs. 1 to the detriment of the debtor.

Section 256: Denied Claims. Remaining claims

(1) If a claim has been denied at the verification meeting or if the amount of the remaining claim held by a creditor entitled to separate satisfaction has not yet been determined, default on performing the insolvency plan for the purpose of section 255 subs. 1 shall not be construed if the debtor takes into account the claim until final determination of its amount to the extent corresponding to the decision of the insolvency court on the voting right of such creditor upon the vote on the plan. If the court has not decided on the voting right, at the request of the debtor or of the creditor it shall subsequently determine the extent to which the debtor has to provisionally take such claim into account.

(2) If such final determination shows the debtor falling short in his payments he shall pay the arrears. Default to a considerable extent in performance of the plan shall be construed only if the debtor omits to pay the arrears although reminded by the creditor in writing with a period of grace of at least two weeks.

(3) If such final determination shows the debtor overpaying he may claim restitution of the overpaid amount only to the extent exceeding even the immature item of the claim of the creditor under the insolvency plan.

Section 257: Execution under the Plan

(1) Creditors of the insolvency proceedings with determined claims which were not denied by the debtor at the verification meeting may execute under a confirmed and final insolvency plan in connection with entry in the schedule against the debtor as under a judgment declared executable. A claim in respect of which an objection has been raised and overruled shall be deemed equivalent to a claim which has not been denied. Section 202 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(2) The same shall apply to execution against a third party which, by a written statement submitted to the insolvency court without reserving the beneficium excussionis, have undertaken responsibility together with the debtor for performance of the plan by the latter.

(3) If a creditor invokes his rights in the case of considerable default on the part of the debtor in respect of performance of the plan, he shall show to the satisfaction of the court the reminder and the expiry of the period of grace, but must prove no other facts constituting the default on the part of the debtor in order to receive an execution clause for such rights and to initiate such execution.

Section 258: Termination of the Insolvency Proceedings

(1) As soon as confirmation of the insolvency plan has become final, the insolvency court shall decide on termination of the insolvency proceedings.

(2) Prior to termination the administrator shall settle those claims on the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings which have not been denied and provide securities for denied claims.

(3) Such decision and the reason for termination shall be published. The debtor, the insolvency administrator and the members of the creditors’ committee shall be informed in advance of the date when termination will become effective (section 9 subs. 1 third sentence). Section 200 subs. 2 second and third sentences shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 259: Effects of Termination

(1) The offices of the insolvency administrator and of the members of the creditors’ committee shall expire upon termination of the insolvency proceedings. The right of unhindered disposition of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings shall be transferred back to the debtor.

(2) The provisions governing surveillance of the implementation of the plan shall remain unaffected.

(3) An action brought in the insolvency proceedings to contest the debtor’s transactions maybe continued by the administrator even after termination of the proceedings if provided for in the constructive part of the plan. In such a case the action will be carried on for the debtor’s account unless the plan provides otherwise.

Section 260: Surveillance of Implementation of the Plan

(1) The constructive part of the insolvency plan may provide for surveillance of implementation of the plan.

(2) In the case of subs. 1, subsequent to termination of the insolvency proceedings the performance of the claims of the creditors under the constructive part against the debtor shall be monitored.

(3) If the constructive part provides for such situation, surveillance shall include performance of the claims of the creditors under the constructive part against corporations or companies without legal personality established after the opening of the insolvency proceedings in order to take over or continue the debtor’s enterprise or plant (takeover company).

Section 261: Tasks and Rights of the Insolvency Administrator

(1) Surveillance shall be incumbent on the insolvency administrator. The offices of the administrator and of the members of the creditors’ committee as well as the supervision of the court shall continue for such purpose. Section 22 subs. 3 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(2) During the period of surveillance the administrator shall each year report to the creditors’ committee, if appointed, and to the court on the progress and further expectations of performance of the insolvency plan. Such reporting obligation shall leave unaffected the right of the creditors’ committee and of the court to demand specific information or an intermediate report at any time.

Section 262: Obligation to Disclosure incumbent on the Insolvency Administrator

If the insolvency administrator finds that claims monitored for performance are not met or cannot be met he shall disclose such failure to the creditors’ committee and to the insolvency court immediately. If no creditors’ committee has been appointed the administrator shall instead inform all creditors entitled against the debtor or the takeover company under the constructive part of the insolvency plan.

Section 263: Transactions Requiring Consent

The constructive part of the insolvency plan may provide that specific transactions of the debtor or of the takeover company shall require the consent of the insolvency administrator during the period of surveillance in order to become effective. Sections 81 subs. 1 and 82 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 264: Loan Ceiling

(1) The constructive part of the insolvency plan may provide for lower-ranking status for the creditors of the insolvency proceedings compared with creditors with entitlements deriving from loans or other credits entered into by the debtor or the takeover company during the period of surveillance or held open by a creditor of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings to extend into the period of surveillance. In such a case the maximum amount of such loans shall also be fixed (loan ceiling). It may not exceed the value of property listed in the survey of assets contained in the plan (section 229 first sentence).

(2) The creditors of the insolvency proceedings shall rank lower under subs. 1 only in comparison with creditors entering into an agreement that and to which amount the main claim, interest and costs of the loans granted by them are under the loan ceiling, and receiving confirmation of such agreement in writing from the insolvency administrator.

(3) Section 39 subs. 1 No. 5 shall remain unaffected.

Section 265: Lower-ranking Status of New Creditors

Creditors with other contractual claims created during the period of surveillance shall also have a lower-ranking status in comparison with creditors with entitlements deriving from loans entered into or held open under section 264. Claims created under a continuing obligation prior to surveillance shall also be deemed to constitute such claims for the time after the first date on which the creditor could terminate such contract after surveillance began.

Section 266: Consideration of Lower-ranking Status

(1) Lower-ranking status of the creditors of the insolvency proceedings and of the creditors mentioned at section 265 shall be taken into account only in insolvency proceedings opened before termination of surveillance.

(2) In any such new insolvency proceedings such creditors shall take priority over any other lower-ranking creditors.

Section 267: Publication of Surveillance

(1) If performance of the insolvency plan is to be monitored, this shall be published together with the order terminating the insolvency proceedings.

(2) Publication shall also cover:

1. in the case of section 260 subs. 3 any extension of such surveillance to the takeover company;

2. in the case of section 263 the criteria of transactions requiring the consent of the insolvency administrator;

3. in the case of section 264 the amount of a loan ceiling.

(3) Section 31 shall apply mutatis mutandis. If in the case of section 263 the right to transfer a real estate, a registered ship, a ship under construction or an aircraft, a right in any such object or a right in such a right is subject to’ restriction, sections 32 and 33 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 268: Termination of Surveillance

(1) The insolvency court shall decide on termination of surveillance if

1. the claims monitored for satisfaction have been met or their satisfaction is ensured, or

2. three years have expired since termination of the insolvency proceedings and the opening of new insolvency proceedings has not been requested.

(2) Such decision shall be published. Section 267 subs. 3 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 269: Costs of Surveillance

The cost of surveillance shall be borne by the debtor. In the case of section 260 subs. 3 the takeover company shall bear any costs incurred for its surveillance.

Part Seven: Personal Management

Section 270: Prerequisites

(1) The debtor may manage and dispose of the assets involved in insolvency proceedings under surveillance by a custodian if the insolvency court orders such personal management while deciding on the opening of the insolvency proceedings. Such proceedings shall be subject to the general provisions unless this part provides otherwise.

(2) The order shall require

1. the debtor’s request,

2. if a creditor has requested the opening of insolvency proceedings, the consent of the creditor to the debtor’s request, and

3. that in accordance with the circumstances it is to be expected that the order will not lead to a delay in the proceedings or other disadvantages to the creditors.

(3) In the case of subs. 1, a custodian shall be appointed instead of an insolvency administrator. The claims of the creditors of the insolvency proceedings shall be filed with the custodian. Sections 32 and 33 shall not apply.

Section 271: Subsequent Order

If the debtor’s request for personal management has been refused by the insolvency court, but the debtor’s personal management is requested by the first creditors’ assembly, the court shall order such personal management. The former insolvency administrator may be appointed custodian.

Section 272: Repeal of the Order

(1) The insolvency court shall repeal its decision ordering personal management if requested by

1. the creditors’ assembly;

2. a creditor with a right to separate satisfaction or by a creditor of the insolvency proceedings, and if the prerequisite under section 270 subs. 2 No. 3 has been removed;

3. by the debtor.

(2) A creditor’s request shall be only admissible if he shows the removal of such prerequisite to the satisfaction of the court. Before deciding on the request, the insolvency court shall hear the debtor. The creditor and the debtor may bring an immediate appeal against the decision of the court.

(3) The former custodian may be appointed as insolvency administrator.

Section 273: ublication

The decision of the insolvency court ordering the debtor’s personal management after the opening of insolvency proceedings, or repealing such order, shall be published.

Section 274: Legal Status of the Custodian

(1) Sections 54 No. 2, as well as 56 to 60 and 62 to 65 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the custodian’s appointment, supervision by the insolvency court, as well as to liability and remuneration.

(2) The custodian shall verify the debtor’s economic situation and monitor the management of his business and expenses for his livelihood. Section 22 subs. 3 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(3) If the custodian finds circumstances suggesting disadvantages to the creditors under the debtor’s continued personal management he shall disclose such circumstances to the creditors’ committee and to the insolvency court immediately. If no creditors’ committee has been appointed the custodian shall instead inform the creditors of the insolvency proceedings who have filed claims, as well as the creditors with a right to separate satisfaction.

Section 275: Consent of the Custodian

(1) No obligations exceeding the range of his ordinary business may be entered into by the debtor without the custodian’s consent. The debtor may even not enter into obligations falling under the range of his ordinary business if the custodian objects to such obligations.

(2) The custodian may require the debtor to allow collection of all payments received only by the custodian and payments to be made by the custodian only.

Section 276: Consent of the Creditors’ Committee

The debtor shall obtain the consent of the creditors’ committee for transactions of particular importance to the insolvency proceedings. Section 160 subs. 1 second sentence, subs. 2., section 161 second sentence and section 164 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 277: Ordering the Requirement of Consent

(1) At the request of the creditors’ assembly the insolvency court shall order the requirement of the custodian’s consent for certain transactions by the debtor to become legally effective. Section 81 subs. 1 and the second and third sentences, as well as section 82, shall apply mutatis mutandis. If the custodian consents to a transaction giving rise to an obligation incumbent on the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings, section 61 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(2) Such order may also be issued at the request of a creditor with a right to separate satisfaction or of a creditor of the insolvency proceedings if it is urgently necessary in order to prevent disadvantages to the creditors. The admissibility of such a request shall require that the requesting party shows such prerequisite for the order to the satisfaction of the court.

(3) Such order shall be published. Section 31 shall apply mutatis mutandis. If the right to transfer real property, a registered ship, a ship under construction or an aircraft, a right in such an object or a right in such a right is subjected to the requirement of consent, sections 32 and 33 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 278: Funds for the Debtor’s Livelihood

(1) The debtor may draw funds for himself and the family members mentioned in section 100 subs. 2 second sentence from the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings permitting the debtor a modest livelihood with respect to his former living conditions.

(2) If the debtor is not an individual, subs. 1 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the debtor’s partners with personal liability entitled to represent him.

Section 279: Mutual Contracts

The provisions governing the performance of transactions and the cooperation of the works council (sections 103 to 128) shall apply with the proviso that the insolvency administrator be replaced by the debtor. The debtor shall exercise his rights under such provisions with the concurrence of the custodian. The exercise of the rights under sections 120, 122 and 126 shall require the custodian’s consent to become legally effective.

Section 280: Liability. Contest of the Debtor’s Transactions in Insolvency Proceedings

Only the custodian may claim any liability to the credit of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings under sections 92 to 93 and contest the debtor’s transactions under sections 129 to 147.

Section 281: Notification of Creditors

(1) The debtor shall establish the record of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings, the record of creditors and the survey of property (sections 151 to 153). The custodian shall verify such records and survey and give a written statement for each as to whether the result of his verification gives rise to objections.

(2) During the report meeting the debtor shall give the report. The custodian shall comment on the report.

(3) Accounting (sections 66 and 155) shall be incumbent on the debtor. Subs. 1 second sentence shall apply mutatis mutandis to the debtor’s final accounts.

Section 282: Disposition of Securities

(1) The insolvency administrator’s right to dispose of objects subject to rights to separate satisfaction shall be vested in the debtor. However, costs for the determination of such objects and of the rights to such objects shall not be charged. Only the costs actually incurred for disposition and the amount of turnover tax may be counted as costs of disposition.

(2) The debtor shall exercise his right to disposition with the concurrence of the custodian.

Section 283: atisfaction of the Creditors of the Insolvency Proceedings

(1) In examining claims, in addition to the creditors of the insolvency proceedings the debtor and the custodian may deny claims which have been filed. A claim denied by a creditor of the insolvency proceedings, by the debtor or by the custodian shall be deemed not determined.

(2) Distributions shall be effected by the debtor. The custodian shall verify each distribution record and give a written statement for each record as to whether the result of his verification gives rise to objections.

Section 284: Insolvency Plan

(1) Any charge on the part of the creditors’ assembly to establish an insolvency plan shall be directed to the custodian or the debtor. If the charge is directed to the debtor, the custodian shall serve as advisor.

(2) Surveillance of implementation of the plan shall be incumbent on the custodian.

Section 285: Lacking Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings

The custodian shall inform the insolvency court of lacking assets involved in the insolvency proceedings.

Part Eight: Discharge of Residual Debt

Section 286: Policy

If the debtor is an individual he shall be discharged under sections 287 to 303 of his obligations not performed by way of the insolvency proceedings and due to the creditors of the insolvency proceedings.

Section 287: Debtor’s Request

(1) Discharge of residual debt shall require a request on the part of the debtor, which should be joined with his request to open the insolvency proceedings. If it is not joined with the latter, it shall be submitted within two weeks of the reference in accordance with section 20 subs. 2.

(2) Such request shall be accompanied by a statement assigning the debtor’s garnishable claims to emoluments due to him under a service relationship or to emoluments replacing them to a trustee to be appointed by the court for a period of six years following opening of the insolvency proceedings. If the debtor had assigned or pledged such claims to a third party already prior to his request he shall indicate such assignment or pledge in his statement.

(3) Agreements excluding, making dependent on a condition, or otherwise restricting the assignment of claims on the part of the debtor to payments resulting from a service relationship or current payments in lieu shall be ineffective insofar as they would obstruct or be detrimental to the declaration of assignment pursuant to subs. 2 first sentence.

Section 288: Right of Proposal

The debtor and the creditors may propose to the insolvency court as trustee an individual suited to the individual case at hand.

Section 289: Decision by the Insolvency Court

(1) At the debtor’s request, the creditors of the insolvency proceedings and the insolvency administrator shall be heard at the final meeting. The insolvency court shall decide by order at the debtor’s request.

(2) Against such an order an immediate appeal shall be available to the debtor and any creditor of the insolvency proceedings requesting refusal of the discharge of residual debt at the final meeting. The insolvency proceedings shall not be terminated before the order has become final. The final order shall be published together with the order terminating the insolvency proceedings.

(3) If the insolvency proceedings are discontinued, discharge of residual debt may only be granted if, after the notification of lacking assets involved in the insolvency proceedings pursuant to section 209, the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings have been distributed and the proceedings are discontinued pursuant to section 211. Subs. 2 shall apply with the proviso that discontinuation shall replace termination of the proceedings.

Section 290: Refusal of Discharge of Residual Debt

(1) The order shall refuse discharge of residual debt if such refusal has been requested by a creditor of the insolvency proceedings at the final meeting and

1. if the debtor has received a final verdict for commission of a criminal offence under sections 283 to 283 c of the Criminal Code;

2. if the debtor by wanton act or gross negligence has given a false or incomplete statement on his economic condition in writing in the last three years prior to the request to open the insolvency proceedings or subsequent to this request in order to obtain a loan or grants from public funds or to avoid making payments to public funds;

3. if the debtor has obtained discharge of residual debt in the last ten years prior to the request to open the insolvency proceedings or subsequent to this request, or if such request has been refused pursuant to section 296 or 297;

4. the debtor by wanton act or gross negligence has impaired the satisfaction of the creditors of the insolvency proceedings in the last year prior to the request to open insolvency proceedings, or subsequent to this request, by entering into inappropriate obligations, by wasting property or by delaying the opening of the insolvency proceedings without any expectancy of an improved economic condition;

5. if the debtor by wanton act or gross negligence has infringed the obligations of disclosure or cooperation under this statute during the insolvency proceedings; or

6. if in the lists of his property, income, creditors and claims against him, which are to be submitted pursuant to section 305 subs. 1 No. 3, the debtor has by wanton act or gross negligence made false or incomplete statements.

(2) A creditor’s request of refusal shall be admissible only if a reason why a discharge of residual debt should be refused is shown to the satisfaction of the court.

Section 291: Notification of Discharge of Residual Debt

(1) Unless any of the conditions mentioned at section 290 exist, the court shall state in its order that the debtor will achieve discharge of his residual debt if he meets his obligations under section 295 and the preconditions for refusal pursuant to sections 297 or 298 do not pertain.

(2) In such same order the court shall appoint the trustee in whom the debtor’s garnishable emoluments will be vested in accordance with the latter’s statement of assignment (Section 287 subs. 2).

Section 292: Legal Status of Trustee

(1) The trustee must bring the assignment to the notice of the person obliged to pay the emoluments, insofar as the costs of the proceedings which have been deferred in accordance with section 4a have been corrected by deducting the cost of appointing counsel. He must keep separate the amounts received under such assignment and any other payments contributed by the debtor or third parties from his own property and distribute them annually to the creditors of the insolvency proceedings as directed by the final record. Section 36 subs. 1 second sentence and subs. 4 shall apply mutatis mutandis. From the sums which he receives from the assignment, as well as from the other payments, he shall pay the debtor on expiry of a period of four years from termination of the insolvency proceedings ten percent, and on expiry of a period of five years from termination, fifteen percent. If the costs of the proceedings deferred in accordance with section 4a have not yet been corrected, money shall only be transferred to the debtor if his income does not exceed the amount calculated in accordance with section 115 subs. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(2) The creditor’s assembly may also charge the trustee with surveillance of the debtor meeting his obligations. In such a case the trustee shall inform the creditors immediately upon determining an infringement of such obligations. The trustee shall only be obliged to carry out surveillance if the additional payment for this is either covered or advanced.

(3) The trustee shall render account to the insolvency court upon expiry of his office’ Sections 58 and 59 shall apply mutatis mutandis, whilst section 59 shall however apply with the proviso that any creditor of the insolvency proceedings may request dismissal of the insolvency administrator and any creditor of the insolvency proceedings may bring an immediate appeal.

Section 293: Trustee’ s Remuneration

(1) The trustee shall be entitled to remuneration in consideration of his activity and to reimbursement of appropriate expenses. Such remuneration shall take into account the time and scope of the trustee’s activity.

(2) Section 63 subs. 2 and sections 64 and 65 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 294: Equal Treatment of Creditors

(1) Executions for individual creditors of the insolvency proceedings into the debtor’s property shall be prohibited during the period of the latters’ statement of assignment.

(2) Any agreement between the debtor or other persons and individual creditors of the insolvency proceedings providing for the latters’ advantage shall be void.

(3) Against the claim to emoluments covered by the statement of assignment the obligated person may set off only a claim against the debtor qualifying for set-off under Section 114 subs. 2 if the insolvency proceedings were continued.

Section 295: Obligations of the Debtor

(1) During the period of the statement of assignment the debtor shall be obliged to

1. engage in adequate gainful employment or seek such employment and not refuse any reasonable activity;

2. transfer to the trustee half the value of property acquired by him by way of succession or with respect to his future status as heir;

3. inform the insolvency court and the trustee immediately of any change of residence or place of employment, not conceal any emoluments covered by the statement of assignment or any property covered by No. 2. and disclose to the court and the trustee at their request his gainful employment or his efforts to find such employment as well as his emoluments and his property;

4. make payments to satisfy the creditors of the insolvency proceedings only to the trustee, and not provide an individual creditor with an advantage.

(2) If the debtor is self-employed he shall be obliged to satisfy the creditors of the insolvency proceedings by payments to the trustee as if he had entered into an adequate service contract.

Section 296: Contravention of Obligations

(1) At the request of a creditor of the insolvency proceedings the insolvency court shall refuse discharge of residual debt if the debtor contravenes any of his obligations during the period of the statement of assignment and thereby impairs satisfaction of the creditors of the insolvency proceedings; this shall not apply to debtors without faulty conduct. Such request may be filed only within one year of the date when the creditor became aware of the contravention of an obligation. It shall be admissible only if the facts mentioned in the first and second sentences are shown to the satisfaction of the court.

(2) Prior to its decision on the request, the court shall hear the trustee, the debtor and the creditors of the insolvency proceedings. The debtor shall provide information concerning fulfilment of his obligations and at the request of the creditor confirm the correctness of his disclosure by an affidavit. If without a reasonable excuse he does not provide the disclosure or the affidavit within the deadline set for him, or does not appear at a meeting docketed by the court for him to provide the information or the affidavit, although properly summoned and without giving a reasonable excuse, discharge of residual debt shall be refused.

(3) The requesting party and the debtor may bring an immediate appeal against the decision. Refusal of discharge of residual debt shall be published.

Section 297: Insolvency Offences

(1) At the request of a creditor in the insolvency proceedings, the insolvency court shall refuse discharge of residual debt if in the period between the final meeting and termination of the insolvency proceedings, or during the period of the statement of assignment the debtor received a final verdict for commission of a criminal offence under sections 283 to 283c of the Criminal Code.

(2) Section 296 subs. 1 second and third sentences and subs. 3 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 298: Coverage of the Trustee’s Minimum Remuneration

(1) At the trustee’s request the insolvency court shall refuse discharge of residual debt if the amounts received by him for the preceding year of his effort do not cover minimum remuneration and if the debtor does not pay the uncovered amount although the trustee has requested the debtor’s payment in writing within a period of not less than two weeks indicating the possibility that the debtor’s discharge of residual debt may be refused. This shall not apply if the costs of the insolvency proceedings were deferred in accordance with Section 4a.

(2) The debtor shall be heard prior to the decision. The court shall not refuse discharge of residual debt if the debtor at the court’s request pays the uncovered amount to the trustee within two weeks or the amount is deferred in accordance with section 4a.

(3) Section 296 subs. 3 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 299: Expiry before Date

If discharge of residual debt is refused under sections 296, 297 or 298, the period of the statement of assignment, the trustee’s office and any limitation of the creditors’ rights shall expire as soon as the decision of the court becomes final.

Section 300: Decision on Discharge of Residual Debt

(1) If the period of the statement of assignment has expired without expiry before date, the insolvency court shall decide by order on granting a discharge of residual debt, after hearing the creditors of the insolvency proceedings, the trustee and the debtor.

(2) At the request of a creditor of the insolvency proceedings, under the conditions mentioned at section 296 subs. 1, or subs. 2 third sentence, or section 297, or at the trustee’s request, the insolvency court shall refuse discharge of residual debt under the conditions mentioned at section 298.

(3) The order shall be published. Section 9 remaining unaffected, if the residual debt is discharged, excerpts are to be published in the Federal Gazette.

Section 301: Effect of Discharge of Residual Debt

(1) If a discharge of residual debt is granted it shall become binding upon all creditors of the insolvency proceedings. Such binding effect shall also apply to those creditors who have not filed their claims.

(2) The rights of the creditors of the insolvency proceedings against the debtor’s co-obligors and guarantors and their rights deriving from a registered priority notice securing them or from a right entitling them to separate satisfaction in insolvency proceedings shall remain unaffected by discharge of residual debt. The debtor, however, shall be discharged of claims of co-obligors, guarantors or any other redressing party against himself in the same way as he is discharged of the claims of the creditors of the insolvency proceedings.

(3) If a creditor without entitlement to satisfaction under discharge of residual debt is satisfied he shall not be held liable to restitution.

Section 302: Excepted Claims

The grant of discharge of residual debt shall leave unaffected:

1. obligations of the debtor incumbent on him under a tort committed by wanton act, insofar as the creditor had registered the corresponding claim in accordance with section 174 subs. 2, stating this legal reason;

2. the debtor’s fines as well as his obligations equal to such fines under section 39 subs. 1 No. 3;

3. liabilities from interest-free loans granted to the debtor to pay the costs of the insolvency proceedings.

Section 303: Retraction of Discharge of Residual Debt

(1) At the request of a creditor of the insolvency proceedings, the insolvency court shall retract the grant of discharge of residual debt if it is subsequently found that the debtor has infringed one of his obligations by wanton act and thereby impaired the satisfaction of the creditors of the insolvency proceedings to a considerable extent.

(2) Such request of a creditor shall be admissible only if it is filed within one year after the decision on granting discharge of residual debt became final and if the creditor shows to the satisfaction of the court that the prerequisites under subs. 1 exist and that he was not aware of such prerequisites before the decision of the court became final.

(3) The debtor and the trustee shall be heard prior to the decision. The requesting party and the debtor may bring immediate appeal against such decision. The decision retracting discharge of residual debt shall be published.

Part Nine: Consumer Insolvency Proceedings and other Minor Proceedings

Chapter One: Scope of Application

Section 304: Principle

(1) If the debtor is an individual who pursues or has pursued no independent economic activity, the general provisions shall apply to the proceedings insofar as nothing else is provided in this part. If the debtor has pursued independent economic activity, the first sentence shall apply if his assets are comprehensible and no claims exist against him from employment.

(2) The assets shall be comprehensible within the meaning of subs. 1 only if the debtor has fewer than 20 creditors at the time the request is made to open the insolvency proceedings.

Chapter Two: Plan for the Settlement of Debts

Section 305: Debtor’s Request to open Insolvency Proceedings

(1) With the application to be filed, the debtor shall submit the following with the request to open insolvency proceedings (section 311) or immediately subsequent to this request:

1. a certificate issued by a suitable person or agency from which emerges that within the last six months prior to the request to open insolvency proceedings an unsuccessful attempt has been made to settle out of court with the creditors on the basis of a plan; the plan shall be enclosed and the primary reasons for its failure shall be explained; the Länder may determine which persons or agencies are to be regarded as suitable;

2. the request for grant of discharge of residual debt (section 287), or the declaration that discharge of residual debt is not to be applied for;

3. a record of available assets and income (record of assets), a summary of the main content of this record (overview of the assets), a record of the creditors and a record of the claims against the debtor; the records and the overview of the assets shall also include a declaration that their contents are correct and complete;

4. a plan for the settlement of debts; this may contain all provisions which are suited to lead to an appropriate settlement of debts when account is taken of the interests of the creditors, as well as of the debtor’s assets, income and family circumstances; the plan shall include whether and to what extent sureties, pledges and other securities pertaining to the creditors are to be affected by the plan.

(2) The record of claims pursuant to subs. 1 No. 3, may also refer to enclosed statements of claims made by the creditors. At the request of the debtor, the creditors shall be obliged to provide the debtor with a written statement of their claims against him, at their expense, in order to aid him in preparing the record of claims; in particular, they shall state the extent of their claims and their categorisation in main claim, interest and costs. The request on the part of the debtor must include a reference to a request to open insolvency proceedings which has already been filed with a court, or the filing of which is intended in the near future.

(3) If the debtor has not submitted all the declarations and documents specified in subs. 1, the insolvency court shall request him to supply the missing parts immediately. If the debtor does not comply with this request within one month, his request to open insolvency proceedings shall be regarded as having been retracted. In cases falling under section 306 subs. 3 third sentence the period shall be three months.

(4) In the proceedings in accordance with this Chapter, the debtor may be represented before the insolvency court by a suitable person or by a member of an agency recognised as suitable within the meaning of subs. 1 No. 1. Section 157 subs. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall not apply.

(5) In order to simplify the consumer insolvency proceedings, by virtue of a legal ordinance and with the approval of the Bundesrat, the Federal Ministry of Justice shall be entitled to introduce for the persons concerned forms for the certificates, applications, lists and plans to be submitted in accordance with subs. 1 Nos. 1 to 4. Where forms are introduced in accordance with the first sentence the debtor must use them. Different forms may be introduced for proceedings in courts that process the proceedings automatically, and for proceedings in courts that do not process the proceedings automatically.

Section 305a: Failure of Out-of-Court Debt Settlement

An attempt to reach an out-of-court agreement with the creditors regarding settlement of debts shall be considered to have failed if a creditor requests coercive execution after the negotiations regarding out-of-court settlement of debts have been initiated.

Section 306: Suspension of Proceedings

(1) The proceedings relating to the request to open insolvency proceedings shall be suspended until the decision is taken on the plan for the settlement of debts. This period shall not exceed three months. After hearing the debtor, the court shall order the continuation of the proceedings regarding the request to open proceedings if in accordance with his freely-formed conviction the debt settlement plan is likely not to be accepted.

(2) Subs. 1 shall not be a hindrance to the ordering of safeguards. If the proceedings are suspended, the debtor shall submit the number of duplicates of the debt settlement plan and of the record of assets required for service within two weeks of being called on to do so by the court. Section 305 subs. 3 second sentence shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(3) If a creditor requests opening of proceedings, the insolvency court shall give the debtor the opportunity prior to the decision on opening to also file a request. If the debtor files a request, subs. 1 shall also apply to the creditor’s request. In this case, the debtor shall initially attempt to reach an out-of-court agreement in accordance with section 305 subs. 1 No. 1.

Section 307: Service on the Creditors

(1) The insolvency court shall serve on the creditors named by the debtor the plan for the settlement of debts, as well as the overview of assets, and at the same time shall request the creditors to comment on the records specified in section 305 subs. 1 No. 3 and the plan for the settlement of debts within a deadline of one month; the creditors shall be informed that the records have been deposited at the insolvency court for viewing. At the same time, with express reference to the legal consequences of section 308 subs. 3 second sentence, each creditor shall be given the opportunity to examine the information on his claims in the record of claims, which has been deposited for viewing at the insolvency court within the period set in the first sentence and where necessary to make additions. Section 8 subs. 1 second and third sentences and subs. 2 and 3 shall not apply to service pursuant to the first sentence.

(2) If the comment of a creditor pursuant to subs. 1 first sentence does not arrive at the court within the deadline set, this shall be deemed as approval of the plan for the settlement of debts. This must be pointed out in the request for comment.

(3) Once the deadline set according to subs. 1 first sentence has expired, the debtor shall be given the opportunity to amend or make additions to the plan for the settlement of debts within a deadline to be set by the court, if this is necessary on the basis of the comments of one of the creditors or seems sensible in the interest of a mutually agreed settlement of debts. If necessary, the amendments or additions are to be served on the creditors. Subs. 1 first and third sentences and subs. 2 shall apply mutatis mutandis

Section 308: Acceptance of the Plan for the Settlement of Debts

(1) If no creditor has objected to the plan for the settlement of debts, or if agreement is replaced pursuant to section 309, the plan for the settlement of debts shall be deemed to be approved; the insolvency court shall determine this by means of an order. The plan for the settlement of debts shall have the effect of a settlement in the meaning of section 794 subs. 1 No. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The creditors and the debtor shall be served with a copy of the plan for the settlement of debts and of the order mentioned in the first sentence.

(2) The requests to open insolvency proceedings and to grant discharge of residual debt shall be regarded as retracted.

(3) If claims are neither included in the debtor’s record nor subsequently taken into account when the plan for the settlement of debts is prepared, the creditors may demand that the debtor comply with these claims. This shall not apply to the extent that a creditor has not added to the information on his claim in the record of claims deposited for viewing at the insolvency court within the period set, in spite of the fact that the plan for the settlement of debts was sent to him and the claim had come into existence prior to expiry of the deadline; in this respect, the claim shall become void.

Section 309: Replacement of Approval

(1) If the plan for the settlement of debts has been approved by more than half the named creditors, and if the total of the claims of those creditors who have given approval amounts to more than half the claims of the named creditors, at the request of a creditor or of the debtor, the insolvency court shall replace the objections of a creditor to the plan for the settlement of debts with agreement. This shall not apply if

1. the creditor who has raised objections is not taken into account to an appropriate extent in relation to the other creditors, or

2. this creditor is presumably placed at an economic disadvantage by the plan for the settlement of debts in comparison to the implementation of the procedure for opening insolvency proceedings and discharge of residual debt; in cases of doubt, the income, assets and family circumstances of the debtor at the time of the request pursuant to the first sentence shall be taken as the basis during the whole period of the proceedings.

(2) The creditor shall be heard prior to the decision. He must show to the satisfaction of the court the reasons which pursuant to subs. 1 second sentence stand in the way of replacement of his objections by approval. The party making the request and the creditor whose agreement is being replaced may bring immediate appeal. Section 4a subs. 2 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(3) If the creditor shows to the satisfaction of the court facts giving rise to serious doubts as to whether a claim stated by the debtor exists or comes to an amount which is higher or lower than that stated, and if the outcome of the dispute is decisive in respect of whether the creditor is suitably taken into account in comparison to the other creditors (subs. 1 second sentence No. 1), approval of this creditor may not be replaced.

Section 310: Costs

The creditors shall have no claim on the debtor for defrayal of the costs incurred by them in connection with the plan for the settlement of debts.

Chapter Three: Simplified Insolvency Proceedings

Section 311: Initiation of the Proceedings concerning Opening of the Insolvency Proceedings

If objections are raised to the plan for the settlement of debts which are not replaced by court approval pursuant to section 309, the proceedings concerning opening of insolvency proceedings shall be reopened ex officio.

Section 312: General Procedural Simplifications

(1) Public announcements shall be effected by means of excerpts; section 9 subs. 2 shall not apply. When the insolvency proceedings are opened, in contrast to what applies at section 29, only the verification meeting shall be docketed. If the proceedings are opened at the request of the debtor, the period named in section 88 shall be three months.

(2) If the debtor’s assets can be clearly seen, and the number of creditors or the extent of the obligations is low, the insolvency court may order that the proceedings or individual parts thereof be carried out in writing. It may rescind or amend this order at any time.

(3) The provisions concerning the insolvency plan (sections 217 to 269) and on personal management (sections 270 to 285) shall not apply.

Section 313: Trustee

(1) The duties of the insolvency administrator shall be assumed by the trustee (section 292). In contrast to section 291 subs. 2, the latter shall be nominated when the insolvency proceedings are opened. Sections 56 to 66 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(2) It is not the trustee who is entitled to contest transactions pursuant to sections 129 to 147 but every creditor of the insolvency proceedings. The costs incurred by the creditor are to be refunded first from the proceeds. The creditors’ assembly may commission the trustee or a creditor to contest. If the creditors’ assembly has commissioned a creditor to contest the transaction, any costs incurred by him shall be refunded out of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings if they cannot be covered from the proceeds.

(3) The trustee shall not be entitled to dispose of chattels in respect of which there are pledges or other special rights. The creditor shall have the right of disposition. Section 173 < subs. 2 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 314: Simplified Distribution

(1) At the request of the trustee, the insolvency court shall order waiver of disposition of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings, either in whole or in part. In this case, it shall also instruct the debtor to pay a sum to the trustee within a period set by the court in accordance with the value of the assets which would have had to be distributed to the creditors of the insolvency proceedings. The order shall not be given if disposition of the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings appears to be necessary, particularly in the interest of the creditors.

(2) The creditors of the insolvency proceedings shall be heard prior to the decision.

(3) The decision on a request on the part of the debtor for discharge of residual debt to be granted (sections 289 to 291) shall not be taken until expiry of the deadline set pursuant to subs. 1 second sentence. At the request of one of the creditors of the insolvency proceedings, the court shall refuse to grant discharge of residual debt if the amount payable pursuant to subs. 1 second sentence has not been paid even subsequent to expiry of a further deadline of two weeks set by the court with reference to the possibility of refusing to grant discharge of residual debt. The debtor shall be heard prior to a decision being taken.

Part Ten: Special Types of Insolvency Proceeding

Chapter One: Insolvency Proceedings of a Decedent’s Estate

Section 315: Local Jurisdiction

The insolvency court in whose district a decedent had his usual place of abode shall have exclusive local jurisdiction for the insolvency proceedings to be opened for his estate. If the decedent had the centre of his self-employed business activity in a different place the insolvency court in whose district such place is located shall have exclusive jurisdiction.

Section 316: Admissibility of the Opening of Insolvency Proceedings

(1) The opening of the insolvency proceedings shall not be barred by the fact that the heir has not yet accepted devolution of the estate on himself or that he is subject to unlimited liability for the obligations incumbent on the estate.

(2) If there are several heirs, the insolvency proceedings may also be opened subsequent to division of the estate.

(3) There shall be no insolvency proceedings in respect of a portion of an estate.

Section 317: Persons Entitled to Request the Opening of Proceedings

(1) The opening of the insolvency proceedings relating to a decedent’s estate may be requested by any heir, by the administrator of the estate or by any other guardian. by an executor entitled to manage the estate and by any creditor of the estate.

(2) If the request is not made by all heirs, it shall be admissible if the reason to open the insolvency proceedings is shown to the satisfaction of the court. The insolvency court shall hear the other heirs.

(3) If the administration of the estate is incumbent on an executor, the insolvency court shall hear the executor if the heir has made the request, and the heir, if the executor has made the request, respectively.

Section 318: Entitlement to make a Request for the Joint Marital Property

(1) If the estate forms part of the joint marital property of a community the spouse who is the heir and the other spouse who is not the heir, but who administers the joint marital property alone or together with the other spouse, may request the opening of the insolvency proceedings relating to such estate. The consent of the other spouse shall not be required. The spouses shall retain the right to make a request even if the community is terminated.

(2) If the request is not brought by both spouses, it shall be admissible if a reason to open insolvency proceedings is shown to the satisfaction of the court. The insolvency court shall hear the dissenting spouse.

Section 319: Request Deadline

The request of a creditor of the estate to open the insolvency proceedings shall be not admissible if a period of two years has expired after the heir accepted devolution of the estate on himself.

Section 320: Reasons for Opening

The estate’s illiquidity and overindebtedness shall be reasons to open the insolvency proceedings. If the opening of the insolvency proceedings is requested by the heir, by the administrator of the estate, by a guardian or by an executor, imminent illiquidity shall also be a reason to open the insolvency proceedings.

Section 321: Execution following Succession

Measures of execution against the estate which were effected following succession shall not entitle a creditor to separate satisfaction.

Section 322: Contestable Transactions on the part of the Heir

If the heir has satisfied claims of descendants to a compulsory portion, legacies or bequests prior to the opening of the insolvency proceedings such transaction may be contested in the same manner as a gratuitous benefit granted by the heir.

Section 323: The Heir’s Expenses

The heir may not withhold satisfaction of any obligations incumbent on him because of the expenses which are to be reimbursed to him from the estate in accordance with sections 1978 and 1979 of the Civil Code.

Section 324: Debts incumbent on the Assets Involved in the Insolvency Proceedings

(1) In addition to the debts mentioned at sections 54 and 55 the following debts shall be deemed as debts incumbent on the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings:

1. expenses to be reimbursed to the heir from the estate in accordance with sections 1978 and 1979 of the Civil Code;

2. the costs of the decedent’s funeral;

3. costs incumbent on the estate incurred for the proceedings to have the decedent’s death declared;

4. costs incurred for the disclosure of the decedent’s will, for the estate’s judicial arrestment, for the guardianship of such estate, for the offer to the creditors of the estate to file their claims and for the establishment of an inventory;

5. obligations under transactions made by the estate’s guardian or by an executor;

6. obligations incurred in the management of the estate by its guardian, by an executor or by an heir who has not accepted the devolution of the estate on himself incumbent on the heir to the extent that such obligations would be incumbent on the creditors of the estate upon the designated persons’ management of affairs on their behalf.

(2) In the case of lacking assets involved in the insolvency proceedings the obligations mentioned at subs. 1 shall have the rank specified under section 209 subs. 1 No. 3.

Section 325: Obligations incumbent on the Estate

In insolvency proceedings opened for an estate only the obligations incumbent on the estate may be claimed.

Section 326: The Heirs’ Claims

(1) The heir may claim his rights entitling him against the decedent.

(2) If the heir has performed an obligation incumbent on the estate, and if his performance is not deemed as having been made for the account of the estate under section 1979 of the Civil Code, he shall replace the creditor unless he is subject to unlimited liability to the obligations incumbent on the estate.

(3) If the heir has unlimited liability to an individual creditor, he may claim the creditor’s right if the creditor does not claim it.

Section 327: Lower-ranking Obligations

(1) The following shall be satisfied as obligations ranking below the obligations mentioned at section 39, in the following order, and equal-ranking obligations in proportion to their amount:

1. obligations towards descendants entitled to a compulsory portion;

2. obligations under the legacies and bequests ordered by the decedent in his will;

3. obligations to persons with rights as substitute heirs.

(2) A legacy excluding the legal entitlement of a descendant under section 2307 of the Civil Code shall rank among the legal entitlements of descendants as far as it does not exceed such legal entitlement. If the decedent has ordered in his will the satisfaction of a legacy or bequest prior to another legacy or bequest such legacy or bequest shall prevail.

(3) An obligation whose creditor has been excluded under the proceedings offering the creditors of the estate to file their claims or ranking among the excluded creditors under section 1974 of the Civil Code shall be satisfied only after the obligations mentioned at section 39 and, if it forms part of the obligations under subs. 1, after the obligations with which it would have been identical. In other respects, such restrictions shall not affect the order of claims.

Section 328: Restituted Objects

(1) Any object restituted to the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings due to contest of the transaction made by the decedent or made with respect to him may not be used for satisfaction of the obligations mentioned at section 327 subs. 1.

(2) Any property to be reimbursed to the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings by the heir under sections 1978 to 1980 of the Civil Code may only be claimed by creditors excluded under the proceedings offering the creditors of the estate to file their claims or ranking among the excluded creditors under section 1974 of the Civil Code to the extent to which the heir would be liable to restitution of such property under the provisions governing the restitution of an unjust enrichment.

Section 329: Revisionary Succession

Sections 323, 324 subs. 1 No. 1 and 326 subs. 2 and 3 shall also apply to a limited heir after the revisionary heir has succeeded to the decedent’s estate.

Section 330: Purchase of a Decedent’s Estate

(1) If the heir has sold the decedent’s estate he shall be replaced by the purchaser for the insolvency proceedings.

(2) The heir may request the opening of the insolvency proceedings like a creditor of the decedent’s estate with respect to an obligation incumbent on the decedent’s estate which is incumbent on the purchaser under his contractual relationship with the heir. The heir shall have the same right with respect to another obligation incumbent on the decedent’s estate unless the heir is subject to unlimited liability or administration of the estate was ordered. Sections 323, 324 subs. 1 No. 1 and 326 shall also apply to the heir subsequent to the latter’s sale of the decedent’s estate.

(3) Subs. 1 and 2 shall apply mutatis mutandis to cases where a person has sold an estate acquired by means of a contract, or in some other way obligated himself to sell an estate acquired by him by law or in another way.

Section 331: Simultaneous Insolvency of the Heir

(1) In the insolvency proceedings concerning the property of the heir, if insolvency proceedings have also been opened in respect of the estate or if administration of the estate is ordered, sections 52, 190, 192, 198, and 237 subs. 1 second sentence shall apply mutatis mutandis to creditors to the estate regarding whom the heir has unlimited liability.

(2) The same shall apply if a spouse is the heir and the estate is part of the joint marital property which is administered solely by the other spouse, also in insolvency proceedings relating to the property of the other spouse and, if the joint marital property is administered jointly by the spouses, also in insolvency proceedings relating to the joint marital property and in insolvency proceedings relating to other property of the spouse who is not the heir.

Chapter Two: Insolvency Proceedings relating to the Joint Marital Property of a Continued Community

Section 332: Referral to Insolvency Proceedings opened for an Estate

(1) In the case of continued community, sections 315 to 331 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the insolvency proceedings relating to the joint property.

(2) Only those creditors whose claims existed as obligations on the joint property when continued community was established shall be creditors to the insolvency proceedings.

(3) Descendants with partial entitlement shall not be entitled to request the opening of proceedings. They shall however be heard by the insolvency court in the case of a request to open proceedings.

Chapter Three: Insolvency Proceedings relating to the Jointly Administered Marital Property of a Community

Section 333: Right to file a Request. Grounds for Opening Proceedings

(1) Any creditor who can demand fulfilment of an obligation from the joint property shall be entitled to request the opening of insolvency proceedings in relation to the joint property administered jointly by the spouses.

(2) Any spouse shall also be entitled to file a request. If the request is not filed by both spouses, it shall be admissible if the illiquidity of the joint property is shown to the satisfaction of the court; the insolvency court shall hear the other spouse. If the request is filed by both spouses, imminent illiquidity shall also constitute grounds for opening proceedings.

Section 334: Personal Liability of the Spouses

(1) During the insolvency proceedings, personal liability of the spouses for obligations the fulfilment of which can be demanded from the joint property may be claimed only by the insolvency administrator or custodian.

(2) In the case of an insolvency plan, section 227 subs. 1 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the personal liability of the spouses.

Part Eleven: Entering into Force

Section 335: Referral to Introductory Act

This statute shall enter into force on the day determined by means of the introductory act to the Insolvency Statute.


The above translation was published by the Federal Ministry of Justice. Reproduced with kind permission. This HTML edition by Marcin Szala and ©2003 Gerhard Dannemann. The contents of this page may be downloaded and printed out in single copies for individual use only. Making multiple copies without permission is prohibited.

Courts Constitution Acts (Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, GVG)

In the version published on 9 May 1975 (Federal Law Gazette (Bundesgesetzblatt), Part I, page 1077), as most recently amended by Article 9 subsection (1) of the Act of 30 July 2009 (Federal Law Gazette, Part I, page 2449)

Translation provided by the Federal Ministry for Justice and Kathleen Müller-Rostin and reproduced with kind permission.


Title I

Jurisdiction

Section 1

Judicial power shall be exercised by independent courts that are subject only to the law.

Sections 2-9

(repealed)

Section 10

Under the supervision of a judge, trainee jurists (Referendare) may handle requests for mutual judicial assistance and, except in criminal matters, hear participants in the proceedings, take evidence and conduct the oral hearing. Trainee jurists shall not be authorised to order administration of an oath or to administer an oath.

Section 11

(repealed)

Section 12

Ordinary jurisdiction shall be exercised by local courts (Amtsgerichte), regional courts (Landgerichte), higher regional courts (Oberlandesgerichte) and by the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, the highest federal court for the area of ordinary jurisdiction).

Section 13

The ordinary courts shall have jurisdiction over the civil disputes, family matters and non-contentious matters (civil matters) as well as criminal matters for which neither the competence of administrative authorities nor the jurisdiction of the administrative courts (Verwaltungsgerichte) has been established and for which no special courts have been created or permitted by provisions of federal law.

Section 13a

Land law may provide that matters of all kinds be assigned either entirely or partially to a single court for the districts of several courts and that external adjudicating bodies of courts be established.

Section 14

Navigation courts (Schifffahrtsgerichte) shall be permitted as special courts for the matters designated in international treaties.

Section 15

(repealed)

Section 16

Extraordinary courts shall not be allowed. No one may be removed from the jurisdiction of his1 lawful judge.

1: Translator’s note: The masculine form is used hereinafter solely in the interest of readability

Section 17

(1) Once an action has been brought before a court, the admissibility of such recourse shall not be affected by any subsequent change in the circumstances upon which it is founded. The matter may not be brought before another court by any party while it is pending.

(2) The court of admissible recourse shall decide the dispute in the light of all relevant legal aspects. Article 14 paragraph (3), fourth sentence, and Article 34, third sentence, of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) shall remain unaffected.

Section 17a

(1) If a court has declared with final and binding effect that the recourse taken to it is admissible, other courts shall be bound by this decision.

(2) If the recourse taken is inadmissible, the court shall declare this proprio motuafter hearing the parties and shall at the same time refer the legal dispute to the competent court of admissible recourse. If several courts are competent, the dispute shall be referred to the court to be selected by the plaintiff or applicant or, if no selection is made, to the court designated by the referring court. The decision shall be binding upon the court to which the dispute has been referred in respect of the admissibility of the recourse.

(3) If the recourse taken is admissible, the court may give a preliminary decision to this effect. It must give a preliminary decision if a party challenges the admissibility of the recourse.

(4) The decision pursuant to subsections (2) and (3) may be given without an oral hearing. Reasons must be given therefor. The immediate complaint (sofortige Beschwerde) shall be available against the decision pursuant to the provisions of the respective applicable code of procedure. The participants shall only be entitled to lodge a complaint against a decision of a higher regional court at the highest federal court if this has been admitted in the decision. The complaint must be admitted if the legal issue concerned is of fundamental importance or if the court deviates from a decision of one of the highest federal courts or from a decision of the Joint Panel of the Highest Federal Courts (Gemeinsamer Senat der obersten Gerichtshöfe des Bundes). The highest federal court shall be bound by the admission of the complaint.

(5) The court that rules on an appellate remedy against a decision by the court seized of the case shall not review whether the recourse taken was admissible.

(6) Subsections (1) to (5) shall apply mutatis mutandis to adjudicating bodies with jurisdiction over civil disputes, family matters and non-contentious matters in relation to each other.

Section 17b

(1) After the decision on referral has become final and absolute, the legal dispute shall be pending at the court designated in the decision upon receipt of the file by that court. The effects of pendency shall continue to exist.

(2) If a dispute is referred to another court, the costs of the proceedings before the first court shall be treated as part of the costs incurred at the court to which the dispute was referred. The plaintiff shall bear the additional costs incurred even if he prevails on the main issue.

(3) Subsection (2), second sentence, shall not apply to family matters and non-contentious matters.

Section 18

The members of the diplomatic missions established in the territory of application of this Act, the members of their families and their private servants shall be exempt from German jurisdiction under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961 (Federal Law Gazette 1964, Part II, pages 957 et seq.). This shall also apply if their sending state is not a party to this Convention; in such case Article 2 of the Act of 6 August 1964 relating to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961 (Federal Law Gazette 1964, Part II, page 957) shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 19

(1) The members of the consular posts established in the territory of application of this Act, including the honorary consular officers, shall be exempt from German jurisdiction under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963 (Federal Law Gazette 1969, Part II, pages 1585 et seq.). This shall also apply if their sending state is not a party to this Convention; in such case Article 2 of the Act of 26 August 1969 relating to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963 (Federal Law Gazette 1969, Part II, page 1585) shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(2) Special international agreements concerning the exemption of the persons designated in subsection (1) from German jurisdiction shall remain unaffected.

Section 20

(1) German jurisdiction also shall not apply to representatives of other states and persons accompanying them who are staying in territory of application of this Act at the official invitation of the Federal Republic of Germany.

(2) Moreover, German jurisdiction also shall not apply to persons other than those designated in subsection (1) and in sections 18 and 19 insofar as they are exempt therefrom pursuant to the general rules of international law or on the basis of international agreements or other legislation.

Section 21

Sections 18 to 20 shall not stand in the way of execution of a request for transfer of a person in custody and for mutual judicial assistance communicated by an international criminal court established by a legal instrument that is binding on the Federal Republic of Germany.

Title II

General provisions concerning the presidium and the allocation of court business

Section 21a

(1) A presidium shall be established at each court.

(2) The presidium shall be composed of the president or supervising judge acting as chairman and,

  1. at courts with at least eighty permanent judicial posts, ten elected judges,
  2. at courts with at least forty permanent judicial posts, eight elected judges,
  3. at courts with at least twenty permanent judicial posts, six elected judges,
  4. at courts with at least eight permanent judicial posts, four elected judges,
  5. at the other courts, the judges eligible to stand for election pursuant to section 21b subsection (1).

Section 21b

(1) Eligible to vote in elections to the presidium are the judges appointed for life and the judges appointed for a specified term upon whom a judicial office has been conferred at the court as well as the judges on probation who are working at the court, the judges by commission and the judges on secondment for a term of at least three months who are performing judicial duties at the court. Eligible to stand for election to the presidium are the judges appointed for life and the judges appointed for a specified term upon whom a judicial office has been conferred at the court. Neither eligible to vote in elections nor eligible to stand for election are judges who have been seconded to another court for more than three months, who have been on leave for more than three months or who have been seconded to an administrative authority.

(2) Each eligible voter may vote for no more than the prescribed number of judges.

(3) The election shall be direct and secret. The persons receiving the most votes shall be deemed elected. Provision for other election procedures for the election to the presidium may be made by Land law. In such case the Land government shall lay down the necessary rules governing the election procedure in an ordinance; it may transfer the authorisation herefor to the Land agency for the administration of justice. In the case of a tie, a decision shall be taken by drawing lots.

(4) Members shall be elected for four years. Half of the members shall resign every two years. The first members to resign shall be determined by drawing lots.

(5) The election procedure shall be regulated in an ordinance that shall be issued by the Federal Government with the approval of the Bundesrat.

(6) In the event that a law is infringed in the course of the election, the election may be challenged by the judges designated in subsection (1), first sentence. Such challenge shall be decided by a division of the competent higher regional court, in the case of the Federal Court of Justice by a panel of that court. If the challenge is declared to be well founded, an appellate remedy lodged against a court decision may not be based on the assertion that the presidium consequently was not properly composed. Otherwise, the provisions of the Act on Procedure in Family Matters and Non-Contentious Matters shall be applicable to the procedure mutatis mutandis.

Section 21c

(1) In the event that the president or supervising judge is unable to be present, he shall be represented by his deputy (section 21h). If the president or supervising judge is present, his deputy, if he has not himself been elected to the presidium, may attend the meetings of the presidium in an advisory capacity. The elected members of the presidium shall not have deputies.

(2) If an elected member of the presidium leaves the court, is seconded to another court for more than three months, is granted leave for more than three months, is seconded to an administrative authority or becomes a member of the presidium by statute, he shall be replaced by the person who is next in line on the basis of the last election.

Section 21d

(1) The size of the presidium shall be governed by the number of permanent judicial posts at the end of the day six months preceding the day on which the business year begins.

(2) If the number of permanent judicial posts at a court with a presidium pursuant to section 21a subsection (2), numbers 1 to 3, has fallen below the respective specified minimum number, the following number of judges shall be elected at the next election held pursuant to section 21b subsection (4):

  1. four judges at a court with a presidium pursuant to section 21a subsection (2), number 1,
  2. three judges at a court with a presidium pursuant to section 21a subsection (2), number 2,
  3. two judges at a court with a presidium pursuant to section 21a subsection (2), number 3.

In addition to the members resigning from the presidium pursuant to section 21b subsection (4), a further member shall resign who shall be selected by drawing lots.

(3) If the number of permanent judicial posts at a court with a presidium pursuant to section 21a subsection (2), numbers 2 to 4, has risen above the maximum number specified for the previous size of the presidium, the following number of judges shall be elected at the next election held pursuant to section 21b subsection (4):

  1. six judges at a court with a presidium pursuant to section 21a subsection (2), number 2,
  2. five judges at a court with a presidium pursuant to section 21a subsection (2), number 3,
  3. four judges at a court with a presidium pursuant to section 21a subsection (2), number 4.

One of these members, who shall be selected by drawing lots, shall resign from the given presidium at the end of two years.

Section 21e

(1) The presidium shall determine the composition of the adjudicating bodies, appoint the investigating judges, regulate representation and allocate court business. It shall make these arrangements prior to the beginning of the business year for the latters duration. The president shall determine which judicial duties he shall perform. Each judge may belong to several adjudicating bodies.

(2) The judges who are not members of the presidium shall be given an opportunity to be heard prior to the allocation of court business.

(3) The arrangements pursuant to subsection (1) may only be changed in the course of the business year if this becomes necessary due to the excessive or insufficient workload of a judge or adjudicating body or as a result of the transfer or prolonged absence of individual judges. The presiding judges of the adjudicating bodies affected by the change in the allocation of court business shall be given an opportunity to be heard prior to such change.

(4) The presidium may order that a judge or adjudicating body that has been handling a case continue to be responsible for that case following a change in the allocation of court business.

(5) If a judge is to be assigned to another adjudicating body or if his sphere of competence is to be changed, he shall, except in urgent cases, be given an opportunity to be heard beforehand.

(6) If a judge is to be released, either entirely or partially, in order to perform judicial administration functions, the presidium shall be heard beforehand.

(7) The presidium shall decide by a majority vote. Section 21i subsection (2) shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(8) The presidium may rule that judges of the court may be present during the deliberations and votes of the presidium, either for the entire duration or for a part thereof. Section 171b shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(9) The roster allocating court business shall be open for inspection at the registry of the court designated by the president or supervising judge; it need not be published.

Section 21f

(1) The adjudicating bodies at the regional courts, at the higher regional courts and at the Federal Court of Justice shall be presided over by the president and the presiding judges.

(2) In the event that the presiding judge is unable to be present, the member of the adjudicating body designated by the presidium shall preside. In the event that this deputy is also unable to be present, the most senior member or, in a case of equal seniority, the oldest member of the adjudicating body shall preside.

Section 21g

1) Within an adjudicating body composed of several judges, court business shall be allocated among the members by a ruling of all the professional judges belonging to the adjudicating body. In the case of a tie, the presidium shall decide.

(2) The ruling shall specify, prior to the beginning of the business year and for the latters duration, the principles governing the participation of the members in the proceedings; it may only be amended if this becomes necessary due to the excessive or insufficient workload, transfer or prolonged absence of individual members of the adjudicating body.

(3) If, pursuant to the provisions of procedural law, proceedings may be assigned by the adjudicating body to one of its members for decision as a judge sitting alone, subsection (2) shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(4) Where a professional judge is unable to present at the time of the ruling, his place shall be taken by the deputy designated in the roster allocating court business.

(5) Section 21i subsection (2) shall apply mutatis mutandis, provided that the arrangements are made by the presiding judge.

(6) The professional judges affected by the ruling shall be given an opportunity to be heard before it is given.

(7) Section 21e subsection (9) shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 21h

The president or supervising judge shall, in respect of the court business assigned to him under this Act that is not to be allocated by the presidium, be represented by his permanent deputy; where there are several permanent deputies, he shall be represented by the most senior deputy or, in a case of equal seniority, by the oldest deputy. Where a permanent deputy has not been designated or is unable to be present, the president or supervising judge shall be represented by the most senior judge or, in a case of equal seniority, by the oldest judge.

Section 21i

(1) A quorum of the presidium shall exist if at least half of its elected members are present.

(2) If a timely decision of the presidium cannot be given, the arrangements specified in section 21e shall be made by the president or by the supervising judge. The reasons for the arrangements shall be stated in writing. The arrangements shall be submitted to the presidium for approval without delay. They shall remain in force as long as the presidium does not rule otherwise.

Section 21j

(1) If a court is established, and if the presidium is to be established pursuant to section 21a subsection (2), numbers 1 to 4, the arrangements specified in section 21e shall be made by the president or by the supervising judge until the presidium is established. Section 21i subsection (2), second to fourth sentences, shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(2) A presidium pursuant to section 21a subsection (2), numbers 1 to 4, shall be established within three months after the establishment of the court. The term specified in section 21b subsection (4), first sentence, shall start at the beginning of the business year following the business year in which the presidium is established if the presidium is not established at the beginning of a business year.

(3) The day on which the court is established shall take the place of the time specified in section 21d subsection (1).

(4) When the electoral board is appointed for the first time, the functions pursuant to section 1 subsection (2), second and third sentences, and section 1 subsection (3) of the Election Regulations for the Presidiums of the Courts of 19 September 1972 (Federal Law Gazette, Part I, page 1821) shall be discharged by the president or by the supervising judge. The end of the time period specified in subsection (2), first sentence, shall be taken as the end of the business year specified in section 1 subsection (2), second sentence, and section 3, first sentence, of the Election Regulations for the Presidiums of the Courts.

Title III

Local courts

Section 22

(1) The local courts (Amtsgerichte) shall be presided over by judges sitting alone.

(2) A judge at a local court may at the same time be conferred an additional judicial office at another local court or at a regional court.

(3) Responsibility for general supervision of service may be transferred by the Land agency for the administration of justice to the president of the superior regional court. If this is not done, and if the local court is staffed with several judges, the Land agency for the administration of justice shall transfer responsibility for general supervision of service to one of them.

(4) Each local court judge shall perform the duties incumbent upon him as a judge sitting alone unless otherwise provided under this Act.

(5) Judges by commission may also be employed. Judges on probation may be employed except as otherwise provided under subsection (6), section 23b subsection (3), second sentence, section 23c subsection (2), or section 29 subsection (1), second sentence.

(6) A judge on probation may not handle insolvency matters during the first year after his appointment.

Section 22a

At local courts with a presidium consisting of all the judges eligible to stand for election (section 21a subsection (2), number 5), the president of the superior regional court or, if the president of another local court is vested with responsibility for supervision of service, that president shall belong to the presidium as chairman.

Section 22b

(1) If a local court is staffed with only one judge, the presidium of the regional court shall designate a judge in its district to serve as the permanent representative of the local court judge.

(2) If it is necessary for a judge at a local court to be temporarily represented by a judge at another court, the presidium of the regional court shall designate a judge in its district to represent the local court judge for no longer than two months.

(3) In urgent cases the president of the regional court may appoint a provisional representative. The grounds for the order must be specified in writing.

(4) In the case of local courts where the president of another local court is responsible for general supervision of service, the presidium of the other local court shall be competent in the cases of subsections (1) and (2) and its president shall be competent in the case of subsection (3).

Section 22c

(1) The Land governments shall be authorised to issue ordinances providing that a joint standby duty schedule be compiled for several local courts in the district of one regional court or that a single local court handle standby duty business, either entirely or partially, if this is advisable in order to ensure a more equitable distribution of standby duty assignments among the judges. The judges of the local courts designated in the first sentence shall be scheduled for standby duty. The ordinance issued pursuant to the first sentence may stipulate that the judges of the regional court also be scheduled for standby duty. Standby duty business shall, pursuant to section 21e, be allocated by the presidium of the regional court in agreement with the presidiums of the local courts concerned. If no agreement can be reached, such allocation shall be made by the presidium of the higher regional court to the district of which the regional court belongs.

(2) The Land governments may transfer the authorisation pursuant to subsection (1) to the Land agencies for the administration of justice.

Section 22d

The validity of an act performed by a judge at a local court shall not be affected by the fact that the act should have been performed by another judge according to the roster allocating court business.

Section 23

The jurisdiction of the local courts in civil disputes shall encompass the following, insofar as they have not been assigned to the regional courts irrespective of the value of the matter in dispute:

  1. disputes concerning claims involving an amount or with a monetary value not exceeding the sum of five thousand euros;
  2. irrespective of the value of the matter in dispute:a) disputes concerning claims arising out of a lease of living accommodation or concerning the existence of such a lease; this jurisdiction shall be exclusive;b) disputes between travellers and providers of food or lodging, carriers, shippers or passage brokers at ports of embarkation concerning bills for food or lodging, carriage charges, passage monies, carriage of travellers and their belongings and loss of or damage to the latter, as well as disputes between travellers and artisans arising on the occasion of travel;c) disputes pursuant to section 43, numbers 1 to 4 and 6 of the Condominium Act; this jurisdiction shall be exclusive;d) disputes concerning damage caused by game;e) (repealed)f) (repealed)g) claims arising out of a contract for a life annuity, life endowment or life interest or for vacation of premises that is connected with the transfer of possession of a piece of land.

Section 23a

(1) The local courts shall furthermore have jurisdiction over

  1. family matters;
  2. non-contentious matters, insofar as no other jurisdiction has been established by statutory provisions.

The jurisdiction pursuant to the first sentence, number 1, shall be exclusive.

(2) Non-contentious matters shall be

  1. adult guardianship matters, committal matters and matters relating to adult guardianship appointments;
  2. matters relating to probate and estate division;
  3. register matters;
  4. proceedings under company law pursuant to section 375 of the Act on Procedure in Family Matters and Non-Contentious Matters;
  5. the further non-contentious matters pursuant to section 410 of the Act on Procedure in Family Matters and Non-Contentious Matters;
  6. proceedings in imprisonment matters pursuant to section 415 of the Act on Procedure in Family Matters and Non-Contentious Matters;
  7. proceedings by public notice process;
  8. land register matters;
  9. proceedings under section 1, numbers 1 and 2 to 6, of the Act on Court Procedure in Agricultural Matters;
  10. shipping register matters as well as
  11. other non-contentious matters, insofar as they have been assigned to the courts by federal law.

Section 23b

(1) Divisions for family matters (family courts) shall be established at the local courts.

(2) If several divisions for family matters are established, then all the family matters relating to the same group of persons should be assigned to the same division. If a matrimonial matter becomes pending at one division while another family matter relating to the same group of persons or a common child of both spouses is pending at first instance at another division, the latter matter shall be transferred proprio motu to the division handling the matrimonial matter. If an application in proceedings under sections 10 to 12 of the Act to Implement Certain Legal Instruments in the Field of International Family Law of 26 January 2005 (Federal Law Gazette, Part I, page 162) becomes pending at one division while a family matter relating to the same child is pending at first instance at another division, the latter matter shall be transferred proprio motu to the first-mentioned division; this shall not apply if the application is manifestly inadmissible. Upon concurring application of both parents, the arrangement specified in the third sentence shall also be applied to other family matters in which the parents are involved.

(3) The divisions for family matters shall be composed of family court judges. A judge on probation may not perform the duties of a family court judge during the first year after his appointment.

Section 23c

(1) Divisions for adult guardianship matters, committal matters and matters relating to adult guardianship appointments (adult guardianship courts) shall be established.

(2) The adult guardianship courts (Betreuungsgerichte) shall be composed of adult guardianship court judges. A judge on probation may not perform the duties of an adult guardianship court judge during the first year after his appointment.

Section 23d

The Land governments shall be authorised to issue ordinances assigning to one local court the family matters and, either entirely or partially, the commercial matters and non-contentious matters for the districts of several local courts, insofar as such concentration serves the purpose of material furtherance of the proceedings or appears advisable in order to ensure uniform administration of justice. The Land governments may transfer this authorisation to the Land agencies for the administration of justice.

Section 24

(1) In criminal matters, the local courts shall have jurisdiction unless

  1. the jurisdiction of the regional court is established under section 74 subsection (2) or section 74a or the jurisdiction of the higher regional court is established under section 120,
  2. in an individual case a sentence of imprisonment exceeding four years or committal of the accused to a psychiatric hospital in lieu of or in addition to a penalty or committal of the accused to preventive detention (sections 66 to 66b of the Criminal Code) is to be expected, or
  3. the public prosecution office prefers charges before the regional court due to the particular need for protection of persons aggrieved by the criminal offence who might be considered witnesses or due to the particular scale or the special significance of the case.

(2) The local court may not impose a sentence of imprisonment exceeding four years and may neither order committal to a psychiatric hospital in lieu of or in addition to a penalty nor order committal to preventive detention.

Section 25

A local court judge shall give a decision as a criminal court judge on less serious criminal offences

  1. if they are prosecuted by way of a private prosecution or
  2. if a penalty more severe than a two-year sentence of imprisonment is not to be expected.

Section 26

(1) In the case of criminal offences committed by adults through which a child or a juvenile is injured or directly endangered, and in the case of violations by adults of legal provisions serving the protection or education of young people, the juvenile courts shall also have jurisdiction in addition to the courts with jurisdiction over general criminal matters. Sections 24 and 25 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(2) In matters relating to the protection of children and juveniles, the public prosecutor should only prefer charges before the juvenile courts if children or juveniles are required as witnesses in the proceedings or if a hearing before the juvenile court appears expedient for other reasons.

Section 26a

(repealed)

Section 27

The jurisdiction and scope of duties of the local courts shall otherwise be determined by the provisions of this Act and the provisions of the procedural codes.

Title IV

Courts with lay judges

Section 28

Courts with lay judges (Schöffengerichte) shall be established at the local courts to hear and decide criminal matters falling under the jurisdiction of the local courts, insofar as such matters are not decided by a criminal court judge.

Section 29

(1) The benchshall consist of a local court judge as presiding judge and two lay judges. A judge on probation may not serve as presiding judge during the first year after his appointment.

(2) Upon application by the public prosecution office, it may be decided at the opening of the main proceedings that a second local court judge be added to the bench (extended bench) if his participation appears necessary in the light of the scale of the matter. An application by the public prosecution office shall not be required if a court of higher rank opens the main proceedings before a court with lay judges.

Section 30

(1) Except where the law provides for exceptions, during the main hearing the lay judges shall exercise judicial office in full and with the same voting rights as the local court judges and shall also participate in the decisions to be made in the course of a main hearing that are entirely unrelated to the delivery of the judgment and may be made without an oral hearing.

(2) The necessary decisions to be made outside the main hearing shall be made by the local court judge.

Section 31

The office of lay judge is an honorary position. It may only be held by Germans.

Section 32

The following persons shall be ineligible for the office of lay judge:

  1. persons who as a result of a judicial decision do not have the capacity to hold public office or who have been sentenced to imprisonment exceeding six months for an intentional act;
  2. persons against whom investigation proceedings are pending for an offence that can result in loss of capacity to hold public office.
  3. (repealed)

Section 33

The following persons should not be appointed to the office of lay judge:

  1. persons who would not yet have attained the age of twenty-five by the beginning of the term of office;
  2. persons who have attained the age of seventy or would have attained the age of seventy by the beginning of the term of office;
  3. persons who are not residing in the municipality at the time the list of nominees is compiled;
  4. persons who are unsuitable candidates for health reasons;
  5. persons who are no longer able to freely dispose over their assets.

Section 34

(1) The following also should not be appointed to the office of lay judge:

  1. the Federal President;
  2. the members of the Federal Government or of a Land government;
  3. civil servants who could be suspended or provisionally retired at any time;
  4. judges, officials of the public prosecution office, notaries and attorneys-at-law;
  5. court bailiffs, police officers and prison staff as well as full-time probation officers and staff of the court assistance agency;
  6. ministers of religion and members of religious associations that by their rules are committed to the common life;
  7. persons who have served as honorary judges in the criminal justice system for two successive terms of office, of which the last term of office is still ongoing at the time the list of nominees is compiled.

(2) In addition to the officials designated hereinbefore, Land legislation may designate higher administrative officials who should not be appointed to the office of lay judge.

Section 35

The following may decline appointment to the office of lay judge:

  1. members of the Bundestag, the Bundesrat, the European Parliament, a Land parliament or a second chamber;
  2. persons who during the previous term of office discharged the obligation to serve as an honorary judge in the criminal justice system on forty days as well as persons who are already serving as honorary judges;
  3. doctors, dentists, nurses, paediatric nurses, orderlies and midwives;
  4. heads of pharmacies that do not employ any other pharmacists;
  5. persons who can credibly demonstrate that their immediate obligation to personally care for their families would make it particularly difficult for them to perform the duties of the office;
  6. persons who have attained the age of sixty-five or would have attained the age of sixty-five by the end of the term of office;
  7. persons who can credibly demonstrate that performing the duties of the office would constitute a particular hardship either for them or for a third party because it would jeopardise or considerably impair an adequate livelihood.

Section 36

(1) The municipality shall compile a list of prospective lay judges every five years. Inclusion in the list shall require the approval of two thirds of the members of the municipal assembly who are present, but at least, however, half of the statutory number of members of the municipal assembly. The respective rules for the adoption of resolutions by the municipal assembly shall remain unaffected.

(2) The list of nominees should adequately reflect all groups within the population in terms of sex, age, occupation and social status. It must contain the names at birth, surnames, first names, date and place of birth, residential address and occupation of the persons nominated.

(3) The list of nominees shall be open to public inspection in the municipality for one week. The time at which it will be laid out for inspection shall be publicly announced in advance.

(4) The lists of nominees for the district of the local court shall contain at least twice as many names as the required number of principal lay judges and alternate lay judges specified in section 43. Their allocation among the municipalities of the district shall be undertaken by the president of the regional court (president of the local court) in keeping with the populations of the municipalities.

Section 37

Objections to the list of nominees may be lodged within one week, calculated from the end of the period of public inspection, either in writing or for the record on the grounds that persons have been included in the list of nominees who are ineligible for inclusion pursuant to section 32 or should not have been included pursuant to sections 33 and 34.

Section 38

(1) The chairman of the municipal council shall send the list of nominees and the objections to the judge at the local court of the district.

(2) If corrections to the list of nominees become necessary after it has been sent, the chairman of the municipal council must notify the judge at the local court accordingly.

Section 39

The judge at the local court shall consolidate the municipalities lists of nominees into a district list and shall prepare the ruling on the objections. He must verify that the provisions of section 36 subsection (3) have been observed and ensure that any defects are remedied.

Section 40

(1) A committee shall convene at the local court every five years.

(2) The committee shall be composed of the judge at the local court as chairman, an administrative official to be designated by the Land government and seven upstanding individuals as associate members. The Land governments shall be authorised to issue ordinances regulating the competence for designation of the administrative official in derogation from the first sentence. They may issue ordinances transferring this authorisation to the highest Landauthorities.

(3) The associate members shall be elected from among the inhabitants of the district of the local court by the representative body of the corresponding administrative subdivision by a two-thirds majority of the members present, but at least, however, by half of the statutory number of members. The respective rules for the adoption of resolutions by this representative body shall remain unaffected. If the district of the local court encompasses several administrative districts or parts of several administrative districts, the competent highest Land authority shall determine the number of associate members to be elected by the representative bodies of these administrative districts.

(4) A quorum of the committee shall exist if at least the chairman, the administrative official and three associate members are present.

Section 41

The committee shall rule on the objections to the list of nominees by a simple majority vote. In the case of a tie, the chairman shall have the casting vote. The decisions shall be placed on record. They shall not be contestable.

Section 42

(1) From the corrected list of nominees, the committee shall, by a two-thirds majority vote, select the following for the next five business years:

  1. the necessary number of lay judges;
  2. the necessary number of persons to take the place of any lay judges who become unavailable or to serve as lay judges in the cases of sections 46 and 47 (alternate lay judges). Persons should be selected who reside at the seat of the local court or in the immediate vicinity.

(2) Care should be taken at the time of selection to ensure that all groups within the population are adequately represented in terms of sex, age, occupation and social status.

Section 43

(1) The number of principal lay judges and alternate lay judges required for each local court shall be determined by the president of the regional court (president of the local court).

(2) The number of principal lay judges should be calculated in such a way that each one is likely to be called to serve on no more than twelve ordinary sitting days per year.

Section 44

The names of the selected principal lay judges and alternate lay judges shall be entered in separate lists (Schöffenlisten) at each local court.

Section 45

(1) The dates of the ordinary sittings of a court with lay judges shall be set in advance for the entire year.

(2) The order in which the principal lay judges are to participate in the years individual ordinary sittings shall be decided by drawing lots in a public sitting of the local court. If several benches with lay judges have been established at a local court, lots may be drawn in such a way that each principal lay judge only participates in the sittings of one bench. Lots are to be drawn in such a way that each principal lay judge selected is called to serve on twelve sitting days if possible. The first sentence shall apply mutatis mutandis to the order in which the alternate lay judges shall take the place of lay judges who become unavailable (list of alternate lay judges); the second sentence shall not apply to alternate lay judges.

(3) Lots shall be drawn by the judge at the local court.

(4) The lists of lay judges shall be maintained by a designated registry clerk of the court registry (Schöffengeschäftsstelle). He shall record the drawing of lots. The judge at the local court shall inform the lay judges of the results of the drawing. At the same time, the principal lay judges shall be informed of the sitting days on which they must serve and advised of the legal consequences of failure to appear. A lay judge who is not called to serve on a sitting day until after the commencement of the business year shall be informed and advised in the same manner once he is called.

Section 46

If an additional bench with lay judges is established at a local court during the business year, the number of principal lay judges required for its ordinary sittings shall be drawn by lots from the list of alternate lay judges pursuant to section 45 subsection (1), subsection (2), first sentence, and subsections (3) and (4). The lay judges selected in this manner shall be deleted from the list of alternate lay judges.

Section 47

If court business necessitates the scheduling of extraordinary sittings or if it becomes necessary for lay judges other than the ones initially appointed or for additional lay judges to be called to serve at individual sittings, they shall be selected from the list of alternate lay judges.

Section 48

(1) Additional lay judges (section 192 subsections (2) and (3)) shall be assigned from the list of alternate lay judges.

(2) In the event that a principal lay judge is unable to be present, the additional lay judge initially assigned from the list shall even then take his place if the unavailability of the principal lay judge becomes known prior to the beginning of the sitting.

Section 49

(1) If it becomes necessary for alternate lay judges to be called to serve at individual sittings (section 47 and section 48 subsection (1)), they shall be assigned from the list of alternate lay judges in the order in which they appear on the list.

(2) If a principal lay judge is deleted from the list of lay judges, he shall be replaced by the alternate lay judge who is next in line on the list of alternate lay judges; the name of the replacement shall then be deleted from the list of alternate lay judges. The designated registry clerk of the court registry shall thereupon inform and advise the new principal lay judge in accordance with section 45 subsection (4), third and fourth sentences.

(3) The order in which alternate lay judges are called shall be determined by the date of receipt by the designated registry clerk of the order or ruling indicating the necessity of calling alternate lay judges. The designated registry clerk shall make a note of the date and time of receipt on the order or ruling. Proceeding in the order of receipt, he shall assign the alternate lay judges to the various sittings in accordance with subsection (1) or transfer them to the list of principal lay judges in accordance with subsection (2). In the event that several orders or rulings are received simultaneously, he shall first transfer names from the list of alternate lay judges to the list of principal lay judges in accordance with subsection (2) in alphabetical order of the surnames of the principal lay judges deleted from the list of lay judges; in all other cases the alphabetical order of the surnames of the primary defendants shall be decisive.

(4) If an alternate lay judge is assigned to a sitting day, he shall not be called again until all the other alternate lay judges have likewise been assigned or released from their service commitment or deemed unreachable (section 54). This shall also be the case even if he himself has been released from his service commitment or deemed unreachable.

Section 50

If a sitting extends beyond the time for which the lay judge was initially called, he must continue to serve until the end of the sitting.

Section 51

(repealed)

Section 52

(1) A lay judge shall be deleted from the list of lay judges if

  1. he becomes ineligible for the office of lay judge or if such ineligibility becomes known, or
  2. circumstances arise or become known that are such that he should not be appointed to the office of lay judge.

In the cases of section 33, number 3, however, this shall only apply if the lay judge gives up his residence in the district of the regional court.

(2) Upon his application, a lay judge shall be deleted from the list of lay judges if he

  1. gives up his residence in the district of the local court in which he is serving, or
  2. has participated in sittings on more than 24 sitting days during one business year.

In the case of principal lay judges, such deletion shall only become effective for the sittings that begin more than two weeks after the day on which the application is received by the designated registry clerk of the court registry. If an alternate lay judge has already been notified that he has been called to serve on a specific sitting day, his deletion from the list shall not become effective until after the conclusion of the main hearing begun on that sitting day.

(3) If the lay judge has died or moved out of the district of the regional court, the judge at the local court shall order his deletion from the list. He shall otherwise rule on the application after hearing the public prosecution office and the lay judge concerned.

(4) The decision shall not be contestable.

(5) If an alternate lay judge is transferred to the list of principal lay judges, he shall first fulfil the service commitments for which he was previously called as an alternate lay judge.

(6) If the number of alternate lay judges on the list of alternate lay judges has declined to half the original number, additional lay judges shall be selected from the existing lists of nominees by the committee that was responsible for selecting the original lay judges. The judge at the local court may dispense with selecting additional lay judges if such selection would have to take place during the last six months of the period for which the lay judges have been selected. The order of succession of the new alternate lay judges shall be determined by section 45 mutatis mutandis with the proviso that the places on the list of lay judges to be filled by drawing lots shall follow the last name on the list of lay judges at the time of the drawing.

Section 53

(1) Grounds for refusing service shall only be considered if they are put forward by the lay judge concerned within one week of the time he was informed of his assignment. If such grounds arise or become known at a later date, the time limit shall be calculated from that point onward.

(2) The judge at the local court shall rule on the request after hearing the public prosecution office. The decision shall not be contestable.

Section 54

(1) The judge at the local court may release a lay judge from his service commitment on specific sitting days upon the latters application due to obstacles that have arisen. An obstacle shall be deemed to have arisen if the lay judge is prevented from serving by circumstances that are beyond his control or if it would be unreasonable to expect him to serve.

(2) For the purposes of calling alternate lay judges, it shall be deemed equivalent to being prevented from serving if a lay judge cannot be reached. A lay judge who does not appear at a sitting and whose appearance probably cannot be effected without considerably delaying commencement of the sitting shall be deemed unreachable. An alternate lay judge shall also then be considered unreachable if calling him would necessitate a postponement of the hearing or a considerable delay in its commencement. The decision as to whether a lay judge is unreachable shall be made by the judge at the local court. Section 56 shall remain unaffected.

(3) The decision shall not be contestable. The application pursuant to subsection (1) and the decision shall be recorded in the files.

Section 55

The lay judges and the associate members of the committee shall receive remuneration pursuant to the Judicial Remuneration and Compensation Act.

Section 56

(1) A coercive fine shall be imposed on lay judges and associate members of the committee who fail to appear at the sittings on time without a sufficient excuse or otherwise shirk their obligations. At the same time they shall be charged with the costs incurred.

(2) The decision shall be made by the judge at the local court after hearing the public prosecution office. If a sufficient excuse is subsequently provided, the decision may be either entirely or partially revoked. A complaint (Beschwerde) by the person concerned against the decision shall be admissible pursuant to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Section 57

The Land agency for the administration of justice shall specify the date by which the lists of nominees are to be compiled and submitted to the judge at the local court as well as the date on which the committee is to be convened and lots are be drawn to select the lay judges.

Section 58

(1) The Land governments shall be authorised to issue ordinances providing that criminal matters, either entirely or partially, as well as certain kinds of decisions in criminal matters and requests for mutual assistance in criminal matters from offices outside the territorial scope of this Act be assigned to a single local court for the districts of several local courts insofar as such concentration serves the purpose of material furtherance or swifter disposal of the proceedings. The Landgovernments may issue ordinances transferring this authorisation to the Land agencies for the administration of justice.

(2) If a joint court with lay judges is established for the districts of several local courts, the president of the regional court (president of the local court) shall determine the necessary number of principal and alternate lay judges and allocate the number of principal lay judges among the individual local court districts. If the seat of the local court at which a joint court with lay judges is established is a city that encompasses districts of the other local courts or parts thereof, the president of the regional court (president of the local court) shall allocate the number of alternate lay judges among these local courts; the Landagency for the administration of justice may exempt certain local courts herefrom. The president of the local court shall only then take the place of the president of the regional court if all the local courts concerned are subject to his supervision of service.

(3) All the other provisions of this Title shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Title V

Regional courts

Section 59

(1) The regional courts (Landgerichte) shall be composed of a president, presiding judges and additional judges.

(2) The judges at a regional court may at the same time be conferred an additional judicial office at a local court.

(3) Judges on probation and judges by commission may be employed.

Section 60

Civil and criminal divisions shall be established at the regional courts.

Section 61 to 69

(repealed)

Section 70

(1) Insofar as the representation of a member by a member of the same court is not possible, it shall, upon application of the presidium, be arranged by the Landagency for the administration of justice.

(2) The assignment of a judge on probation or a judge by commission shall be limited to a specific period of time and may not be revoked prior to the expiration of this period.

(3) The provisions of Land law pursuant to which judicial functions may only be exercised by judges appointed for life and the provisions of Land law governing representation by judges appointed for life shall remain unaffected.

Section 71

(1) The civil divisions, including the commercial divisions, shall have jurisdiction over all civil disputes that are not assigned to the local courts.

(2) The regional courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the following, irrespective of the value of the matter in dispute:1. claims brought against the fiscal authorities on the basis of civil service law;2. claims against judges and civil servants for overstepping their official powers or for failing to perform official duties.;3. claims for damages due to false, misleading or omitted public capital market information.;4. proceedings undera) section 324 of the Commercial Code,b) sections 98, 99, 132, 142, 145, 258, 260, 293c and 315 of the Stock Corporation Act,c) section 26 of the SE Implementation Act,d) section 10 of the Company Transformation Act,e) the Award Proceedings Act,f) sections 39a and 39b of the Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act.

(3) It shall be left to Land legislation to assign claims against the state or against a corporation established under public law arising out of dispositions of administrative authorities as well as claims arising out of public charges exclusively to the regional courts, irrespective of the value of the matter in dispute.

(4) The Land governments shall be authorised to issue ordinances assigning the decisions in proceedings pursuant to subsection (2), number 4, letters a to e, to one regional court for the districts of several regional courts if this serves to ensure uniform administration of justice. The Land governments may transfer this authorisation to the Land agencies for the administration of justice.

Section 72

(1) The civil divisions, including the commercial divisions, shall be the courts hearing appeals on fact and law and hearing complaints in the civil disputes heard by the local courts, insofar as the higher regional courts do not have jurisdiction. The regional courts shall furthermore be the courts hearing complaints in imprisonment matters and in the matters decided by the adult guardianship courts.

(2) In disputes pursuant to section 43, numbers 1 to 4 and 6 of the Condominium Act, the regional court with jurisdiction for the seat of the higher regional court shall be the joint court hearing appeals on fact and law and hearing complaints for the district of the higher regional court in which the local court has its seat. This shall also apply to the matters specified in section 119 subsection (1), number 1, letters b and c. The Land governments shall be authorised to issue ordinances designating another regional court in the district of the higher regional court instead of this court. The Land governments may transfer this authorisation to the Land agencies for the administration of justice.

Section 73

(1) The criminal divisions shall rule on complaints against directions of a local court judge, as well as against decisions of a local court judge and decisions of benches with lay judges.

(2) The criminal divisions shall furthermore handle the matters assigned to the regional courts under the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Section 73a

(repealed)

Section 74

(1) The criminal divisions, as adjudicating courts of first instance, shall have jurisdiction over all serious criminal offences that do not fall under the jurisdiction of the local court or the higher regional court. They shall also have jurisdiction over all criminal offences where a sentence of imprisonment exceeding four years or committal of the accused to a psychiatric hospital in lieu of or in addition to a penalty or committal of the accused to preventive detention is to be expected or where the public prosecution office prefers charges before the regional court in the cases of section 24 subsection (1), number 3.

(2) In the case of the serious criminal offences of

  1. sexual abuse of children resulting in death (section 176b of the Criminal Code),
  2. sexual coercion and rape resulting in death (section 178 of the Criminal Code),
  3. sexual abuse of persons incapable of resisting resulting in death (section 179 subsection (7) in conjunction with section 178 of the Criminal Code),
  4. murder (section 211 of the Criminal Code),
  5. manslaughter (section 212 of the Criminal Code),
  6. (repealed)
  7. abandonment resulting in death (section 221 subsection (3) of the Criminal Code),
  8. bodily injury resulting in death (section 227 of the Criminal Code),
  9. child stealing resulting in death (section 235 subsection (5) of the Criminal Code),
  10. deprivation of liberty resulting in death (section 239 subsection (4) of the Criminal Code),
  11. extortionate kidnapping resulting in death (section 239a subsection (2) of the Criminal Code),
  12. hostage taking resulting in death (section 239b subsection (2) in conjunction with section 239a subsection (2) of the Criminal Code),
  13. robbery resulting in death (section 251 of the Criminal Code),
  14. robbery-like theft resulting in death (section 252 in conjunction with section 251 of the Criminal Code),
  15. robbery-like extortion resulting in death (section 255 in conjunction with section 251 of the Criminal Code),
  16. arson resulting in death (section 306c of the Criminal Code),
  17. causing an explosion by nuclear power (section 307 subsections (1) to (3) of the Criminal Code),
  18. causing an explosion by use of explosives resulting in death (section 308 subsection (3) of the Criminal Code),
  19. misuse of ionizing radiation exposing a vast number of human beings to such radiation (section 309 subsections (2) and (4) of the Criminal Code),
  20. defective construction of a nuclear facility resulting in death (section 312 subsection (4) of the Criminal Code),
  21. causing a flood resulting in death (section 313 in conjunction with section 308 subsection (3) of the Criminal Code),
  22. poisoning dangerous to the public resulting in death (section 314 in conjunction with section 308 subsection (3) of the Criminal Code),
  23. robbery-like assault on the driver of a motor vehicle resulting in death (section 316a subsection (3) of the Criminal Code),
  24. assaults on air and sea traffic resulting in death (section 316c subsection (3) of the Criminal Code),
  25. damaging important facilities resulting in death (section 318 subsection (4) of the Criminal Code),
  26. an intentional environmental crime resulting in death (section 330 subsection (2), number 2, of the Criminal Code),

a criminal division with lay judges (Schwurgericht) shall have jurisdiction. Section 120 shall remain unaffected.

(3) The criminal divisions shall furthermore have jurisdiction for hearing and ruling on the legal remedy of appeal on fact and law (Berufung) against decisions of a criminal court judge or a court with lay judges.

Section 74a

(1) At the regional courts in the district of which a higher regional court has its seat, a criminal division for the district of this higher regional court shall be the adjudicating court of first instance with jurisdiction over the criminal offences of

  1. crimes against peace in the cases of section 80a of the Criminal Code,
  2. endangering the democratic state based on the rule of law in the cases of sections 84 to 86, sections 87 to 90, section 90a subsection (3) and section 90b of the Criminal Code,
  3. endangering the national defence in the cases of sections 109d to 109g of the Criminal Code,
  4. violation of a ban of an organisation in the cases of section 129, also in conjunction with section 129b subsection (1), of the Criminal Code and section 20 subsection (1), first sentence, numbers 1 to 4, of the Associations Act; this shall not apply if the same act constitutes a criminal offence under the Narcotics Act,
  5. abduction (section 234a of the Criminal Code) and
  6. casting political suspicion (section 241a of the Criminal Code).

(2) The regional court shall not have jurisdiction if the Federal Prosecutor General takes over the prosecution prior to the opening of the main proceedings due to the special significance of the case, unless jurisdiction has been vested in the regional court through referral pursuant to section 142a subsection (4) or referral pursuant to section 120 subsection (2), second sentence.

(3) In the cases over which a criminal division has jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (1), it shall also give the decisions designated in section 73 subsection (1).

(4) At the regional courts in the district of which a higher regional court has its seat, a division that is not seized of main proceedings in criminal matters shall have jurisdiction for the district of this higher regional court to order measures pursuant to section 100c of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

(5) Within the scope of subsections (1), (3) and (4), the district of the regional court shall encompass the district of the higher regional court.

Section 74b

In matters relating to the protection of children and juveniles (section 26 subsection (1), first sentence), the juvenile division as adjudicating court of first instance shall have jurisdiction along with the criminal division with jurisdiction over general criminal matters. Section 26 subsection (2) and sections 73 and 74 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 74c

(1) For criminal offences1. pursuant to the Patent Law, the Utility Model Act, the Semiconductor Protection Act, the Plant Variety Protection Act, the Trade Mark Act, the Designs Act, the Copyright Act, the Act against Unfair Competition, the Insolvency Statute, the Stock Corporation Act, the Act on the Financial Statements of Certain Enterprises and Groups, the Act on Limited Liability Companies, the Commercial Code, the SE Implementation Act, the Act to Implement Council Regulation (EEC) on the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG), the Cooperatives Act, the SCE Implementation Act and the Company Transformation Act,2. pursuant to the laws governing the banking industry, the custody and acquisition of securities, the stock exchanges and the credit system as well as the Act on the Supervision of Insurance Companies and the Securities Trading Act,3. pursuant to the Economic Offences Act of 1954, the Foreign Trade and Payments Act and foreign exchange control legislation as well as fiscal monopoly, tax and customs laws, including cases where their criminal provisions are applicable pursuant to other laws; this shall not apply if the same act constitutes a criminal offence under the Narcotics Act and shall not apply to fiscal offences involving the motor vehicle tax,4. pursuant to the Wine Act and food products legislation,5. involving subsidy fraud, capital investment fraud, credit fraud, bankruptcy offences, preferential treatment for a creditor and preferential treatment for a debtor,5a. involving agreements in restriction of competition upon invitations to tender as well as the taking and offering of a bribe in business transactions,6.a) involving fraud, computer fraud, breach of trust, usury, the granting of a benefit, the offering of a bribe, and the withholding and embezzlement of wages or salaries,b) pursuant to the Labour Leasing Act, Book Three of the Social Code and the Act to Combat Clandestine Employment, to the extent that special knowledge of business operations and practices is required in order to judge the case,

insofar as the regional court has jurisdiction as court of first instance pursuant to section 74 subsection (1) and jurisdiction for hearing and ruling on the legal remedy of appeal on fact and law against judgments of a court with lay judges pursuant to section 74 subsection (3), jurisdiction shall be vested in a criminal division as an economic offences division. Section 120 shall remain unaffected.

(2) In the cases over which an economic offences division has jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (1), it shall also give the decisions designated in section 73 subsection (1).

(3) The Land governments shall be authorised, for the purpose of material furtherance or swifter disposal of the proceedings, to issue ordinances assigning to one regional court, either entirely or partially, the criminal matters for the districts of several regional courts that involve the criminal offences designated in subsection (1). The Land governments may transfer this authorisation to the Land agencies for the administration of justice.

(4) Within the scope of subsection (3), the district of the subsequently designated regional court shall encompass the districts of the other regional courts.

Section 74d

(1) The Land governments shall be authorised to issue ordinances assigning to one regional court the criminal matters designated in section 74 subsection (2) for the districts of several regional courts, insofar as this serves the purpose of material furtherance of the proceedings. The Land governments may transfer this authorisation to the Land agencies for the administration of justice.

(2) (repealed)

Section 74e

Among the various criminal divisions with jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of sections 74 to 74d, precedence shall be accorded

  1. firstly, to the criminal division with lay judges (section 74 subsection (2) and section 74d),
  2. secondly, to the economic offences division (section 74c),
  3. thirdly, to the criminal division pursuant to section 74a.

Section 74f

(1) If at first instance a criminal division has reserved the order of preventive detention or, in the cases of section 66b of the Criminal Code, has ruled as the trial court, this criminal division shall have jurisdiction at first instance for hearing and ruling on the order of preventive detention reserved in the judgment or on the subsequent order of preventive detention.

(2) If in the cases of section 66b of the Criminal Code the local court exclusively has ruled as the trial court at first instance, a criminal division of the superior regional court shall have jurisdiction at first instance for hearing and ruling on the subsequent order of preventive detention.

(3) In the cases of section 66b of the Criminal Code, section 462a subsection (3), second and third sentences of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall apply mutatis mutandis; section 76 subsection (2) of this Act and section 33b subsection (2) of the Juvenile Courts Act shall not apply.

Section 75

The civil divisions shall, insofar as the provisions of procedural law do not provide for a decision to be given by a judge sitting alone in the place of a full bench, be composed of three members including the presiding judge.

Section 76

(1) The criminal divisions shall be composed of three judges, including the presiding judge, and two lay judges (grand criminal divisions); in proceedings involving appeals on fact and law against a judgment of a criminal court judge or of a court with lay judges, they shall be composed of the presiding judge and two lay judges (small criminal divisions). The lay judges shall not participate in decisions made outside the main hearing.

(2) At the opening of the main proceedings, the grand criminal division shall rule that it will be composed of two judges, including the presiding judge, and two lay judges during the main hearing unless a criminal division in the composition of three judges and two lay judges (Schwurgericht) has jurisdiction or the participation of a third judge appears necessary due to the scale or complexity of the case. If a case has been referred back by a court hearing an appeal on law, the then competent criminal division may once again rule on its composition pursuant to the first sentence.

(3) In cases of an appeal on fact and law against a judgment by an extended bench (section 29 subsection (2)), a second judge must be brought in. Decisions outside the main hearing shall be made by the presiding judge alone.

Section 77

(1) The provisions concerning the lay judges serving on the benches of the local courts shall apply mutatis mutandis to the lay judges serving in the criminal divisions of the regional courts with the following proviso:

(2) The president of the regional court shall allocate the number of principal lay judges required for the criminal divisions among the local court districts belonging to the district of the regional court. The alternate lay judges shall be selected by the committee at the local court in the district of which the regional court has its seat. If the regional court has its seat outside its district, the Land agency for the administration of justice shall determine which one of the committees of the local courts belonging to the district of the regional court shall select the alternate lay judges. If the seat of the regional court is a city encompassing two or more of the local court districts, or parts thereof, belonging to the district of the regional court, the first sentence shall apply mutatismutandis to the selection of the alternate lay judges by the committees established at these local courts; the Land agency for the administration of justice may exempt certain local courts from this arrangement. The names of the selected principal lay judges and alternate lay judges shall be communicated by the judge at the local court to the president of the regional court. The president of the regional court shall consolidate the names of the principal lay judges into the regional courts list of lay judges.

(3) The president of the regional court shall take the place of the local court judge at the drawing of lots to determine the order in which the principal lay judges are to participate in the individual ordinary sittings and the order in which the alternate lay judges are to take the place of lay judges who become unavailable; section 45 subsection (4), third and fourth sentences, shall applymutatis mutandis. If the lay judge has died or moved out of the district of the regional court, the presiding judge of the criminal division shall order his deletion from the list; in other cases the decision as to whether a lay judge should be deleted from the list of lay judges and the ruling on the grounds for refusal of service put forward by a lay judge shall be given by a criminal division. In all other respects the presiding judge of the criminal division shall take the place of the judge at the local court.

(4) An honorary judge may only be designated either lay judge for a bench of a local court or lay judge for a criminal division of a regional court for one and the same business year. If a person has been appointed to more than one such office in a single district, or to such an office in more than one district, for one and the same business year, the appointee must assume the office to which he was first appointed.

(5) Section 52 subsection (2), first sentence, number 1, shall not apply.

Section 78

(1) Where the distance to the seat of a regional court is great, the Landgovernments shall be authorised to issue ordinances providing that a criminal division be established at one local court for the district of one or more local courts and that the workload of the criminal division of the regional court involving that district be assigned, either entirely or partially, to that division. The serious criminal offences designated in section 74 subsection (2) may not be assigned to a criminal division established pursuant to the first sentence. The Land governments may transfer this authorisation to the Land agencies for the administration of justice.

(2) The division shall be composed of members of the regional court or judges at the local court of the district for which it is established. The presiding judge and the other members shall be designated by the presidium of the regional court.

(3) The president of the regional court shall allocate the required number of principal lay judges among the local court districts belonging to the district of the criminal division. The alternate lay judges shall be selected by the committee at the local court where the external criminal division has been established. The other functions assigned in section 77 to the president of the regional court shall be exercised by the presiding judge of the criminal division.

Title Va

Criminal divisions with jurisdiction over execution of sentences

Section 78a

(1) Criminal divisions with jurisdiction over execution of sentences (Strafvollstreckungskammern) shall be established at the regional courts if institutions for adults are maintained in their district in which sentences of imprisonment or custodial measures of reform and prevention are executed or if other prison authorities have their seat there. These shall be competent to give the decisions

  1. pursuant to sections 462a and 463 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, except as otherwise provided by the Code of Criminal Procedure,
  2. pursuant to section 50 subsection (5), section 109 and section 138 subsection (3) of the Prison Act,
  3. pursuant to section 50, section 58 subsection (3) and section 71 subsection (4) of the Law on International Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters.

If a decision on suspension of execution is to be given for more than one prison sentence at the same time pursuant to section 454b subsection (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, one criminal division with jurisdiction over execution of sentences shall give a decision on suspension of execution of all of the sentences.

(2) The Land governments shall issue ordinances assigning the criminal matters pursuant to subsection (1), second sentence, number 3, to the regional courts designated in subsection (1), first sentence, for the districts of the regional courts at which no criminal divisions with jurisdiction over execution of sentences are to be established. The Land governments shall be authorised to issue ordinances assigning to one of the regional courts designated in subsection (1) for the districts of several regional courts the criminal matters falling within the competence of the criminal divisions with jurisdiction over execution of sentences and providing that criminal divisions with jurisdiction over execution of sentences also or exclusively have their seat in places within their district where the regional court does not have its seat, insofar as such provisions serve the purpose of material furtherance or swifter disposal of the proceedings. The Landgovernments may issue ordinances transferring the authorisations pursuant to the first and second sentences to the Land agencies for the administration of justice.

(3) If an institution in which sentences of imprisonment or custodial measures of reform and prevention are executed is maintained by one Land on the territory of another Land, the Länder concerned may agree that competence shall lie with the criminal division with jurisdiction over execution of sentences at that regional court in the district of which the supervisory authority responsible for the institution has its seat.

Section 78b

(1) The criminal divisions with jurisdiction over execution of sentences shall be composed of

  1. three judges, including the presiding judge, in proceedings concerning suspension of execution of the remainder of a sentence of life imprisonment or concerning suspension of execution of committal to a psychiatric hospital or to preventive detention,
  2. one judge in all other cases.

(2) The members of the criminal divisions with jurisdiction over execution of sentences shall be appointed by the presidium of the regional court from among the members of the regional court and the judges in its district who are employed at the local court.

Title VI

Criminal divisions with lay judges

Section 79 to 92

(repealed)

Title VII

Commercial divisions

Section 93

(1) The Land governments shall be authorised to issue ordinances providing that commercial divisions be established at the regional courts for their districts or for geographically limited parts thereof. Such divisions may also have their seat in places within the district of the regional court where the court does not have its seat.

(2) The Land governments may transfer the authorisation pursuant to the first sentence to the Land agencies for the administration of justice.

Section 94

If a commercial division has been established at a regional court, commercial matters shall be handled by this division instead of by the civil divisions subject to the following provisions.

Section 95

(1) Commercial matters within the meaning of this Act shall be civil disputes in which an action is brought to assert a claim:

  1. against a merchant within the meaning of the Commercial Code, insofar as he is registered in the commercial register or the cooperatives register or need not be registered therein pursuant to a special statutory arrangement governing corporate entities established under public law, arising out of transactions that are commercial transactions for both parties;
  2. arsing out of a bill of exchange within the meaning of the Bills of Exchange Act or arising out of one of the documents designated in section 363 of the Commercial Code;
  3. on the basis of the Check Act;
  4. arising out of one of the legal relationships designated hereinafter:a) out of the legal relationship between the members of a commercial partnership or cooperative or between the partnership or cooperative and its members or between the silent partner and the owner of the commercial business, both during the existence of and after the dissolution of the partnership relationship, and out of the legal relationship between the managers or liquidators of a commercial partnership or cooperative and the partnership or cooperative or its members;b) out of the legal relationship concerning the right to use the commercial firm name;c) out of the legal relationships concerning the protection of trademarks, other identifying marks and designs;d) out of the legal relationship originating in the acquisition of an existing commercial business “inter vivos” between the previous owner and the acquirer;e) out of the legal relationship between a third party and the party liable on grounds of lack of proof of statutory authority or commercial power of attorney;f) out of the legal relationships under maritime law, especially those concerning the shipping business, those concerning the rights and obligations of the manager or owner of a ship, the ships husband and the crew of the ship, and those concerning average, compensation for damages in the event of collisions between ships, salvage operations and claims of maritime lien holders;
  5. on the basis of the Act against Unfair Competition, with the exception of claims of the ultimate consumer arising out of section 13a of the Act against Unfair Competition, provided that no mutual commercial transaction pursuant to subsection (1), number 1, exists;
  6. arising out of sections 44 to 47 of the Stock Exchange Act.

(2) Commercial matters within the meaning of this Act shall furthermore be

  1. the legal disputes over which the regional court has jurisdiction pursuant to section 246 subsection (3), first sentence, or section 396 subsection (1), second sentence, of the Stock Corporation Act, pursuant to section 51 subsection (3), third sentence, or section 81 subsection (1), second sentence, of the Cooperatives Act, pursuant to section 87 of the Act against Restraints on Competition and section 13 subsection (4) of the Act implementing the EC Consumer Protection Cooperation Regulation,
  2. the proceedings specified in section 71 subsection (2), number 4, letters b to f.

Section 96

(1) A legal dispute shall be heard by the commercial division if the plaintiff so requests in the statement of claim.

(2) If a legal dispute must be referred by the local court to the regional court pursuant to the provisions of sections 281 and 506 of the Civil Procedure Code, the plaintiff must submit the application for a hearing before the commercial division to the local court.

Section 97

(1) If an action over which the commercial division has no jurisdiction is brought before the commercial division, the legal dispute shall upon application of the defendant be referred to the civil division.

(2) If the action or, in the case of section 506 of the Civil Procedure Code, the cross-action is one over which the commercial division has no jurisdiction, the commercial division shall also be entitled proprio motu to refer the dispute to the civil division as long as no hearing has been held on the main issue and no ruling has been pronounced thereon. The referral proprio motu may not be made on the grounds that the defendant is not a merchant.

Section 98

(1) If an action over which the commercial division has jurisdiction is brought before the civil division, the legal dispute shall upon application of the defendant be referred to the commercial division. A defendant who is not registered in the commercial register or the cooperatives register may not base his application on the assertion that he is a merchant.

(2) The application shall be rejected if the cross-action brought pursuant to section 506 of the Civil Procedure Code would not be an action over which the commercial division has jurisdiction.

(3) The civil division shall not be entitled to make a referral proprio motu.

(4) The civil division shall even then be entitled to reject the application if the plaintiff has consented thereto.

Section 99

(1) If, in a legal dispute pending before the commercial division, the scope of the action is extended pursuant to section 256 subsection (2) of the Civil Procedure Code through an application for determination of the existence or non-existence of a legal relationship or through a cross-action, and if the extended action or cross-action is not an action over which the commercial division has jurisdiction, the dispute shall upon application of the opponent be referred to the civil division.

(2) Subject to the restriction of section 97 subsection (2), the division shall also be entitled to make a referral proprio motu. This authority shall also then accrue if, as a result of amendment of an action, a claim is asserted over which the commercial division has no jurisdiction.

Section 100

Sections 96 to 99 shall apply mutatis mutandis to appellate proceedings before the commercial divisions.

Section 101

(1) An application for referral of a legal dispute to another division shall only be admissible prior to the hearing of the applicant on the matter itself. If the applicant has been set a time limit for responding to an action or an appeal prior to the oral hearing, he must file the application within that time limit. Section 296 subsection (3) of the Civil Procedure Code shall apply mutatis mutandis; the excuse shall be substantiated if the court so requires.

(2) A preliminary decision shall be given on the application. The decision may be given without an oral hearing.

Section 102

The decision on referral of a legal dispute to the civil division or the commercial division shall not be contestable. If the dispute is referred to another division, this decision shall be binding on the division to which the dispute is referred. The date for another oral hearing shall be set proprio motu and announced to the parties.

Section 103

A claim pursuant to section 64 of the Civil Procedure Code may only be asserted before the commercial division if the legal dispute is one over which the commercial division has jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of sections 94 and 95.

Section 104

(1) Where the commercial division, sitting as the court hearing complaints, is seized of a complaint over which it has no jurisdiction, the complaint shall be referred proprio motu to the civil division. Likewise, where the civil division, sitting as the court hearing complaints, is seized of a complaint relating to a commercial matter, it shall refer the complaint proprio motu to the commercial division. The provisions of section 102, first and second sentences, shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(2) A complaint may not be referred to another division if the case is pending at the division seized of the complaint or if that division has already given a decision on the main issue.

Section 105

(1) The commercial divisions shall give decisions sitting with one member of the regional court as presiding judge and two honorary judges1 , insofar as the presiding judge must not decide in lieu of the division pursuant to the provisions of procedural law.

(2) All members of the commercial division shall have the same voting rights.

(3) (repealed)

1: Italics in section 105 subsection (1): Now “commercial judges”, see Section 45a of the German Judiciary Act 301-1 

Section 106

In the cases of section 93 subsection (1), second sentence, a local court judge may be presiding judge of the commercial division.

Section 107

(1) The honorary judges2 who have neither their residence nor their business establishment at the seat of the commercial division shall receive per diem and overnight accommodation allowances pursuant to the provisions applicable to judges at the regional court.

(2) The honorary judges shall be reimbursed for their travel expenses in analogous application of section 5 of the Judicial Remuneration and Compensation Act.

2: Italics in section 105 subsection (1): Now “commercial judges”, see Section 45a of the German Judiciary Act 301-1 

Section 108

The honorary judges shall be appointed on the qualified recommendation of the chambers of industry and commerce for a term of five years; re-appointment shall not be excluded.

Section 109

(1) A person may be appointed to the office of honorary judge if he

  1. is a German,
  2. has attained the age of thirty and
  3. is or was registered in the commercial register or in the cooperatives register as a merchant, as a member of the board of management or as a managing director of a corporate entity, or as an officer with statutory authority or if, as a member of the board of management of a corporate entity established under public law, he need not be registered in these registers on the basis of a special statutory arrangement for such corporate entities.

(2) A person who fulfils these requirements should only be appointed if he

  1. lives in the district of the commercial division or
  2. has a business establishment in that district or
  3. is employed by a business enterprise that has its domicile or a branch in that district.

Furthermore, appointment should only be possible in the case of

  1. an officer with statutory authority if he holds a position of responsibility in the enterprise that is comparable to the independent position of an entrepreneur,
  2. a member of the board of management of a cooperative if he is employed full time in a cooperative that engages in commercial activity in a manner similar to a commercial partnership.

(3) A person may not be appointed to the office of honorary judge if he is ineligible for the office of lay judge or should not be appointed to the office of lay judge pursuant to section 33, number 4. A person should not be appointed to the office of honorary judge if he should not be appointed to the office of lay judge pursuant to section 33, number 5.

Section 110

At seaports, honorary judges3 may also be appointed from the circle of individuals with a knowledge of shipping and navigation.

3: Italics in section 105 subsection (1): Now “commercial judges”, see Section 45a of the German Judiciary Act 301-1 

Section 111

(repealed)

Section 112

Honorary judges shall have all the rights and duties appurtenant to the office of a judge for the duration of their term of office.

Section 113

(1) An honorary judge shall be removed from office

  1. if he no longer meets one of the necessary criteria for his appointment or if circumstances arise or subsequently become known that constitute an obstacle to an appointment pursuant to section 109 or
  2. if he is guilty of a gross breach of his official duties.

(2) An honorary judge should be removed from office if circumstances arise or become known the existence of which should preclude an appointment pursuant to section 109 subsection (3), second sentence.

(3) The decision shall be given by the first civil division of the higher regional court in a ruling after hearing the person concerned. It shall not be contestable.

(4) If an honorary judge himself asks to be relieved of his office, the decision shall be made by the Land agency for the administration of justice.

Section 114

The commercial division may, on the basis of its own expertise and knowledge, give decisions on matters for which the judgment of a commercial expert is sufficient as well as decisions concerning the existence of commercial practices.

Title VIII

Higher regional courts

Section 115

The higher regional courts (Oberlandesgerichte) shall be composed of a president, presiding judges and additional judges.

Section 115a

(repealed)

Section 116

(1) Civil and criminal divisions shall be established at the higher regional courts. Investigating judges shall be appointed at the higher regional courts with jurisdiction pursuant to section 120; any member of another higher regional court the seat of which is located in the territory designated in section 120 may also be appointed investigating judge.

(2) The Land governments shall be authorised to issue ordinances providing that civil or criminal divisions be established outside the seat of the higher regional court for the district of one or more regional courts and that they be entirely or partially assigned the functions of the civil or criminal divisions of the higher regional court for that district. An external family division may be established for the districts of several family courts.

(3) The Land governments may transfer the authorisation pursuant to subsection (2) to the Land agencies for the administration of justice.

Section 117

The provision of section 70 subsection (1) shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 118

The higher regional courts shall have jurisdiction in civil disputes at first instance for hearing and ruling on model case proceedings under the Act on Model Case Proceedings in Disputes under Capital Markets Law.

Section 119

(1) The higher regional courts shall have jurisdiction in civil matters for hearing and ruling on the legal remedies of:

  1. complaint against decisions of the local courtsa) in the matters decided by the family courts;b) in non-contentious matters with the exception of imprisonment matters and the matters decided by the adult guardianship courts;
  2. complaint and appeal on fact and law against decisions of the regional courts.

(2) Section 23b subsections (1) and (2) shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(3) (repealed)

(4) (repealed)

(5) (repealed)

(6) (repealed)

Section 120

(1) In criminal matters, the higher regional courts in the districts of which the Land governments have their seat shall have jurisdiction for the territory of the given Land for hearing and deciding cases at first instance involving

  1. crimes against peace in the cases of section 80 of the Criminal Code,
  2. high treason (sections 81 to 83 of the Criminal Code),
  3. treason and endangering external security (sections 94 to 100a of the Criminal Code) as well as criminal offences pursuant to section 52 subsection (2) of the Patent Law, pursuant to section 9 subsection (2) of the Utility Model Act in conjunction with section 52 subsection (2) of the Patent Law, or pursuant to section 4 subsection (4) of the Semiconductor Protection Act in conjunction with section 9 subsection (2) of the Utility Model Act and section 52 subsection (2) of the Patent Law,
  4. an assault against organs and representatives of foreign states (section 102 of the Criminal Code),
  5. a crime against constitutional organs in the cases of sections 105 and 106 of the Criminal Code,
  6. a violation of a ban of an organisation pursuant to section 129a, also in conjunction with section 129b subsection (1), of the Criminal Code,
  7. failure to report crimes pursuant to section 138 of the Criminal Code if the failure to report concerns a crime falling under the jurisdiction of the higher regional court and
  8. criminal offences pursuant to the Code of Crimes against International Law.

(2) These higher regional courts shall furthermore have jurisdiction for hearing and deciding cases at first instance involving

  1. the criminal offences designated in section 74a subsection (1), if the Federal Prosecutor General takes over the prosecution due to the special significance of the case pursuant to section 74a subsection (2),
  2. murder (section 211 of the Criminal Code), manslaughter (section 212 of the Criminal Code) and the criminal offences designated in section 129a subsection (1), number 2, and section 129a subsection (2) of the Criminal Code, if there is a connection with the activity of an organization not or not only existing in Germany the purpose or activity of which is to commit criminal offences of this kind and the Federal Prosecutor General takes over the prosecution due to the special significance of the case,
  3. murder (section 211 of the Criminal Code), manslaughter (section 212 of the Criminal Code), abduction for the purpose of blackmail (second 239a of the Criminal Code), hostage taking (section 239b of the Criminal Code), serious arson and especially serious arson (sections 306a and 306b of the Criminal Code), arson resulting in death (section 306c of the Criminal Code), causing an explosion by nuclear power in the cases of section 307 subsection (1) and subsection (3), number 1, of the Criminal Code, causing an explosion in the cases of section 308 subsections (1) to (3) of the Criminal Code, misuse of ionizing radiation in the cases of section 309 subsections (1) to (4) of the Criminal Code, acts preparatory to causing an explosion or radiation offence in the cases of section 310 subsection (1), numbers 1 to 3, of the Criminal Code, causing a flood in the cases of the section 313 subsection (2) in conjunction with section 308 subsections (2) and (3) of the Criminal Code, poisoning dangerous to the public in the cases of section 314 subsection (2) in conjunction with section 308 subsections (2) and (3) of the Criminal Code and assaults on air and sea traffic in the cases of section 316c subsections (1) and (3) of the Criminal Code, if under the circumstances the offence is intended to and is capable ofa) undermining the continued existence or security of a state,b) destroying, invalidating or undermining a constitutional principle of the Federal Republic of Germany,c) undermining the security of the troops of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or of its non-German member states stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany ord) undermining the continued existence or security of an international organisation and the Federal Prosecutor General takes over the prosecution due to the special significance of the case.
  4. criminal offences pursuant to the Foreign Trade and Payments Act and criminal offences pursuant to section 19 subsection (2), number 2, and section 20 subsection (1) of the Act on the Control of Weapons of War, if under the circumstances the offencea) is capable of seriously endangering the external security or the foreign relations of the Federal Republic of Germany orb) is intended to and is capable of disrupting the peaceful coexistence of peoplesand the Federal Prosecutor General takes over the prosecution due to the special significance of the case.

At the opening of the main proceedings they shall, in the cases of number 1, refer the matter to the regional court and, in the cases of numbers 2 to 4, to the regional court or the local court, if the case is not deemed to be of special significance.

(3) In the matters under the jurisdiction of these higher regional courts pursuant to subsections (1) or (2), they shall also give the decisions designated in section 73 subsection (1). They shall furthermore rule on complaints against orders of the investigating judges of the higher regional courts (section 169 subsection (1), first sentence, of the Code of Criminal Procedure) in the cases designated in section 304 subsection (5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

(4) These higher regional courts shall also rule on complaints against orders and decisions of the court with jurisdiction pursuant to section 74a. For rulings on complaints against orders and decisions of the court with jurisdiction pursuant to section 74a subsection (4) and in the cases of section 100d subsection (1), sixth sentence, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a division that is not seized of main proceedings in criminal matters shall have jurisdiction.

(5) The place of jurisdiction shall be governed by the general provisions. The Länder involved may agree to transfer the functions assigned to the higher regional courts under subsections (1) to (4) to the duly competent court of one Land for the territory of another Land as well.

(6) Insofar as the competence of the Federation to prosecute criminal cases has been established pursuant to section 142a, these higher regional courts shall exercise jurisdiction pursuant to Article 96 paragraph (5) of the Basic Law.

(7) Insofar as the Länder, on the basis of criminal proceedings in which the higher regional courts rule in exercise of jurisdiction of the Federation, must bear costs of the proceedings and expenses of participants in the proceedings or pay remuneration, they may request reimbursement from the Federation.

Section 120a

(1) If at first instance a criminal division has reserved the order of preventive detention or, in the cases of section 66b of the Criminal Code, has ruled as the trial court, this criminal division shall have jurisdiction at first instance for hearing and ruling on the order of preventive detention reserved in the judgment or on the subsequent order of preventive detention.

(2) In the cases of section 66b of the Criminal Code, section 462a subsection (3), second and third sentences of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall apply mutatis mutandis.

Section 121

(1) In criminal matters, the higher regional courts shall furthermore have jurisdiction for hearing and ruling on the legal remedies of:

  1. appeal on points of law only againsta) judgments delivered by criminal court judges that cannot be contested with an appeal on fact and law;b) judgments delivered by small criminal divisions and grand criminal divisions in appeals on fact and law;c) judgments delivered by the regional court at first instance if the appeal on law is exclusively based on the violation of a legal norm contained in Land legislation;
  2. complaint against decisions of criminal court judges, except where the criminal divisions or the Federal Court of Justice have jurisdiction;
  3. complaint on points of law only against decisions of the criminal divisions with jurisdiction over execution of sentences pursuant to section 50 subsection (5), section 116 and section 138 subsection (3) of the Prison Act and decisions of the juvenile divisions pursuant to section 92 subsection (2) of the Juvenile Courts Act.

(2) If a higher regional court wishes to deviate in its decision pursuant to subsection (1), number 1a or 1b, from a decision given after 1 April 1950, or in its decision pursuant to subsection (1), number 3, from a decision given after 1 January 1977, by another higher regional court or from a decision of the Federal Court of Justice, it must submit the matter to that court.

(3) A Land in which several higher regional courts have been established may, under an ordinance issued by the Land government, assign to one higher regional court or to the highest regional court the decisions pursuant to subsection (1), number 3, for the districts of several higher regional courts, insofar as such assignment serves the purpose of material furtherance or swifter disposal of the proceedings. The Land governments may issue ordinances transferring this authorisation to the Land agencies for the administration of justice.

Section 122

(1) The divisions of the higher regional courts shall, unless decisions are to be given by a judge sitting alone in lieu of a division pursuant to the provisions of procedural law, give decisions sitting with three members, including the presiding judge.

(2) The criminal divisions shall rule on the opening of the main proceedings at first instance sitting with five judges, including the presiding judge. At the opening of the main proceedings, the criminal division shall rule that it will be composed of three judges, including the presiding judge, during the main hearing unless the participation of two more judges appears necessary due to the scale or complexity of the case. The criminal division shall rule on the termination of the main proceedings due to a procedural impediment in the composition prescribed for the main hearing. If a case has been referred back by a court hearing an appeal on law, the then competent criminal division may once again rule on its composition pursuant to the second sentence.

Title IX

Federal Court of Justice

Section 123

The seat of the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) shall be Karlsruhe.

Section 124

The Federal Court of Justice shall be composed of a president, presiding judges and additional judges.

Section 125

(1) The members of the Federal Court of Justice shall be chosen jointly by the Federal Minister of Justice and the judicial selection committee pursuant to the Judicial Selection Act and shall be appointed by the Federal President.

(2) A person may only be appointed a member of the Federal Court of Justice if he has attained the age of thirty-five.

Section 126 to 129

(repealed)

Section 130

(1) Civil panels and criminal panels shall be established and investigating judges shall be appointed at the Federal Court of Justice. Their number shall be determined by the Federal Minister of Justice.

(2) The Federal Minister of Justice shall be authorised to also establish civil panels and criminal panels outside the seat of the Federal Court of Justice and to determine the official seats of the investigating judges of the Federal Court of Justice.

Section 131

(repealed)

Section 131a

(repealed)

Section 132

(1) A Grand Panel for Civil Matters and a Grand Panel for Criminal Matters shall be established at the Federal Court of Justice. The Grand Panels shall form the United Grand Panels.

(2) In the event that a panel wishes to deviate from the decision of another panel on a legal issue, the Grand Panel for Civil Matters shall decide if a civil panel wishes to deviate from another civil panel or from the Grand Panel for Civil Matters, the Grand Panel for Criminal Matters shall decide if a criminal panel wishes to deviate from another criminal panel or from the Grand Panel for Criminal Matters, and the United Grand Panels shall decide if a civil panel wishes to deviate from a criminal panel or from the Grand Panel for Criminal Matters or if a criminal panel wishes to deviate from a civil panel or from the Grand Panel for Civil Matters or if a panel wishes to deviate from the United Grand Panels.

(3) A submission to the Grand Panel or to the United Grand Panels shall only be admissible if the panel from whose decision there is to be deviation has declared in response to an inquiry of the adjudicating panel that it stands by its legal opinion. If the panel from whose decision there is to be deviation can no longer be seized of the legal issue due to a change in the roster allocating court business, its place shall be taken by the panel that would be competent pursuant to the roster allocating court business for the case in which the divergent decision was given. The ruling on the inquiry and the response shall be given in a ruling by the respective panel in the composition prescribed for judgments; section 97 subsection (2), first sentence, of the Act on Tax Advisors and section 74 subsection (2), first sentence, of the Auditors Regulations shall remain unaffected.

(4) The adjudicating panel may submit an issue of fundamental importance to the Grand Panel for a decision if it deems this necessary for the development of the law or in order to ensure uniform application of the law.

(5) The Grand Panel for Civil Matters shall be composed of the president and one member from each of the civil panels; the Grand Panel for Criminal Matters shall be composed of the president and two members from each of the criminal panels. If submission is by another panel, or if there is to be deviation from the decision of another panel, a member of that panel shall also sit on the Grand Panel. The United Grand Panels shall be composed of the president and the members of the Grand Panels.

(6) The members and their deputies shall be appointed by the presidium for one business year. This shall also apply to the member of another panel pursuant to subsection (5), second sentence, and to his deputy. The Grand Panels and the United Grand Panels shall be presided over by the president or, in the event that he is unable to be present, by the most senior member. In the case of a tie, the presiding judge shall have the casting vote.

Section 133

In civil matters, the Federal Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction for hearing and ruling on the legal remedies of appeal on points of law only (Revision), immediate appeal on law only in lieu of an appeal on fact and law (Sprungrevision), complaint on points of law only (Rechtsbeschwerde) and immediate complaint on points of law only in lieu of a complaint (Sprungrechtsbeschwerde).

Section 134

(repealed)

Section 134a

(repealed)

Section 135

(1) In criminal matters, the Federal Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction for hearing and ruling on the legal remedy of appeal on points of law only (Revision) against judgments of the higher regional courts at first instance and against judgments of the regional courts at first instance, unless the jurisdiction of the higher regional courts has been established.

(2) The Federal Court of Justice shall furthermore rule on complaints against orders and directions given by the higher regional courts in the cases designated in section 138d subsection (6), first sentence, section 304 subsection (4), second sentence, and section 310 subsection (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure as well as on complaints against directions of the investigating judge at the Federal Court of Justice (section 169 subsection (1), second sentence, of the Code of Criminal Procedure) in the cases designated in section 304 subsection (5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Section 136

(repealed)

Section 137

(repealed)

Section 138

(1) The Grand Panels and the United Grand Panels shall give a decision on the point of law only. They may decide without an oral hearing. The decision shall be binding on the panel adjudicating the case at hand.

(2) The Federal Prosecutor General shall be heard prior to the decision of the Grand Panel for Criminal Matters or the United Grand Panels and in legal disputes the subject of which is the contestation of a declaration of death. The Federal Prosecutor General may also present his opinion at the sitting.

(3) If a decision on the matter requires another oral hearing before the adjudicating panel, the participants shall be summoned to the hearing and informed in the summons of the decision given on the point of law.

Section 139

(1) The panels of the Federal Court of Justice shall give decisions sitting with five members, including the presiding judge.

(2) The criminal panels shall give decisions on complaints sitting with three members, including the presiding judge. This shall not apply to the decision on complaints against rulings through which the opening of the main proceedings is refused or the proceedings are terminated due to a procedural impediment.

Section 140

The official procedure shall be governed by rules of procedure that shall be adopted by the full court.

Title IXa

Jurisdiction over proceedings to reopen cases in criminal matters

Section 140a

(1) In proceedings to reopen a case, a decision shall be given by another court with the same substantive jurisdiction as the court against whose decision the application for the reopening of proceedings is directed. The decision on an application against a judgment delivered in appellate proceedings on law shall be given by another court of the same rank as the court against whose judgment the appeal on law was filed.

(2) Prior to the beginning of the business year, the presidium of the higher regional court shall designate the courts within its district that shall have local jurisdiction over decisions in proceedings to reopen cases.

(3) If only one regional court has been established within the district of a higher regional court, the decision on an application over which the regional court has jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (1) shall be given by another criminal division of the regional court, which shall be designated by the presidium of the higher regional court prior to the beginning of the business year. The Landgovernments shall be authorised to issue ordinances providing that the decision to be given pursuant to subsection (2) by the presidium of a higher regional court in the district of which only one regional court has been established be assigned to the presidium of a neighbouring higher regional court in respect of those applications over which the regional court has jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (1). The Land governments may issue ordinances transferring this authorisation to the Land agencies for the administration of justice.

(4) In the Länder in which only one higher regional court and only one regional court have been established, subsection (3), first sentence, shall apply mutatismutandis. The Land governments of these Länder shall be authorised to agree with a neighbouring Land that the duties of the presidium of the higher regional court pursuant to subsection (2) shall be transferred to a neighbouring higher regional court of another Land in respect of applications over which the regional court has jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (1).

(5) In the Länder in which only one regional court has been established and in which one local court has been assigned the criminal matters for the districts of the other local courts, subsection (3), first sentence, and section (4), second sentence, shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(6) If the reopening of proceedings is requested for a case that was decided by a higher regional court at first instance, another division of this higher regional court shall have jurisdiction. Section 120 subsection (5), second sentence, shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(7) Subsections (1) to (6) shall apply mutatis mutandis to decisions on applications to prepare for the reopening of proceedings.

Title X

Public prosecution office

Section 141

A public prosecution office should exist at each court.

Section 142

(1) The official duties of the public prosecution office shall be discharged:

  1. at the Federal Court of Justice by a Federal Prosecutor General and by one or more federal prosecutors;
  2. at the higher regional courts and the regional courts by one or more public prosecutors;
  3. at the local courts by one or more public prosecutors or officials of the public prosecution office with a right of audience before the local courts.

(2) The competence of the officials of the public prosecution office with a right of audience before the local courts shall not encompass the local court proceedings to prepare public charges in criminal matters falling under the jurisdiction of courts other than the local courts.

(3) Trainee jurists may be assigned responsibility for discharging the duties of an official of the public prosecution office with a right of audience before the local courts and, in an individual case, for discharging the duties of a public prosecutor under the latters supervision.

Section 142a

(1) The Federal Prosecutor General shall discharge the duties of the public prosecution office in respect of the criminal matters falling under the jurisdiction of the higher regional courts at first instance (section 120 subsections (1) and (2)) at these courts as well. If, in the cases of section 120 subsection (1), the officials of the public prosecution office of a Land and the Federal Prosecutor General cannot agree which of them should take over the prosecution, the Federal Prosecutor General shall decide.

(2) The Federal Prosecutor General shall refer the proceedings to the Land public prosecution office prior to filing a bill of indictment or a written application (section 440 of the Code of Criminal Procedure)

  1. if the following criminal offences are the subject of the proceedings:a) criminal offences pursuant to section 82, section 83 subsection (2) or sections 98, 99 or 102 of the Criminal Code,b) criminal offences pursuant to sections 105 or 106 of the Criminal Code, if the offence is directed against an organ of a Land or against a member of such an organ,c) criminal offences pursuant to section 138 of the Criminal Code in conjunction with one of the provisions of the Criminal Code designated in letter a) ord) criminal offences pursuant to section 52 subsection (2) of the Patent Law, pursuant to section 9 subsection (2) of the Utility Model Act in conjunction with section 52 subsection (2) of the Patent Law, or pursuant to section 4 subsection (4) of the Semiconductor Protection Act in conjunction with section 9 subsection (2) of the Utility Model Act and section 52 subsection (2) of the Patent Law;
  2. in cases of lesser importance.

(3) The proceedings shall not be referred to the Land public prosecution office

  1. if the offence affects the interests of the Federation to a considerable degree or
  2. if it is advisable in the interest of legal uniformity for the Federal Prosecutor General to prosecute the offence.

(4) The Federal Prosecutor General shall refer a case that he has taken over pursuant to section 120 subsection (2), numbers 2 to 4, or pursuant to section 74a subsection (2) back to the Land public prosecution office if the case is no longer of special significance.

Section 143

(1) The local competence of the officials of the public prosecution office shall be determined by the local jurisdiction of the court for which they are appointed.

(2) In exigent circumstances, an official of the public prosecution office who lacks competence must perform the official acts necessary in his district.

(3) If the officials of the public prosecution office from different Länder cannot agree which one of them is to take over the prosecution, the official of the public prosecution office who is their common superior shall decide; otherwise the Federal Prosecutor General shall decide.

(4) The officials of one public prosecution office may be assigned competence for the districts of several regional or higher regional courts for the prosecution of certain kinds of criminal matters, for the execution of sentences in respect of these matters, and for the processing of requests for mutual judicial assistance from offices outside the territorial scope of this Act, insofar as such assignment serves the purpose of material furtherance or swifter disposal of the proceedings; in such cases the local competence of the officials of the public prosecution office for the matters assigned to them shall encompass all the courts of the districts for which they have been assigned these matters.

(5) The Land governments shall be authorised to issue ordinances providing that competence for execution of sentences or for execution of measures of reform and prevention be assigned either entirely or partially to a single public prosecution office for the districts of several Regional or higher regional courts, insofar as such assignment serves the purpose of material furtherance or swifter disposal of the execution proceedings. The Land governments may issue ordinances transferring this authorisation to the Land agencies for the administration of justice.

Section 144

If the public prosecution office of a court is composed of several officials, the persons assigned to the highest-ranking official shall act as his deputy; they shall, when they act in his stead, be authorised to perform all his official tasks without proof of a special commission.

Section 145

(1) The highest-ranking officials of the public prosecution office at the higher regional courts and the regional courts shall be entitled to take over all the official tasks of the public prosecution office at all the courts in their district themselves or to commission an official other than the initially competent official to perform these tasks.

(2) Officials of the public prosecution office with a right of audience before the local courts may only discharge the official duties of the public prosecution office at the local courts.

Section 145a

(repealed)

Section 146

The officials of the public prosecution office must comply with the official instructions of their superiors.

Section 147

The right of supervision and direction shall lie with:

  1. the Federal Minister of Justice in respect of the Federal Prosecutor General and the federal prosecutors;
  2. the Land agency for the administration of justice in respect of all the officials of the public prosecution office of the Land concerned;
  3. the highest-ranking official of the public prosecution office at the higher regional courts and the regional courts in respect of all the officials of the public prosecution office of the given courts district.

Section 148

The Federal Prosecutor General and the federal prosecutors shall be civil servants.

Section 149

The Federal Prosecutor General and the federal prosecutors shall be appointed by the Federal President on the proposal of the Federal Minister of Justice, which shall require the approval of the Bundesrat.

Section 150

The public prosecution office shall be independent of the courts in the performance of its official tasks.

Section 151

The public prosecutors may not perform judicial functions. They also may not be assigned responsibility for supervising the service of judges.

Section 152

(1) The investigative personnel of the public prosecution office shall be obliged in this capacity to comply with the orders of the public prosecution office of their district and the orders of the officials superior thereto.

(2) The Land governments shall be authorised to issue ordinances designating the groups of civil servants and salaried staff who are to be subject to this provision. The salaried staff must be public service employees, must have attained the age of 21 and must have been employed in the designated groups of civil servants or salaried staff for at least two years. The Land governments may issue ordinances transferring this authorisation to the Land agencies for the administrationof justice.

Title XI

Court registry

Section 153

(1) A court registry staffed with the necessary number of registry clerks shall be established at each court and at each public prosecution office.

(2) Anyone who has completed two years of preparatory training (Vorbereitungsdienst) and passed the examination for the intermediate judicial service or for the intermediate service in the area of labour jurisdiction may be entrusted with the duties of a registry clerk of the court registry. Six months of the preparatory training should consist of a specialised course of instruction.

(3) Anyone

  1. who has passed the judicial administration officers examination or the examination for the higher intermediate service in the area of labour jurisdiction,
  2. who has qualified for a career in the intermediate judicial service pursuant to the provisions governing career track changes,
  3. who, as another applicant (section 4 subsection (3) of the Framework Act to Harmonise Civil Service Law), has been admitted to the intermediate judicial service career track pursuant to the provisions of Land law

may also be entrusted with the duties of a registry clerk of the court registry.

(4) The detailed provisions governing implementation of subsections (1) to (3) shall be enacted by the Federation and the Länder for their areas. They may also specify whether and to what extent periods of other training or employment conducive to realisation of the training objective may be credited towards the period of preparatory training.

(5) The Federation and the Länder may furthermore specify that a person may also be entrusted with the duties of a registry clerk of the court registry if he can demonstrate a level of knowledge and proficiency in the area of expertise to be transferred to him that is equivalent to the level imparted through the training pursuant to subsection (2). In the Länder Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia, those persons may continue to be entrusted with the duties of a registry clerk of the court registry who were entrusted with such duties until 25 April 2006 pursuant to Annex I Chapter III Subject Area A Section III, number 1, letter q, paragraph (1), of the Unification Treaty of 31 August 1990 (Federal Law Gazette 1990, Part II, pages 889, 922).

Title XII

Officials entrusted with service and execution

Section 154

The status and duties of the officials entrusted with service, summons and execution (court bailiffs) shall be determined at the Federal Court of Justice by the Federal Minister of Justice and at the regional courts by the Land agency for the administration of justice.

Section 155

The court bailiff shall be barred by law from exercising his office:I. in civil disputes:

  1. if he himself is a party or the statutory representative of a party or is jointly entitled or jointly obligated along with a party or is liable for damages to a party;
  2. if his spouse or same sex partner is a party, even if the marriage or same sex partnership no longer exists;
  3. if a party is a person with whom he is or was lineally related or related by marriage, collaterally related to the third degree, or related by marriage to the second degree;

II. in criminal matters:

  1. if he himself was aggrieved by the criminal offence;
  2. if he is or was the spouse or same sex partner of the accused or of the aggrieved party;
  3. if he is or was related or related by marriage to the accused or to the aggrieved party in the manner designated under number I 3.

Title XIII

Mutual judicial assistance

Section 156

The courts shall provide mutual judicial assistance in civil matters and in criminal matters.

Section 156a Costs and Financing of Redevelopment Measures

(1) Where subsequent to implementation of the urban redevelopment measure and the transference of the trust assets of the redevelopment agency to the municipality the municipality finds itself with a surplus resulting from the revenues received in respect of the preparation and implementation of the urban redevelopment measure being in access of the expenditure incurred in connection with this measure, this surplus shall be divided among the owners of the plots located within the redevelopment area. The applicable status of ownership shall be that as of the date of publication of the resolution on the formal designation of the redevelopment area. Where the title to the property has passed by way of sale to another owner subsequent to this point, the amount to be apportioned to the property shall be shared equally between the previous owner and the owner who was required under Section 154 to render a financial settlement.

(2) The surplus shall be apportioned to the individual plots reflecting the initial values of the plots within the meaning of Section 154 para. 2.

(3) In calculating the surplus the municipality shall deduct any subsidies which have been granted out of other public funds either to the municipality or to property owners to cover the costs of preparation and implementation of the redevelopment measure. Other details of the procedure for distribution of the surplus shall be governed by the provisions of state law.

Section 157

(1) A request for mutual judicial assistance shall be addressed to the local court in the district of which the official act is to be performed.

(2) The Land governments shall be authorised to issue ordinances providing that the handling of requests for mutual judicial assistance be assigned either entirely or partially to a single local court for the districts of several local courts insofar as this serves to facilitate or expedite the provision of mutual judicial assistance in general. The Land governments may issue ordinances transferring this authorisation to the Land agencies for the administration of justice.

Section 158

(1) A request may not be refused.

(2) A request by a court that is not a superior appellate instance must, however, be refused if the act to be performed is prohibited by the law of court to which the request has been addressed. If the requested court does not have local jurisdiction, it shall refer the request to the competent court.

Section 159

(1) If a request is refused, or if it is granted in contravention of the provision of section 158 subsection (2), the matter shall be decided by the higher regional court to the district of which the requested court belongs. The decision shall only be contestable if it declares the mutual judicial assistance to be inadmissible and the requesting and requested courts belong to the districts of different higher regional courts. The Federal Court of Justice shall rule on the complaint.

(2) The decisions shall, upon application of the participants or the requesting court, be given without an oral hearing.

Section 160

Execution, summons and service shall be effected pursuant to the provisions of procedural law, irrespective of whether they are to be performed in the Land to which the trial court belongs or in another German Land.

Section 161

Courts, public prosecution offices and court registries may, for the purpose of commissioning a court bailiff, avail themselves of the assistance of the court registry of the local court in the district of which the commission is to be executed. The court bailiff commissioned by the court registry shall be deemed to be directly commissioned.

Section 162

If a person sentenced to a term of imprisonment is staying at a place outside the district of the executing authority, this authority may request the public prosecution office of the regional court in the district of which the convicted person is staying to execute the sentence.

Section 163

If a prison sentence is to be executed in the district of another court or if a convicted person staying in the district of another court is to be apprehended and handed over in order to serve his sentence, the public prosecution office at the regional court of that district shall be asked to perform the act.

Section 164

(1) The costs and expenses entailed in the provision of mutual judicial assistance shall not be reimbursed by the requesting authority.

(2) Fees or other public charges to which the documents (certificates, records) sent by the requesting authority are subject pursuant to the law of the requested authority shall not be levied.

Section 165

(repealed)

Section 166

Within the territorial scope of this Act, a court may also perform official acts outside its district.

Section 167

(1) The police officers of one German Land shall be authorised to continue to pursue a fugitive on the territory of another German Land and to apprehend the fugitive there.

(2) The apprehended person shall be taken without delay to the nearest court or the nearest police authority of the Land in which he was apprehended.

Section 168

The provisions existing in one German Land concerning the communication of files of a public authority to a court of that Land shall also apply in the event that the requesting court belongs to another German Land.

Title XIV

Publicity and court officers

Section 169

The hearing before the adjudicating court, including the pronouncement of judgments and rulings, shall be public. Audio and television or radio recordings as well as audio and film recordings intended for public presentation or for publication of their content shall be inadmissible.

Section 170

(1) Proceedings, discussions and hearings in family matters and in non-contentious matters shall not be public. The court may admit the public but not, however, against the will of a participant. In adult guardianship and committal matters, at the request of the person concerned a person of his confidence shall be permitted to be present.

(2) The court hearing a complaint on points of law only may admit the public unless there is an overriding interest of a participant in non-public discussion.

Section 171

(repealed)

Section 171a

The public may be excluded from the main hearing or from a part thereof if the subject of the proceedings is the committal of the accused to a psychiatric hospital or to an institution for withdrawal treatment in lieu of or in addition to a penalty.

Section 171b

(1) The public may be excluded if circumstances from the private sphere of a participant in the proceedings, a witness or a person aggrieved by an unlawful act (section 11 subsection (1), number 5, of the Criminal Code) are mentioned, the public discussion of which would violate interests that are worthy of protection, unless there is an overriding interest in public discussion of these circumstances. This shall not apply if the persons whose private sphere is affected object to exclusion of the public in the main hearing.

(2) The public shall be excluded if the preconditions of subsection (1), first sentence, exist and the person whose private sphere is affected applies for such exclusion.

(3) The decisions pursuant to subsections (1) and (2) shall not be contestable.

Section 172

The court may exclude the public from a hearing or from a part thereof if1. endangerment of state security, the public order or public morals is to be feared,1a. endangerment of the life, limb or liberty of a witness or another person is to be feared,2. an important business, trade, invention or tax secret is mentioned, the public discussion of which would violate overriding interests worthy of protection,3. a private secret is discussed, the unauthorised disclosure of which by a witness or expert carries a penalty,4. a person under the age of 18 is examined.

Section 173

(1) The pronouncement of the judgment shall in any case be public.

(2) The public may, under the preconditions of sections 171b and 172, also be excluded from the pronouncement of the reasons for the judgment or a part thereof by a special ruling of the court.

Section 174

(1) The issue of exclusion of the public shall be discussed in a non-public sitting if a participant so applies or if the court deems this appropriate. The ruling excluding the public must be pronounced in public; it may be pronounced in a non-public sitting if there is fear that its public pronouncement would seriously disrupt order in the sitting. In the cases of sections 171b, 172 and 173, the reason for exclusion of the public must be stated at the time of pronouncement.

(2) Insofar as the public is excluded on the grounds of endangerment of state security, the press, radio and television may not make public any reports concerning the hearing or the content of an official document relating to the matter.

(3) If the public has been excluded on the grounds of endangerment of state security or on the grounds designated in section 171b and section 172, numbers 2 and 3, the court may obligate the persons present to observe secrecy in respect of facts of which they become aware in the course of the hearing or through an official document relating to the matter. The ruling shall be included in the record of the sitting. It shall be contestable. The complaint shall not have suspensive effect.

Section 175

(1) Access to public hearings may be denied to minors and to persons who appear in a manner that is not in keeping with the dignity of the court.

(2) The court may grant individuals access to non-public hearings. In criminal matters, the aggrieved person should be granted access. The participants need not be heard.

(3) Exclusion of the public shall not constitute an obstacle to the presence of the judicial administration officials responsible for supervision of service at the hearings before the adjudicating court.

Section 176

The maintenance of order in the sitting shall be incumbent upon the presiding judge.

Section 177

Parties, accused persons, witnesses, experts or persons not participating in the hearing who fail to follow the orders given to maintain order may be removed from the courtroom or taken into coercive detention and held for a period of time to be determined; such period may not exceed twenty-four hours. Decisions on measures pursuant to the first sentence in respect of persons who are not participants in the hearing shall be made by the presiding judge and in all other cases by the court.

Section 178

(1) A coercive fine of up to one thousand euros may be imposed or coercive detention of up to one week may be ordered and immediately executed against parties, accused persons, witnesses, experts or persons not participating in the hearing who are found to be in contempt of court at the sitting, subject to prosecution by a criminal court. At the time the coercive fine is imposed, a determination shall also be made concerning the extent to which it shall be replaced by coercive detention in event that the fine cannot be collected.

(2) The decision on imposition of coercive measures in respect of persons who are not participants in the hearing shall be made by the presiding judge and in all other cases by the court.

(3) If a person is later sentenced for the same offence, the coercive fine or coercive detention shall be credited against the sentence.

Section 179

Execution of the coercive measures designated hereinbefore shall be ordered directly by the presiding judge.

Section 180

The powers designated in sections 176 to 179 shall also be vested in a single judge performing official acts outside the sitting.

Section 181

(1) If, in the cases of sections 178 and 180, a coercive measure has been imposed, a complaint may be lodged against the decision within a time limit of one week after its notification unless it has been given by the Federal Court of Justice or by a higher regional court.

(2) The complaint shall not have suspensive effect in the case of section 178 and shall have suspensive effect in the case of section 180.

(3) The higher regional court shall rule on the complaint.

Section 182

If a coercive measure has been imposed for contempt of court, or if a person has been taken into coercive detention, or if a person participating in the hearing has been removed from the courtroom, the ruling of the court and the reasons therefor shall be included in the record of the proceedings.

Section 183

If a criminal offence is committed at the sitting, the court must establish the facts and communicate the record thereof to the competent authority. Where appropriate, the provisional arrest of the perpetrator shall be ordered.

Title XV

Language of the court, communication with the court

Section 184

The language of the court shall be German. The right of the Sorbs to speak Sorbian before the courts in the home districts of the Sorbian population shall be guaranteed.

Section 185

(1) If persons are participating in the hearing who do not have a command of the German language, an interpreter shall be called in. No additional record shall be made in the foreign language; however, testimony and declarations given in the foreign language should also be included in the record or appended thereto in the foreign language if and to the extent that the judge deems this necessary in view of the importance of the case. Where appropriate, a translation to be certified by the interpreter should be annexed to the record.

(2) An interpreter may be dispensed with if all the persons involved have a command of the foreign language.

(3) In family matters and in non-contentious matters, an interpreter need not be called in if the judge has a command of the language in which the persons involved make their statements.

Section 186

(1) Communication with a hearing-impaired or speech-impaired person during the hearing shall, at his choice, take place orally, in writing or with the assistance of a communication facilitator to be called in by the court. The court shall furnish suitable technical aids for oral and written communication. The hearing-impaired or speech-impaired person shall be advised of his right to choose.

(2) The court may require written communication or order a person to be called in as an interpreter if the hearing-impaired or speech-impaired person has not availed himself of his right to choose pursuant to subsection (1) or if adequate communication is not possible in the form chosen pursuant to subsection (1) or would require disproportionate effort.

Section 187

(1) The court shall call in an interpreter or a translator for an accused or convicted person who does not have a command of the German language or is hearing impaired or speech impaired, insofar as this is necessary for the exercise of his rights under the law of criminal procedure.

(2) Subsection (1) shall also apply to persons who have the right to join a public prosecution as a private accessory prosecutor pursuant to section 395 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Section 188

Persons who do not have a command of the German language shall swear oaths in the language they speak fluently.

Section 189

(1) The interpreter shall swear an oath affirming that he will translate faithfully and conscientiously. If the interpreter states that he does not wish to swear an oath for reasons of faith or conscience, he shall make an affirmation. This affirmation shall be equivalent to an oath; the interpreter shall be informed of this fact.

(2) If the interpreter has been generally sworn for translations of the kind involved in one Land pursuant to the provisions of Land law, a reference to this oath shall be sufficient before all courts of the Federation and the Länder.

(3) In family matters and in non-contentious matters, the interpreter need not be sworn if the persons involved waive this requirement.

Section 190

The services of an interpreter may be rendered by the registry clerk of the court registry. No special administration of an oath shall be required.

Section 191

The provisions governing the exclusion and rejection of experts shall apply mutatis mutandis to the interpreter. The decision shall be made by the court or by the judge who called in the interpreter.

Section 191a

(1) A blind or visually impaired person may, as provided in the ordinance pursuant to subsection (2), demand that the court documents intended for him also be made available to him in a form accessible to him to the extent that this is necessary in order to safeguard his rights in the proceedings. There shall be no charge for this.

(2) The Federal Ministry of Justice shall specify in an ordinance, which shall require the approval of the Bundesrat, the conditions under which and the manner in which the documents mentioned in subsection (1) and the documents submitted by the parties for the record shall be made accessible to a blind or visually impaired person as well as whether and how this person is to participate in the safeguarding of his rights.

Title XVI

Deliberations and voting

Section 192

(1) Only the statutory number of judges may participate in decisions.

(2) At hearings of lengthy duration, the presiding judge may order that additional judges be called in to attend the hearing and take the place of a judge in the event that he is unable to be present.

(3) These provisions shall also be applicable to lay judges.

Section 193

(1) Except for the judges who have been appointed to give the decision, only those persons who are employed at the same court for the purposes of their judicial training and the specialist auxiliary staff who are employed there may be present during deliberations and voting, insofar as the presiding judge permits them to be present.

(2) Foreign professional judges, public prosecutors and attorneys-at-law who have been assigned to a court in the context of a study visit may be present during deliberations and voting at the same court, insofar as the presiding judge permits them to be present and they are placed under an obligation pursuant to subsections (3) and (4). The first sentence shall apply mutatis mutandis to foreign jurists who are undergoing training in the seconding state.

(3) The persons designated in subsection (2) shall upon their application be placed under a special obligation to observe secrecy. Section 1 subsections (2) and (3) of the Obligations Act of 2 March 1974 (Federal Law Gazette I, page 469, page 547 – Article 42) shall apply mutatis mutandis. Persons who have been placed under a special obligation pursuant to the first sentence shall be deemed to be the equivalent of persons with special public service obligations for the purposes of application of the provisions of the Criminal Code on the violation of private secrets (section 203 subsection (2), first sentence, number 2, section 203 subsection (2), second sentence, section 203 subsections (4) and (5), and section 205), exploitation of secrets of another (sections 204 and 205), violation of official secrecy (section 353b subsection (1), first sentence, number 2, section 353b subsection (1), second sentence, and section 353b subsections (3) and (4)) and violation of tax secrecy (section 355).

(4) The obligation shall be imposed by the president or by the supervising judge of the court. He may transfer this authority to the presiding judge of the adjudicating body or to the judge to whom the persons designated in subsection (2) have been assigned. A renewal of the obligation shall not be required for the duration of the study visit. In the cases of section 355 of the Criminal Code, the judge imposing the obligation shall be entitled to file a complaint collateral to the aggrieved party.

Section 194

(1) The presiding judge shall preside over the deliberations, ask the questions and collect the votes.

(2) Differences of opinion concerning the subject matter, wording and sequence of the questions or concerning the result of the vote shall be resolved by the court.

Section 195

No judge or lay judge may refuse to vote on a question because he was in the minority when a vote was taken on a previous question.

Section 196

(1) The court shall give its decisions by an absolute majority vote unless otherwise provided by statute.

(2) If more than two opinions emerge in connection with amounts to be decided and no one of them can command a majority, the number of votes cast for the largest amount shall be added to the votes initially cast for the next smaller amount(s) until a majority is reached.

(3) If more than two opinions emerge in a criminal matter, aside from the question of guilt, and no one of them can command the necessary majority, the votes cast for the decision most unfavourable to the accused shall be added to those initially cast for the next less unfavourable decision(s) until the necessary majority is reached. If two opinions emerge on the question of sentencing and neither can command the necessary majority, the more lenient opinion shall prevail.

(4) If there is a tie at a court composed of two judges and two lay judges on an issue to be decided by a simple majority, the presiding judge shall have the casting vote.

Section 197

The judges shall vote in order of seniority, and in a case of equal seniority in order of age, whereas the honorary judges and lay judges shall vote in order of age; the younger one shall vote before the older one. The lay judges shall vote before the judges. If a rapporteur has been appointed, he shall vote first. The presiding judge shall vote last.

Section 198

(repealed)


The above translation was published by the the Federal Ministry of Justice. Reproduced with kind permission. This HTML edition by Jens Askan Brückerhoff and © 2011 Gerhard Dannemann. The contents of this page may be downloaded and printed out in single copies for individual use only. Making multiple copies without permission is prohibited.

Bilingual Civil Code (BGB) – restitution / unjustified enrichment

The following is a bilingual version of those of the provisions in the German Civil Code which relate to restitution or unjust enrichment in a wider sense, including reasons why contracts can be void or voidable, restitutionary consequences of termintation of contract, and claims arising between the owner of chattels and a possessor without title.

Capacity
Illegality
Marriage Brokering
Mistake
Immorality and Usury
Mandate
Deceit and Duress
Termination of Contract
Negotiorum Gestio
Gaming and Betting
Unjustified Enrichment
Owner/Possessor Claims

Erstes Buch. Allgemeiner Teil

Dritter Abschnitt. Rechtsgeschäfte

Erster Titel. Geschäftsfähigkeit

Book One. General Part

Chapter Three. Legal Transactions

Subchapter One. Capacity

§ 104. [Geschäftsunfähigkeit]
Geschäftsunfähig ist: 
1. wer nicht das siebente Lebensjahr vollendet hat; 
2. wer sich in einem die freie Willensbestimmung aussschließenden Zustande krankhafter Störung der Geistestätigkeit befindet, sofern nicht der Zustand seiner Natur nach ein vorübergehender ist. 
§ 104. [Incapacity to Contract]
A person who 
1. has not completed the seventh year of life 
2. is in a medical condition of disturbance of mental activity which prevents the free exercise of will, unless this condition, by its nature, is of a temporary kind, 
does not possess capacity to contract.
§ 105. [Nichtigkeit der Willenserklärung]
(1) Die Willenserklärung eines Geschäftsunfähigen ist nichtig. 
(2) Nichtig ist auch eine Willenserklärung, die im Zustande der Bewußtlosigkeit oder vorübergehenden Störung der Geistestätigkeit abgegeben wird. 
§ 105. [Declaration is Void]
1) A declaration of intention made by a person without capacity to contract is void. 
(2) A declaration of intention which has been made during a condition of unconsciousness or during a temporary disturbance of mental activity is equally void. 
§ 106. [Beschränkte Geschäftsfähigkeit Minderjähriger]
Ein Minderjähriger, der das siebente Lebensjahr vollendet hat, ist nach Maßgabe der §§ 107 bis 113 in der Geschäftsfähigkeit beschränkt. 
§ 106. [Limited Capacity of Minors to Contract]
A minor who has completed the seventh year of life is limited in his capacity to contract in accordance with §§ 107 to 113.
§ 107. [Einwilligung des gesetzlichen Vertreters] Der Minderjährige bedarf zu einer Willenserklärung, durch die er nicht lediglich einen rechtlichen Vorteil erlangt, der Einwilligung seines gesetzlichen Vertreters. § 107. [Consent by Statutory Representative]
In order to make a declaration of intention by which he does not merely acquire a legal advantage, a minor requires consent by his statutory representative.

Zweiter Titel. Willenserklärung

Subchapter Two. Declaration of Intention

§ 119. [Anfechtbarkeit wegen Irrtums] (1) Wer bei der Abgabe einer Willenserklärung über deren Inhalt im Irrtume war oder eine Erklärung dieses Inhalts überhaupt nicht abgeben wollte, kann die Erklärung anfechten, wenn anzunehmen ist, daß er sie bei Kenntnis der Sachlage und bei verständiger Würdigung des Falles nicht abgegeben haben würde. 
(2) Als Irrtum über den Inhalt der Erklärung gilt auch der Irrtum über solche Eigenschaften der Person oder der Sache, die im Verkehr als wesentlich angesehen werden.
§ 119. [Rescission on the Ground of Mistake] (1) A person who, when making a declaration of intention, was mistaken about its content or had no intention to make a declaration with this content, can rescind this declaration if it can be assumed that he would not have made this declaration in knowledge of the facts and with a sensible appreciation of the case. 
(2) Any mistake about such characteristics of a person or an object which are considered substantial is also considered a mistake about the content of the declaration.
§ 123. [Anfechtbarkeit wegen Täuschung oder Drohung] (1) Wer zur Abgabe einer Willenserklärung durch arglistige Töuschung oder widerrechtlich durch Drohung bestimmt worden ist, kann die Erklärung anfechten. 
(2) Hat ein Dritter die Täuschung verübt, so ist eine Erklärung, die einem anderen gegenüber abzugeben war, nur dann anfechtbar, wenn dieser die Täuschung kannte oder kennen mußte. Soweit ein anderer als derjenige, welchem gegenüber die Erklärung abzugeben war, aus der Erklärung unmittelbar ein Recht erworben hat, ist die Erklärung ihm gegenüber anfechtbar, wenn er die Täuschung kannte oder kennen mußte.
§ 123. [Rescission on the Grounds of Deceit and Duress] (1) A person who has been caused to make a declaration of intention by deceit or duress, can rescind this declaration. 
(2) If a third party committed this deceit, a declaration which was to be made towards another party can be rescinded only if this other party knew of ought to have known of the deceit. If a party other than the person towards whom the declaration was to be made acquired a right immediately by the declaration, this declaration can be rescinded against this person if he knew or ought to have known of the deceit. 
§ 134. [Gesetzliches Verbot] Ein Rechtsgeschäft, das gegen ein gesetzliches Verbot verstößt, ist nichtig, wenn sich nicht aus dem Gesetz ein anderes ergibt. § 134. [Statutory Prohibition] A legal transaction which violates a statutory prohibition is void, unless a different intention can be taken from the statute. 
§ 138. [Sittenwidriges Rechtsgeschäft; Wucher] (1) Ein Rechtsgeschäft, das gegen die guten Sitten verstößt, ist nichtig. 
(2) Nichtig ist insbesondere ein Rechtsgeschäft, durch das jemand unter Ausbeutung der Zwangslage, der Unerfahrenheit, des Mangels an Urteilsvermögen oder der erheblichen Willensschwäche eines anderen sich oder einem Dritten für eine Leistung Vermögensvorteile versprechen oder gewähren läßt, die in einem auffälligen Mißverhältnis zu der Leistung stehen. 
§ 138. [Immoral Transaction; Usury] (1) A legal transaction which offends good morals is void. 
2) In particular, a legal transaction is void by which somebody, by exploiting the predicament, inexperience, lack of judgment or considerable weakness of will of another party, causes pecuniary advantages to be promised or conferred onto him or onto a third party in exchange for a performance, whereby these pecuniary advantages are clearly disproportionate to this performance.

Zweites Buch. Recht der Schuldverhältnisse.

Erster Abschnitt. Inhalt der Schuldverhältnisse.

Zweiter Titel. Gegenseitiger Vertrag

Book Two. Law of Obligations.

Chapter Two. Content of Obligations.

Subchapter Two. Synallagmatic Contracts

§ 327. [Regelung des gesetzlichen Rücktrittsrechts] Auf das in den §§ 325, 326 bestimmte Rücktrittsrecht finden die für das vertragsmäßige Rücktritssrecht geltenden Vorschriften der §§ 346 bis 356 entsprechende Anwendung. Erfolgt der Rücktritt wegen eines Umstandes, den der andere Teil nicht zu vertreten hat, so haftet dieser nur nach den Vorschriften über die Herausgabe einer ungerechtfertigten Bereicherung. § 327. [Regulation of the statutory right to terminate a contract] The rules on a contractually stipulated right to terminate a contract under §§ 346-356 apply accordingly to the the right to ter-minate a contract under §§ 325, 326. If termination occurs due to a circumstance for which the other party is not responsible, that party is only liable under the rules which govern the return of an unjustified enrichment.

Fünfter Titel. Rücktritt

Subchapter Five. Termination of Contract

§ 346. [Wirkung des Rücktritts] Hat sich in einem Vertrag ein Teil den Rücktritt vorbehalten, so sind die Parteien, wenn der Rücktritt erfolgt, verpflichtet, einander die empfangenen Leistungen zurückzugewähren. Für geleistete Dienste sowie für die Überlassung der Benutzung einer Sache ist der Wert zu vergüten oder, falls in dem Vertrag eine Gegenleistung in Geld bestimmt ist, diese zu entrichten. § 346. [Effects of termination] If in a contract one party has reserved his right to terminate, and if termination occurs, the parties are obliged to return to each other the performances which they have received. For services rendered, or for permitting the use of a corporeal object, the value must be paid; if the contract specifies a counter-performance in money, this must be paid. 
§ 347. [Haftung bei Rückgewähr] Der Anspruch auf Schadensersatz wegen Verschlechterung, Untergangs oder einer aus einem anderen Grunde eintretenden Unmöglichkeit der Herausgabe bestimmt sich im Falle des Rücktritts von dem Empfange der Leistung an nach den Vorschriften, welche für das Verhältnis zwischen dem Eigentümer und dem Besitzer von dem Eintritte der Rechtshängigkeit des Eigentumsanspruchs an gelten. Das gleiche gilt von dem Anspruch auf Herausgabe oder Vergütung von Nutzungen und von dem Anspruch auf Ersatz von Verwendungen. Eine Geldsumme ist von der Zeit des Empfanges an zu verzinsen. § 347. [Liability in case of return] In case of termination, claims for damages for deterioration, perishing, or impossibility of return for any other reason, are determined, from the time of receipt of the performance, by those provisions which apply to the relationship between the owner of a corporeal object and the possessor from the time when an action for return of the object becomes pending. The same applies to claims for the surrender, or for the value of, any benefits, and to claims for reimbursement of expenditure. A sum of money carries interest from the time when it was received. 
§ 348. [Erfüllung Zug um Zug] Die sich aus dem Rücktritt ergebenden Verpflichtungen der Parteien sind Zug um Zug zu erfüllen. Die Vorschriften der §§ 320, 322 finden entsprechende Anwendung. § 348. [Performance upon tender of counter-performance] Obligations between parties which arise from the termination are to be performed upon tender of counter-performance. The provisions of §§ 320, 322 apply accordingly. 
§ 349. [Erklärung des Rücktritts] Der Rücktritt erfolgt durch Erklärung gegenüber dem anderen Teile. § 349. [Declaration of termination] Termination occurs by declaration towards the other party. 
§ 350. [Zufälliger Untergang] Der Rücktritt wird nicht dadurch ausgeschlossen, daß der Gegenstand, welcher der Berechtigte empfangen hat, durch Zufall untergegangen ist. § 350. [Accidental perishing] Termination is not excluded by the fact that an object, which the party entitled to termination has received, has accidentally perished. 
§ 351. [Verschuldeter Untergang] Der Rücktritt ist ausgeschlossen, wenn der Berechtigte eine wesentliche Verschlechterung, den Untergang oder die anderweitige Unmöglichkeit der Herausgabe des empfangenen Gegenstandes verschuldet hat. Der Untergang eines erheblichen Teiles steht einer wesentlichen Verschlechterung des Gegenstandes, das von dem Berechtigten nach § 278 zu vertretende Verschulden eines anderen steht dem eigenen Verschulden des Berechtigten gleich. § 351. [Culpable perishing] Termination is ex-cluded if the party entitled to termination is to blame for the fact that the object received has materially deteriorated or perished, or that its return has become impossible in another way. Perishing of a considerable part of the object is equal to material deterioration, and culpability of another party for which the entitled party is responsible under § 278 is equal to the entitled party’s own culpability. 
§ 352. [Verarbeitung oder Umbildung] Der Rücktritt ist ausgeschlossen, wenn der Berechtigte die empfangene Sache durch Verarbeitung oder Umbildung in eine Sache anderer Art umgestaltet hat. § 352. [Processing or Transformation] Termination is excluded if the party entitled to termination has changed the corporeal object received into another corporeal object by way of processing or transformation. 
§ 353. [Veräußerung oder Belastung] (1) Hat der Berechtigte den empfangenen Gegenstand oder einen erheblichen Teil des Gegenstandes veräußert oder mit dem Rechte eines Dritten belastet, so ist der Rücktritt ausgeschlossen, wenn bei demjenigen, welcher den Gegenstand infolge der Verfügung erlangt hat, die Vorausstzungen des § 351 oder des § 352 eingetreten sind. 
(2) Einer Verfügung des Berechtigten steht eine Verfügung gleich, die im Wege der Zwangsvollstreckung oder der Arrestvollziehung oder durch den Konkursverwalter erfolgt.
§ 353. [Passing on or Encumbrance] (1) If the party entitled to termination passes on, or charges with third party rights, the object received, or a considerable part thereof, termination is excluded if the requirements set forth in § 351 or in § 352 have been met in the hand of the person who has received the object by such disposition. 
(2) A disposition which occurs by enforcement of a judgment or attachment order, or by an administrator in bankruptcy, is treated the same as a disposition by the party entitled to terminate the contract.

Siebenter Abschnitt. Einzelne Schuldverhältnisse

Achter Titel. Mäklervertrag

Chapter Seven. Particular Types of Obligation Relationships

Subchapter Eight. Brokerage

§ 656. [Heiratsvermittlung] (1) Durch das Versprechen eines Lohne
s für den Nachweis der Gelegenheit zur Eingehung einer Ehe oder für die Vermittelung des Zustandekommens einer Ehe wird eine Verbindlichkeit nicht begründet. Das auf Grund des Versprechens Geleistete kann nicht deshalb zurückgefordert werden, weil eine Verbindlichkeit nicht bestanden hat. 
(2) Diese Vorschriften gelten auch für eine Vereinbarung, durch die der andere Teil zum Zwecke der Erfüllung des Versprechens dem Mäkler gegenüber eine Verbindlichkeit eingeht, insbesondere für ein Schuldanerkenntnis. 
§ 656. [Marriage Brokering]
(1) A promise to pay a fee in exchange for providing an opportu-nity to enter into a marriage, or for brokering the coming into being of a marriage does not create an obligation. What has been performed on the basis of this promise cannot be claimed back on the ground that the obligation did not exist. 
(2) These provisions apply equally to any agreement by which the other party, for the purpose of fulfilling the promise towards the broker, enters into an obligation, and in particular to a recognition of debt.

Zehnter Titel. Auftrag

Subchapter Ten. Mandate

§ 667. [Herausgabepflicht des Beauftragen] Der Beauftragte ist verpflichtet, dem Auftraggeber alles, was er zur Ausführung des Auftrags erhält und was er aus der Geschäftsbesorgung erlangt, herauszugeben. 
§ 667. [Mandatee’s Obligation to Give up] The mandatee is obliged to give up to the mandator anything which he receives for carrying out the mandate, and anything he obtains from managing the business. 
§ 670. [Ersatz von Aufwendungen] Macht der Beauftragte zum Zwecke der Ausführung des Auftrags Aufwendunge, die er den Umständen nach für erforderlich halten darf, so ist der Auftraggeber zum Ersatze verpflichtet. § 670. [Recovery of Expenditure] If the mandatee, for the purpose of carrying out the mandate, incurs expenditure which, according to the circumstances, he was allowed to consider as necessary, the mandator is obliged to provide reimbursement.

Elfter Titel. Geschäftsführung ohne Auftrag

Subchapter Eleven. Negotiorum Gestio

§ 677. [Pflichten des Geschäftsführers] Wer ein Geschäfts für einen anderen besorgt, ohne von ihm beauftragt oder ihm gegenüber sonst dazu berechtigt zu sein, hat das Geschäft so zu führen, wie das Interesse des Geschäftsherrn mit Rücksicht auf dessen wirklichen oder mutmaßlichen Willen es erfordert. § 677. [Duties of the Intervener] Whoever manages a business for another person without having been instructed by this party, or without being otherwise entitled to do so towards this party, must carrry out this business in such a way as is necessary to serve the interest of the master of the business and with regard to this party’s actual or presumed will. 
§ 678. [Geschäftsführung gegen den Willen des Geschäftsherrn] Steht die Übernahme der Geschäftsführung mit dem wirklichen oder dem mutmaßlichen Willen des Geschäftsherrn in Widerspruch und mußte der Geschäftsführer dies erkennen, so ist er dem Geschäftsherrn zum Ersatze des aus der Geschäftsführung entstehenden Schadens auch dann verpflichtet, wenn ihm ein sonstiges Verschulden nicht zur Last fällt. § 678. [Management Against the Will of the Master of the Business] If the intervener, by taking on the management of the business, acts against the actual or presumed will of the master of the business, and if the intervener ought to have realized this, he is liable towards the master of the business for compensation of the damage which results from the management of the business, even if he cannot be blamed for any other culpable conduct. 
§ 679. [Unbeachtlichkeit des entgegenstehenden Willens des Geschäftsherrn] Ein der Geschäftsführung entgegenstehender Wille des Geschäftsherrn kommt nicht in Betracht, wenn ohne die Geschäftsführung eine Pflicht des Geschäftsherrn, deren Erfüllung im öffentlichen Interesse liegt, oder eine gesetzliche Unterhaltspflicht des Geschäftsherrn nicht rechtzeitig erfüllt werden würde. § 679. [Will of Master of Business Irrelevant] If the master of the business is opposed to the management of the business, this will is irrelevant if, without the management of the business, a duty which falls on the master of the business cannot be fulfilled in time, provided that the fulfilment of this duty is in the pubic interest or concerns a statutory obligation to provide maintenance. 
§ 680. [Geschäftsführung zur Gefahrenabwehr] Bezweckt die Geschäftsführung die Abwendung einer dem Geschäftsherrn drohenden dringenden Gefahr, so hat der Geschäftsführer nur Vorsatz und grobe Fahrlässigkeit zu vertreten. § 680. [Management of Business in Order to Avert Danger] If the management of the business is aimed at averting an urgent and impeding danger for the master of the business, the intervenor is responsible only for wilful and grossly negligent conduct. 
§ 681. [Nebenpflichten des Geschäftsführers] Der Geschäftsführer hat die Übernahme der Geschäftsführung, sobald es tunlich ist, dem Geschäftsherrn anzuzeigen und, wenn nicht mit dem Aufschube Gefahr verbunden ist, dessen Entschließung abzuwarten. Im übrigen finden auf die Verpflichtungen des Geschäftsführers die für einen Beauftragten geltenden Vorschriften der §§ 666 bis 668 entsprechende Anwendung. § 681. [Ancillary Duties of the Intervener] The intervener must communicate his taking over the management of the business to the master of the business as soon as this is expedient and must wait for his decision, unless this postponent entails danger. Otherwise, the provisions in §§ 666 to 668 relating to the mandatee apply to the obligations of the intervener. 
§ 682. [Fehlende Geschäftsfähigkeit des Geschäftsführers] Ist der Geschäftsführer geschäftsunfähig oder in der Geschäftsfähigkeit beschränkt, so ist er nur nach den Vorschriften über den Schadensersatz wegen unerlaubter Handlungen und über die Herausgabe einer ungerechtfertigten Bereicherung verantwortlich. § 682. [Intervener’s Lack of Capacity] If the intervener lacks capacity, or possesses limited capacity only, he is liable only under the provisions on damages for tort and on giving up an unjustified enrichment. 
§ 683. [Ersatz von Aufwendungen] Entspricht die Übernahme der Geschäftsführung dem Interesse und dem wirklichen oder dem mutmaßlichen Willen des Geschäftsherrn, so kann der Geschäftsführer wie ein Beauftragter Ersatz seiner Aufwendungen verlangen. In den Fällen des § 679 steht dieser Anspruch dem Geschäftsführer zu, auch wenn die Übernahme der Geschäftsführung mit dem Willen des Geschäftsherrn in Widerspruch steht. § 683. [Recovery of Expenditure] If taking over the management of the business corresponds to the interest and the actual or presumed will of the master of the business, the intervenor can claim compensation for his expenditure in the same way as a mandatee. In the cases of § 679 the intervenor has this claim even if taking over the management of the business conflicts with the will of the master of the business. 
§ 684. [Herausgabe der Bereicherung] Liegen die Voraussetzungen des § 683 nicht vor, so ist der Geschäftsherr verpflichtet, dem Geschäftsführer alles, was er durch die Geschäftsführung erlangt, nach den Vorschriften über die Herausgabe einer ungerechtfertigten Bereicherung herauszugeben. Genehmigt der Geschäftsherr die Geschäftsführung, so steht dem Geschäftsführer der im § 683 bestimmte Anspruch zu. § 684. [Giving up of Enrichment] If the requirements of § 683 are not met, the intervener is obliged to give up to the master of the business anything which he obtains by managing the business, in accordance with the provisions on giving up an unjustified enrichment. If the master of the business ratifies the management of the business, the intervenor is entitled to the claim set forth in § 683. 
§ 685. [Schenkungsabsicht] (1) Dem Geschäftsführer steht ein Anspruch nicht zu, wenn er nicht die Absicht hatte, von dem Geschäftsherrn Ersatz zu verlangen. 
(2) Gewähren Eltern oder Voreltern ihren Abkömmlingen oder diese jenen Unterhalt, so ist im Zweifel anzunehmen, daß die Absicht fehlt, von dem Empfänger Ersatz zu verlangen. 
§ 685. [Intention to Act Without Reimbursement] The intervener has no claim if he did not have the intention to claim compensation from the master of the business. 
(2) If parents or other ancestors provide maintenance to their offspring, or vice versa, it is to presumed when in doubt that there was no intention to require compensation from the recipient. 
§ 686. [Irrtum über Person des Geschäftsherrn] Ist der Geschäftsführer über die Person des Geschäftsherrn im Irrtume, so wird der wirkliche Geschäftsherr aus der Geschäftsführung berechtigt und verpflichtet. § 686. [Mistake About Identity of Master of the Business] If the intervener is mistaken about the identity of the master of the business, rights and duties arising from the management of the business accrue to the true master of the business. 
§ 687. [Vermeintliche Geschäftsführung; unechte Geschäftsführung] (1) Die Vorschriften der §§ 677 bis 686 finden keine Anwendung, wenn jemand ein fremdes Geschäft in der Meinung besorgt, daß es sein eigenes sei. 
(2) Behandelt jemand ein fremdes Geschäft als sein eigenes, obwohl er weiß, daß er nicht dazu berechtigt ist, so kann der Geschäftsherr die sich aus den §§ 677, 678, 681, 682 ergebenden Ansprüche geltend machen. Macht er sie geltend, so ist er dem Geschäftsführer nach § 684 Satz 1 verpflichtet. 
§ 687. [Apparent Management of Business; Unjustified Management of Business] (1) The provisions of §§ 677 to 686 do not apply if somebody conducts another party’s business in the belief that this is his own business. (2) If somebody treats another party’s business as his own although he knows that he is not entitled to do so, the master of the business can rely on the claims arising from §§ 677, 678, 681, 682. If he relies on these claims, he becomes obliged towards the intervener under § 684 sentence 1.

Siebzehnter Titel. Spiel. Wette.

Subchapter Seventeen. Gaming. Betting

§ 762. [Unvollkommene Verbindlichkeit]
(1) Durch Spiel oder durch Wette wird eine Verbindlichkeit nicht begründet. Das auf Grund des Spieles oder der Wette Geleistete kann nicht deshalb zurückgefordert werden, weil ine Verbindlichkeit nicht bestanden hat. 
(2) Diese Vorschriften gelten auch für eine Vereinbarung, durch die der verlierende Teil zum Zwecke der Erfüllung einer Spiel- oder einer Wettschuld dem gewinnenden Teile gegenüber eine Verbindlichkeit eingeht, insbesondere für ein Schuldanerkenntnis. 
§ 762. [Incomplete Obligation]
(1) Gaming and Betting do not create obligations. What has been performed on the basis of the game or the bet cannot be claimed back on the ground that the obligation did not exist. 
(2) These provisions apply equally to any agreement by which the other party, for the purpose of fulfilling a gaming or betting debt, enters into an obligation towards the winning party, and in particular to a recognition of debt.

Vierundzwanzigster Titel. Ungerechtfertigte Bereicherung

Subchapter Twenty-four. Unjustified Enrichment

§ 812. [Grundsatz] (1) Wer durch die Leistung eines anderen oder in sonstiger Weise auf dessen Kosten etwas ohne rechtlichen Grund erlangt, ist ihm zur Herausgabe verpflichtet. Diese Verpflichtung besteht auch dann, wenn der rechtliche Grund später wegfällt oder der mit einer Leistung nach dem Inhalte des Rechtsgeschäfts bezweckte Erfolg nicht eintritt. (2) Als Leistung gilt auch die durch Vertrag erfolgte Anerkennung des Bestehens oder Nichtbestehens eines Schuldverhältnisses. § 812. [General Rule] (1) A person who obtains something by performance by another person or in another way at the expense of this person with-out legal cause is bound to give it up to him. The same obligation exists if the legal cause later lapses or if the result does not occur which the performance had been aimed at to produce according to the content of the legal transaction. 
(2) The recognition or denial of the existence of an obligation by way of contract is also considered as performance. 
§ 813. [Erfüllung trotz Einrede] (1) Das zum Zwecke der Erfüllung einer Verbindlichkeit Geleistete kann auch dann zurückgefordert werden, wenn dem Anspruch eine Einrede entgegenstand, durch welche die Geltendmachung des Anspruchs dauernd ausgeschlossen wurde. Die Vorschrift des § 222 Abs. 2 bleibt unberührt. 
(2) Wird eine betagte Verbindlichkeit vorzeitig erfüllt, so ist die Rückforderung ausgeschlossen; die Erstattung von Zwischenzinsen kann nicht verlangt werden. 
§ 813. [Performance in Spite of Defence] (1) What has been performed for the purpose of fulfilling an obligation can also be claimed back if the claim was barred by a defence which permanently excluded the claim from being raised. This is without prejudice to the provision of § 222 subs. 2. (2) If an obligation is performed before the fixed time, restitution is excluded; interest cannot be claimed for the time until performance would have been due.
§ 814. [Kenntnis der Nichtschuld; Anstands- und Sittenpflicht] Das zum Zwecke der Erfüllung einer Verbindlichkeit Geleistete kann nicht zurückgefordert werden, wenn der Leistende gewußt hat, daß er zur Leistung nicht verpflichtet war, oder wenn die Leistung einer sittlichen Pflicht oder einer auf den Anstand zu nehmenden Rücksicht entsprach. § 814. [Knowlege of Lack of Obligation; Decency and Moral Duty] What has been performed for the purpose of fulfilling an obligation cannot be claimed back if the person who performed knew that he was not obliged to perform, or if performance corresponded with a moral duty or with respect to decency. 
§ 815. [Nichteintritt des Erfolgs] Die Rückforderung wegen Nichteintritts des mit einer Leistung bezweckten Erfolges ist ausgeschlossen, wenn der Eintritt des Erfolges von Anfang an unmöglich war und der Leistende dies gewußt hat oder wenn der Leistende den Eintritt des Erfolges wider Treu und Glauben verhindert hat. § 815. [Result Fails to Occur] Restitution for lack of occurrence of the result which the performance was aimed at is excluded if it was impossible from the beginning to achieve the result and if the person who performed was aware of this, or if the person who performed has prevented the occurrence of the result in a manner which offends good faith. 
§ 816. [Verfügung eines Nichtberechtigten] (1) Trifft ein Nichtberechtigter über einen Gegenstand eine Verfügung, die dem Berechtigten gegenüber wirksam ist, so ist er dem Berechtigten zur Herausgabe des durch die Verfügung Erlangten verpflichtet. Erfolgt die Verfügung unentgeltlich, so trifft die gleiche Verpflichtung denjenigen, welcher auf Grund der Verfügung unmittelbar einen rechtlichen Vorteil erlangt. 
(2) Wird an einen Nichtberechtigten eine Leistung bewirkt, die dem Berechtigten gegenüber wirksam ist, so ist der Nichtberechtigte dem Berechtigten zur Herausgabe des Geleisteten verpflichtet.
§ 816. [Disposition by Unauthorized Person] (1) If an unauthorized person disposes of an object and this disposition is effective towards the entitled person, the unauthorized person is obliged to give up what he obtained by the disposition to the entitled person. If the disposition was gratuitous, the same obligation lies on the person who obtained a legal advantage immediately by the disposition. (2) If performance is made towards an unauthorized person, and this performance is effective towards the entitled person, the unauthorized person is obliged to give up to the entitled person what has been performed.
§ 817. [Verstoß gegen Gesetz oder gute Sitten] War der Zweck einer Leistung in der Art bestimmt, daß der Empfänger durch die Annahme gegen ein gesetzliches Verbot oder gegen die guten Sitten verstoßen hat, so ist der Empfänger zur Herausgabe verpflichtet. Die Rückforderung ist ausgeschlossen, wenn dem Leistenden gleichfalls ein solcher Verstoß zur Last fällt, es sei denn, daß die Leistung in der Eingehung einer Verbindlichkeit bestand; das zur Erfüllung einer solchen Verbindlichkeit Geleistete kann nicht zurückgefordert werden. § 817. [Violation of Statutory Prohibition or Good Morals] If the purpose of a performance was defined in such a way that by his acceptance the recipient violated a statutory prohibition or offended good morals, the recipient is obliged to provide restitution. Restitution is excluded if the person who performed is also to blame for such a violation, unless the performance consisted in the undertaking of an obligaton; what has been performed in order to discharge such an obligation cannot be claimed back. 
§ 818. [Umfang des Bereicherungsanspruchs] (1) Die Verpflichtung zur Herausgabe erstreckt sich auf die gezogenen Nutzungen sowie auf dasjenige, was der Empfänger auf Grund eines erlangten Rechtes oder als Ersatz für die Zerstörung, Beschädigung oder Entziehung des erlangten Gegenstandes erwirbt. (2) Ist die Herausgabe wegen der Beschaffenheit des Erlangten nicht möglich oder ist der Emfänger aus einem anderen Grunde zur Herausgabe außerstande, so hat er den Wert zu ersetzen. 
(3) Die Verpflichtung zur Herausgabe oder zum Ersatze des Wertes ist ausgeschlossen, soweit der Emfänger nicht mehr bereichert ist. 
(4) Von dem Eintritte der Rechtshängigkeit an haftet der Empfänger nach den allgemeinen Vorschriften.
§ 818. [Measure of Enrichment Claim] (1) The obligation to provide restitution extends to benefits [Nutzungen, § 101 BGB] which have been obtained, as well as to anything which the recipient acquires on the basis of on obtained right, or in replacement for the destruction, damage to or deprivation of the obtained object. 
(2) If, due to the nature of what has been obtained, return is impossible, or if the recipient for another reason is not in the position to return what he has obtained, he must compensate for the value. 
(3) The obligation to provide return or compensa-tion for the value is excluded to the extent that the recipient is no longer enriched. 
(4) Once an ation is pending against the recipient, he becomes liable under the general provisions. 
§ 819. [Verschärfte Haftung bei Bösgläubigkeit und bei Gesetzes- oder Sittenverstoß] (1) Kennt der Empfänger den Mangel des rechtli-chen Grundes bei dem Empfang oder erfährt er ihn später, so ist er von dem Empfang oder der Erlangung der Kenntnis an zur Herausgabe verpflichtet, wie wenn der Anspruch auf Herausgabe zu dieser Zeit rechtshängig geworden wäre. 
(2) Verstößt der Empfänger durch die Annahme der Leistung gegen ein gesetzliches Verbot oder gegen die guten Sitten, so ist er von dem Empfange der Leistung an in der gleichen Weise verpflichtet. 
§ 819. [Increased Liability: Mala Fide Debtor, Vio-lation of Statute or Good Morals] (1) If the recipient knows of the lack of a legal cause at the time of the receipt, or if he later learns of this lack, he is obliged to provide restitution from the time of the receipt or from the time when he obtains this knowledge as if an action for restitution had been pending at that time. (2) If the recipient, by accepting performance, violates a statutory prohibition or offends good morals, the same obligation falls on him from the time when he receives performance. 
§ 820. [Verschärfte Haftung bei ungewissem Erfolgseintritt] (1) War mit der Leistung ein Erfolg bezweckt, dessen Eintritt nach dem Inhalte des Rechtsgeschäfts als ungewiß angesehen wurde, so ist der Empfänger, falls der Erfolg nicht eintritt, zur Herausgabe so verpflichtet, wie wenn der Anspruch auf Herausgabe zur Zei des Empfanges rechtshängig geworden wäre. Das gleiche gilt, wenn die Leistung aus einem Rechtsgrunde, dessen Wegfall nach dem Inhalte des Rechtsgeschäfts als möglich angesehen wurde, erfolgt ist und der Rechtsgrund wegfällt. 
(2) Zinsen hat der Emfänger erst von dem Zeitpunkt an zu entrichten, in welchem er erfährt, daß der Erfolg nicht eingetreten oder daß der Rechtsgrund weggefallen ist; zur Herausgabe von Nutzungen ist er insoweit nicht verpflichtet, als er zu dieser Zeit nicht mehr bereichert ist. 
§ 820. [Increased Liability: Occurrence of Result Uncertain] (1) If a result was aimed at by the performance, the occurrence of which was considered uncertain according to the content of the legal transaction, and if this result fails to occur, the recipient is obliged to provide restitution as if an action for restitution had been pending at the time of the receipt. This also applies if performance occurred for a legal ground, the lapse of which was deemed possible according to the content of the legal transaction, and if the legal cause then lapses. 
(2) The recipient is obliged to pay interest only from the time when he learns that the result has not been obtained or that the legal cause has lapsed; he is not obliged to provide restitution of benefits to the extent that he is no longer enriched at this time. 
§ 821. [Einrede der Bereicherung] Wer ohne rechtlichen Grund eine Verbindlichkeit eingeht, kann die Erfüllung auch dann verweigern, wenn der Anpsruch auf Befreiung von der Verbindlichkeit verjährt ist. § 821. [Enrichment as Defence] A person who undertakes an obligation without legal cause can refuse performance even if the claim for release from this obligation is time-barred. 
§ 822. [Herausgabepflicht Dritter] Wendet der Empfänger das Erlangte unentgeltlich einem Dritten zu, so ist, soweit infolgedessen die Verpflichtung des Empfängers zur Herausgabe der Bereicherung ausgeschlossen ist, der Dritte zur Herausgabe verpflichtet, wie wenn er die Zuwendung von dem Gläubiger ohne rechtlichen Grund erhalten hätte. § 822. [Restitution by Third Parties] If the recipient passes on what he has obtained gratuitously to a third party, this third party must provide restitution as if the creditor had made the transfer onto him without a legal cause, to the extent that the recipient’s disposition excludes the recipient’s obligation to give up his enrichment.

Drittes Buch. Sachenrecht

Dritter Abschnitt. Eigentum

Vierter Abschnitt. Ansprüche aus dem Eigentume

Book Three. Law of Property

Chapter Three. Ownership

Subchapter Four. Claims Arising from Ownership

§ 985. [Herausgabeanspruch] Der Eigentümer kann von dem Besitzer die Herausgabe der Sache verlangen. § 985. [Claim for Surrender] The owner can require the possessor to surrender the corporeal object. 
§ 986. [Einwendungen des Besitzers] (1) Der Besitzer kann die Herausgabe der Sache verwei-gern, wenn er oder der mittelbare Besitzer, von dem er sein Recht zum Besitz ableitet, dem Ei-gentümer gegenüber zum Besitze berechtigt ist. … 
(2) …
§ 986. [Defences of the Possessor] (1) The pos-sessor can refuse to surrender the cor-poreal object if he, or an indirect possessor from whom he derives his right to possess, has a right to posses-sion against the owner. … 
(2) … 
§ 987. [Nutzungen nach Rechtshängigkeit] (1) Der Besitzer hat dem Eigentümer die Nutzungen herauszugeben, die er nach dem Eintritte der Rechtshängigkeit zieht. (2) Zieht der Besitzer nach dem Eintritte der Rechtshängigkeit Nutzungen nicht, die er nach den Regeln einer ordnungsmäßigen Wirtschaft ziehen könnte, so ist er dem Eigentümer zum Ersatze verpflichtet, soweit ihm ein Verschulden zur Last fällt. § 987. [Secondary Benefits After Action for Surrender of Corporeal Object is Pending] (1) The possessor must give up any secondary benefits to the owner which he reaps after the action is pending. 
(2) If the possessor, after an action is pending, fails to reap secondary benefits which he could have reaped according to the rules of orderly business, he becomes liable towards the owner for compensation, inasfar as he can be blamed for culpability. 
§ 988. [Nutzungen des unentgeltlichen Besitzers] Hat ein Besitzer, der die Sache als ihm gehörig oder zum Zwecke der Ausübung eines ihm in Wirklichkeit nicht zustehenden Nutzungsrechts an der Sache besitzt, den Besitz unentgeltlich erlangt, so ist er dem Eigentümer gegenüber zur Herausgabe der Nutzungen, die er vor dem Eintritte der Rechtshängigkeit zieht, nach den Vorschriften über die Herausgabe einer ungerechtfertigten Bereicherung verpflichtet. § 988. [Secondary Benefits Reaped by Gratuitous Bona Fide Possessor] If a possessor has gratuitously acquired possession and possesses the corporeal object in the belief that it is his own, or in order to exercise a right to use the corporeal object whereas in reality he has no such right, he is obliged to give up to the owner secondary benefits which he reaps before the action becomes pending, according to the rules on giving up an unjustified enrichment. 
§ 989. Schadensersatz nach Rechtshängigkeit Der Besitzer ist von dem Eintritte der Rechtshängigkeit an dem Eigentümer für den Schaden verantwortlich, der dadurch entsteht, daß infolge seines Verschuldens die Sache verschlechtert wird, untergeht, oder aus einem anderen Grunde von ihm nicht herausgegeben werden kann. § 989. [Damages After Action is Pending] Once the action is pending, the possessor becomes liable towards the owner for the damage which occurs because, due to the possessor’s culpability, the corporeal object deteriorates, perishes, or cannot be surrendered by him for another reason.
§ 990. [Bösgläubiger Besitzer] (1) War der Besitzer bei dem Erwerbe des Besitzes nicht in gutem Glauben, so haftet er dem Eigentümer von der Zeit des Erwerbes an nach den §§ 987, 989. Erfährt der Besitzer später, daß er zum Besitze nicht berechtigt ist, so haftet er in gleicher Weise von der Erlangung der Kenntnis an. 
(2) Eine weitergehende Haftung des Besitzers wegen Verzugs bleibt unberührt. 
§ 990. [Mala Fide Possessor] (1) If the possessor, when acquiring possession, was not bona fide, he is liable towards the posses-sor from the time of this acquisition in accordance with §§ 987, 989. If the possessor later learns that he is not entitled to posession, he becomes liable in the same way, from the time when he gains this knowledge. 
(2) Any additional liability of the possessor for delay remains unaffected.
§ 991. [Haftung des Besitzmittlers] (1) Leitet der Besitzer das Recht zum Besitze von einem mittelbaren Besitzer ab, so finden die Vorschriften des § 990 in Ansehung der Nutzungen nur Anwendung, wenn die Voraussetzungen des § 990 auch bei dem mittelbaren Besitzer vorliegen oder diesem gegenüber die Rechtshängigkeit eingetreten ist. 
(2) War der Besitzer bei dem Erwerbe des Besitzes in gutem Glauben, so hat er gleichwohl von dem Erwerb an den im § 989 bezeichneten Schaden dem Eigentümer gegenüber insoweit zu vertreten, als er dem mittelbaren Besitzer verantwortlich ist. 
§ 991. [Liability of Indirect Possessor] (1) If the possessor derives the right for posses-sion from an indirect possessor, the provisions in § 990, as regards secondary benefits, apply only if the requirements set forth in § 990 are also met in the person of the indirect possessor, or if the action has become pending against him. (2) If the possessor was bona fide when acquiring possession, he nevertheless is responsible towards the owner for damage as described in § 989 from the time of this acquisition, to the extent that the possessor is responsible towards the indirect possessor.
§ 992. [Haftung des deliktischen Besitzers] Hat sich der Besitzer durch verbotene Eigenmacht oder durch eine Straftat den Besitz verschafft, so haftet er dem Eigentümer nach den Vorschriften über den Schadensersatz wegen unerlaubter Handlungen. § 992. [Liability of the tortious possessor] If the possessor has acquired possession by unlawful interference, or by a criminal offence, he is liable towards the owner under the provisions on damages for tort. 
§ 993. [Haftung des redlichen Besitzers] (1) Liegen die in den §§ 987 bis 992 bezeichneten Voraussetzungen nicht vor, so hat der Besitzer die gezogenen Früchte, soweit sie nach den Regeln einer ordnungsmäßigen Wirtschaft nicht als Ertrag der Sache anzusehen sind, nach den Vorschriften über die Herausgabe einer ungerechtfertigten Bereicherung herauszugeben; im übrigen ist er weder zur Herausgabe von Nutzungen noch zum Schadensersatze verpflichtet. 
(2) Für die Zeit, für welche dem Besitzer die Nutzungen verbleiben, finden auf ihn die Vorschriften des § 101 Anwendung. 
§ 993. [Liability of the bona fide possessor for value] (1) If the requirements set forth in §§ 987 to 992 are not met, the possessor must give up any fruits which, according to the rules on orderly business, are not considered as yield of the corporeal object, under the rules on giving up an unjustified enrichment; otherwise, he is not liable for giving up secondary benefits, or for damages. (2) The provisions in § 101 apply to the possessor for that period of time for which he keeps the secondary benefits. 
§ 994. [Notwendige Verwendungen] (1) Der Besitzer kann für die auf die Sache gemachten notwendigen Verwendungen von dem Eigentümer Ersatz verlangen. Die gewöhnlichen Erhaltungskosten sind ihm jedoch für die Zeit, für welche ihm die Nutzungen verbleiben, nicht zu ersetzen. 
(2) Macht der Besitzer nach dem Eintritte der Rechtshängigkeit oder nach dem Beginne der im § 990 bestimmten Haftung notwendige Verwen-dungen, so bestimmt sich die Ersatzpflicht des Eigentümers nach den Vorschriften über die Ge-schäftsführung ohne Auftrag. 
§ 994. [Necessary Expenditure] (1) The possessor can claim from the owner reimbursement for necessary expenditure incurred on the corporeal object. However, the usual costs for upkeep are not to be reimbursed for that period of time for which the possessor keeps the secondary benefits. (2) If the possessor incurs necessary expenditure after the action is pending, or after liability as described in § 990 has set in, the owner’s obliga-tion to reimburse is governed by the provisions on negotiorum gestio. 
§ 995 … § 995 … 
§ 996. [Nützliche Verwendungen] Für andere als notwendige Verwendungen kann der Besitzer Ersatz nur insoweit verlangen, als sie vor dem Eintritte der Rechtshängigkeit und vor dem Beginne der im § 990 bestimmten Haftung gemacht werden und der Wert der Sache durch sie noch zu der Zeit erhöht ist, zu welcher der Eigentümer die Sache wiedererlangt. § 996. [Useful Expenditure]
For other than necessary expenditures, the possessor can claim reimbursement only to the extent that they were incurred before the action was pending, and before liability as described in § 990 has set in, and to the extent that the value of the corporeal object is still increased at the time when the owner regains the corporeal object.

Translation by Gerhard Dannemann.

These translations have not been published elsewhere, with the following two exceptions:
The translations of §§ 812-822 BGB have first appeared in The German Law of Obligations, Vol. I: The Law of Contracts and Restitution, by B.S. Markesinis, W. Lorenz and G. Dannemann, Oxford University Press 1997. Reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press.
The translations of §§ 327, 346-353 have first appeared in G. Dannemann, Restitution for termination of contract in German law, in: Failure of Contracts. Contractual, restitutionary and proprietary consequences, ed. by Francis Rose, Hart Publishing 1997, pp. 129-153 (pp. 152-3)

Modernized Civil Law Sections

Bilingual Civil Code (BGB) – “Book 1: General Part” and “Book 2: Law of Obligations” (modernized)

When the Act to Modernise the Law of Obligations (Schuldrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz) entered into force on 1 January 2002, this marked the most sweeping reform of the German Civil Code or Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch since it was enacted on 1 January 1900. The following is a bilingual edition of those provisions of the BGB’s Book 1 (General Part) and Book 2 (Law of Obligations) which are affected by the reform. Some unaltered provisions were added to this translation for context, whereas some minor alterations to less central provisions are only mentioned as such without having been reproduced. The English translation by Geoffrey Thomas and Gerhard Dannemann was made possible through the generous support of the Zeit-Stiftung Ebelin und Gerd Bucerius.

We invite all our users to comment on this translation and point out any errors, inconsistencies or potential improvements. Please mail your comments to: gerhard.dannemann@gbz.hu-berlin.de. Thank you.

Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch

Table of content

  • Buch 1: Allgemeiner Teil
    • Abschnitt 5: Verjährung
      • Titel 1 : Gegenstand und Dauer der Verjährung
      • Titel 2: Hemmung, Ablaufhemmung und Neubeginn der Verjährung
      • Titel 3: Rechtsfolgen der Verjährung
  • Buch 2: Recht der Schuldverhältnisse
    • Abschnitt 1: Inhalt der Schuldverhältnisse
      • Titel 1: Verpflichtung zur Leistung
    • Abschnitt 2: Gestaltung rechtsgeschäftlicher Schuldverhältnisse durch Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen
    • Abschnitt 3: Schuldverhältnisse aus Verträgen
      • Titel 1: Begründung, Inhalt und Beendigung
        • Untertitel 1: Begründung
        • Untertitel 2: Besondere Vertriebsformen
        • Untertitel 3: Anpassung und Beendigung von Verträgen
        • Untertitel 4: Einseitige Leistungsbestimmungsrechte
      • Titel 2: Gegenseitiger Vertrag
      • Titel 5: Rücktritt, Widerrufs­ und Rückgaberecht bei Verbraucherverträgen
        • Untertitel 1: Rücktritt
        • Untertitel 2: Widerrufs­ und Rückgaberecht bei Verbraucherverträgen
    • Abschnitt 8: Einzelne Schuldverhältnisse
      • Titel 1: Kauf, Tausch
        • Untertitel 1: Allgemeine Vorschriften
        • Untertitel 2: Besondere Arten des Kaufs
          • Kapitel 1: Kauf auf Probe
          • Kapitel 2: Wiederkauf
          • Kapitel 3: Vorkauf
        • Untertitel 3: Verbrauchsgüterkauf
        • Untertitel 4: Tausch
      • Titel 2: Teilzeit­Wohnrechteverträge
      • Titel 3: Darlehensvertrag, Finanzierungshilfen und Ratenlieferungsverträge zwischen einem Unternehmer und einem Verbraucher
        • Untertitel 1: Darlehensvertrag
        • Untertitel 2: Finanzierungshilfen zwischen einem Unternehmer und einem Verbraucher
        • Untertitel 3: Ratenlieferungsverträge zwischen einem Unternehmer und einem Verbraucher
        • Untertitel 4: Unabdingbarkeit, Anwendung auf Existenzgründer
      • Titel 7: Sachdarlehensvertrag
      • Titel 9: Werkvertrag und ähnliche Verträge
        • Untertitel 1: Werkvertrag
      • Titel 10: Maklervertrag
        • Untertitel 1: Allgemeine Vorschriften
        • Untertitel 2: Darlehensvermittlungsvertrag zwischen einem Unternehmer und einem Verbraucher
      • Titel 27: Unerlaubte Handlungen
  • Footnotes

Civil Code

Table of content

  • Book 1: General Part
  • Section 5: Limitation
    • Title 1: Matters subject to limitation and the limitation period
    • Title 2: Suspension, suspension of expiration and recommencement of the limitation period
    • Title 3: Legal consequences of limitation
  • Book 2: Law of Obligations
  • Section 1: Subject matter of obligations
    • Title 1: Obligation to perform
  • Section 2: Shaping contractual obligations by means of standard business terms
  • Section 3: Contractual obligations
    • Title 1: Creation, subject matter and cessation
      • Sub-title 1: Creation
      • Sub-title 2: Particular forms of marketing
      • Sub-title 3: Adaptation and cessation of contracts
      • Sub-title 4: Unilateral rights to specify performance
    • Title 2: Synallagmatic contracts
    • Title 5: Termination and right of revocation and of return in consumer contracts
      • Sub-title 1: Termination
      • Sub-title 2: Right of revocation and of return in consumer contracts
  • Section 8: Particular kinds of obligations
    • Title 1: Sale, exchange
      • Sub-title 1: General provisions
      • Sub-title 2: Special types of sale
        • Chapter 1: Sale on approval
        • Chapter 2: Repurchase
        • Chapter 3: Pre-emption
      • Sub-title 3: Sale of consumer goods
      • Sub-title 4: Exchange
    • Title 2: Time-share agreements
    • Title 3: Loan contract, financial accommodation and instalment supply contracts between a businessperson and a consumer
      • Sub-title 1: Loan contract
      • Sub-title 2: Financial accommodation granted by a businessperson to a consumer
      • Sub-title 3: Instalment supply contracts between a businessperson and a consumer
      • Sub-title 4: No contrary agreements, application to start-up businesses
    • Title 7: Contract for the loan of a thing
    • Title 9: Contract for work and similar contracts
      • Sub-title 1: Contract for work
    • Title 10: Brokerage contract
      • Sub-title 1: General provisions
      • Sub-title 2: Loan brokerage contract between a businessperson and a consumer
    • Title 27: Delict
  • Footnotes

Buch 1: Allgemeiner Teil

Abschnitt 5: Verjährung

Titel 1 : Gegenstand und Dauer der Verjährung

Book 1: General Part

Section 5: Limitation

Title 1: Matters subject to limitation and the limitation period

 194 Gegenstand der Verjährung 
(1) Das Recht, von einem anderen ein Tun oder Unterlassen zu verlangen (Anspruch), unterliegt der Verjährung.
(2) Ansprüche aus einem familienrechtlichen Verhältnis unterliegen der Verjährung nicht, soweit sie auf die Herstellung des dem Verhältnis entsprechenden Zustandes für die Zukunft gerichtet sind.
§ 194: Matters subject to limitation
(1) The right to require another person to do or to refrain from doing an act (a claim) is subject to limitation.
(2) Claims based on a relationship governed by family law are not subject to limitation in so far as they are directed at establishing, for the future, a situation appropriate to the relationship.
§ 195 Regelmäßige Verjährungsfrist Die regelmäßige Verjährungsfrist beträgt drei Jahre.§ 195 Standard limitation periodThe standard limitation period is three years.
§ 196 Verjährungsfrist bei Rechten an einem Grundstück Ansprüche auf Übertragung des Eigentums an einem Grundstück sowie auf Begründung, Übertragung oder Aufhebung eines Rechts an einem Grundstück oder auf Änderung des Inhalts eines solchen Rechts sowie die Ansprüche auf Gegenleistung verjähren in zehn Jahren.§ 196 Limitation period in the case of rights to landThe limitation period is ten years in the case of claims for the transfer of title to land and for the establishment, transfer or cancellation of rights to land or for the alteration of the subject matter of such a right and also for claims for counter-performance.
§ 197 Dreißigjährige Verjährungsfrist 
(1) In 30 Jahren verjähren, soweit nicht ein anderes bestimmt ist,
1. Herausgabeansprüche aus Eigentum und anderen dinglichen Rechten,
2. familien­ und erbrechtliche Ansprüche,
3. rechtskräftig festgestellte Ansprüche,
4. Ansprüche aus vollstreckbaren Vergleichen oder vollstreckbaren Urkunden und5. Ansprüche, die durch die im Insolvenzverfahren erfolgte Feststellung vollstreckbar geworden sind.
(2) Soweit Ansprüche nach Absatz 1 Nr. 2 regelmäßig wiederkehrende Leistungen oder Unterhaltsleistungen und Ansprüche nach Absatz 1 Nr. 3 bis 5 künftig fällig werdende regelmäßig wiederkehrende Leistungen zum Inhalt haben, tritt an die Stelle der Verjährungsfrist von 30 Jahren die regelmäßige Verjährungsfrist.
§ 197 30-year limitation period
(1) Save in so far as otherwise provided, the limitation period is 30 years in the case of:
1. claims for surrender based on property or other rights in rem,
2. claims under family law or the law of succession,
3. claims that have been declared final and absolute,
4. claims based on enforceable settlements or enforceable documents and5. claims that have become enforceable by virtue of having been established in insolvency proceedings.
(2) In so far as claims under subsection (1), No 2, concern the performance of regularly recurring obligations or maintenance obligations and in so far as claims under subsection 1, Nos 3 to 5, concern regularly recurring obligations that will fall due in the future, the standard limitation period applies instead of the period of 30 years.
§ 198 Verjährung bei RechtsnachfolgeGelangt eine Sache, hinsichtlich derer ein dinglicher Anspruch besteht, durch Rechtsnachfolge in den Besitz eines Dritten, so kommt die während des Besitzes des Rechtsvorgängers verstrichene Verjährungszeit dem Rechtsnachfolger zugute.§ 198 Limitation in the case of successors in titleIf a thing in respect of which a claim in rem exists comes into the possession of a third person, the part of the limitation period that has expired during the period of possession of his predecessor in title accrues to his benefit.
§ 199 Beginn der regelmäßigen Verjährungsfrist und Höchstfristen
(1) Die regelmäßige Verjährungsfrist beginnt mit dem Schluss des Jahres, in dem1. der Anspruch entstanden ist, und2. der Gläubiger von den den Anspruch begründenden Umständen und der Person des Schuldners Kenntnis erlangt oder ohne grobe Fahrlässigkeit erlangen müsste.(2)Schadensersatzansprüche, die auf der Verletzung des Lebens, des Körpers, der Gesundheit oder der Freiheit beruhen, verjähren ohne Rücksicht auf ihre Entstehung und die Kenntnis oder grob fahrlässige Unkenntnis in 30 Jahren von der Begehung der Handlung, der Pflichtverletzung oder dem sonstigen, den Schaden auslösenden Ereignis an.
(3) Sonstige Schadensersatzansprüche verjähren1. ohne Rücksicht auf die Kenntnis oder grob fahrlässige Unkenntnis in zehn Jahren von ihrer Entstehung, und2. ohne Rücksicht auf ihre Entstehung und die Kenntnis oder grob fahrlässige Unkenntnis in 30 Jahren von der Begehung der Handlung, der Pflichtverletzung oder dem sonstigen, den Schaden auslösenden Ereignis an.Maßgeblich ist die früher endende Frist.
(4) Andere Ansprüche als Schadensersatzansprüche verjähren ohne Rücksicht auf die Kenntnis oder grob fahrlässige Unkenntnis in zehn Jahren von ihrer Entstehung an.
(5) Geht der Anspruch auf ein Unterlassen, so tritt an die Stelle der Entstehung die Zuwiderhandlung.
§ 199 Beginning of the standard limitation period and maximum periods
(1) The standard limitation period begins upon the expiry of the year in which:1. the claim has arisen, and2. the obligee becomes aware of the circumstances giving rise to the claim and of the identity of the obligor or ought to have become aware of those matters but for his gross negligence.
(2) Irrespective of how they arose and irrespective of awareness or grossly negligent lack of awareness, claims arising out of death,1 injury to body, health, or liberty are time-barred 30 years from the date upon which the act, breach of duty or other event causing the loss occurred.
(3) Other claims for compensation are time-barred1. irrespective of knowledge or grossly negligent lack of knowledge, ten years after they arose and2. irrespective of when they arose and of knowledge or grossly negligent lack of knowledge, 30 years from the date on which the act, breach of duty or other event causing the loss occurred.The period which ends first is decisive.
(4) Irrespective of knowledge or grossly negligent lack of knowledge, claims other than claims for compensation are time-barred ten years after the date upon which they arose.
(5) If the claim is for an obligation of forbearance, the date of the infringement of that obligation replaces the date on which the claim arose.
§ 200 Beginn anderer VerjährungsfristenDie Verjährungsfrist von Ansprüchen, die nicht der regelmäßigen Verjährungsfrist unterliegen, beginnt mit der Entstehung des Anspruchs, soweit nicht ein anderer Verjährungsbeginn bestimmt ist. § 199 Abs. 5 findet entsprechende Anwendung.§ 200 Beginning of other limitation periodsSave where another date is provided, the limitation period for claims not subject to the standard limitation period begins when the claim arises. § 199 (5) applies mutatis mutandis.
§ 201 Beginn der Verjährungsfrist von festgestellten Ansprüchen 
Die Verjährung von Ansprüchen der in § 197 Abs. 1 Nr. 3 bis 5 bezeichneten Art beginnt mit der Rechtskraft der Entscheidung, der Errichtung des vollstreckbaren Titels oder der Feststellung im Insolvenzverfahren, nicht jedoch vor der Entstehung des Anspruchs. § 199 Abs. 5 findet entsprechende Anwendung.
§ 201 Beginning of the limitation period for established claims
The limitation period for claims of the type referred to in § 197 (1), Nos. 3 to 5, begins on the date when the decision becomes final and absolute, the enforceable title is created or the claim is established in the insolvency proceedings but not, however, before the claim arises. § 199 (5) applies mutatis mutandis.
§ 202 Unzulässigkeit von Vereinbarungen über die Verjährung 
(1) Die Verjährung kann bei Haftung wegen Vorsatzes nicht im Voraus durch Rechtsgeschäft erleichtert werden.
(2) Die Verjährung kann durch Rechtsgeschäft nicht über eine Verjährungsfrist von 30 Jahren ab dem gesetzlichen Verjährungsbeginn hinaus erschwert werden.
§ 202 Inadmissibility of agreements on limitation
(1) In the case of liability for deliberate acts and omissions, the limitation period may not be shortened in advance by way of legal transaction.(2) The limitation period may not be extended by way of legal transaction beyond a period of 30 years from the beginning of the statutory period.

Titel 2: Hemmung, Ablaufhemmung und Neubeginn der Verjährung

Title 2: Suspension, suspension of expiration and recommencement of the limitation period

§ 203 Hemmung der Verjährung bei Verhandlungen Schweben zwischen dem Schuldner und dem Gläubiger Verhandlungen über den Anspruch oder die den Anspruch begründenden Umstände, so ist die Verjährung gehemmt, bis der eine oder der andere Teil die Fortsetzung der Verhandlungen verweigert. Die Verjährung tritt frühestens drei Monate nach dem Ende der Hemmung ein.§ 203 Suspension of limitation in the event of negotiationsIf negotiations between the obligor and the obligee are underway with regard to the claim or the circumstances on which the claim is based, limitation is suspended until one of the parties refuses to continue the negotiations. The claim is not barred until at least three months have elapsed following the end of the suspension.
§ 204 Hemmung der Verjährung durch Rechtsverfolgung 
(1) Die Verjährung wird gehemmt durch
1. die Erhebung der Klage auf Leistung oder auf Feststellung des Anspruchs, auf Erteilung der Vollstreckungsklausel oder auf Erlass des Vollstreckungsurteils,
2. die Zustellung des Antrags im vereinfachten Verfahren über den Unterhalt Minderjähriger,
3. die Zustellung des Mahnbescheids im Mahnverfahren,
4. die Veranlassung der Bekanntgabe des Güteantrags, der bei einer durch die Landesjustizverwaltung eingerichteten oder anerkannten Gütestelle oder, wenn die Parteien den Einigungsversuch einvernehmlich unternehmen, bei einer sonstigen Gütestelle, die Streitbeilegungen betreibt, eingereicht ist; wird die Bekanntgabe demnächst nach der Einreichung des Antrags veranlasst, so tritt die Hemmung der Verjährung bereits mit der Einreichung ein,
5. die Geltendmachung der Aufrechnung des Anspruchs im Prozess,
6. die Zustellung der Streitverkündung,
7. die Zustellung des Antrags auf Durchführung eines selbständigen Beweisverfahrens,
8. den Beginn eines vereinbarten Begutachtungsverfahrens oder die Beauftragung des Gutachters in dem Verfahrens nach § 641a,
9. die Zustellung des Antrags auf Erlass eines Arrestes, einer einstweiligen Verfügung oder einer einstweiligen Anordnung, oder, wenn der Antrag nicht zugestellt wird, dessen Einreichung, wenn der Arrestbefehl, die einstweilige Verfügung oder die einstweilige Anordnung innerhalb eines Monats seit Verkündung oder Zustellung an den Gläubiger dem Schuldner zugestellt wird,10. die Anmeldung des Anspruchs im Insolvenzverfahren oder im Schifffahrtsrechtlichen Verteilungsverfahren,
11. den Beginn des schiedsrichterlichen Verfahrens,
12. die Einreichung des Antrags bei einer Behörde, wenn die Zulässigkeit der Klage von der Vorentscheidung dieser Behörde abhängt und innerhalb von drei Monaten nach Erledigung des Gesuchs die Klage erhoben wird; dies gilt entsprechend für bei einem Gericht oder bei einer in Nummer 4 bezeichneten Gütestelle zu stellende Anträge, deren Zulässigkeit von der Vorentscheidung einer Behörde abhängt,
13. die Einreichung des Antrags bei dem höheren Gericht, wenn dieses das zuständige Gericht zu bestimmen hat und innerhalb von drei Monaten nach Erledigung des Gesuchs die Klage erhoben oder der Antrag, für den die Gerichtsstandsbestimmung zu erfolgen hat, gestellt wird, und
14. die Veranlassung der Bekanntgabe des erstmaligen Antrags auf Gewährung von Prozesskostenhilfe; wird die Bekanntgabe demnächst nach der Einreichung des Antrags veranlasst, so tritt die Hemmung der Verjährung bereits mit der Einreichung ein.(2) Die Hemmung nach Absatz 1 endet sechs Monate nach der rechtskräftigen Entscheidung oder anderweitigen Beendigung des eingeleiteten Verfahrens. Gerät das Verfahren dadurch in Stillstand, dass die Parteien es nicht betreiben, so tritt an die Stelle der Beendigung des Verfahrens die letzte Verfahrenshandlung der Parteien, des Gerichts oder der sonst mit dem Verfahren befassten Stelle. Die Hemmung beginnt erneut, wenn eine der Parteien das Verfahren weiter betreibt.
(3) Auf die Frist nach Absatz 1 Nr. 9, 12 und 13 finden die §§ 206, 210 und 211 entsprechende Anwendung.
§ 204 Suspension of limitation by pursuit of rights
(1) Limitation is suspended by:
1. the bringing of an action for performance or for a declaration of the existence of the claim, for the attachment of an execution certificate, or for the issue of an order for execution,
2. service of an application under the simplified procedure for the maintenance of minors,
3. service of a demand for payment in a summary debt procedure,
4. occasioning the notice of an application for conciliation lodged at a conciliation body established or recognised by the administration of justice of a Land or, if the parties agree to seek conciliation, at any other conciliation body which settles disputes; if notice is occasioned shortly after the lodging of the application, limitation is suspended immediately upon the giving of notice,
5. assertion of a right to set off the claim in the course of a lawsuit,
6. service of a third-party notice,
7. service of an application for an independent procedure for the taking of evidence,
8. the beginning of an agreed expert opinion procedure or the appointment of an expert in accordance with § 641a,
9. service of an application for an attachment order, an interim order or an injunction, or, if the application is not served, the lodging thereof if the order for attachment, the interim order or the injunction is served on the obligor within one month of its being made or of its service on the obligee,
10. the lodging of a claim in insolvency proceedings or in proceedings for the distribution of assets under shipping law,
11. the beginning of the arbitration proceedings,
12. the lodging of an application to an administrative authority, if the admissibility of the action is conditional on a preliminary decision by that authority and the action is brought within three months after the application has been dealt with; this applies mutatis mutandis to applications which are to be made to a court or a conciliation body referred to in 4 above, the admissibility of which depends on a preliminary decision by an authority,
13. the lodging of an application to a higher court, if it is for that court to decide upon the court with jurisdiction over the claim and, within three months after the application has been dealt with, the action is brought or the application for which a decision on jurisdiction was necessary is filed, and
14. the occasioning of the notice of the first application for the grant of legal aid; if notice is occasioned shortly after the lodging of the application, suspension of limitation takes effect immediately upon the lodging of the application.(2) Suspension under subsection (1) above ends six months after a final decision has been made in respect of the proceedings commenced or their cessation in some other manner. If the proceedings come to a halt because of inaction by the parties, the date of the last procedural step of the parties, the court or other body responsible for the procedure applies instead of the date of cessation of the proceedings. Suspension begins anew if one of the parties pursues the proceedings further.
(3) §§ 206, 210, and 211 apply mutatis mutandis to subsection (1), Nos. 9, 12 and 13 above.
§ 205 Hemmung der Verjährung bei Leistungsverweigerungsrecht Die Verjährung ist gehemmt, solange der Schuldner auf Grund einer Vereinbarung mit dem Gläubiger vorübergehend zur Verweigerung der Leistung berechtigt ist.§ 205 Suspension of limitation in the event of a right to refuse performanceLimitation is suspended during a period in which the obligor is temporarily entitled, on the basis of an agreement with the obligee, to refuse to perform.
§ 206 Hemmung der Verjährung bei höherer GewaltDie Verjährung ist gehemmt, solange der Gläubiger innerhalb der letzten sechs Monate der Verjährungsfrist durch höhere Gewalt an der Rechtsverfolgung gehindert ist.§ 206 Suspension of limitation in the event of force majeureLimitation is suspended for a period during which the obligee has, within the last six months of the limitation period, been prevented by force majeure from pursuing his rights.
§ 207 Hemmung der Verjährung aus familiären und ähnlichen Gründen Die Verjährung von Ansprüchen zwischen Ehegatten ist gehemmt, solange die Ehe besteht. Das Gleiche gilt für Ansprüche zwischen
1. Lebenspartnern, solange die Lebenspartnerschaft besteht,
2. Eltern und Kindern und dem Ehegatten eines Elternteils und dessen Kindern während der Minderjährigkeit der Kinder,
3. dem Vormund und dem Mündel während der Dauer des Vormundschaftsverhältnisses,
4. dem Betreuten und dem Betreuer während der Dauer des Betreuungsverhältnisses, und
5. dem Pflegling und dem Pfleger während der Dauer der Pflegschaft.Die Verjährung von Ansprüchen des Kindes gegen den Beistand ist während der Dauer der Beistandschaft gehemmt.(2) § 208 bleibt unberührt.
§ 207 Suspension of limitation on grounds relating to the family and for similar reasonsLimitation of claims between spouses is suspended during the continuance of the marriage. The same applies to claims between
1. life partners for the period during which that life partnership exists,
2. parents and children and the spouse of one parent and the latter’s children during the minority of the children,
3. a guardian and his ward during the continuance of the guardianship,
4. a carer and the person cared for during the continuance of a care relationship,2 and
5. a foster child and a foster parent during the continuance of the fostering.Limitation of claims of a child against a friend in litigation proceedings is suspended during the period of the latter’s activity as such.
(2) § 208 is not affected.
§ 208 Hemmung der Verjährung bei Ansprüchen wegen Verletzung der sexuellen SelbstbestimmungDie Verjährung von Ansprüchen wegen Verletzung der sexuellen Selbstbestimmung ist bis zur Vollendung des 21. Lebensjahres des Gläubigers gehemmt. Lebt der Gläubiger von Ansprüchen wegen Verletzung der sexuellen Selbstbestimmung bei Beginn der Verjährung mit dem Schuldner in häuslicher Gemeinschaft, so ist die Verjährung auch bis zur Beendigung der häuslichen Gemeinschaft gehemmt.§ 208 Suspension of limitation in the case of claims for infringement of the right to sexual self-determinationThe limitation period in respect of claims for infringement of the right to sexual self-determination is suspended until the obligee’s 21st birthday. If, when the limitation period commences, the obligee in respect of claims for infringement of the right to sexual self-determination is living with the obligor as a domestic unit, limitation is suspended until the cessation of the domestic unit.
§ 209 Wirkung der HemmungDer Zeitraum, während dessen die Verjährung gehemmt ist, wird in die Verjährungsfrist nicht eingerechnet.§ 209 Effect of the suspensionA period during which limitation is suspended is not included when calculating the limitation period.
§ 210 Ablaufhemmung bei nicht voll Geschäftsfähigen(1) Ist eine geschäftsunfähige oder in der Geschäftsfähigkeit beschränkte Person ohne gesetzlichen Vertreter, so tritt eine für oder gegen sie laufende Verjährung nicht vor dem Ablauf von sechs Monaten nach dem Zeitpunkt ein, in dem die Person unbeschränkt geschäftsfähig oder der Mangel der Vertretung behoben wird. Ist die Verjährungsfrist kürzer als sechs Monate, so tritt der für die Verjährung bestimmte Zeitraum an die Stelle der sechs Monate.(2) Absatz 1 findet keine Anwendung, soweit eine in der Geschäftsfähigkeit beschränkte Person prozessfähig ist.§ 210 Expiration of the limitation period suspended in the case of persons without full legal capacity (1) If a person without full legal capacity or with limited legal capacity has no statutory representative, a limitation period is not completed to his benefit or detriment until the expiry of six months after the time when he acquires unlimited legal capacity or the lack of representative is cured. If the limitation period is less than six months, the period specified for limitation purposes applies instead of the period of six months.(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in so far as a person without full legal capacity is capable of suing and being sued.
§ 211 Ablaufhemmung in NachlassfällenDie Verjährung eines Anspruchs, der zu einem Nachlass gehört oder sich gegen einen Nachlass richtet, tritt nicht vor dem Ablauf von sechs Monaten nach dem Zeitpunkt ein, in dem die Erbschaft von dem Erben angenommen oder das Insolvenzverfahren über den Nachlass eröffnet wird oder von dem an der Anspruch von einem oder gegen einen Vertreter geltend gemacht werden kann. Ist die Verjährungsfrist kürzer als sechs Monate, so tritt der für die Verjährung bestimmte Zeitraum an die Stelle der sechs Monate.§ 211 Expiration of the limitation period suspended in matters relating to estatesA claim that is part of or directed against an estate is not time-barred until at least six months have elapsed from the time when the inheritance is accepted by the heirs or when insolvency proceedings in respect of the estate are commenced or when the claim can be asserted by or against an agent. If the limitation period is less than six months, the period specified for limitation purposes applies instead of the period of six months.
§ 212 Neubeginn der Verjährung(1) Die Verjährung beginnt erneut, wenn1. der Schuldner dem Gläubiger gegenüber den Anspruch durch Abschlagszahlung, Zinszahlung, Sicherheitsleistung oder in anderer Weise anerkennt, oder2. eine gerichtliche oder behördliche Vollstreckungshandlung vorgenommen oder beantragt wird.(2) Der erneute Beginn der Verjährung infolge einer Vollstreckungshandlung gilt als nicht eingetreten, wenn die Vollstreckungshandlung auf Antrag des Gläubigers oder wegen Mangels der gesetzlichen Voraussetzungen aufgehoben wird.(3) Der erneute Beginn der Verjährung durch den Antrag auf Vornahme einer Vollstreckungshandlung gilt als nicht eingetreten, wenn dem Antrag nicht stattgegeben oder der Antrag vor der Vollstreckungshandlung zurückgenommen oder die erwirkte Vollstreckungshandlung nach Absatz 2 aufgehoben wird.§ 212 Limitation period beginning anew(1) The limitation period begins anew if1. the obligor acknowledges the claim to the obligee by part payment, payment of interest, the granting of security or in some other way, or2. a judicial or official act of execution is performed or applied for.(2) The new beginning of the limitation period as a result of an act of execution is deemed not to have occurred if the act is annulled upon application by the obligee or because of a failure to fulfil the statutory requirements.(3) The new beginning of the limitation period as a result of an application for an act of execution is deemed not to have occurred if the application is not granted or is withdrawn before the act or the completed act is annulled in accordance with subsection (2) above.
§ 213 Hemmung, Ablaufhemmung und erneuter Beginn der Verjährung bei anderen AnsprüchenDie Hemmung, die Ablaufhemmung und der erneute Beginn der Verjährung gelten auch für Ansprüche, die aus demselben Grund wahlweise neben dem Anspruch oder an seiner Stelle gegeben sind.§ 213 Suspension, suspension of expiration and recommencement of limitation in the case of other claims Suspension, suspension of expiration and the new beginning of the limitation period also applies to claims which may be pursued, on the same basis, as an ancillary claim or in lieu of the claim.

Titel 3: Rechtsfolgen der Verjährung

Title 3: Legal consequences of limitation

§ 214 Wirkung der Verjährung(1) Nach Eintritt der Verjährung ist der Schuldner berechtigt, die Leistung zu verweigern.(2) Das zur Befriedigung eines verjährten Anspruchs Geleistete kann nicht zurückgefordert werden, auch wenn in Unkenntnis der Verjährung geleistet worden ist. Das gleiche gilt von einem vertragsmäßigen Anerkenntnis sowie einer Sicherheitsleistung des Schuldners.§ 214 Effect of limitation(1) When limitation occurs, the obligor is entitled to refuse to perform his obligation.(2) Performance made in satisfaction of a claim that has become time-barred may not be reclaimed, even if made without knowledge of the time-bar. The same applies to an acknowledgement made in accordance with a contract and to a security given by the obligor.
§ 215 Aufrechnung und Zurückbehaltungsrecht nach Eintritt der VerjährungDie Verjährung schließt die Aufrechnung und die Geltendmachung eines Zurückbehaltungsrechts nicht aus, wenn der Anspruch in dem Zeitpunkt noch nicht verjährt war, in dem erstmals aufgerechnet oder die Leistung verweigert werden konnte.§ 215 Set-off and right of retention after limitation has occurredThe fact that a claim is time-barred does not preclude set-off and assertion of a right of retention if the claim was not time-barred at the moment when set off could first have been made or performance refused.
§ 216 Wirkung der Verjährung bei gesicherten Ansprüchen(1) Die Verjährung eines Anspruchs, für den eine Hypothek, eine Schiffshypothek oder ein Pfandrecht besteht, hindert den Gläubiger nicht, seine Befriedigung aus dem belasteten Gegenstand zu suchen.(2) Ist zur Sicherung eines Anspruchs ein Recht verschafft worden, so kann die Rückübertragung nicht auf Grund der Verjährung des Anspruchs gefordert werden. Ist das Eigentum vorbehalten, so kann der Rücktritt vom Vertrag auch erfolgen, wenn der gesicherte Anspruch verjährt ist.(3) Die Absätze 1 und 2 finden keine Anwendung auf die Verjährung von Ansprüchen auf Zinsen und andere wiederkehrenden Leistungen.§ 216 Effect of limitation in the case of secured claims(1) The time-bar of a claim in respect of which a mortgage, ship’s mortgage or lien exists does not preclude the obligee from seeking to satisfy his claim out of the encumbered object.(2) If a right has been procured in order to secure a claim, retransfer of the right cannot be demanded on the ground that the claim has become time-barred. If title has been reserved, the contract may be terminated even if the secured claim is time-barred.(3) Subsections (1) and (2) above do not apply to the limitation of claims for interest and other recurring obligations.
§ 217 Verjährung von NebenleistungenMit dem Hauptanspruch verjährt der Anspruch auf die von ihm abhängenden Nebenleistungen, auch wenn die für diesen Anspruch geltende besondere Verjährung noch nicht eingetreten ist.§ 217 Limitation of collateral performanceA claim for a collateral performance dependent on the main claim becomes time-barred at the same time as the main claim, even if the specific limitation period for the first-mentioned claim has not yet expired.
§ 218 Unwirksamkeit des Rücktritts(1) Der Rücktritt wegen nicht oder nicht vertragsgemäß erbrachter Leistung ist unwirksam, wenn der Anspruch auf die Leistung oder der Nacherfüllungsanspruch verjährt ist und der Schuldner sich hierauf beruft. Dies gilt auch, wenn der Schuldner nach § 275 Abs. 1 bis 3, § 439 Abs. 3 oder § 635 Abs. 3 nicht zu leisten braucht und der Anspruch auf die Leistung oder der Nacherfüllungsanspruch verjährt wäre. § 216 Abs. 2 Satz 2 bleibt unberührt.(2) § 214 Abs. 2 findet entsprechende Anwendung.§ 218 Ineffectiveness of termination(1) Termination for non-performance or failure to perform in accordance with the contract is ineffective if the claim for performance or the claim for supplementary performance has become time-barred and the obligor raises that plea. This applies even if, by virtue of § 275 (1) to (3), § 439 (3) or § 635 (3), the obligor does not need to perform and the claim for performance or supplementary performance would be time-barred. § 216 (2), second sentence, is unaffected.(2) § 214 (2) applies mutatis mutandis.

Buch 2: Recht der Schuldverhältnisse

Abschnitt 1: Inhalt der Schuldverhältnisse

Titel 1: Verpflichtung zur Leistung

Second Book: Law of Obligations

Section 1: Subject matter of obligations

Title 1: Obligation to perform

§ 241 Pflichten aus dem Schuldverhältnis(1) Kraft des Schuldverhältnisses ist der Gläubiger berechtigt, von dem Schuldner eine Leistung zu fordern. Die Leistung kann auch in einem Unterlassen bestehen.(2) Das Schuldverhältnis kann nach seinem Inhalt jeden Teil zur Rücksicht auf die Rechte, Rechtsgüter und Interessen des anderen Teils verpflichten.§ 241 Duties arising out of the obligation(1) By virtue of the obligation the obligee is entitled to demand performance from the obligor. Performance may also consist in refraining from doing something.(2) An obligation may require each party to have regard to the other party’s rights, legally protected interests and other interests.
§ 241a Lieferung unbestellter Sachen(1) Durch die Lieferung unbestellter Sachen oder durch die Erbringung unbestellter sonstiger Leistungen durch einen Unternehmer an einen Verbraucher wird ein Anspruch gegen diesen nicht begründet.(2) Gesetzliche Ansprüche sind nicht ausgeschlossen, wenn die Leistung nicht für den Empfänger bestimmt war oder in der irrigen Vorstellung einer Bestellung erfolgte und der Empfänger dies erkannt hat oder bei Anwendung der im Verkehr erforderlichen Sorgfalt hätte erkennen können.(3) Eine unbestellte Leistung liegt nicht vor, wenn dem Verbraucher statt der bestellten eine nach Qualität und Preis gleichwertige Leistung angeboten und er darauf hingewiesen wird, dass er zur Annahme nicht verpflichtet ist und die Kosten der Rücksendung nicht zu tragen hat.§241a Delivery of unsolicited things(1) The delivery of unsolicited things to a consumer by a businessperson or the supply of other unsolicited services does not found a claim against the consumer.(2) Statutory claims are not excluded if the performance was not intended for the recipient or took place under the mistaken assumption that an order had been placed and the recipient was aware of this or could have been aware of this if he had observed the relevant accepted standards of care.(3) Performance is not unsolicited where, instead of the performance ordered, the consumer is offered performance that is equivalent in quality and price, and it is drawn to his attention that he is not obliged to accept it and does not have to pay the costs of return carriage.
§ 242 Leistung nach Treu und GlaubenDer Schuldner ist verpflichtet, die Leistung so zu bewirken, wie Treu und Glauben mit Rücksicht auf die Verkehrssitte es erfordern.§ 242 Performance in good faithThe obligor must perform in a manner consistent with good faith taking into account accepted practice.
§ 243 Gattungsschuld(1) Wer eine nur der Gattung nach bestimmte Sache schuldet, hat eine Sache von mittlerer Art und Güte zu leisten.(2) Hat der Schuldner das zur Leistung einer solchen Sache seinerseits Erforderliche getan, so beschränkt sich das Schuldverhältnis auf diese Sache.§ 243 Generic obligation(1) A person whose obligation is to provide things described only in generic terms must provide things of average kind and quality.(2) If the obligor has done everything necessary on his part to supply such things, the obligation is restricted to those things.
§ 244 Geldschuld(1) Ist eine in anderer Währung als Euro ausgedrückte Geldschuld im Inland zu zahlen, so kann die Zahlung in Euro erfolgen, es sei denn, dass Zahlung in der anderen Währung ausdrücklich vereinbart ist.>(2) Die Umrechnung erfolgt nach dem Kurswerte, der zur Zeit der Zahlung für den Zahlungsort maßgebend ist.§ 244 Money debts(1) If a money debt expressed in a currency other than the Euro is payable in Germany, payment may be made in Euro unless payment in the other currency is an express term of the contract.(2) The debt is converted at the rate applicable at the place of payment at the time of payment.
§ 245 GeldsortenschuldIst eine Geldschuld in einer bestimmten Münzsorte zu zahlen, die sich zur Zeit der Zahlung nicht mehr im Umlauf befindet, so ist die Zahlung so zu leisten, wie wenn die Münzsorte nicht bestimmt wäre.§ 245 Debt payable in a specific type of coinIf a debt is payable in a specific type of coin which is no longer in circulation at the time of payment, payment is to be made in the manner which would have been applicable if the type of coin had not been specified.
§ 246 Gesetzlicher ZinssatzIst eine Schuld nach Gesetz oder Rechtsgeschäft zu verzinsen, so sind vier vom Hundert für das Jahr zu entrichten, sofern nicht ein anderes bestimmt ist.§ 246 Statutory rate of interestIf interest on a debt is payable by virtue of statute or of a legal transaction, the interest rate is 4% per year, unless otherwise provided.
§ 247 Basiszinssatz(1) Der Basiszinssatz beträgt 3,62 Prozent. Er verändert sich zum 1. Januar und 1. Juli eines jeden Jahres um die Prozentpunkte, um welche die Bezugsgröße seit der letzten Veränderung des Basiszinssatzes gestiegen oder gefallen ist. Bezugsgröße ist der Zinssatz für die jüngste Hauptrefinanzierungsoperation der Europäischen Zentralbank vor dem ersten Kalendertag des betreffenden Halbjahres.(2) Die Deutsche Bundesbank gibt den geltenden Basiszinssatz unverzüglich nach den in Absatz 1 Satz 2 genannten Zeitpunkten im Bundesanzeiger bekannt.§ 247 Basic rate of interest(1) The basic rate of interest is 3.62 %. It changes on 1 January and 1 July each year by the percentage points by which the reference rate has risen or fallen since the last change in the basic rate of interest. The reference rate is the interest rate for the most recent main refinancing operation of the European Central Bank prior to the first calendar day of the six month period concerned.(2) The applicable basic rate of interest is announced by the Deutsche Bundesbank in the Bundesanzeiger3 immediately after the dates referred to in subsection (1), second sentence, above.
§ 275 Ausschluss der Leistungspflicht(1) Der Anspruch auf Leistung ist ausgeschlossen, soweit diese für den Schuldner oder für jedermann unmöglich ist.(2) Der Schuldner kann die Leistung verweigern, soweit diese einen Aufwand erfordert, der unter Beachtung des Inhalts des Schuldverhältnisses und der Gebote von Treu und Glauben in einem groben Missverhältnis zu dem Leistungsinteresse des Gläubigers steht. Bei der Bestimmung der dem Schuldner zuzumutenden Anstrengungen ist auch zu berücksichtigen, ob der Schuldner das Leistungshindernis zu vertreten hat.(3) Der Schuldner kann die Leistung ferner verweigern, wenn er die Leistung persönlich zu erbringen ist und sie ihm unter Abwägung des seiner Leistung entgegenstehenden Hindernisses mit dem Leistungsinteresse des Gläubigers nicht zugemutet werden kann.(4) Die Rechte des Gläubigers bestimmen sich nach den §§ 280, 283 bis 285, 311a und 326.§ 275 Exclusion of the obligation to perform(1) A claim for performance cannot be made in so far as it is impossible for the obligor or for anyone else to perform.(2) The obligor may refuse to perform in so far as performance requires expenditure which, having regard to the subject matter of the obligation and the principle of good faith, is manifestly disproportionate to the obligee’s interest in performance. When determining what may reasonably be required of the obligor, regard must also be had to whether he is responsible for the impediment.(3) Moreover, the obligor may refuse to perform if he is to effect the performance in person and, after weighing up the obligee’s interest in performance and the impediment to performance, performance cannot be reasonably required of the obligor.(4) The obligee’s rights are determined by §§ 280, 283 to 285, 311a and 326.
§ 276 Verantwortlichkeit des Schuldners(1) Der Schuldner hat Vorsatz und Fahrlässigkeit zu vertreten, wenn eine strengere oder mildere Haftung weder bestimmt noch aus dem sonstigen Inhalt des Schuldverhältnisses, insbesondere aus der Übernahme einer Garantie oder eines Beschaffungsrisikos zu entnehmen ist. Die Vorschriften der §§ 827 und 828 finden entsprechende Anwendung.(2) Fahrlässig handelt, wer die im Verkehr erforderliche Sorgfalt außer Acht lässt.(3) Die Haftung wegen Vorsatzes kann dem Schuldner nicht im Voraus erlassen werden.§ 276 Liability of the obligor(1) The obligor is liable for deliberate and negligent acts or omissions, unless the existence of a stricter or more lenient degree of liability is specified or to be inferred from the other subject matter of the obligation, in particular the assumption of a guarantee or the acquisition risk. The provisions of §§ 827 and 828 apply mutatis mutandis.(2) A person acts negligently if he fails to observe the relevant accepted standards of care.(3) The obligor cannot be relieved in advance of liability for deliberate acts or omissions.
§ 277 Sorgfalt in eigenen Angelegenheiten; grobe FahrlässigkeitWer nur für diejenige Sorgfalt einzustehen hat, welche er in eigenen Angelegenheiten anzuwenden pflegt, ist von der Haftung wegen grober Fahrlässigkeit nicht befreit.§ 277 Standard of care in one’s own affairs; gross negligenceA person who is liable only for failure to display the standard of care that he displays in his own affairs is not relieved of liability for gross negligence.
§ 278 Verschulden von ErfüllungsgehilfenDer Schuldner hat ein Verschulden seines gesetzlichen Vertreters und der Personen, deren er sich zur Erfüllung seiner Verbindlichkeit bedient, in gleichem Umfange zu vertreten wie eigenes Verschulden. Die Vorschrift des § 276 Abs. 3 findet keine Anwendung.§ 278 Fault of persons employed to perform an obligationThe obligor is liable for the fault of his statutory agent, and of persons whom he employs to perform his obligation, to the same extent as for his own fault. The rule in § 276 (3) does not apply.
§ 279 (aufgehoben)§ 279 (repealed)
§ 280 Schadensersatz wegen Pflichtverletzung(1) Verletzt der Schuldner eine Pflicht aus dem Schuldverhältnis, so kann der Gläubiger Ersatz des hierdurch entstehenden Schadens verlangen. Dies gilt nicht, wenn der Schuldner die Pflichtverletzung nicht zu vertreten hat.(2) Schadensersatz wegen Verzögerung der Leistung kann der Gläubiger nur unter der zusätzlichen Voraussetzung des § 286 verlangen.(3) Schadensersatz statt der Leistung kann der Gläubiger nur unter den zusätzlichen Voraussetzungen des § 281, des § 282 oder des § 283 verlangen.§ 280 Compensation for breach of duty(1) If the obligor fails to comply with a duty arising under the obligation, the obligee may claim compensation for the loss resulting from this breach. This does not apply if the obligor is not liable for the failure.(2) The obligee may demand compensation for delay in performance only if the additional requirement in § 286 is satisfied.(3) The obligee may demand compensation in lieu of performance only if the additional requirements of § 281, § 282 or § 283 are satisfied.
§ 281 Schadensersatz statt der Leistung wegen nicht oder nicht wie geschuldet erbrachter Leistung(1) Soweit der Schuldner die fällige Leistung nicht oder nicht wie geschuldet erbringt, kann der Gläubiger unter den Voraussetzungen des § 280 Abs. 1 Schadensersatz statt der Leistung verlangen, wenn er dem Schuldner erfolglos eine angemessene Frist zur Leistung oder Nacherfüllung bestimmt hat. Hat der Schuldner eine Teilleistung bewirkt, so kann der Gläubiger Schadensersatz statt der ganzen Leistung nur verlangen, wenn er an der Teilleistung kein Interesse hat. Hat der Schuldner die Leistung nicht wie geschuldet bewirkt, so kann der Gläubiger Schadensersatz statt der ganzen Leistung nicht verlangen, wenn die Pflichtverletzung unerheblich ist.(2) Die Fristsetzung ist entbehrlich, wenn der Schuldner die Leistung ernsthaft und endgültig verweigert oder wenn besondere Umstände vorliegen, die unter Abwägung der beiderseitigen Interessen die sofortige Geltendmachung des Schadenersatzanspruchs rechtfertigen.(3) Kommt nach der Art der Pflichtverletzung eine Fristsetzung nicht in Betracht, so tritt an deren Stelle eine Abmahnung.(4) Der Anspruch auf die Leistung ist ausgeschlossen, sobald der Gläubiger statt der Leistung Schadensersatz verlangt hat.(5) Verlangt der Gläubiger Schadensersatz statt der ganzen Leistung, so ist der Schuldner zur Rückforderung des Geleisteten nach den §§ 346 bis 348 berechtigt.§ 281 Compensation in lieu of performance because of failure to perform or failure to perform properly(1) In so far as the obligor fails to perform when performance is due or fails to perform properly, the obligee may, subject to the requirements of § 280 (1), demand compensation in lieu of performance if he has fixed to no avail a reasonable period within which the obligor is to perform or to effect supplementary performance. If the obligor has performed only in part, the obligee may demand compensation in lieu of full performance only if he has no interest in performance in part. If the obligor has failed to perform properly, the obligee may not demand compensation in lieu of performance if the breach of duty is immaterial.(2) A period for performance does not have to be fixed if the obligor seriously and definitely refuses to perform or if there are special circumstances which, after each party’s interests are balanced, justify the immediate assertion of a claim for compensation.(3) If the type of breach of duty is such that, it is not feasible to fix a period for performance, a warning notice replaces the fixing of such a period.(4) The claim for performance is excluded once the obligee has demanded compensation in lieu of performance.(5) If the obligee demands compensation in lieu of full performance, then the obligor may claim, in accordance with §§ 346 to 348, the return of whatever he has performed.
§ 282 Schadensersatz statt der Leistung wegen Verletzung einer Pflicht nach § 241 Abs. 2Verletzt der Schuldner eine Pflicht nach § 241 Abs. 2, kann der Gläubiger unter den Voraussetzungen des § 280 Abs. 1 Schadensersatz statt der Leistung verlangen, wenn ihm die Leistung durch den Schuldner nicht mehr zuzumuten ist.§ 282 Compensation in lieu of performance because of infringement of a duty under § 241 (2) If the obligor infringes a duty under § 241 (2), the obligee may, subject to the requirements of § 280 (1), demand compensation in lieu of performance if he can no longer reasonably be expected to accept performance by the obligor.
§ 283 Schadensersatz statt der Leistung bei Ausschluss der LeistungspflichtBraucht der Schuldner nach § 275 Abs. 1 bis 3 nicht zu leisten, kann der Gläubiger unter den Voraussetzungen des § 280 Abs. 1 Schadensersatz statt der Leistung verlangen. § 281 Abs. 1 Satz 2 und 3 und Abs. 5 finden entsprechende Anwendung.§ 283 Compensation in lieu of performance where there is no duty to performIf, by virtue of § 275 (1) to (3), the obligor does not have to perform, the obligee may demand compensation in lieu of performance. § 281 (1), second and third sentence, and (5) apply mutatis mutandis.
§ 284 Ersatz vergeblicher AufwendungenAnstelle des Schadensersatzes statt der Leistung kann der Gläubiger Ersatz der Aufwendungen verlangen, die er im Vertrauen auf den Erhalt der Leistung gemacht hat und billigerweise machen durfte, es sei denn, deren Zweck wäre auch ohne die Pflichtverletzung des Schuldners nicht erreicht worden.§ 284 Reimbursement for wasted expenditureInstead of demanding compensation in lieu of performance, the obligee may demand reimbursement of the expenditure which he has incurred in reasonable reliance on the receipt of performance, save where the purpose of that expenditure would not have been achieved even if the obligor had not breached his duty.
§ 285 Herausgabe des Ersatzes(1) Erlangt der Schuldner infolge des Umstandes, auf Grund dessen er die Leistung nach § 275 Abs. 1 bis 3 nicht zu erbringen braucht, für den geschuldeten Gegenstand einen Ersatz oder einen Ersatzanspruch, so kann der Gläubiger Herausgabe des als Ersatz Empfangenen oder Abtretung des Ersatzanspruchs verlangen.(2) Kann der Gläubiger statt der Leistung Schadensersatz verlangen, so mindert sich dieser, wenn er von dem in Absatz 1 bestimmten Recht Gebrauch macht, um den Wert des erlangten Ersatzes oder Ersatzanspruchs.§ 285 Surrender of substitute(1) If, as a result of a circumstance under which § 275(1) to (3) relieves the obligor of the obligation to perform, the obligor obtains a substitute or a substitute claim for the object owed, the obligee may demand surrender of what has been received as substitute or an assignment of the substitute claim.(2) If the obligee may demand compensation in lieu of performance, then, if he uses the right laid down in subsection (1) above, the compensation is reduced by the value of the substitute or substitute claim he has obtained.
§ 286 Verzug des Schuldners(1) Leistet der Schuldner auf eine Mahnung des Gläubigers nicht, die nach dem Eintritt der Fälligkeit erfolgt, so kommt er durch die Mahnung in Verzug. Der Mahnung stehen die Erhebung der Klage auf die Leistung sowie die Zustellung eines Mahnbescheids im Mahnverfahren gleich.(2) Der Mahnung bedarf es nicht, wenn1. für die Leistung eine Zeit nach dem Kalender bestimmt ist,2. der Leistung ein Ereignis vorauszugehen hat und eine angemessene Zeit für die Leistung in der Weise bestimmt ist, dass sie sich von dem Ereignis an nach dem Kalender berechnen lässt,3. der Schuldner die Leistung ernsthaft und endgültig verweigert,4. aus besonderen Gründen unter Abwägung der beiderseitigen Interessen der sofortige Eintritt des Verzugs gerechtfertigt ist.(3) Der Schuldner einer Entgeltforderung kommt spätestens in Verzug, wenn er nicht innerhalb von 30 Tagen nach Fälligkeit und Zugang einer Rechnung oder gleichwertigen Zahlungsaufstellung leistet; dies gilt gegenüber einem Schuldner, der Verbraucher ist, nur, wenn auf diese Folgen in der Rechnung oder Zahlungsaufstellung besonders hingewiesen worden ist. Wenn der Zeitpunkt des Zugangs der Rechnung oder Zahlungsaufstellung unsicher ist, kommt der Schuldner, der nicht Verbraucher ist, spätestens 30 Tage nach Fälligkeit und Empfang der Gegenleistung in Verzug.(4) Der Schuldner kommt nicht in Verzug, solange die Leistung infolge eines Umstandes unterbleibt, den er nicht zu vertreten hat.§ 286 Delay by the obligor(1) If, after notice from the obligee to perform, such notice having been given after performance became due, the obligor fails to perform, that notice puts him in default. The bringing of an action for performance and the service of a demand for payment in summary debt proceedings is equivalent to a notice to perform.(2) Notice to perform is unnecessary, if1. a time for performance is determined according to the calendar,2. an event must precede performance and an appropriate time for the performance is fixed in such a way that it can be calculated according to the calendar from the date of the event,3. the obligor seriously and definitely refuses to perform,4. having regard to each party’s interests, special reasons justify the occurrence of default with immediate effect .(3) The obligor of a claim for remuneration is put in default at the latest if he fails to perform within 30 days after the due date and receipt of an invoice or equivalent payment statement; this applies to an obligor who is a consumer only if a specific reference to those consequences has been made in the invoice or payment statement. If the time at which the invoice or payment statement reached the obligor is uncertain, an obligor who is not a consumer is put in default at the latest 30 days after the due date and receipt of the counterperformance.(4) The obligor is not put in default for as long as performance is not made because of a circumstance for which he is not responsible.
§ 287 Verantwortlichkeit während des VerzugsDer Schuldner hat während des Verzugs jede Fahrlässigkeit zu vertreten. Er haftet wegen der Leistung auch für Zufall, es sei denn, dass der Schaden auch bei rechtzeitiger Leistung eingetreten sein würde.§ 287 Liability during a period of defaultDuring a period of default the obligor is liable for any negligence. He remains liable for performance even in the event of fortuitous events, unless the damage would have occurred even if performance had been made on time.
§ 288 Verzugszinsen(1) Eine Geldschuld ist während des Verzugs zu verzinsen. Der Verzugszinssatz beträgt für das Jahr fünf Prozentpunkte über dem Basiszinssatz.(2) Bei Rechtsgeschäften, an denen ein Verbraucher nicht beteiligt ist, beträgt der Zinssatz für Entgeltforderungen acht Prozentpunkte über dem Basiszinssatz.(3) Der Gläubiger kann aus einem anderen Rechtsgrund höhere Zinsen verlangen.(4) Die Geltendmachung eines weiteren Schadens ist nicht ausgeschlossen.§ 288 Default interest(1) Interest is payable on a money debt during the period of default. The rate of default interest is 5% per annum above the basic interest rate.(2) In the case of legal transactions to which a consumer is not a party the interest rate for claims for remuneration is 8% above the basic rate.(3) The obligee may claim higher interest on a different legal basis.(4) The right to claim additional loss is not excluded.
[Minor amendments to §§ 291 and 296.]

Abschnitt 2: Gestaltung rechtsgeschäftlicher Schuldverhältnisse durch Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen

Section 2: Shaping contractual obligations by means of standard business terms

§ 305 Einbeziehung Allgemeiner Geschäftsbedingungen in den Vertrag(1) Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen sind alle für eine Vielzahl von Verträgen vorformulierten Vertragsbedingungen, die eine Vertragspartei (Verwender) der anderen Vertragspartei bei Abschluss eines Vertrags stellt. Gleichgültig ist, ob die Bestimmungen einen äußerlich gesonderten Bestandteil des Vertrags bilden oder in die Vertragsurkunde selbst aufgenommen werden, welchen Umfang sie haben, in welcher Schriftart sie verfasst sind und welche Form der Vertrag hat. Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen liegen nicht vor, soweit die Vertragsbedingungen zwischen den Vertragsparteien im einzelnen ausgehandelt sind.(2) Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen werden nur dann Bestandteil eines Vertrags, wenn der Verwender bei Vertragsschluss1. die andere Vertragspartei ausdrücklich oder, wenn ein ausdrücklicher Hinweis wegen der Art des Vertragsschlusses nur unter unverhältnismäßigen Schwierigkeiten möglich ist, durch deutlich sichtbaren Aushang am Ort des Vertragsschlusses auf sie hinweist und2. der anderen Vertragspartei die Möglichkeit verschafft, in zumutbarer Weise, die auch eine für den Verwender erkennbare körperliche Behinderung der anderen Vertragspartei angemessen berücksichtigt, von ihrem Inhalt Kenntnis zu nehmen,und wenn die andere Vertragspartei mit ihrer Geltung einverstanden ist.(3) Die Vertragsparteien können für eine bestimmte Art von Rechtsgeschäften die Geltung bestimmter Allgemeiner Geschäftsbedingungen unter Beachtung der in Absatz 2 bezeichneten Erfordernisse im Voraus vereinbaren.§ 305 Incorporation of standard business terms into the contract(1) Standard business terms are all contractual terms pre-established for a multitude of contracts which one party to the contract (the user) presents to the other party upon the conclusion of the contract. It is irrelevant whether the provisions appear as a separate part of a contract or are included in the contractual document itself, how extensive they are, what script is used for them, or what form the contract takes. Contractual terms do not constitute standard business terms where they have been individually negotiated between the parties.(2) Standard business terms are incorporated into the contract only if, during the conclusion of the contract, the user1. expressly draws the other party’s attention to them, or if, on account of the way in which the contract is concluded, an express reference to them is unreasonably difficult, he draws his attention to them by means of a clearly visible sign at the place where the contract is concluded and2. gives the other party, in a reasonable manner that also appropriately takes account of any physical handicap of the other party discernible by the user, the possibility of gaining knowledge of their content,and if the other party agrees that they are to apply.(3) Subject to observance of the requirements set out in subsection (2) above, the parties may agree in advance that particular standard business terms will apply to a particular type of legal transaction.
§ 305a Einbeziehung in besonderen FällenAuch ohne Einhaltung der in § 305 Abs. 2 Nr. 1 und 2 bezeichneten Erfordernisse werden einbezogen, wenn die andere Vertragspartei mit ihrer Geltung einverstanden ist,1. die mit Genehmigung der zuständigen Verkehrsbehörde oder auf Grund von internationalen Übereinkommen erlassenen Tarife und Ausführungsbestimmungen der Eisenbahnen und die nach Maßgabe des Personenbeförderungsgesetzes genehmigten Beförderungsbedingungen der Straßenbahnen, Obusse und Kraftfahrzeuge im Linienverkehr in den Beförderungsvertrag,2. die im Amtsblatt der Regulierungsbehörde für Telekommunikation und Post veröffentlichten und in den Geschäftsstellen des Verwenders bereitgehaltenen Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungena) in Beförderungsverträge, die außerhalb von Geschäftsräumen durch den Einwurf von Postsendungen in Briefkästen abgeschlossen werden,b) in Verträge über Telekommunikations­, Informations­ und andere Dienstleistungen, die unmittelbar durch Einsatz von Fernkommunikationsmitteln und während der Erbringung einer Telekommunikationsdienstleistung in einem Mal erbracht werden, wenn die Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen der anderen Vertragspartei nur unter unverhältnismäßigen Schwierigkeiten vor dem Vertragsschluss zugänglich gemacht werden können.§ 305a Incorporation in special casesEven if the requirements set out in § 305 (2) Nos 1 and 2 are not observed, if the other party agrees to their application:1. railway tariffs and regulations adopted with the approval of the competent transport authority or on the basis of international conventions and terms of transport, authorised in accordance with the Passenger Transport Act, of trams, trolley buses and motor vehicles in scheduled services are incorporated into the transport contract;2. standard business terms published in the official journal of the regulatory authority for Post and Telecommunications and kept available in the user’s business premises are incorporateda) into contracts of carriage concluded away from business premises by the posting of items in post boxes,(b) into contracts for telecommunications, information and other services that are provided directly and in one go by means of remote communication and during the provision of a telecommunications service, if it is unreasonably difficult to make the standard business terms available to the other party before conclusion of the contract.
§ 305b Vorrang der IndividualabredeIndividuelle Vertragsabreden haben Vorrang vor Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen.§ 305b Precedence of individually negotiated termsIndividually negotiated terms take precedence over standard business terms.
§ 305c Überraschende und mehrdeutige Klauseln(1) Bestimmungen in Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen, die nach den Umständen, insbesondere nach dem äußeren Erscheinungsbild des Vertrags, so ungewöhnlich sind, dass der Vertragspartner des Verwenders mit ihnen nicht zu rechnen braucht, werden nicht Vertragsbestandteil.(2) Zweifel bei der Auslegung Allgemeiner Geschäftsbedingungen gehen zu Lasten des Verwenders.§ 305c Surprising and ambiguous clauses(1) Provisions in standard business terms which in the circumstances, in particular in view of the outward appearance of the contract, are so unusual that the contractual partner of the user could not be expected to have reckoned with them, do not form part of the contract.(2) In case of doubt, standard business terms are interpreted against the user.
§ 306 Rechtsfolgen bei Nichteinbeziehung und Unwirksamkeit(1) Sind Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen ganz oder teilweise nicht Vertragsbestandteil geworden oder unwirksam, so bleibt der Vertrag im Übrigen wirksam.(2) Soweit die Bestimmungen nicht Vertragsbestandteil geworden oder unwirksam sind, richtet sich der Inhalt des Vertrags nach den gesetzlichen Vorschriften.(3) Der Vertrag ist unwirksam, wenn das Festhalten an ihm auch unter Berücksichtigung der nach Absatz 2 vorgesehenen Änderung eine unzumutbare Härte für eine Vertragspartei darstellen würde.§ 306 Legal consequences of non-incorporation and invalidity(1) If all or some standard business terms have not become part of the contract or are invalid, the remainder of the contract continues to be valid.(2) Where provisions have not become part of the contract or are invalid, the content of the contract is determined by the statutory rules.(3) The contract is invalid if one party would suffer unreasonable hardship if he were bound by the contract even after the amendment provided for in subsection (2) above.
§ 306a UmgehungsverbotDie Vorschriften dieses Abschnitts finden auch Anwendung, wenn sie durch anderweitige Gestaltungen umgangen werden.§ 306a No circumventionThe rules in this section apply even if they are circumvented by other arrangements.
§ 307 Inhaltskontrolle (1) Bestimmungen in Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen sind unwirksam, wenn sie den Vertragspartner des Verwenders entgegen den Geboten von Treu und Glauben unangemessen benachteiligen. Eine unangemessene Benachteiligung kann sich auch daraus ergeben, dass die Bestimmung nicht klar und verständlich ist.(2) Eine unangemessene Benachteiligung ist im Zweifel anzunehmen, wenn eine Bestimmung1. mit wesentlichen Grundgedanken der gesetzlichen Regelung, von der abgewichen wird, nicht zu vereinbaren ist, oder2. wesentliche Rechte oder Pflichten, die sich aus der Natur des Vertrags ergeben, so einschränkt, dass die Erreichung des Vertragszwecks gefährdet ist.(3) Die Absätze 1 und 2 sowie die §§ 308 und 309 gelten nur für Bestimmungen in Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen, durch die von Rechtsvorschriften abweichende oder diese ergänzende Regelungen vereinbart werden. Andere Bestimmungen können nach Absatz 1 Satz 2 in Verbindung mit Absatz 1 Satz 1 unwirksam sein.§ 307 Review of subject-matter(1) Provisions in standard business terms are invalid if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, they place the contractual partner of the user at an unreasonable disadvantage. An unreasonable disadvantage may also result from the fact that the provision is not clear and comprehensible.(2) In case of doubt, an unreasonable disadvantage is assumed if a provision1. cannot be reconciled with essential basic principles of the statutory rule from which it deviates, or2. restricts essential rights or duties resulting from the nature of the contract in such a manner that there is a risk that the purpose of the contract will not be achieved.(3) Subsections (1) and (2) above, and §§ 308 and 309 apply only to provisions in standard business terms by means of which provisions derogating from legal rules or provisions supplementing those rules are agreed. Other provisions may be invalid under subsection (1), sentence 2, above, in conjunction with subsection (1), sentence 1, above.
§ 308 Klauselverbote mit WertungsmöglichkeitIn Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen ist insbesondere unwirksam1. (Annahme­ und Leistungsfrist)eine Bestimmung, durch die sich der Verwender unangemessen lange oder nicht hinreichend bestimmte Fristen für die Annahme oder Ablehnung eines Angebots oder die Erbringung einer Leistung vorbehält; ausgenommen hiervon ist der Vorbehalt, erst nach Ablauf der Widerrufs­ oder Rückgabefrist nach § 355 Abs. 1 und 2 und § 356 zu leisten;2. (Nachfrist)eine Bestimmung, durch die sich der Verwender für die von ihm zu bewirkende Leistung abweichend von Rechtsvorschriften eine unangemessen lange oder nicht hinreichend bestimmte Nachfrist vorbehält;3. (Rücktrittsvorbehalt)die Vereinbarung eines Rechts des Verwenders, sich ohne sachlich gerechtfertigten und im Vertrag angegebenen Grund von seiner Leistungspflicht zu lösen; dies gilt nicht für Dauerschuldverhältnisse;4. (Änderungsvorbehalt)die Vereinbarung eines Rechts des Verwenders, die versprochene Leistung zu ändern oder von ihr abzuweichen, wenn nicht die Vereinbarung der Änderung oder Abweichung unter Berücksichtigung der Interessen des Verwenders für den anderen Vertragsteil zumutbar ist;5. (Fingierte Erklärungen)eine Bestimmung, wonach eine Erklärung des Vertragspartners des Verwenders bei Vornahme oder Unterlassung einer bestimmten Handlung als von ihm abgegeben oder nicht abgegeben gilt, es sei denn, dassa) dem Vertragspartner eine angemessene Frist zur Abgabe einer ausdrücklichen Erklärung eingeräumt ist undb) der Verwender sich verpflichtet, den Vertragspartner bei Beginn der Frist auf die vorgesehene Bedeutung seines Verhaltens besonders hinzuweisen; dies gilt nicht für Verträge, in die Teil B der Verdingungsordnung für Bauleistungen insgesamt einbezogen ist;6. (Fiktion des Zugangs)eine Bestimmung, die vorsieht, dass eine Erklärung des Verwenders von besonderer Bedeutung dem anderen Vertragsteil als zugegangen gilt;7. (Abwicklung von Verträgen)eine Bestimmung, nach der der Verwender für den Fall, dass eine Vertragspartei vom Vertrag zurücktritt oder den Vertrag kündigt,a) eine unangemessen hohe Vergütung für die Nutzung oder den Gebrauch einer Sache oder eines Rechts oder für erbrachte Leistungen oderb) einen unangemessen hohen Ersatz von Aufwendungen verlangen kann;8. (Nichtverfügbarkeit der Leistung)die nach Nummer 3 zulässige Vereinbarung eines Vorbehalts des Verwenders, sich von der Verpflichtung zur Erfüllung des Vertrags bei Nichtverfügbarkeit der Leistung zu lösen, wenn sich der Verwender nicht verpflichtet,a) den Vertragspartner unverzüglich über die Nichtverfügbarkeit zu informieren undb) Gegenleistungen des Vertragspartners unverzüglich zu erstatten.§ 308 Clauses whose validity depends on an appraisalIn standard business terms the following terms, in particular, are invalid:1. (period for acceptance or performance)a provision by which the user reserves the right to an unreasonably long or inadequately specified period for acceptance or rejection of an offer or for performance; this does not include reservation of the right to perform only after expiry of the period for revocation or return under §§ 355 (1) and (2) and 356;2. (additional period for performance)a provision by which the user, in derogation from legislative provisions, reserves the right to an unreasonably long or inadequately specified additional period within which to perform;3. (right of termination)the stipulation of a right for the user to free himself, without an objectively justified reason specified in the contract, of his duty to perform; this does not apply to a contract for the performance of a recurring obligation;4. (right of amendment)the stipulation of the user’s right to alter or depart from the promised performance, unless, taking into account the user’s interests, the stipulation to alter or depart from performance is reasonable for the other party;5. (fictitious declarations)a provision whereby a declaration of the user’s contractual partner is deemed or not deemed to have been made by him if he does or fails to do a particular act, unlessa) he is allowed a reasonable period within which to make an express declaration andb) the user undertakes to draw to his attention at the beginning of the period the particular significance of his conduct; this does not apply to contracts in which the whole of Part B of the contracting rules for award of public works contracts is incorporated;6. (fictional receipt)a provision which provides that a declaration by the user of particular importance is deemed to have been received by the other party;7. (winding-up of contracts)a provision by which, in the event that one of the parties to the contract terminates the contract or gives notice to terminate it, the user can demanda) unreasonably high remuneration for the utilisation or use of a thing or a right or for performance made, orb) unreasonably high reimbursement of expenditure;8. (unavailability of the object of performance)a stipulation permitted under 3. above of the user’s right to free himself of his obligation to perform the contract if the object of the performance is not available, unless the user agreesa) to inform the other party immediately of the unavailability, andb) immediately to refund counter-performance by that party.
§ 309 Klauselverbote ohne Wertungsmöglichkeit Auch soweit eine Abweichung von den gesetzlichen Vorschriften zulässig ist, ist in Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen unwirksam1. (Kurzfristige Preiserhöhungen)eine Bestimmung, welche die Erhöhung des Entgelts für Waren oder Leistungen vorsieht, die innerhalb von vier Monaten nach Vertragsschluss geliefert oder erbracht werden sollen; dies gilt nicht bei Waren oder Leistungen, die im Rahmen von Dauerschuldverhältnissen geliefert oder erbracht werden;2. (Leistungsverweigerungsrechte)eine Bestimmung, durch diea) das Leistungsverweigerungsrecht, das dem Vertragspartner des Verwenders nach § 320 zusteht, ausgeschlossen oder eingeschränkt wird, oderb) ein dem Vertragspartner des Verwenders zustehendes Zurückbehaltungsrecht, soweit es auf demselben Vertragsverhältnis beruht, ausgeschlossen oder eingeschränkt, insbesondere von der Anerkennung von Mängeln durch den Verwender abhängig gemacht wird;3. (Aufrechnungsverbot)eine Bestimmung, durch die dem Vertragspartner des Verwenders die Befugnis genommen wird, mit einer unbestrittenen oder rechtskräftig festgestellten Forderung aufzurechnen;4. (Mahnung, Fristsetzung)eine Bestimmung, durch die der Verwender von der gesetzlichen Obliegenheit freigestellt wird, den anderen Vertragsteil zu mahnen oder ihm eine Frist für die Leistung oder Nacherfüllung zu setzen;5. (Pauschalierung von Schadensersatzansprüchen)die Vereinbarung eines pauschalierten Anspruchs des Verwenders auf Schadensersatz oder Ersatz einer Wertminderung, wenna) die Pauschale den in den geregelten Fällen nach dem gewöhnlichen Lauf der Dinge zu erwartenden Schaden oder die gewöhnlich eintretende Wertminderung übersteigt, oderb) dem anderen Vertragsteil nicht ausdrücklich der Nachweis gestattet wird, ein Schaden oder eine Wertminderung sei überhaupt nicht entstanden oder wesentlich niedriger als die Pauschale;6. (Vertragsstrafe)eine Bestimmung, durch die dem Verwender für den Fall der Nichtabnahme oder verspäteten Abnahme der Leistung, des Zahlungsverzugs oder für den Fall, dass der andere Vertragsteil sich vom Vertrag löst, Zahlung einer Vertragsstrafe versprochen wird;7. (Haftungsausschluss bei Verletzung von Leben, Körper, Gesundheit und bei grobem Verschulden)a) (Verletzung von Leben, Körper, Gesundheit)ein Ausschluss oder eine Begrenzung der Haftung für Schäden aus der Verletzung des Lebens, des Körpers oder der Gesundheit , die auf einer fahrlässigen Pflichtverletzung des Verwenders oder einer vorsätzlichen oder fahrlässigen Pflichtverletzung eines gesetzlichen Vertreters oder Erfüllungsgehilfen des Verwenders beruhenb) (grobes Verschulden)ein Ausschluss oder eine Begrenzung der Haftung für sonstige Schäden, die auf einer grob fahrlässigen Pflichtverletzung des Verwenders oder auf einer vorsätzlichen oder grob fahrlässigen Pflichtverletzung eines gesetzlichen Vertreters oder Erfüllungsgehilfen des Verwenders beruhen;die Buchstaben a und b gelten nicht für Haftungsbeschränkungen ,in den nach Maßgabe des Personenbeförderungsgesetzes genehmigten Beförderungsbedingungen und Tarifvorschriften der Straßenbahnen, Obusse und Kraftfahrzeuge im Linienverkehr, soweit sie nicht zum Nachteil des Fahrgastes von der Verordnung über die Allgemeinen Beförderungsbedingungen für den Straßenbahn­ und Obusverkehr sowie den Linienverkehr mit Kraftfahrzeugen vom 27. Februar 1970 abweichen; Buchstabe b gilt nicht für Haftungsbeschränkungen für staatlich genehmigte Lotterie- oder Ausspielverträge;8. (Sonstige Haftungsausschlüsse bei Pflichtverletzung)a) (Ausschluss des Rechts, sich vom Vertrag zu lösen)eine Bestimmung, die bei einer vom Verwender zu vertretenden, nicht in einem Mangel der Kaufsache oder des Werks bestehenden Pflichtverletzung das Recht des anderen Vertragsteils, sich vom Vertrag zu lösen, ausschließt oder einschränkt; dies gilt nicht für die in der Nummer 7 bezeichneten Beförderungsbedingungen und Tarifvorschriften unter den dort genannten Voraussetzungen;b) (Mängel)eine Bestimmung, durch die bei Verträgen über Lieferungen neu hergestellter Sachen und über Werkleistungenaa) (Ausschluss und Verweisung auf Dritte)die Ansprüche gegen den Verwender wegen eines Mangels insgesamt oder bezüglich einzelner Teile ausgeschlossen, auf die Einräumung von Ansprüchen gegen Dritte beschränkt oder von der vorherigen gerichtlichen Inanspruchnahme Dritter abhängig gemacht werden;bb) (Beschränkung auf Nacherfüllung)die Ansprüche gegen den Verwender insgesamt oder bezüglich einzelner Teile auf ein Recht auf Nacherfüllung beschränkt werden, sofern dem anderen Vertragsteil nicht ausdrücklich das Recht vorbehalten wird, bei Fehlschlagen der Nacherfüllung zu mindern oder, wenn nicht eine Bauleistung Gegenstand der Mängelhaftung ist, nach seiner Wahl vom Vertrag zurückzutreten;cc) (Aufwendungen bei Nacherfüllung)die Verpflichtung des Verwenders ausgeschlossen oder beschränkt wird, die zum Zwecke der Nacherfüllung erforderlichen Aufwendungen, insbesondere Transport­, Wege­, Arbeits­ und Materialkosten, zu tragen;dd) (Vorenthalten der Nacherfüllung)der Verwender die Nacherfüllung von der vorherigen Zahlung des vollständigen Entgelts oder eines unter Berücksichtigung des Mangels unverhältnismäßig hohen Teils des Entgelts abhängig macht;ee) (Ausschlussfrist für Mängelanzeige)der Verwender dem anderen Vertragsteil für die Anzeige nicht offensichtlicher Mängel eine Ausschlussfrist setzt, die kürzer ist als die nach dem Doppelbuchstaben ff zulässige Frist;ff) (Erleichterung der Verjährung)die Verjährung von Ansprüchen gegen den Verwender wegen eines Mangels in den Fällen des § 438 Abs. 1 Nr. 2 und des § 634a Abs. 1 Nr. 2 erleichtert oder in den sonstigen Fällen eine weniger als ein Jahr betragende Verjährungsfrist ab dem gesetzlichen Verjährungsbeginn erreicht wird; dies gilt nicht für Verträge, in die Teil B der Verdingungsordnung für Bauleistungen insgesamt einbezogen ist;9. (Laufzeit bei Dauerschuldverhältnissen)bei einem Vertragsverhältnis, das die regelmäßige Lieferung von Waren oder die regelmäßige Erbringung von Dienst­ oder Werkleistungen durch den Verwender zum Gegenstand hat,a) eine den anderen Vertragsteil länger als zwei Jahre bindende Laufzeit des Vertrags,b) eine den anderen Vertragsteil bindende stillschweigende Verlängerung des Vertragsverhältnisses um jeweils mehr als ein Jahr, oderc) zu Lasten des anderen Vertragsteils eine längere Kündigungsfrist als drei Monate vor Ablauf der zunächst vorgesehenen oder stillschweigend verlängerten Vertragsdauer;dies gilt nicht für Verträge über die Lieferung als zusammengehörig verkaufter Sachen, für Versicherungsverträge sowie für Verträge zwischen den Inhabern urheberrechtlicher Rechte und Ansprüche und Verwertungsgesellschaften im Sinne des Gesetzes über die Wahrnehmung von Urheberrechten und verwandten Schutzrechten;10. (Wechsel des Vertragspartners)eine Bestimmung, wonach bei Kauf­, Dienst­ oder Werkverträgen ein Dritter anstelle des Verwenders in die sich aus dem Vertrag ergebenden Rechte und Pflichten eintritt oder eintreten kann, es sei denn, in der Bestimmung wirda) der Dritte namentlich bezeichnet, oderb) dem anderen Vertragsteil das Recht eingeräumt, sich vom Vertrag zu lösen;11. (Haftung des Abschlussvertreters)eine Bestimmung, durch die der Verwender einem Vertreter, der den Vertrag für den anderen Vertragsteil abschließt,a) ohne hierauf gerichtete ausdrückliche und gesonderte Erklärung eine eigene Haftung oder Einstandspflicht, oderb) im Falle vollmachtsloser Vertretung eine über § 179 hinausgehende Haftung auferlegt;12. (Beweislast)eine Bestimmung, durch die der Verwender die Beweislast zum Nachteil des anderen Vertragsteils ändert, insbesondere indem era) diesem die Beweislast für Umstände auferlegt, die im Verantwortungsbereich des Verwenders liegen, oderb) den anderen Vertragsteil bestimmte Tatsachen bestätigen lässt;Buchstabe b gilt nicht für Empfangsbekenntnisse, die gesondert unterschrieben oder mit einer gesonderten qualifizierten elektronischen Signatur versehen sind;13. (Form von Anzeigen und Erklärungen)eine Bestimmung, durch die Anzeigen oder Erklärungen, die dem Verwender oder einem Dritten gegenüber abzugeben sind, an eine strengere Form als die Schriftform oder an besondere Zugangserfordernisse gebunden werden.§ 309 Clauses whose invalidity is not subject to any appraisalEven where derogation from the statutory provisions is permissible, the following are invalid in standard business terms:1. (price increases at short notice)a provision which provides for an increase in the remuneration for goods or services that are to be supplied within four months of the conclusion of the contract; this does not apply to goods or services supplied in the course of a recurring obligation;2. (right to refuse to perform)a provision by whicha) the right under § 320 of the contractual partner of the user to refuse to perform is excluded or restricted, orb) a right of retention of the contractual partner of the user, in so far as it arises from the same contractual relationship, is excluded or restricted, in particular by making it subject to recognition by the user of the existence of defects;3. (prohibition of set-off)a provision by which the contractual partner of the user is deprived of the right to set off a claim which is undisputed or has been declared final and absolute;4. (notice, period for performance)a provision by which the user is relieved of the statutory requirement to give notice to the other party to perform or to fix a period for performance or supplementary performance by him;5. (lump-sum claims for damages)stipulation of a lump-sum claim by the user for damages or for compensation for reduction in value, ifa) the lump sum in the cases in question exceeds the damage expected in the normal course of events or the reduction in value which normally occurs, orb) the other party is not given the express right to prove that damage or reduction in value has not occurred or is materially lower than the lump sum agreed;6. (penalty)a provision by which the user is entitled to receive payment of a penalty in the event of non-acceptance or late acceptance of performance, delay in payment or in the event that the other party withdraws from the contract;7. (exclusion of liability for death4, injury to body and health and for gross fault)a) (death and injury to body and health)exclusion or limitation of liability for losses arising out of death, injury to body or health caused by negligent breach of duty by the user or a deliberate or negligent breach of duty by his statutory agent or a person employed by him to perform the contract;b) (gross fault)exclusion or limitation of liability for other losses caused by a grossly negligent breach of duty by the user or a deliberate or grossly negligent breach of duty by a statutory agent of the user or by a person employed by him to perform the contract;a) and b) above do not apply to restrictions of liability in the terms of transport, authorised in accordance with the Passenger Transport Act, of trams, trolley buses and motor vehicles in scheduled services, in so far as they do not derogate, to the detriment of passengers, from the Regulation concerning the terms of transport by tram and trolley bus and by motor vehicles in scheduled services of 27 February 1970; b) above does not apply to restrictions of liability for State-approved lottery or raffle contracts.8. (other exclusions of liability in the event of breach of duty)a) (exclusion of the right to withdraw from the contract)a provision which, upon a breach of duty for which the user is responsible and which does not consist in a defect of the thing sold or the work, excludes or restricts the other party’s right to withdraw from the contract; this does not apply to the terms of contract and tariff rules referred to in No. 7 on the conditions set out therein;b) (defects)a provision by which, in contracts for the supply of new, manufactured things or of work,aa) (exclusion and reference of claims to third parties)claims against the user on account of a defect as a whole or with regard to individual elements of it are excluded entirely, restricted to the assignment of claims against third parties, or which make the pursuit of legal proceedings against third parties a condition precedent;bb) (restriction to supplementary performance)claims against the user are restricted, entirely or with regard to individual elements, to a right to supplementary performance, unless the other party is given an express right to claim a price reduction if supplementary performance is unsuccessful or, except where the defects liability is in respect of building work, to choose to terminate the contract ;cc) (expenditure incurred in the course of supplementary performance)the user’s obligation to bear the expenditure necessary for supplementary performance, in particular the costs of carriage, transport, labour and materials, is excluded or restricted;dd) (withholding of supplementary performance)the user makes supplementary performance conditional on the prior payment of the entire price or, having regard to the defect, an unreasonably high proportion thereof;ee) (time-limit for notice of defects)the user fixes a period within which the other party must give notice of non-obvious defects which is shorter than the period permitted under ff) below;ff) (facilitation of limitation)facilitates the limitation of claims on account of defects in the cases set out in § 438 (1), No. 2 and § 634a (1), No. 2, or, in other cases, results in a limitation period of less than one year from the date on which the statutory period of limitation begins; this does not apply to contracts in which the whole of Part B of the contracting rules for award of public works contracts is incorporated;9. (period of recurring obligations)in a contractual relationship concerning the periodic delivery of goods or the periodic supply of services or work by the user,a) a contract duration which binds the other party for more than two years,b) a tacit extension of the contractual relationship which binds the other party for a period of more than one year in each particular case, orc) to the detriment of the other party, a period of notice to terminate the contract which is more than three months prior to the expiration of the initial or tacitly extended period of the contract;this does not apply to contracts for the supply of things sold as a unit, to insurance contracts or contracts between the owners of copyrights and of claims and copyright collecting societies within the meaning of the Protection of Copyrights and Related Rights Act;10. (change of contract partner)a provision whereby in sales contracts, contracts for the supply of services or contracts for work a third party assumes or may assume the rights and obligations of the user under the contract, unless the provisiona) specifies the third party by name, orb) gives the other party the right to withdraw from the contract;11. (liability of an agent on conclusion of the contract)a provision by which the user imposes on an agent who concludes the contract for the other party,a) the agent’s own liability or duty to perform the contractual obligation without having made an express and separate declaration in that regard, orb) where the agent lacks authority, liability which exceeds that under § 179;12. (burden of proof)a provision by which the user alters the burden of proof to the detriment of the other party in particular bya) imposing the burden in respect of circumstances which fall within the scope of the user’s responsibility, orb) requiring the other party to acknowledge particular facts;Subsection b) above does not apply to acknowledgments of receipt which are separately signed or bear a separate, qualified electronic signature;13. (form of notices and declarations)a provision by which notices or declarations to be given to the user or third parties are subject to a stricter requirement than the need for writing or to special requirements with regard to receipt.
§ 310 Anwendungsbereich(1) § 305 Abs. 2 und 3 und die §§ 308 und 309 finden keine Anwendung auf Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen, die gegenüber einem Unternehmer, einer juristischen Person des öffentlichen Rechts oder einem öffentlich­rechtlichen Sondervermögen verwendet werden. § 307 Abs. 1 und 2 findet in den Fällen des Satzes 1 auch insoweit Anwendung, als dies zur Unwirksamkeit von in den §§ 308 und 309 genannten Vertragsbestimmungen führt; auf die im Handelsverkehr geltenden Gewohnheiten und Gebräuche ist angemessen Rücksicht zu nehmen.(2) Die §§ 308 und 309 finden keine Anwendung auf Verträge der Elektrizitäts­, Gas­, Fernwärme­ und Wasserversorgungsunternehmen über die Versorgung von Sonderabnehmern mit elektrischer Energie, Gas, Fernwärme und Wasser aus dem Versorgungsnetz, soweit die Versorgungsbedingungen nicht zum Nachteil der Abnehmer von Verordnungen über Allgemeine Bedingungen für die Versorgung von Tarifkunden mit elektrischer Energie, Gas, Fernwärme und Wasser abweichen. Satz 1 gilt entsprechend für Verträge über die Entsorgung von Abwasser.(3) Bei Verträgen zwischen einem Unternehmer und einem Verbraucher (Verbraucherverträge) finden die Vorschriften dieses Abschnitts mit folgenden Maßgaben Anwendung:1. Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen gelten als vom Unternehmer gestellt, es sei denn, dass sie durch den Verbraucher in den Vertrag eingeführt wurden;2. § 305c Abs. 2 und die §§ 306 und 307 bis 309 dieses Gesetzes sowie Artikel 29a des Einführungsgesetzes zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuche finden auf vorformulierte Vertragsbedingungen auch dann Anwendung, wenn diese nur zur einmaligen Verwendung bestimmt sind und soweit der Verbraucher auf Grund der Vorformulierung auf ihren Inhalt keinen Einfluss nehmen konnte;3. bei der Beurteilung der unangemessenen Benachteiligung nach § 307 Abs. 1 und 2 sind auch die den Vertragsschluss begleitenden Umstände zu berücksichtigen.(4) Dieser Abschnitt findet keine Anwendung bei Verträgen auf dem Gebiet des Erb­, Familien­ und Gesellschaftsrechts sowie auf Tarifverträge, Betriebs- und Dienstvereinbarungen. Bei der Anwendung auf Arbeitsverträge sind die im Arbeitsrecht geltenden Besonderheiten angemessen zu berücksichtigen; § 305 Abs. 2 und 3 ist nicht anzuwenden. Tarifverträge, Betriebs- und Dienstvereinbarungen stehen Rechtsvorschriften im Sinne von § 307 Abs. 3 gleich.§ 310 Scope of application(1) § 305 (2) and (3) and §§ 308 and 309 do not apply to standard business terms which are proffered to a businessperson, a legal person governed by public law or a special fund governed by public law. In those cases § 307 (1) and (2) nevertheless applies to the extent that this results in the invalidity of the contractual provisions referred to in §§ 308 and 309; due regard must be had to the customs and practices applying in business transactions.(2) §§ 308 and 309 do not apply to contracts of electricity, gas, district heating or water supply undertakings for the supply to special customers of electricity, gas, district heating or water from the supply grid unless the conditions of supply derogate, to the detriment of the customer, from Regulations on general conditions for the supply of tariff customers with electricity, gas, district heating or water. The first sentence applies mutatis mutandis to contracts for the disposal of sewage.(3) In the case of contracts between a businessperson and a consumer (consumer contracts) the rules in this section apply subject to the following provisions:1. Standard business terms are deemed to have been proffered by the businessperson, unless the consumer introduced them into the contract;2. §§ 305c (2) and §§ 306, 307 to 309 of the present Act and Article 29a of the Introductory Act to the Civil Code apply to pre-established conditions of contract even if they are intended for use only once and in so far as, because they are pre-established, the consumer could not influence their content.3. When deciding whether there has been unreasonable detriment under § 307 (1) and (2) the circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the contract must also be taken into account.(4) This section does not apply to contracts in the field of the law of succession, family law and company law or to collective agreements and private- or public-sector works agreements. When it is applied to labour contracts, appropriate regard must be had to the special features of labour law; § 305 (2) and (3) is not to be applied. Collective agreements and public and private sector works agreements are equivalent to legal rules within the meaning of § 307 (3).

Abschnitt 3: Schuldverhältnisse aus Verträgen

Titel 1: Begründung, Inhalt und Beendigung

Untertitel 1: Begründung

Section 3: Contractual obligations

Title 1: Creation, subject matter and cessation

Sub-title 1: Creation

§ 311 Rechtsgeschäftliche und rechtsgeschäftsähnliche Schuldverhältnisse(1) Zur Begründung eines Schuldverhältnisses durch Rechtsgeschäft sowie zur Änderung des Inhalts eines Schuldverhältnisses ist ein Vertrag zwischen den Beteiligten erforderlich, soweit nicht das Gesetz ein anderes vorschreibt.(2) Ein Schuldverhältnis mit Pflichten nach § 241 Abs. 2 entsteht auch durch1. die Aufnahme von Vertragsverhandlungen,2. die Anbahnung eines Vertrags, bei welcher der eine Teil im Hinblick auf eine etwaige rechtsgeschäftliche Beziehung dem anderen Teil die Möglichkeit zur Einwirkung auf seine Rechte, Rechtsgüter und Interessen gewährt oder ihm diese anvertraut, oder3. ähnliche geschäftliche Kontakte.(3) Ein Schuldverhältnis mit Pflichten nach § 241 Abs. 2 kann auch zu Personen entstehen, die nicht selbst Vertragspartei werden sollen. Ein solches Schuldverhältnis entsteht insbesondere, wenn der Dritte in besonderem Maße Vertrauen für sich in Anspruch nimmt und dadurch die Vertragsverhandlungen oder den Vertragsschluss erheblich beeinflusst.§ 311 Obligations created by legal transaction and similar obligations(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, a contract between the parties is necessary in order to create an obligation by legal transaction or to alter the content of an obligation.(2) An obligation with duties in accordance with § 241 (2) also arises as a result of1. entry into contractual negotiations,2. preparations undertaken with a view to creating a contractual relationship if one party permits the other party to affect his rights, his legally protected interest or other interests or entrusts them to that party, or3. similar business contact.(3) An obligation with duties in accordance with § 241 (2) may also arise towards persons who are not intended to be parties to the contract. Such an obligation arises in particular if the third party by enlisting a particularly high degree of reliance materially influences the contractual negotiations or the conclusion of the contract.
§ 311a Leistungshindernis bei Vertragsschluss(1) Der Wirksamkeit eines Vertrags steht es nicht entgegen, dass der Schuldner nach § 275 Abs. 1 bis 3 nicht zu leisten braucht und das Leistungshindernis schon bei Vertragsschluss vorliegt.(2) Der Gläubiger kann nach seiner Wahl Schadensersatz statt der Leistung oder Ersatz seiner Aufwendungen in dem in § 284 bestimmten Umfang verlangen. Dies gilt nicht, wenn der Schuldner das Leistungshindernis bei Vertragsschluss nicht kannte und seine Unkenntnis auch nicht zu vertreten hat. § 281 Abs. 1 Satz 2 und 3 und Abs. 5 finden entsprechende Anwendung.§ 311a Impediment to performance at the time of the conclusion of the contract(1) The fact that by virtue of § 275 (1) to (3) the obligor does not need to perform and the impediment to performance already exists upon conclusion of the contract does not prevent the contract from being valid.(2) The obligee may, at his option, demand compensation in lieu of performance or reimbursement of expenditure to the extent provided for in § 284. This does not apply if, at the time of the conclusion of the contract, the obligor had no knowledge of the impediment to performance and was not responsible for his lack of knowledge. § 281 (1), second and third sentence, and (5) apply mutatis mutandis.
§ 311b Verträge über Grundstücke, das Vermögen und den Nachlass(1) Ein Vertrag, durch den sich der eine Teil verpflichtet, das Eigentum an einem Grundstück zu übertragen oder zu erwerben, bedarf der notariellen Beurkundung. Ein ohne Beachtung dieser Form geschlossener Vertrag wird seinem ganzen Inhalt nach gültig, wenn die Auflassung und die Eintragung in das Grundbuch erfolgen.(2) Ein Vertrag, durch den sich der eine Teil verpflichtet, sein künftiges Vermögen oder einen Bruchteil seines künftigen Vermögens zu übertragen oder mit einem Nießbrauch zu belasten, ist nichtig.(3) Ein Vertrag, durch den sich der eine Teil verpflichtet, sein gegenwärtiges Vermögen oder einen Bruchteil seines gegenwärtigen Vermögens zu übertragen oder mit einem Nießbrauch zu belasten, bedarf der notariellen Beurkundung.(4) Ein Vertrag über den Nachlass eines noch lebenden Dritten ist nichtig. Das gleiche gilt von einem Vertrag über den Pflichtteil oder ein Vermächtnis aus dem Nachlass eines noch lebenden Dritten.(5) Absatz 4 gilt nicht für einen Vertrag, der unter künftigen gesetzlichen Erben über den gesetzlichen Erbteil oder den Pflichtteil eines von ihnen geschlossen wird. Ein solcher Vertrag bedarf der notariellen Beurkundung.§ 311b Contracts relating to land, entire assets or a person’s estate(1) A contract by which one party binds himself to transfer or acquire ownership of a piece of land must be authenticated by a notary. A contract not concluded in that form becomes valid in its entirety if the appropriate conveyance and entry in the land register are made.(2) A contract whereby one party binds himself to transfer his entire future assets or a fractional part of his future assets or to charge them with a usufruct is void.(3) A contract by which one party binds himself to transfer his entire present assets or a fractional part of his present assets or to charge them with a usufruct must be authenticated by a notary.(4) A contract relating to the estate of a living third person is void. The same applies to a contract relating to the compulsory portion or a legacy from the estate of a living third person.(5) Subsection (4) above does not apply to a contract concluded between future statutory heirs relating to the statutory portion or the compulsory portion of one of them. Such a contract must be authenticated by a notary. 
§ 311c Erstreckung auf ZubehörVerpflichtet sich jemand zur Veräußerung oder Belastung einer Sache, so erstreckt sich diese Verpflichtung im Zweifel auch auf das Zubehör der Sache.§ 311c Application to accessoriesIf a person agrees to transfer or charge a thing, that obligation applies, in case of doubt, also to accessories of the thing.

Untertitel 2: Besondere Vertriebsformen

Sub-title 2: Particular forms of marketing

§ 312 Widerrufsrecht bei Haustürgeschäften(1) Bei einem Vertrag zwischen einem Unternehmer und einem Verbraucher, der eine entgeltliche Leistung zum Gegenstand hat und zu dessen Abschluss der Verbraucher1. durch mündliche Verhandlungen an seinem Arbeitsplatz oder im Bereich einer Privatwohnung,2. anlässlich einer vom Unternehmer oder von einem Dritten zumindest auch im Interesse des Unternehmers durchgeführten Freizeitveranstaltung oder3. im Anschluss an ein überraschendes Ansprechen in Verkehrsmitteln oder im Bereich öffentlich zugänglicher Verkehrsflächenbestimmt worden ist (Haustürgeschäft), steht dem Verbraucher ein Widerrufsrecht gemäß § 355 zu. Dem Verbraucher kann anstelle des Widerrufsrechts ein Rückgaberecht nach § 356 eingeräumt werden, wenn zwischen dem Verbraucher und dem Unternehmer im Zusammenhang mit diesem oder einem späteren Geschäft auch eine ständige Verbindung aufrechterhalten werden soll.(2) Die erforderliche Belehrung über das Widerrufs- oder Rückgaberecht muss auf die Rechtsfolgen des § 357 Abs. 1 und 3 hinweisen.(3) Das Widerrufs­ oder Rückgaberecht besteht unbeschadet anderer Vorschriften nicht bei Versicherungsverträgen oder wenn1. im Fall von Absatz 1 Nr. 1 die mündlichen Verhandlungen, auf denen der Abschluss des Vertrags beruht, auf vorhergehende Bestellung des Verbrauchers geführt worden sind oder2. die Leistung bei Abschluss der Verhandlungen sofort erbracht und bezahlt wird und das Entgelt 40 Euro nicht übersteigt oder3. die Willenserklärung des Verbrauchers von einem Notar beurkundet worden ist.§ 312 Right of revocation in the case of doorstep transactions(1) In the case of a contract between a businessperson and a consumer concerning performance for remuneration which the consumer has been induced to conclude1. as a result of oral negotiations at his place of work or in a private residence,2. on the occasion of a leisure event organised by the businessperson or by a third party at least also in the interest of the businessperson, or3. subsequent to a surprise approach in a means of transport or in an open public space,(doorstep transactions), the consumer is entitled to a right of revocation in accordance with § 355. Instead of the right of revocation the consumer may be given a right of return under § 356 if a permanent connection is also to be maintained between the businessperson and the consumer in connection with this or a subsequent transaction.(2) The necessary notice of the right of revocation or return must refer to the legal consequences of § 357 (1) and (3).(3) Without prejudice to other provisions, there is no right of revocation or of return in the case of insurance contracts or if1. in the case of subsection (1), No 1, the oral negotiations on which the conclusion of the contract is based have been conducted pursuant to a previous order placed by the consumer, or2. the performance is paid for and supplied immediately upon conclusion of the contract and the payment made for it does not exceed Euro 40, or3. the consumer’s declaration of intention has been authenticated by a notary.
§ 312a Verhältnis zu anderen VorschriftenUnterfällt ein Haustürgeschäft zugleich den Regelungen über Verbraucherdarlehensverträge oder Finanzierungshilfen (§§ 491 bis 504) oder über Teilzeit-Wohnrechteverträge (§§ 481 bis 487), oder erfüllt ein Haustürgeschäft zugleich die Voraussetzungen eines Geschäfts nach § 11 oder § 15h des Gesetzes über den Vertrieb ausländischer Investmentanteile und über die Besteuerung der Erträge aus ausländischen Investmentanteilen, nach § 23 des Gesetzes über Kapitalanlagegesellschaften oder nach § 4 des Gesetzes zum Schutz der Teilnehmer am Fernunterricht, so finden nur die Vorschriften über diese Geschäfte Anwendung.§ 312a Relationship to other provisionsIf a doorstep transaction also falls within the scope of the provisions on consumer loan contracts or financial accommodation (§§ 491 to 504) or of time-share contracts (§§ 481 to 487) or fulfils the conditions for a transaction under § 11 or § 15h of the Act on the Sale of Foreign Investment Shares and the Taxation of Income from Foreign Investment Shares, under § 23 of the Act on Capital Investment Companies or § 4 of the Act for the Protection of Participants in Distance Learning, only the provisions concerning those transactions apply.
§ 312b Fernabsatzverträge(1) Fernabsatzverträge sind Verträge über die Lieferung von Waren oder über die Erbringung von Dienstleistungen, die zwischen einem Unternehmer und einem Verbraucher unter ausschließlicher Verwendung von Fernkommunikationsmitteln abgeschlossen werden, es sei denn, dass der Vertragsschluss nicht im Rahmen eines für den Fernabsatz organisierten Vertriebs­ oder Dienstleistungssystems erfolgt.(2) Fernkommunikationsmittel sind Kommunikationsmittel, die zur Anbahnung oder zum Abschluss eines Vertrags zwischen einem Verbraucher und einem Unternehmer ohne gleichzeitige körperliche Anwesenheit der Vertragsparteien eingesetzt werden können, insbesondere Briefe, Kataloge, Telefonanrufe, Telekopien, E­Mails sowie Rundfunk, Tele­ und Mediendienste.(3) Die Vorschriften über Fernabsatzverträge finden keine Anwendung auf Verträge1. über Fernunterricht (§ 1 Fernunterrichtsschutzgesetz),2. über die Teilzeitnutzung von Wohngebäuden (§ 481),3. über Finanzgeschäfte, insbesondere Bankgeschäfte, Finanz­ und Wertpapierdienstleistungen und Versicherungen sowie deren Vermittlung, ausgenommen Darlehensvermittlungsverträge,4. über die Veräußerung von Grundstücken und grundstücksgleichen Rechten, die Begründung, Veräußerung und Aufhebung von dinglichen Rechten an Grundstücken und grundstücksgleichen Rechten sowie über die Errichtung von Bauwerken,5. über die Lieferung von Lebensmitteln, Getränken oder sonstigen Haushaltsgegenständen des täglichen Bedarfs, die am Wohnsitz, am Aufenthaltsort oder am Arbeitsplatz eines Verbrauchers von Unternehmern im Rahmen häufiger und regelmäßiger Fahrten geliefert werden,6. über die Erbringung von Dienstleistungen in den Bereichen Unterbringung, Beförderung, Lieferung von Speisen und Getränken sowie Freizeitgestaltung, wenn sich der Unternehmer bei Vertragsschluss verpflichtet, die Dienstleistungen zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt oder innerhalb eines genau angegebenen Zeitraums zu erbringen,7. die geschlossen werdena) unter Verwendung von Warenautomaten oder automatisierten Geschäftsräumen oderb) mit Betreibern von Telekommunikationsmitteln auf Grund der Benutzung von öffentlichen Fernsprechern, soweit sie deren Benutzung zum Gegenstand haben.§ 312b Distance contracts(1) Distance contracts are contracts for the delivery of goods or the supply of services which are concluded between a businessperson and a consumer exclusively by means of distance communication, unless the conclusion of the contract takes place otherwise than in the framework of a an organized distance sales or service-provision scheme.(2) Means of distance communication are means of communication which can be used with a view to or in order to conclude a contract between a consumer and a businessperson without the simultaneous physical presence of the contracting parties, in particular, letters, catalogues, telephone calls, telefax, emails, and radio, television and media services.(3) The provisions on distance contracts do not apply to contracts1. concerning distance learning (§ 1 of the Distance Learning Protection Act2. concerning time-sharing of residential premises (§ 481),3. concerning financial services, in particular bank transactions, finance and investment services and insurances and their arrangement, except contracts for the arrangement of loans,4. concerning the transfer of immovable property or other immovable property rights, the creation, transfer and annulment of real rights in land or other immovable property rights, and the construction of buildings,5. concerning the delivery of foodstuffs, beverages or other goods intended for everyday consumption supplied to the home of the consumer, to his residence or to his workplace by regular roundsmen,6. concerning the provision of accommodation, transport, catering or leisure services, where the businessperson undertakes, when the contract is concluded, to provide these services on a specific date or within a precisely specified period, or7. which are concludeda) by means of automatic vending machines or automated commercial premises, orb) with telecommunications operators through the use of public payphones in so far as they concern the use of those payphones.
§ 312c Unterrichtung des Verbrauchers bei Fernabsatzverträgen(1) Der Unternehmer hat den Verbraucher rechtzeitig vor Abschluss eines Fernabsatzvertrags in einer dem eingesetzten Fernkommunikationsmittel entsprechenden Weise klar und verständlich zu informieren über1. die Einzelheiten des Vertrags, für die dies in der Rechtsverordnung nach Artikel 240 des Einführungsgesetzes zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuche bestimmt ist, und2. den geschäftlichen Zweck des Vertrags.Bei Telefongesprächen muss der Unternehmer seine Identität und den geschäftlichen Zweck des Vertrags bereits zu Beginn des Gesprächs ausdrücklich offenlegen.(2) Der Unternehmer hat dem Verbraucher die in der Rechtsverordnung nach Artikel 240 des Einführungsgesetzes zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuche bestimmten Informationen in dem dort bestimmten Umfang und der dort bestimmten Art und Weise alsbald, spätestens bis zur vollständigen Erfüllung des Vertrags, bei Waren spätestens bei Lieferung an den Verbraucher, in Textform mitzuteilen.(3) Absatz 2 gilt nicht für Dienstleistungen, die unmittelbar durch Einsatz von Fernkommunikationsmitteln erbracht werden, sofern diese Leistungen in einem Mal erfolgen und über den Betreiber der Fernkommunikationsmittel abgerechnet werden. Der Verbraucher muss sich in diesem Fall aber über die Anschrift der Niederlassung des Unternehmers informieren können, bei der er Beanstandungen vorbringen kann.(4) Weitergehende Einschränkungen bei der Verwendung von Fernkommunikationsmitteln und weitergehende Informationspflichten auf Grund anderer Vorschriften bleiben unberührt.§ 312c Information to be given to consumers in the case of distance contracts(1) In good time prior to the conclusion of any distance contract, the consumer must be provided with the following information in a clear and comprehensible manner in any way appropriate to the means of distance communication used, of1. the details of the contract specified by the Regulation under Article 240 of the Introductory Act to the Civil Code and2. the commercial purpose of the contract.In the case of telephone communications, the identity of the businessperson and the commercial purpose of the call must be made explicitly clear at the beginning of any conversation with the consumer.(2) The businessperson must inform the consumer in textual form of the information specified in the Regulation under Article 240 of the Introductory Act to the Civil Code to the extent specified therein and in the manner laid down therein, in good time, at the latest by the completion of performance of the contract or, where goods are concerned, at the latest at the time of delivery to the consumer.(3) Subsection (2) above does not apply to services which are performed through the use of a means of distance communication, where they are supplied in one go and are invoiced by the operator of the means of distance communication. Nevertheless, the consumer must in all cases be able to obtain the geographical address of the place of business of the businessperson to which he may address any complaints.(4) More extensive restrictions of the use of means of telecommunication and more extensive duties to provide information on the basis of other provisions are unaffected.
§ 312d Widerrufs­ und Rückgaberecht bei Fernabsatzverträgen(1) Dem Verbraucher steht bei einem Fernabsatzvertrag ein Widerrufsrecht nach § 355 zu. Anstelle des Widerrufsrechts kann dem Verbraucher bei Verträgen über die Lieferung von Waren ein Rückgaberecht nach § 356 eingeräumt werden.(2) Die Widerrufsfrist beginnt abweichend von § 355 Abs. 2 Satz 1 nicht vor Erfüllung der Informationspflichten gemäß § 312c Abs. 1 und 2, bei der Lieferung von Waren nicht vor dem Tag ihres Eingangs beim Empfänger, bei der wiederkehrenden Lieferung gleichartiger Waren nicht vor dem Tag des Eingangs der ersten Teillieferung und bei Dienstleistungen nicht vor dem Tag des Vertragsschlusses; § 355 Abs. 2 Satz 2 findet keine Anwendung.(3) Das Widerrufsrecht erlischt bei einer Dienstleistung auch, wenn der Unternehmer mit der Ausführung der Dienstleistung mit ausdrücklicher Zustimmung des Verbrauchers vor Ende der Widerrufsfrist begonnen hat oder der Verbraucher diese selbst veranlasst hat.(4) Das Widerrufsrecht besteht, soweit nicht ein anderes bestimmt ist, nicht bei Fernabsatzverträgen1. zur Lieferung von Waren, die nach Kundenspezifikation angefertigt werden oder eindeutig auf die persönlichen Bedürfnisse zugeschnitten sind oder die auf Grund ihrer Beschaffenheit nicht für eine Rücksendung geeignet sind oder schnell verderben können oder deren Verfalldatum überschritten würde,2. zur Lieferung von Audio­ oder Videoaufzeichnungen oder von Software, sofern die gelieferten Datenträger vom Verbraucher entsiegelt worden sind,3. zur Lieferung von Zeitungen, Zeitschriften und Illustrierten,4. zur Erbringung von Wett­ und Lotterie­Dienstleistungen oder5. die in der Form von Versteigerungen (§ 156) geschlossen werden.§ 312d Right of revocation and return in distance contracts(1) In the case of a distance contract the consumer has a right of revocation under § 355. In the case of contracts for the delivery of goods, the consumer may be granted a right of return under § 356 instead of the right of revocation.(2) In derogation from § 355 (2), sentence 1, the revocation period does not commence before the duties to provide information in accordance with § 312c (1) and (2) have been fulfilled; in the case of the delivery of goods not before the day on which they reach the recipient; in the case of a recurring deliveries of goods of the same kind, not before the day on which the first instalment reaches the recipient; and in the case of services, not before the day on which the contract is concluded. § 355 (2), sentence 2, does not apply.(3) In the case of a service, the right of revocation also expires if the businessperson has begun to provide the service with the express consent of the consumer before the end of the revocation period or if the consumer himself has occasioned this.(4) Save where otherwise provided, there is no right of revocation in the case of distance contracts1. for the delivery of goods made to the consumer’s specifications or clearly personalized or which, by reason of their nature, cannot be returned or are liable to deteriorate or expire rapidly or where the recommended period for their consumption would be exceeded,2. for the delivery of audio or video recordings or of software which were unsealed by the consumer,3. for the delivery of newspapers, periodicals and magazines,4. for gaming and lottery services, or5. concluded by way of auction (§ 156).
§ 312e Pflichten im elektronischen Geschäftsverkehr(1) Bedient sich ein Unternehmer zum Zwecke des Abschlusses eines Vertrags über die Lieferung von Waren oder über die Erbringung von Dienstleistungen eines Tele-oder Mediendienstes (Vertrag im elektronischen Geschäftsverkehr), hat er dem Kunden1. angemessene, wirksame und zugängliche technische Mittel zur Verfügung zu stellen, mit deren Hilfe der Kunde Eingabefehler vor Abgabe seiner Bestellung erkennen und berichtigen kann,2. die in der Rechtsverordnung nach Artikel 241 des Einführungsgesetzes zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuche bestimmten Informationen rechtzeitig vor Abgabe von dessen Bestellung klar und verständlich mitzuteilen,3. den Zugang von dessen Bestellung unverzüglich auf elektronischem Wege zu bestätigen und4. die Möglichkeit zu verschaffen, die Vertragsbestimmungen einschließlich der einbezogenen Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen bei Vertragsschluss abzurufen und in wiedergabefähiger Form zu speichern.Bestellung und Empfangsbestätigung im Sinne von Satz 1 Nr. 3 gelten als zugegangen, wenn die Parteien, für die sie bestimmt sind, sie unter gewöhnlichen Umständen abrufen können.(2) Absatz 1 Satz 1 Nr. 1 bis 3 findet keine Anwendung, wenn der Vertrag ausschließlich durch individuelle Kommunikation geschlossen wird. Absatz 1 Satz 1 Nr. 1 bis 3 und Satz 2 finden keine Anwendung, wenn zwischen Vertragsparteien, die nicht Verbraucher sind, etwas anderes vereinbart wird.(3) Weitergehende Informationspflichten auf Grund anderer Vorschriften bleiben unberührt. Steht dem Kunden ein Widerrufsrecht gemäß § 355 zu, beginnt die Widerrufsfrist abweichend von § 355 Abs. 2 Satz 1 nicht vor Erfüllung der in Absatz 1 Satz 1 geregelten Pflichten.§ 312e Duties in electronic business transactions(1) If a businessperson uses a television or media service for the purpose of concluding a contract for the delivery of goods or the supply of services (electronic contract), he must1. provide the customer with appropriate, effective and accessible technical means allowing the customer to identify and correct input errors, prior to sending his order,2. in good time before the sending of his order, communicate to the customer clearly and comprehensibly the information specified in the Regulation under Article 241 of the Introductory Act to the Civil Code,3. acknowledge to the customer the receipt of his order without undue delay and by electronic means, and4. enable the customer to retrieve and save in reproducible form the conditions of the contract including standard business terms incorporated in it upon conclusion of the contract.The order and the acknowledgement of receipt within the meaning of sentence 1, No. 3 are deemed to be received when the parties to whom they are addressed are able to access them in normal circumstances.(2) Subsection (1), sentence 1, No. 1 to 3 does not apply if the contract is concluded exclusively by personal communication. Subsection (1) sentence 1, No 1 to 3 and sentence 2 does not apply if otherwise agreed in a contract between parties who are not consumers.(3) More extensive duties to provide information pursuant to other provisions are unaffected. If the customer is entitled to a right of revocation under § 355, the revocation period does not begin, in derogation from § 355 (2), sentence 1, until the duties laid down in subsection (1), sentence 1, have been performed.
§ 312f Abweichende VereinbarungenVon den Vorschriften dieses Untertitels darf, soweit nicht ein anderes bestimmt ist, nicht zum Nachteil des Verbrauchers oder Kunden abgewichen werden. Die Vorschriften dieses Untertitels finden, soweit nicht ein anderes bestimmt ist, auch Anwendung, wenn sie durch anderweitige Gestaltungen umgangen werden.§ 312f Contrary agreementsSave where otherwise provided, no derogation from the provisions of this sub-title may be made to the detriment of the consumer or customer. The provisions of this sub-title apply, save where otherwise provided, even if they are circumvented by other arrangements.

Untertitel 3: Anpassung und Beendigung von Verträgen

Sub-title 3: Adaptation and cessation of contracts

§ 313 Störung der Geschäftsgrundlage (1) Haben sich Umstände, die zur Grundlage des Vertrags geworden sind, nach Vertragsschluss schwerwiegend verändert und hätten die Parteien den Vertrag nicht oder mit anderem Inhalt geschlossen, wenn sie diese Veränderung vorausgesehen hätten, so kann Anpassung des Vertrags verlangt werden, soweit einem Teil unter Berücksichtigung aller Umstände des Einzelfalles, insbesondere der vertraglichen oder gesetzlichen Risikoverteilung, das Festhalten am unveränderten Vertrag nicht zugemutet werden kann.(2) Einer Veränderung der Umstände steht es gleich, wenn wesentliche Vorstellungen, die zur Grundlage des Vertrags geworden sind, sich als falsch herausstellen.(3) Ist eine Anpassung des Vertrags nicht möglich oder einem Teil nicht zumutbar, so kann der benachteiligte Teil vom Vertrag zurücktreten. An die Stelle des Rücktrittsrechts tritt für Dauerschuldverhältnisse das Recht zur Kündigung.§ 313 Interference with the basis of the contract(1) If circumstances upon which a contract was based have materially changed after conclusion of the contract and if the parties would not have concluded the contract or would have done so upon different terms if they had foreseen that change, adaptation of the contract may be claimed in so far as, having regard to all the circumstances of the specific case, in particular the contractual or statutory allocation of risk, it cannot reasonably be expected that a party should continue to be bound by the contract in its unaltered form.(2) If material assumptions that have become the basis of the contract subsequently turn out to be incorrect, they are treated in the same way as a change in circumstances.(3) If adaptation of the contract is not possible or cannot reasonably be imposed on one party, the disadvantaged party may terminate the contract. In the case of a contract for the performance of a recurring obligation, the right to terminate is replaced by the right to terminate on notice.
§ 314 Kündigung von Dauerschuldverhältnissen aus wichtigem Grund(1) Dauerschuldverhältnisse kann jeder Vertragsteil aus wichtigem Grund ohne Einhaltung einer Kündigungsfrist kündigen. Ein wichtiger Grund liegt vor, wenn dem kündigenden Teil unter Berücksichtigung aller Umstände des Einzelfalls und unter Abwägung der beiderseitigen Interessen die Fortsetzung des Vertragsverhältnisses bis zur vereinbarten Beendigung oder bis zum Ablauf einer Kündigungsfrist nicht zugemutet werden kann.(2) Besteht der wichtige Grund in der Verletzung einer Pflicht aus dem Vertrag, ist die Kündigung erst nach erfolglosem Ablauf einer zur Abhilfe bestimmten Frist oder nach erfolgloser Abmahnung zulässig. § 323 Abs. 2 findet entsprechende Anwendung.(3) Der Berechtigte kann nur innerhalb einer angemessenen Frist kündigen, nachdem er vom Kündigungsgrund Kenntnis erlangt hat.(4) Die Berechtigung, Schadensersatz zu verlangen, wird durch die Kündigung nicht ausgeschlossen.§ 314 Termination, for good cause, of contracts for the performance of a recurring obligation (1) Either party may terminate a contract for the performance of a recurring obligation on notice with immediate effect if there is good cause for doing so. There is good cause if, having regard to all the circumstances of the specific case and balancing the interests of both parties, the terminating party cannot reasonably be expected to continue the contractual relationship until the agreed termination date or until the end of a notice period.(2) If the good cause consists in the infringement of a duty under the contract, the contract may be terminated on notice only after a specified period for remedial action has expired or notice of default has been given to no avail. § 323 (2) applies mutatis mutandis.(3) The person entitled may terminate only if he gives notice of termination within a reasonable period after becoming aware of the cause for termination.(4) The right to claim damages is not precluded by the termination.

Untertitel 4: Einseitige Leistungsbestimmungsrechte

Titel 2: Gegenseitiger Vertrag

Sub-title 4: Unilateral rights to specify performance

Title 2: Synallagmatic contracts

 320 Einrede des nichterfüllten Vertrags(1) Wer aus einem gegenseitigen Vertrage verpflichtet ist, kann die ihm obliegende Leistung bis zur Bewirkung der Gegenleistung verweigern, es sei denn, daß er vorzuleisten verpflichtet ist. Hat die Leistung an mehrere zu erfolgen, so kann dem einzelnen der ihm gebührende Teil bis zur Bewirkung der ganzen Gegenleistung verweigert werden. Die Vorschrift des § 273 Abs. 3 findet keine Anwendung.(2) Ist von der einen Seite teilweise geleistet worden, so kann die Gegenleistung insoweit nicht verweigert werden, als die Verweigerung nach den Umständen, insbesondere wegen verhältnismäßiger Geringfügigkeit des rückständigen Teiles, gegen Treu und Glauben verstoßen würde.§ 320 Defence of failure to perform the contract(1) Unless the contract requires him to perform first, a person bound by a synallagmatic contract may refuse to perform his part until the other party effects counter-performance. If performance is to be made to several persons, the part due to one of them can be refused until the entire counter-performance has been effected. The rule in § 273 (3) does not apply.(2) If one party has partially performed, counter-performance may not be refused if, under the circumstances, in particular on account of the relative insignificance of the part not performed, the refusal would constitute bad faith.
§ 321 Unsicherheitseinrede(1) Wer aus einem gegenseitigen Vertrag vorzuleisten verpflichtet ist, kann die ihm obliegende Leistung verweigern, wenn nach Abschluss des Vertrags erkennbar wird, dass sein Anspruch auf die Gegenleistung durch mangelnde Leistungsfähigkeit des anderen Teils gefährdet wird. Das Leistungsverweigerungsrecht entfällt, wenn die Gegenleistung bewirkt oder Sicherheit für sie geleistet wird.(2) Der Vorleistungspflichtige kann eine angemessene Frist bestimmen, in welcher der andere Teil Zug um Zug gegen die Leistung nach seiner Wahl die Gegenleistung zu bewirken oder Sicherheit zu leisten hat. Nach erfolglosem Ablauf der Frist kann der Vorleistungspflichtige vom Vertrag zurücktreten. § 323 findet entsprechende Anwendung.§ 321 Defence of insecurityA person bound by a synallagmatic contract to perform first may refuse to perform his part if after conclusion of the contract it becomes apparent that his claim for counter-performance is endangered by the other party’s lack of ability to perform. The right to refuse to perform ceases if counter-performance is effected or security provided for it.(2) The person required to perform first may specify a reasonable period within which the other party must, at his option, effect counter-performance or provide security concurrently with performance. If the period expires to no avail the person required to perform first may terminate the contract. § 323 applies mutatis mutandis.
§ 322 Verurteilung zur Leistung Zug-um-Zug(1) Erhebt aus einem gegenseitigen Vertrage der eine Teil Klage auf die ihm geschuldete Leistung, so hat die Geltendmachung des dem anderen Teile zustehenden Rechtes, die Leistung bis zur Bewirkung der Gegenleistung zu verweigern, nur die Wirkung, daß der andere Teil zur Erfüllung Zug um Zug zu verurteilen ist.(2) Hat der klagende Teil vorzuleisten, so kann er, wenn der andere Teil im Verzuge der Annahme ist, auf Leistung nach Empfang der Gegenleistung klagen.(3) Auf die Zwangsvollstreckung findet die Vorschrift des § 274 Abs. 2 Anwendung.§ 322 Order to perform concurrently(1) If a party under a synallagmatic contract brings an action for performance and the other party asserts his right to refuse to perform until he receives counter-performance, the only effect of that assertion is that the other party must be ordered to perform concurrently.(2) If the party bringing the action must perform his part first, he may, if the other party is in default through non-acceptance, bring an action for performance after receipt of counter-performance.(3) The rule in § 274 (2) applies to execution of the judgment.
§ 323 Rücktritt wegen nicht oder nicht vertragsgemäß erbrachter Leistung(1) Erbringt bei einem gegenseitigen Vertrag der Schuldner eine fällige Leistung nicht oder nicht vertragsgemäß, so kann der Gläubiger, wenn er dem Schuldner erfolglos eine angemessene Frist zur Leistung oder Nacherfüllung bestimmt hat, vom Vertrag zurücktreten.(2) Die Fristsetzung ist entbehrlich, wenn1. der Schuldner die Leistung ernsthaft und endgültig verweigert,2. der Schuldner die Leistung zu einem im Vertrag bestimmten Termin oder innerhalb einer bestimmten Frist nicht bewirkt und der Gläubiger im Vertrag den Fortbestand seines Leistungsinteresses an die Rechtzeitigkeit der Leistung gebunden hat oder3. besondere Umstände vorliegen, die unter Abwägung der beiderseitigen Interessen den sofortigen Rücktritt rechtfertigen.(3) Kommt nach der Art der Pflichtverletzung eine Fristsetzung nicht in Betracht, so tritt an deren Stelle eine Abmahnung.(4) Der Gläubiger kann bereits vor dem Eintritt der Fälligkeit der Leistung zurücktreten, wenn offensichtlich ist, dass die Voraussetzungen des Rücktritts eintreten werden.(5) Hat der Schuldner eine Teilleistung bewirkt, so kann der Gläubiger vom ganzen Vertrag nur zurücktreten, wenn er an der Teilleistung kein Interesse hat. Hat der Schuldner die Leistung nicht vertragsgemäß bewirkt, so kann der Gläubiger vom Vertrag nicht zurücktreten, wenn die Pflichtverletzung unerheblich ist.(6) Der Rücktritt ist ausgeschlossen, wenn der Gläubiger für den Umstand, der ihn zum Rücktritt berechtigen würde, allein oder weit überwiegend verantwortlich ist, oder wenn der vom Schuldner nicht zu vertretende Umstand zu einer Zeit eintritt, zu welcher der Gläubiger im Verzug der Annahme ist.§ 323 Termination for non-performance or for performance not in accordance with the contract(1) If under a synallagmatic contract the obligor fails to effect performance when due or to perform in accordance with the contract, the obligee may terminate the contract, if he has fixed, to no avail, an additional period of time for performance.(2) A period of time does not have to be fixed if1. the obligor seriously and definitely refuses to perform,2. the obligor fails to perform by a date specified in the contract or within a specified period and, in the contract, the obligee has linked the continuation of his interest in performance to the punctuality of that performance, or3. special circumstances exist which, after each party’s interests have been weighed, justify immediate termination.(3) If the type of breach of duty is such that, it is not feasible to fix a period for performance, a warning notice replaces it.(4) The obligee may terminate the contract before performance becomes due if it is obvious that the preconditions for termination will be satisfied.(5) If the obligor has performed in part, the obligee may terminate the entire contract only if he has no interest in partial performance. If the obligor has failed to perform in accordance with the contract, the obligee may not terminate the contract if there has been no more than an immaterial breach of duty.(6) Termination is excluded if the obligee is solely or overwhelmingly responsible for the circumstance which would entitle him to terminate the contract or if a circumstance for which the obligor is not responsible materialises at a time when the obligee is in default through non-acceptance.
§ 324 Rücktritt wegen Verletzung Pflicht nach § 241 Abs. 2Verletzt der Schuldner bei einem gegenseitigen Vertrag eine Pflicht nach § 241 Abs. 2, so kann der Gläubiger zurücktreten, wenn ihm ein Festhalten am Vertrag nicht mehr zuzumuten ist.§ 324 Termination for breach of a duty under § 241 (2)If the obligor breaches some other duty under § 241 (2) under a synallagmatic contract, the obligee may terminate the contract if he can no longer reasonably be expected to abide by the contract.
§ 325 Schadensersatz und RücktrittDas Recht, bei einem gegenseitigen Vertrag Schadensersatz zu verlangen, wird durch den Rücktritt nicht ausgeschlossen.§ 325 Compensation and terminationThe right to claim compensation in the case of a synallagmatic contract is not precluded by termination.
§ 326 Befreiung von der Gegenleistung und Rücktritt beim Ausschluss der Leistungspflicht(1) Braucht der Schuldner nach § 275 Abs. 1 bis 3 nicht zu leisten, entfällt der Anspruch auf die Gegenleistung; bei einer Teilleistung findet § 441 Abs. 3 entsprechende Anwendung. Satz 1 gilt nicht, wenn der Schuldner im Fall der nicht vertragsgemäßen Leistung die Nacherfüllung nach § 275 Abs. 1 bis 3 nicht zu erbringen braucht.(2) Ist der Gläubiger für den Umstand, auf Grund dessen der Schuldner nach § 275 Abs. 1 bis 3 nicht zu leisten braucht, allein oder weit überwiegend verantwortlich oder tritt dieser vom Schuldner nicht zu vertretende Umstand zu einer Zeit ein, zu welcher der Gläubiger im Verzug der Annahme ist, so behält der Schuldner den Anspruch auf die Gegenleistung. Er muss sich jedoch dasjenige anrechnen lassen, was er infolge der Befreiung von der Leistung erspart oder durch anderweitige Verwendung seiner Arbeitskraft erwirbt oder zu erwerben böswillig unterlässt.(3) Verlangt der Gläubiger nach § 285 Herausgabe des für den geschuldeten Gegenstand erlangten Ersatzes oder Abtretung des Ersatzanspruchs, so bleibt er zur Gegenleistung verpflichtet. Diese mindert sich jedoch nach Maßgabe des § 441 Abs. 3 insoweit, als der Wert des Ersatzes oder des Ersatzanspruchs hinter dem Wert der geschuldeten Leistung zurückbleibt.(4) Soweit die nach dieser Vorschrift nicht geschuldete Gegenleistung bewirkt ist, kann das Geleistete nach den §§ 346 bis 348 zurückgefordert werden.(5) Braucht der Schuldner nach § 275 Abs. 1 bis 3 nicht zu leisten, kann der Gläubiger zurücktreten; auf den Rücktritt findet § 323 mit der Maßgabe entsprechende Anwendung, dass die Fristsetzung entbehrlich ist.§ 326 Release from counter-performance, and termination where there is no duty to perform(1) If, by virtue of § 275 (1) to (3), the obligor is released from his obligation to perform, the claim for counter-performance lapses; in the case of part performance § 441 (3) applies mutatis mutandis. Sentence 1 does not apply if the obligor under § 275 (1) to (3) does not have to effect supplementary performance in the event of a failure to perform in accordance with the contract.(2) If the obligee is solely or overwhelmingly responsible for the circumstance releasing the obligor from the need to perform pursuant to § 275 (1) to (3), or if the obligor is not responsible for that circumstance and this occurs at a time when the obligee is in default through non-acceptance, the obligor retains his claim for counter-performance. He must, however, allow a deduction for whatever he saves as a result of release from performance, he acquires through the utilisation of his labour elsewhere, or he maliciously fails to acquire.(3) If, pursuant to § 285, the obligee demands the surrender of a substitute obtained for the object in respect of which the obligation is due or assignment of a substitute claim, he remains bound to effect counter-performance. Counter-performance is, however, reduced in accordance with § 441 (3) in so far as the value of the substitute or of the claim for compensation is less than the value of the performance due.(4) To the degree that counter-performance is effected although not due under this provision, whatever is effected may be reclaimed under §§ 346 to 348.(5) If, by virtue of § 275 (1) to (3), the obligor does not have to perform, the obligee may terminate; § 323 applies mutatis mutandis to the termination, except that it is not necessary to fix a period of time.
§ 327 (aufgehoben)§ 327 (repealed)

Titel 5: Rücktritt, Widerrufs­ und Rückgaberecht bei Verbraucherverträgen

Untertitel 1: Rücktritt

Title 5: Termination and right of revocation and of return in consumer contracts

Sub-title 1: Termination

§ 346 Wirkungen des Rücktritts(1) Hat sich eine Vertragspartei vertraglich den Rücktritt vorbehalten oder steht ihr ein gesetzliches Rücktrittsrecht zu, so sind im Fall des Rücktritts die empfangenen Leistungen zurückzugewähren und die gezogenen Nutzungen herauszugeben.(2) Statt der Rückgewähr hat der Schuldner Wertersatz zu leisten, soweit1. die Rückgewähr oder die Herausgabe nach der Natur des Erlangten ausgeschlossen ist,2. er den empfangenen Gegenstand verbraucht, veräußert, belastet, verarbeitet oder umgestaltet hat,3. der empfangene Gegenstand sich verschlechtert hat oder untergegangen ist; jedoch bleibt die durch die bestimmungsgemäße Ingebrauchnahme entstandene Verschlechterung außer Betracht.Ist im Vertrag eine Gegenleistung bestimmt, ist sie bei der Berechnung des Wertersatzes zugrundezulegen.(3) Die Pflicht zum Wertersatz entfällt,1. wenn sich der zum Rücktritt berechtigende Mangel erst während der Verarbeitung oder Umgestaltung des Gegenstandes gezeigt hat,2. soweit der Gläubiger die Verschlechterung oder den Untergang zu vertreten hat oder der Schaden bei ihm gleichfalls eingetreten wäre,3. wenn im Fall eines gesetzlichen Rücktrittsrechts die Verschlechterung oder der Untergang beim Berechtigten eingetreten ist, obwohl dieser diejenige Sorgfalt beobachtet hat, die er in eigenen Angelegenheiten anzuwenden pflegt.Eine verbleibende Bereicherung ist herauszugeben.(4) Der Gläubiger kann wegen Verletzung einer Pflicht aus Absatz 1 nach Maßgabe der §§ 280 bis 283 Schadensersatz verlangen.§ 346 Effects of termination(1) If one party to a contract has reserved a right to terminate the contract or if he has a statutory right of termination, then, if termination occurs, any performance received is to be returned, as are benefits derived from such performance.(2) The obligor must pay compensation for value rather than effect a return, where1. the return or surrender is excluded because of the nature of what has been acquired,2. he has consumed, transferred, encumbered, processed or transformed the object received,3. the object received has deteriorated or has been destroyed; any deterioration resulting from the proper use of the object for its intended purpose is, however, disregarded.If the contract specifies a counter-performance, such counter-performance is to be taken as a basis for calculation of the compensation for value.(3) There is no duty to pay compensation for value1. if the defect which gives the right to termination became apparent only during the processing or transformation of the item,2. in so far as the obligee is responsible for the deterioration or destruction or the damage would also have occurred in his hands,3. if, in the case of a statutory right of termination, the deterioration or destruction has occurred in the hands of the person entitled even though he has taken the care which he usually takes in his own affairs.Any remaining enrichment must be given up.(4) The obligee may demand compensation, in accordance with §§ 280 to 283, for infringement of a duty under subsection (1) above.
§ 347 Nutzungen und Verwendungen nach Rücktritt(1) Zieht der Schuldner Nutzungen entgegen den Regeln einer ordnungsmäßigen Wirtschaft nicht, obwohl ihm das möglich gewesen wäre, so ist er dem Gläubiger zum Wertersatz verpflichtet. Im Fall eines gesetzlichen Rücktrittsrechts hat der Berechtigte hinsichtlich der Nutzungen nur für diejenige Sorgfalt einzustehen, die er in eigenen Angelegenheiten anzuwenden pflegt.(2) Gibt der Schuldner den Gegenstand zurück, leistet er Wertersatz oder ist seine Wertersatzpflicht gemäß § 346 Abs. 3 Nr. 1 oder 2 ausgeschlossen, so sind ihm notwendige Verwendungen zu ersetzen. Andere Aufwendungen sind zu ersetzen, soweit der Gläubiger durch diese bereichert wird.§ 347 Benefits and expenditure after termination(1) If, contrary to the rules of proper management, the obligor has failed to derive benefits even though it would have been possible to do so, he must compensate the obligee for their value. In the case of termination based on a statutory right, the person entitled must display with regard to the benefits only the standard of care which he usually takes in his own affairs.(2) If the obligor returns the object, compensates the obligee for value, or if his duty to compensate for value is excluded pursuant to § 346 (3), Nos. 1 or 2, he must be reimbursed for necessary expenditure. Other expenditure is to be reimbursed in as much as the obligee is enriched by it.
§ 348 Erfüllung Zug um ZugDie sich aus dem Rücktritt ergebenden Verpflichtungen der Parteien sind Zug um Zug zu erfüllen. Die Vorschriften der §§ 320, 322 finden entsprechende Anwendung.§ 348 Concurrent performanceThe obligations of the parties arising out of termination are to be performed concurrently. The provisions of §§ 320 and 322 apply mutatis mutandis.
§ 349 Erklärung des RücktrittsDer Rücktritt erfolgt durch Erklärung gegenüber dem anderen Teile.§ 349 Declaration of terminationTermination is effected by declaration to the other party.
§ 350 Erlöschen des Rücktrittsrechts nach Fristsetzung Ist für die Ausübung des vertraglichen Rücktrittsrechts eine Frist nicht vereinbart, so kann dem Berechtigten von dem anderen Teil für die Ausübung eine angemessene Frist bestimmt werden. Das Rücktrittsrecht erlischt, wenn nicht der Rücktritt vor dem Ablauf der Frist erklärt wird.§ 350 Expiry of the right of termination after a period of time has been setIf a period has not been agreed for exercise of a contractual right of termination, the other party may fix a reasonable period within which the party entitled to terminate must exercise that right. If termination is not declared before the end of that period, the right of termination expires.
§ 351 Unteilbarkeit des RücktrittsrechtsSind bei einem Vertrag auf der einen oder der anderen Seite mehrere beteiligt, so kann das Rücktrittsrecht nur von allen und gegen alle ausgeübt werden. Erlischt das Rücktrittsrecht für einen der Berechtigten, so erlischt es auch für die übrigen.§ 351 Indivisibility of the right of terminationIf one or the other party to the contract consists of more than one person, the right to termination can be exercised only by all and against all persons. If the right to termination expires for one of the persons entitled, it also expires for the others.
§ 352 Aufrechnung nach NichterfüllungDer Rücktritt wegen Nichterfüllung einer Verbindlichkeit wird unwirksam, wenn der Schuldner sich von der Verbindlichkeit durch Aufrechnung befreien konnte und unverzüglich nach dem Rücktritt die Aufrechnung erklärt.§ 352 Set-off after failure to performTermination for failure to perform an obligation is ineffective if the obligor could free himself from the commitment by means of a set-off and declares a set-off immediately after the termination.
§ 353 Rücktritt gegen ReugeldIst der Rücktritt gegen Zahlung eines Reugeldes vorbehalten, so ist der Rücktritt unwirksam, wenn das Reugeld nicht vor oder bei der Erklärung entrichtet wird und der andere Teil aus diesem Grunde die Erklärung unverzüglich zurückweist. Die Erklärung ist jedoch wirksam, wenn das Reugeld unverzüglich nach der Zurückweisung entrichtet wird.§ 353 Termination on payment of a forfeitIf a right to terminate on payment of a forfeit has been reserved, termination is ineffective if the forfeit is not paid before or when the declaration is made and the other party immediately rejects the declaration on this ground. The declaration is nevertheless effective if the forfeit is paid immediately after the rejection.
§ 354 VerwirkungsklauselIst ein Vertrag mit dem Vorbehalte geschlossen, daß der Schuldner seiner Rechte aus dem Vertrage verlustig sein soll, wenn er seine Verbindlichkeit nicht erfüllt, so ist der Gläubiger bei dem Eintritte dieses Falles zum Rücktritte vom Vertrage berechtigt.§ 354 Forfeiture clauseIf a contract has been concluded with the reservation that the obligor will forfeit his rights under the contract if he does not fulfil his obligation, the obligee is entitled to terminate the contract if that case arises.

Untertitel 2: Widerrufs­ und Rückgaberecht bei Verbraucherverträgen

Sub-title 2: Right of revocation and of return in consumer contracts

§ 355 Widerrufsrecht bei Verbraucherverträgen(1) Wird einem Verbraucher durch Gesetz ein Widerrufsrecht nach dieser Vorschrift eingeräumt, so ist er an seine auf den Abschluss des Vertrags gerichtete Willenserklärung nicht mehr gebunden, wenn er sie fristgerecht widerrufen hat. Der Widerruf muss keine Begründung enthalten und ist in Textform oder durch Rücksendung der Sache innerhalb von zwei Wochen gegenüber dem Unternehmer zu erklären; zur Fristwahrung genügt die rechtzeitige Absendung.(2) Die Frist beginnt mit dem Zeitpunkt, zu dem dem Verbraucher eine deutlich gestaltete Belehrung über sein Widerrufsrecht, die ihm entsprechend den Erfordernissen des eingesetzten Kommunikationsmittels seine Rechte deutlich macht, in Textform mitgeteilt worden ist, die auch Namen und Anschrift desjenigen, gegenüber dem der Widerruf zu erklären ist, und einen Hinweis auf den Fristbeginn und die Regelung des Absatzes 1 Satz 2 enthält. Sie ist vom Verbraucher bei anderen als notariell beurkundeten Verträgen gesondert zu unterschreiben oder mit einer qualifizierten elektronischen Signatur zu versehen. Ist der Vertrag schriftlich abzuschließen, so beginnt die Frist nicht zu laufen, bevor dem Verbraucher auch eine Vertragsurkunde, der schriftliche Antrag des Verbrauchers oder eine Abschrift der Vertragsurkunde oder des Antrags zur Verfügung gestellt werden. Ist der Fristbeginn streitig, so trifft die Beweislast den Unternehmer.(3) Das Widerrufsrecht erlischt spätestens sechs Monate nach Vertragsschluss. Bei der Lieferung von Waren beginnt die Frist nicht vor dem Tag ihres Eingangs beim Empfänger.§ 355 Right of revocation in consumer contracts(1) If a consumer is granted a statutory right of revocation under this provision, he is no longer bound by his declaration of intention to conclude the contract if he has revoked it in good time. The revocation does not have to state any grounds and must be declared to the businessperson in textual form or by return of the thing within two weeks; punctual dispatch suffices to comply with the time limit.(2) The period begins when the consumer has been informed in textual form by a clearly formulated notice of his right of revocation which makes clear to him the nature of his rights in accordance with the requirements of the means of communication used, which also states the name and address of the person to whom revocation is to be declared and refers to the beginning of the period and the rules in subsection (1), sentence 2 above. Except in the case of contracts authenticated by a notary, it is to be signed separately by the consumer or provided by him with a qualified electronic signature. If the contract is to be made in writing, the period does not begin until the consumer has also been provided with a contract document, his written application or a copy of the contract document or of the application. If the beginning of the period is disputed, the businessperson bears the burden of proof.(3) The right of revocation ceases to exist at the latest six months after the conclusion of the contract. In the case of the delivery of goods the period does not begin before the day on which they reach the consignee.
§ 356 Rückgaberecht bei Verbraucherverträgen(1) Das Widerrufsrecht nach § 355 kann, soweit dies ausdrücklich durch Gesetz zugelassen ist, beim Vertragsschluss auf Grund eines Verkaufsprospekts im Vertrag durch ein uneingeschränktes Rückgaberecht ersetzt werden. Voraussetzung ist, dass1. im Verkaufsprospekt eine deutlich gestaltete Belehrung über das Rückgaberecht enthalten ist,2. der Verbraucher den Verkaufsprospekt in Abwesenheit des Unternehmers eingehend zur Kenntnis nehmen konnte und3. dem Verbraucher das Rückgaberecht in Textform eingeräumt wird.(2) Das Rückgaberecht kann innerhalb der Widerrufsfrist, die jedoch nicht vor Erhalt der Sache beginnt, und nur durch Rücksendung der Sache oder, wenn die Sache nicht als Paket versandt werden kann, durch Rücknahmeverlangen ausgeübt werden. § 355 Abs. 1 Satz 2 findet entsprechende Anwendung.§ 356 Right of return in consumer contracts(1) To the extent expressly allowed by statute, the right of revocation may, where the contract is concluded on the basis of a catalogue, be replaced in the contract by an unrestricted right of return. It is a precondition that1. the catalogue contains a clearly presented notice concerning the right of return,2. the consumer could peruse the contract in detail in the absence of the businessperson, and3. the right of return is granted to the consumer in textual form.(2) The right of return may be exercised within the revocation period, which does not, however, begin before receipt of the thing, and only by return of the thing or, if it cannot be dispatched as a parcel, be exercised by a demand for collection. § 355 (1), sentence 2 applies mutatis mutandis.
§ 357 Rechtsfolgen des Widerrufs und der Rückgabe (1) Auf das Widerrufs­ und das Rückgaberecht finden, soweit nicht ein anderes bestimmt ist, die Vorschriften über den gesetzlichen Rücktritt entsprechende Anwendung. Die in § 286 Abs. 3 bestimmte Frist beginnt mit der Widerrufs­ oder Rückgabeerklärung des Verbrauchers.(2) Der Verbraucher ist bei Ausübung des Widerrufsrechts zur Rücksendung verpflichtet, wenn die Sache durch Paket versandt werden kann. Kosten und Gefahr der Rücksendung trägt bei Widerruf und Rückgabe der Unternehmer. Wenn ein Widerrufsrecht besteht, dürfen dem Verbraucher bei einer Bestellung bis zu einem Betrag von 40 Euro die regelmäßigen Kosten der Rücksendung vertraglich auferlegt werden, es sei denn, dass die gelieferte Ware nicht der bestellten entspricht.(3) Der Verbraucher hat abweichend von § 346 Abs. 2 Satz 1 Nr. 3 Wertersatz für eine durch die bestimmungsgemäße Ingebrauchnahme der Sache entstandene Verschlechterung zu leisten, wenn er spätestens bei Vertragsschluss in Textform auf diese Rechtsfolge und eine Möglichkeit hingewiesen worden ist, sie zu vermeiden. Dies gilt nicht, wenn die Verschlechterung ausschließlich auf die Prüfung der Sache zurückzuführen ist. § 346 Abs. 3 Satz 1 Nr. 3 findet keine Anwendung, wenn der Verbraucher über sein Widerrufsrecht ordnungsgemäß belehrt worden ist oder hiervon anderweitig Kenntnis erlangt hat.(4) Weitergehende Ansprüche bestehen nicht.§ 357 Legal consequences of revocation and return(1) Save where otherwise provided, the provisions on statutory termination apply mutatis mutandis to the right of revocation and return. The period laid down in § 286 (3) begins upon the consumer’s declaration of revocation or return.(2) In the event that he exercises the right of revocation the consumer is bound to return the thing if it can be sent as a parcel. The cost and risk of return is borne by the businessperson in the event of revocation and return. If a right of revocation exists, the normal costs of return may be imposed by contract on the consumer where the value of his order does not exceed Euro 40, unless the goods delivered do not correspond to the goods ordered.(3) In derogation from § 346 (2), sentence 1, No. 3, the consumer must pay compensation for value in respect of a deterioration in the goods as a result of their proper use, if his attention has previously been drawn in textual form to this legal consequence and to a means of avoiding it. This does not apply if the deterioration is due exclusively to inspection of the thing. § 346 (3), sentence 1, No. 3 does not apply if the consumer has been properly informed of his right of revocation or he has become aware of it in another way.(4) More extensive claims do not exist.
§ 358 Verbundene Verträge(1) Hat der Verbraucher seine auf den Abschluss eines Vertrags über die Lieferung einer Ware oder die Erbringung einer anderen Leistung durch einen Unternehmer gerichtete Willenserklärung wirksam widerrufen, so ist er auch an seine auf den Abschluss eines mit diesem Vertrag verbundenen Verbraucherdarlehensvertrags gerichtete Willenserklärung nicht mehr gebunden.(2) Hat der Verbraucher seine auf den Abschluss eines Verbraucherdarlehensvertrags gerichtete Willenserklärung wirksam widerrufen, so ist er auch an seine auf den Abschluss eines mit diesem Verbraucherdarlehensvertrag verbundenen Vertrags über die Lieferung einer Ware oder die Erbringung einer anderen Leistung gerichtete Willenserklärung nicht mehr gebunden. Kann der Verbraucher die auf den Abschluss des verbundenen Vertrags gerichtete Willenserklärung nach Maßgabe dieses Untertitels widerrufen, gilt allein Absatz 1 und sein Widerrufsrecht aus § 495 Abs. 1 ist ausgeschlossen. Erklärt der Verbraucher im Fall des Satzes 2 dennoch den Widerruf des Verbraucherdarlehensvertrags, gilt dies als Widerruf des verbundenen Vertrags gegenüber dem Unternehmer gemäß Absatz 1.(3) Ein Vertrag über die Lieferung einer Ware oder die Erbringung einer anderen Leistung und ein Verbraucherdarlehensvertrag sind verbunden, wenn das Darlehen ganz oder teilweise der Finanzierung des anderen Vertrags dient und beide Verträge eine wirtschaftliche Einheit bilden. Eine wirtschaftliche Einheit ist insbesondere anzunehmen, wenn der Unternehmer selbst die Gegenleistung des Verbrauchers finanziert, oder im Fall der Finanzierung durch einen Dritten, wenn sich der Darlehensgeber bei der Vorbereitung oder dem Abschluss des Verbraucherdarlehensvertrags der Mitwirkung des Unternehmers bedient.(4) § 357 gilt für den verbundenen Vertrag entsprechend. Im Falle des Absatzes 1 sind jedoch Ansprüche auf Zahlung von Zinsen und Kosten aus der Rückabwicklung des Verbraucherdarlehensvertrags gegen den Verbraucher ausgeschlossen. Der Darlehensgeber tritt im Verhältnis zum Verbraucher hinsichtlich der Rechtsfolgen des Widerrufs oder der Rückgabe in die Rechte und Pflichten des Unternehmers aus dem verbundenen Vertrag ein, wenn das Darlehen dem Unternehmer bei Wirksamwerden des Widerrufs oder der Rückgabe bereits zugeflossen ist.(5) Die erforderliche Belehrung über das Widerrufs­ oder Rückgaberecht muss auf die Rechtsfolgen nach Absatz 1 und Absatz 2 Satz 1 und 2 hinweisen.§ 358 Linked contracts(1) If the consumer has validly revoked his declaration of intention to conclude a contract for the delivery of goods or for other performance by a businessperson, he also ceases to be bound by his declaration of intention to conclude a consumer loan contract linked with that contract.(2) If the consumer has validly revoked his declaration of intention to conclude a consumer loan contract, he also ceases to be bound by his declaration of intention to conclude a contract linked with that consumer loan contract for the delivery of goods or the supply of other performance. If the consumer may revoke the declaration of intention to conclude the linked contract in accordance with this sub-title, solely subsection (1) applies and his right of revocation under § 495 (1) is excluded. If, in the case of sentence 2, the consumer nevertheless declares his revocation of the consumer loan contract, this is deemed to be the revocation of the linked contract with regard to the businessperson under subsection (1) above.(3) A contract for the delivery of goods or for the provision of other performance is linked to a consumer loan contract if the loan serves wholly or in part to finance the other contract and both contracts form an economic unit. An economic unit is to be assumed in particular if the businessperson himself finances the counter-performance by the consumer or, in the event of financing by a third person, if the giver of the loan uses the services of the businessperson in preparation for or for the conclusion of the consumer loan contract.(4) § 357 applies mutatis mutandis to the linked contract. In the case of subsection (1) above, however, no claims for payment of interest and costs arising out of the winding up of the consumer loan contract may be brought against the consumer. The giver of the loan assumes the rights and obligations of the businessperson under the linked contract in relation to the consumer with regard to the legal consequences of revocation or return if the loan has already passed to the businessperson when the revocation or return became effective.(5) The necessary notice concerning the right of revocation or return must draw attention to the legal consequences under subsections (1) and (2), sentence 1 and 2, above.
§§ 361 to 361b are repealed.§ 390, sentence 2, is repealed.
In § 425 (2) the words “Unterbrechung und Hemmung” are replaced by the words “Neubeginn, Hemmung und Ablaufhemmung”.

Abschnitt 8: Einzelne Schuldverhältnisse

Titel 1: Kauf, Tausch

Untertitel 1: Allgemeine Vorschriften

Section 8: Particular kinds of obligations

Title 1: Sale, exchange

Sub-title 1: General provisions

§ 433 Vertragstypische Pflichten beim Kaufvertrag(1) Durch den Kaufvertrag wird der Verkäufer einer Sache verpflichtet, dem Käufer die Sache zu übergeben und das Eigentum an der Sache zu verschaffen. Der Verkäufer hat dem Käufer die Sache frei von Sach­ und Rechtsmängeln zu verschaffen.(2) Der Käufer ist verpflichtet, dem Verkäufer den vereinbarten Kaufpreis zu zahlen und die gekaufte Sache abzunehmen.§ 433 Standard obligations in contracts of sale(1) By a contract of sale the seller of a thing is bound to hand over the thing to the buyer and to transfer to him ownership of the thing. The seller must procure the thing for the buyer in a state that is free from defects as to quality and defects of title.(2) The buyer is bound to pay to the seller the agreed price and to take delivery of the thing purchased.
§ 434 Sachmangel(1) Die Sache ist frei von Sachmängeln, wenn sie bei Gefahrübergang die vereinbarte Beschaffenheit hat. Soweit die Beschaffenheit nicht vereinbart ist, ist die Sache frei von Sachmängeln,1. wenn sie sich für die nach dem Vertrag vorausgesetzte Verwendung eignet, sonst2. wenn sie sich für die gewöhnliche Verwendung eignet und eine Beschaffenheit aufweist, die bei Sachen der gleichen Art üblich ist und die der Käufer nach der Art der Sache erwarten kann.Zu der Beschaffenheit nach Satz 2 Nr. 2 gehören auch Eigenschaften, die der Käufer nach den öffentlichen Äußerungen des Verkäufers, des Herstellers (§ 4 Abs. 1 und 2 des Produkthaftungsgesetzes) oder seines Gehilfen insbesondere in der Werbung oder bei der Kennzeichnung über bestimmte Eigenschaften der Sache erwarten kann, es sei denn, dass der Verkäufer die Äußerung nicht kannte und auch nicht kennen musste, dass sie im Zeitpunkt des Vertragsschlusses in gleichwertiger Weise berichtigt war oder dass sie die Kaufentscheidung nicht beeinflussen konnte.(2) Ein Sachmangel ist auch dann gegeben, wenn die vereinbarte Montage durch den Verkäufer oder dessen Erfüllungsgehilfen unsachgemäß durchgeführt worden ist. Ein Sachmangel liegt bei einer zur Montage bestimmten Sache ferner vor, wenn die Montageanleitung mangelhaft ist, es sei denn, die Sache ist fehlerfrei montiert worden.(3) Einem Sachmangel steht es gleich, wenn der Verkäufer eine andere Sache oder eine zu geringe Menge liefert.§ 434 Defects as to quality(1) The thing is free from defects as to quality if, upon the passing of the risk, the thing is in the agreed quality. If the quality has not been agreed, the thing is free from defects as to quality1. if it is fit for the use specified in the contract, and otherwise2. if it is fit for the normal use and its quality is such as is usual in things of the same kind and can be expected by the buyer by virtue of its nature.For the purposes of sentence 2, No. 2, above, condition includes features which the buyer may expect by virtue of public statements concerning the thing’s features that are made by the seller, the producer (§ 4 (1) and (2) of the Product Liability Act) or persons assisting him, in particular in advertisements or in connection with labelling, unless the seller was not aware of the statement nor ought to have been aware of it, or at the time of the conclusion of the contract it had been corrected by equivalent means, or it could not influence the decision to purchase the thing.(2) There is a defect as to quality also where the agreed assembly of the thing has not been properly performed by the seller or persons employed by him for that purpose. Moreover, there is a defect as to quality of a thing intended to be assembled if the assembly instructions are defective, save where the thing has been assembled correctly.(3) Delivery by the seller of a different thing or of a lesser amount of the thing is equivalent to a defect as to quality.
§ 435 RechtsmangelDie Sache ist frei von Rechtsmängeln, wenn Dritte in Bezug auf die Sache keine oder nur die im Kaufvertrag übernommenen Rechte gegen den Käufer geltend machen können. Einem Rechtsmangel steht es gleich, wenn im Grundbuch ein Recht eingetragen ist, das nicht besteht.§ 435 Defects of titleThe thing is free from defects of title if third parties cannot assert against the buyer, in relation to the thing, any rights or can assert only such rights as are assumed in the sales contract. Entry in the land register of a right that does not exist is equivalent to a defect of title.
§ 436 Öffentliche Lasten von Grundstücken (1) Soweit nicht anders vereinbart, ist der Verkäufer eines Grundstücks verpflichtet, Erschließungsbeiträge und sonstige Anliegerbeiträge für die Maßnahmen zu tragen, die bis zum Tage des Vertragsschlusses bautechnisch begonnen sind, unabhängig vom Zeitpunkt des Entstehens der Beitragsschuld.(2) Der Verkäufer eines Grundstücks haftet nicht für die Freiheit des Grundstücks von anderen öffentlichen Abgaben und von anderen öffentlichen Lasten, die zur Eintragung in das Grundbuch nicht geeignet sind.§ 436 Public charges with respect to land(1) Save where otherwise agreed, the seller of land is bound to bear development costs and other adjoining property charges in respect of building-related measures which have been commenced prior to the conclusion of the contract, irrespective of when those charges arise.(2) The seller of land is not responsible for the land being free from other public levies and other public charges that are not of such a nature as to be registered in the land register.
§ 437 Rechte des Käufers bei MängelnIst die Sache mangelhaft, kann der Käufer, wenn die Voraussetzungen der folgenden Vorschriften vorliegen und soweit nicht ein anderes bestimmt ist,1. nach § 439 Nacherfüllung verlangen,2. nach den §§ 440, 323 und 326 Abs. 5 von dem Vertrag zurücktreten oder nach § 441 den Kaufpreis mindern und3. nach den §§ 440, 280, 281, 283 und 311a Schadensersatz oder nach § 284 Ersatz vergeblicher Aufwendungen verlangen.§ 437 Buyer’s rights in the event of defectsIf the thing is defective, then, if the requirements of the following provisions are satisfied and save as otherwise provided, the buyer may1. demand supplementary performance under § 439;2. terminate the contract under §§ 440, 323, and 326 (5), or reduce the purchase price under § 441; and3. claim compensation under §§ 440, 280, 281, 283 and 311a, or reimbursement for wasted expenditure under § 284.
§ 438 Verjährung der Mängelansprüche(1) Die in § 437 Nr. 1 und 3 bezeichneten Ansprüche verjähren1. in 30 Jahren, wenn der Mangela) in einem dinglichen Recht eines Dritten, auf Grund dessen Herausgabe der Kaufsache verlangt werden kann, oderb) in einem sonstigen Recht, das im Grundbuch eingetragen ist, besteht,2. in fünf Jahrena) bei einem Bauwerk undb) bei einer Sache, die entsprechend ihrer üblichen Verwendungsweise für ein Bauwerk verwendet worden ist und dessen Mangelhaftigkeit verursacht hat, und3. im Übrigen in zwei Jahren.(2) Die Verjährung beginnt bei Grundstücken mit der Übergabe, im Übrigen mit der Ablieferung der Sache.(3) Abweichend von Absatz 1 Nr. 2 und 3 und Absatz 2 verjähren die Ansprüche in der regelmäßigen Verjährungsfrist, wenn der Verkäufer den Mangel arglistig verschwiegen hat. Im Fall des Absatzes 1 Nr. 2 tritt die Verjährung jedoch nicht vor Ablauf der dort bestimmten Frist ein.(4) Für das in § 437 bezeichnete Rücktrittsrecht gilt § 218. Der Käufer kann trotz einer Unwirksamkeit des Rücktritts nach § 218 Abs. 1 die Zahlung des Kaufpreises insoweit verweigern, als er auf Grund des Rücktritts dazu berechtigt sein würde. Macht er von diesem Recht Gebrauch, kann der Verkäufer vom Vertrag zurücktreten.(5) Auf das in § 437 bezeichnete Minderungsrecht finden § 218 und Absatz 4 Satz 2 entsprechende Anwendung.§ 438 Limitation of claims in respect of defects(1) The claims set out in § 437 Nos 1 and 3 are time-barred:1. in 30 years, if the defect consistsa) in a third party right in rem pursuant to which surrender of the thing purchased can be demanded, orb) in some other right registered in the land register,2. in five years,a) in the case of a building andb) in the case of a thing which has been used for a building in accordance with its normal use and has caused it to be defective, and3. otherwise, in two years.(2) In the case of land the limitation period begins upon its being handed over, in other cases upon delivery of the thing.(3) In derogation from subsections (1), Nos 2 and 3, and (2) above, the claims are time-barred at the end of the standard limitation period, if the seller fraudulently concealed the defect. However in the case of subsection (1), No 2, above, the claims are not time-barred before the expiry of the period specified there.(4) § 218 applies to the right of termination specified in § 437. Even though the buyer’s termination is ineffective by virtue of § 218 (1), he may refuse to pay the purchase price in so far as termination would entitle him to do so. If he makes use of that right, the seller may terminate the contract.(5) § 218 and subsection (4), sentence 2, above apply mutatis mutandis to the right to reduce the price specified in § 437.
§ 439 Nacherfüllung (1) Der Käufer kann als Nacherfüllung nach seiner Wahl die Beseitigung des Mangels oder die Lieferung einer mangelfreien Sache verlangen.(2) Der Verkäufer hat die zum Zweck der Nacherfüllung erforderlichen Aufwendungen, insbesondere Transport­, Wege­, Arbeits­ und Materialkosten zu tragen.(3) Der Verkäufer kann die vom Käufer gewählte Art der Nacherfüllung unbeschadet des § 275 Abs. 2 und 3 verweigern, wenn sie nur mit unverhältnismäßigen Kosten möglich ist. Dabei sind insbesondere der Wert der Sache in mangelfreiem Zustand, die Bedeutung des Mangels und die Frage zu berücksichtigen, ob auf die andere Art der Nacherfüllung ohne erhebliche Nachteile für den Käufer zurückgegriffen werden könnte. Der Anspruch des Käufers beschränkt sich in diesem Fall auf die andere Art der Nacherfüllung; das Recht des Verkäufers, auch diese unter den Voraussetzungen des Satzes 1 zu verweigern, bleibt unberührt.(4) Liefert der Verkäufer zum Zweck der Nacherfüllung eine mangelfreie Sache, so kann er vom Käufer Rückgewähr der mangelhaften Sache nach Maßgabe der §§ 346 bis 348 verlangen.§ 439 Supplementary performance(1) As supplementary performance, the buyer may, at his option, demand the removal of the defect or supply of a thing free from defects.(2) The seller must bear all expenditure required for the purposes of supplementary performance, in particular carriage, transport, labour and material costs.(3) Without prejudice to § 275 (2) and (3), the seller may refuse the form of supplementary performance chosen by the buyer if such performance is possible only with unreasonable expense. In that connection, it is necessary to have regard in particular to the value of the thing when free from defects, the significance of the defect and the question whether the defect could be remedied by the other form of supplementary performance without material detriment to the buyer. The buyer’s claim is restricted in this case to the other form of supplementary performance; the seller’s right to refuse also that supplementary performance under the conditions laid out in sentence 1 above is unaffected.(4) If the seller delivers a thing free from defects for the purpose of supplementary performance, he may demand the return of the defective thing in accordance with §§ 346 to 348.
§ 440 Besondere Bestimmungen für Rücktritt und SchadensersatzAußer in den Fällen des § 281 Abs. 2 und des § 323 Abs. 2 bedarf es der Fristsetzung auch dann nicht, wenn der Verkäufer beide Arten der Nacherfüllung gemäß § 439 Abs. 3 verweigert oder wenn die dem Käufer zustehende Art der Nacherfüllung fehlgeschlagen oder ihm unzumutbar ist. Eine Nachbesserung gilt nach dem erfolglosen zweiten Versuch als fehlgeschlagen, wenn sich nicht insbesondere aus der Art der Sache oder des Mangels oder den sonstigen Umständen etwas anderes ergibt.§ 440 Special provisions concerning termination and compensationExcept in the cases of § 281 (2) and § 323 (2), it is not necessary to fix a period of time if the seller has refused to perform both forms of supplementary performance under § 439 (3) or if the form of supplementary performance to which the buyer is entitled has failed or would be unreasonable for him. A repair is deemed to have failed after two unsuccessful attempts, unless, having regard in particular to the nature of the thing or of the defect or the other circumstances, a different conclusion is appropriate.
§ 441 Minderung(1) Statt zurückzutreten, kann der Käufer den Kaufpreis durch Erklärung gegenüber dem Verkäufer mindern. Der Ausschlussgrund des § 323 Abs. 5 Satz 2 findet keine Anwendung.(2) Sind auf der Seite des Käufers oder auf der Seite des Verkäufers mehrere beteiligt, so kann die Minderung nur von allen oder gegen alle erklärt werden.(3) Bei der Minderung ist der Kaufpreis in dem Verhältnis herabzusetzen, in welchem zur Zeit des Vertragsschlusses der Wert der Sache in mangelfreiem Zustand zu dem wirklichen Wert gestanden haben würde. Die Minderung ist, soweit erforderlich, durch Schätzung zu ermitteln.(4) Hat der Käufer mehr als den geminderten Kaufpreis gezahlt, so ist der Mehrbetrag vom Verkäufer zu erstatten. § 346 Abs. 1 und § 347 Abs. 1 finden entsprechende Anwendung.§ 441 Price reduction(1) Instead of terminating the contract, the buyer may, by declaration to the seller, reduce the price. The exclusion in § 323 (5), sentence 2, does not apply.(2) If the buyer or the seller consists of more than one person, price reduction may be declared only by or to all such persons.(3) In the case of price reduction, the purchase price is reduced in the ratio which the value of the thing free of defects would, at the time of the conclusion of the contract, have had to the actual value. Where necessary, the price reduction is to be estimated.(4) If the buyer has paid more than the reduced purchase price, the excess amount is to be refunded by the seller. § 346 (1) and § 347 (1) apply mutatis mutandis.
§ 442 Kenntnis des Käufers(1) Die Rechte des Käufers wegen eines Mangels sind ausgeschlossen, wenn er bei Vertragsschluss den Mangel kennt. Ist dem Käufer ein Mangel infolge grober Fahrlässigkeit unbekannt geblieben, kann der Käufer Rechte wegen dieses Mangels nur geltend machen, wenn der Verkäufer den Mangel arglistig verschwiegen oder eine Garantie für die Beschaffenheit der Sache übernommen hat.(2) Ein im Grundbuch eingetragenes Recht hat der Verkäufer zu beseitigen, auch wenn es der Käufer kennt.§ 442 Awareness of the buyer(1) The buyer has no rights in respect of a defect if he is aware of the defect upon conclusion of the contract. If, owing to gross negligence on his part, the buyer is unaware of a defect, he may assert rights in respect of that defect only if the seller fraudulently concealed the defect or guaranteed the quality of the thing.(2) A right registered in the land register must be removed by the seller even if the buyer is aware of it.
§ 443 Beschaffenheits- und Haltbarkeitsgarantie(1) Übernimmt der Verkäufer oder ein Dritter eine Garantie für die Beschaffenheit der Sache oder dafür, dass die Sache für eine bestimmte Dauer eine bestimmte Beschaffenheit behält (Haltbarkeitsgarantie), so stehen dem Käufer im Garantiefall unbeschadet der gesetzlichen Ansprüche die Rechte aus der Garantie zu den in der Garantieerklärung und der einschlägigen Werbung angegebenen Bedingungen gegenüber demjenigen zu, der die Garantie eingeräumt hat.(2) Soweit eine Haltbarkeitsgarantie übernommen worden ist, wird vermutet, dass ein während ihrer Geltungsdauer auftretender Sachmangel die Rechte aus der Garantie begründet.§ 443 Guarantee of quality and durability(1) If the seller or a third person guarantees the quality of the thing or that the thing will retain a particular quality for a specified period (guarantee of durability), then, in the event of a claim under the guarantee, the buyer has the rights under the guarantee upon the terms set out in the declaration of guarantee and in the relevant advertising against the person who gave the guarantee, and those rights do not affect his statutory claims.(2) In so far as a guarantee of durability has been given, it is assumed that a defect as to the quality of the thing which arises during the guarantee period establishes the rights under the guarantee.
§ 444 HaftungsausschlussAuf eine Vereinbarung, durch welche die Rechte des Käufers wegen eines Mangels ausgeschlossen oder beschränkt werden, kann sich der Verkäufer nicht berufen, wenn er den Mangel arglistig verschwiegen oder eine Garantie für die Beschaffenheit der Sache übernommen hat.§ 444 Exclusion of liabilityThe seller may not rely on an agreement excluding or restricting the buyer’s rights in respect of defects if the seller fraudulently concealed the defect or if he has guaranteed the quality of the thing.
§ 455 Haftungsbegrenzung bei öffentlichen VersteigerungenWird eine Sache auf Grund eines Pfandrechts in einer öffentlichen Versteigerung unter der Bezeichnung als Pfand verkauft, so stehen dem Käufer Rechte wegen eines Mangels nur zu, wenn der Verkäufer den Mangel arglistig verschwiegen oder eine Garantie für die Beschaffenheit der Sache übernommen hat.§ 455 Limitation of liability in the case of public auctionsIf a thing is sold pursuant to a lien in a public auction in which it is described as a pledge, the buyer has rights in respect of a defect only if the seller has fraudulently concealed the defect or guaranteed the condition of the thing.
§ 44 Gefahr­ und LastenübergangMit der Übergabe der verkauften Sache geht die Gefahr des zufälligen Untergangs und der zufälligen Verschlechterung auf den Käufer über. Von der Übergabe an gebühren dem Käufer die Nutzungen und trägt er die Lasten der Sache. Der Übergabe steht es gleich, wenn der Käufer im Verzug der Annahme ist.§ 446 Passing of risk and liability for chargesThe risk of accidental loss and accidental deterioration passes to the buyer when the thing sold is handed over. From that moment onwards the benefits related to the thing accrue to the buyer and charges on it are for his account. The same consequences arise if the buyer is in default in accepting delivery.
§ 447 Gefahrübergang beim Versendungskauf(1) Versendet der Verkäufer auf Verlangen des Käufers die verkaufte Sache nach einem anderen Ort als dem Erfüllungsort, so geht die Gefahr auf den Käufer über, sobald der Verkäufer die Sache dem Spediteur, dem Frachtführer oder der sonst zur Ausführung der Versendung bestimmten Person oder Anstalt ausgeliefert hat.(2) Hat der Käufer eine besondere Anweisung über die Art der Versendung erteilt und weicht der Verkäufer ohne dringenden Grund von der Anweisung ab, so ist der Verkäufer dem Käufer für den daraus entstehenden Schaden verantwortlich.§ 447 Passing of risk under a sale by dispatch(1) If, at the buyer’s request, the seller dispatches the thing sold to a place other than the place of performance, the risk passes to the buyer when the seller has handed the thing over to the forwarder, carrier or other person or body designated to dispatch the thing.(2) If the buyer has given specific instructions as to the method of dispatching the thing and, without urgent reason, the seller fails to comply with this instruction, the seller is liable to the buyer for damage arising from that failure.
§ 448 Kosten der Übergabe und vergleichbare Kosten(1) Der Verkäufer trägt die Kosten der Übergabe der Sache, der Käufer die Kosten der Abnahme und der Versendung der Sache nach einem anderen Ort als dem Erfüllungsort.(2) Der Käufer eines Grundstücks trägt die Kosten der Beurkundung des Kaufvertrags und der Auflassung, der Eintragung ins Grundbuch und der zu der Eintragung erforderlichen Erklärungen.§ 448 Costs of delivery and similar costs (1) The seller bears the costs of delivering the thing, and the buyer bears the costs of taking delivery and of dispatching the thing to a place other than the place of performance.(2) The buyer of a piece of land bears the costs of authenticating the contract and of the conveyance, registration in the land register and declarations necessary for registration.
§ 449 Eigentumsvorbehalt (1) Hat sich der Verkäufer einer beweglichen Sache das Eigentum bis zur Zahlung des Kaufpreises vorbehalten, so ist im Zweifel anzunehmen, dass das Eigentum unter der aufschiebenden Bedingung vollständiger Zahlung des Kaufpreises übertragen wird (Eigentumsvorbehalt).(2) Auf Grund des Eigentumsvorbehalts kann der Verkäufer die Sache nur herausverlangen, wenn er vom Vertrag zurückgetreten ist.(3) Die Vereinbarung eines Eigentumsvorbehalts ist nichtig, soweit der Eigentumsübergang davon abhängig gemacht wird, dass der Käufer Forderungen eines Dritten, insbesondere eines mit dem Verkäufer verbundenen Unternehmens, erfüllt.§ 449 Reservation of title(1) If the seller has reserved title to a movable thing until payment of the purchase price, it is to be assumed, in case of doubt, that title will be transferred only upon payment of the purchase price in full, which constitutes a condition precedent (reservation of title).(2) Reservation of title entitles the seller to demand the surrender of thing only if he has terminated the contract.(3) An agreement on reservation of title is void inasmuch as the transfer of property is made conditional on the satisfaction by the buyer of third-party claims, in particular those of a business associated with the seller.
§ 450 Ausgeschlossene Käufer bei bestimmten Verkäufen(1) Bei einem Verkauf im Wege der Zwangsvollstreckung dürfen der mit der Vornahme oder Leitung des Verkaufs Beauftragte und die von ihm zugezogenen Gehilfen einschließlich des Protokollführers den zu verkaufenden Gegenstand weder für sich persönlich oder durch einen anderen noch als Vertreter eines anderen kaufen.(2) Absatz 1 gilt auch bei einem Verkauf außerhalb der Zwangsvollstreckung, wenn der Auftrag zu dem Verkauf auf Grund einer gesetzlichen Vorschrift erteilt worden ist, die den Auftraggeber ermächtigt, den Gegenstand für Rechnung eines anderen verkaufen zu lassen, insbesondere in den Fällen des Pfandverkaufs und des in den §§ 383 und 385 zugelassenen Verkaufs, sowie bei einem Verkauf aus einer Insolvenzmasse.§ 450 Persons who may not buy in particular sales(1) If an object is sold by way of judicial execution, the person entrusted with the performance or management of the sale and any person used by him for that purpose, including the minute-writer, may not purchase the object to be sold, whether on his own behalf or through or on behalf of another person.(2) Subsection (1) above applies also to a sale otherwise than in the course of judicial execution, if the instruction to sell the object has been given pursuant to a statutory provision authorising the instructing party to have the object sold for the account of another person, in particular in the case of sale of a pledge, sale authorised by §§ 383 and 385, and sale of assets in an insolvency.
§ 451 Kauf durch ausgeschlossenen Käufer(1) Die Wirksamkeit eines dem § 450 zuwider erfolgten Kaufs und der Übertragung des gekauften Gegenstandes hängt von der Zustimmung der bei dem Verkauf als Schuldner, Eigentümer oder Gläubiger Beteiligten ab. Fordert der Käufer einen Beteiligten zur Erklärung über die Genehmigung auf, so findet § 177 Abs. 2 entsprechende Anwendung.(2) Wird infolge der Verweigerung der Genehmigung ein neuer Verkauf vorgenommen, so hat der frühere Käufer für die Kosten des neuen Verkaufs sowie für einen Mindererlös aufzukommen.§ 451 Purchase by excluded persons(1) The validity of a purchase made contrary to § 450 and of the transfer of title to the object purchased depends on the consent of the person participating in the sale as debtor, owner or creditor. If the buyer requests a person so participating to make a declaration of consent, § 177 (2) applies mutatis mutandis.(2) If, as a result of a refusal to give consent, a new sale is performed, the first buyer is liable for the costs of the new sale and any lesser amount of the proceeds of sale.
§ 452 SchiffskaufDie Vorschriften dieses Untertitels über den Kauf von Grundstücken finden auf den Kauf von eingetragenen Schiffen und Schiffsbauwerken entsprechende Anwendung.§ 452 Sale of a shipThe provisions of this sub-title on the sale of land apply mutatis mutandis to the sale of registered ships and ships under construction.
§ 453 Rechtskauf (1) Die Vorschriften über den Kauf von Sachen finden auf den Kauf von Rechten und sonstigen Gegenständen entsprechende Anwendung.(2) Der Verkäufer trägt die Kosten der Begründung und Übertragung des Rechts.(3) Ist ein Recht verkauft, das zum Besitz einer Sache berechtigt, so ist der Verkäufer verpflichtet, dem Käufer die Sache frei von Sach­ und Rechtsmängeln zu übergeben.§ 453 Sale of rights(1) The provisions on the sale of things apply mutatis mutandis to the sale of rights and other objects.(2) The seller bears the costs of creating and transferring a right.(3) If a right giving entitlement to possession of a thing is sold, the seller is bound to hand over the thing to the buyer free of defects as to quality and of defects in title.

Untertitel 2: Besondere Arten des Kaufs

Kapitel 1: Kauf auf Probe

Sub-title 2: Special types of sale

Chapter 1: Sale on approval
§ 454 Zustandekommen des Kaufvertrags(1) Bei einem Kauf auf Probe oder auf Besichtigung steht die Billigung des gekauften Gegenstandes im Belieben des Käufers. Der Kauf ist im Zweifel unter der aufschiebenden Bedingung der Billigung geschlossen.(2) Der Verkäufer ist verpflichtet, dem Käufer die Untersuchung des Gegenstandes zu gestatten.§ 454 Creation of the contract of sale(1) In a sale on approval or on inspection, approval of the object is at the buyer’s discretion. In case of doubt, the sale is concluded subject to the condition precedent of approval.(2) The seller is bound to permit the buyer to examine the object.
§ 455 Billigungsfrist Die Billigung eines auf Probe oder auf Besichtigung gekauften Gegenstandes kann nur innerhalb der vereinbarten Frist und in Ermangelung einer solchen nur bis zum Ablauf einer dem Käufer von dem Verkäufer bestimmten angemessenen Frist erklärt werden. War die Sache dem Käufer zum Zwecke der Probe oder der Besichtigung übergeben, so gilt sein Schweigen als Billigung.§ 455 Period for approvalAn object purchased on approval or inspection may be approved only during the period agreed or, if no such period has been agreed, only before the expiry of a reasonable period fixed by the seller for the buyer. If the thing was handed over the buyer for approval or inspection, silence on his part is considered approval.
Kapitel 2: Wiederkauf
Chapter 2: Repurchase
§ 456 Zustandekommen des Wiederkaufs(1) Hat sich der Verkäufer in dem Kaufvertrag das Recht des Wiederkaufs vorbehalten, so kommt der Wiederkauf mit der Erklärung des Verkäufers gegenüber dem Käufer, dass er das Wiederkaufsrecht ausübe, zustande. Die Erklärung bedarf nicht der für den Kaufvertrag bestimmten Form.(2) Der Preis, zu welchem verkauft worden ist, gilt im Zweifel auch für den Wiederkauf.§ 456 Creation of a contract of repurchase(1) If the seller has, in the contract of sale, reserved a right of repurchase, the repurchase is effected when the seller declares to the buyer that he is exercising that right. The declaration need not be in the form laid down for the contract of sale.(2) In case of doubt, the price at which the sale was made is also the price of the repurchase.
§ 457 Haftung des Wiederverkäufers(1) Der Wiederverkäufer ist verpflichtet, dem Wiederkäufer den gekauften Gegenstand nebst Zubehör herauszugeben.(2) Hat der Wiederverkäufer vor der Ausübung des Wiederkaufsrechts eine Verschlechterung, den Untergang oder eine aus einem anderen Grund eingetretene Unmöglichkeit der Herausgabe des gekauften Gegenstandes verschuldet oder den Gegenstand wesentlich verändert, so ist er für den daraus entstehenden Schaden verantwortlich. Ist der Gegenstand ohne Verschulden des Wiederverkäufers verschlechtert oder ist er nur unwesentlich verändert, so kann der Wiederkäufer Minderung des Kaufpreises nicht verlangen.§ 457 Liability of the original purchaser(1) The original purchaser is bound to deliver to the re-purchaser the purchased object and its accessories.(2) If, before the exercise of the right of repurchase, the original purchaser has caused through his fault the deterioration or destruction of the purchased thing or the impossibility of surrendering it on account of some other reason or if he has materially altered the object, he is liable for the damage resulting therefrom. If the object has deteriorated without fault of the original purchaser or if it has only immaterially altered, the re-purchaser may not demand reduction of the purchase price.
§ 458 Beseitigung von Rechten DritterHat der Wiederverkäufer vor der Ausübung des Wiederkaufsrechts über den gekauften Gegenstand verfügt, so ist er verpflichtet, die dadurch begründeten Rechte Dritter zu beseitigen. Einer Verfügung des Wiederverkäufers steht eine Verfügung gleich, die im Wege der Zwangsvollstreckung oder der Arrestvollziehung oder durch den Insolvenzverwalter erfolgt.§ 458 Removal of third-party rightsIf the original purchaser has disposed of the purchased object before the exercise of the right of repurchase, he is bound to remove third-party rights established by the disposition. A disposition by way of judicial execution or execution of an attachment order or by an insolvency administrator is equivalent to a disposition by the original purchaser.
§ 459 Ersatz von VerwendungenDer Wiederverkäufer kann für Verwendungen, die er auf den gekauften Gegenstand vor dem Wiederkauf gemacht hat, insoweit Ersatz verlangen, als der Wert des Gegenstandes durch die Verwendungen erhöht ist. Eine Einrichtung, mit der er die herauszugebende Sache versehen hat, kann er wegnehmen.§ 459 Reimbursement of expenditure The original purchaser may demand reimbursement of the expenditure he has incurred in respect of the purchased object prior to repurchase in so far as the value of the object is increased by the expenditure. He may remove equipment which he has attached to the thing to be returned.
§ 460 Wiederkauf zum SchätzungswertIst als Wiederkaufpreis der Schätzungswert vereinbart, den der gekaufte Gegenstand zur Zeit des Wiederkaufs hat, so ist der Wiederverkäufer für eine Verschlechterung, den Untergang oder die aus einem anderen Grund eingetretene Unmöglichkeit der Herausgabe des Gegenstandes nicht verantwortlich, der Wiederkäufer zum Ersatz von Verwendungen nicht verpflichtet.§ 460 Repurchase at an estimated valueIf the repurchase price is agreed to be the estimated value of the purchased object at the time of the repurchase, the original purchaser is not liable for the deterioration or destruction of the purchased thing or for the impossibility of delivering it on account of some other reason and the re-purchaser is not obliged to reimburse for expenditure incurred.
§ 461 Mehrere WiederkaufsberechtigteSteht das Wiederkaufsrecht mehreren gemeinschaftlich zu, so kann es nur im Ganzen ausgeübt werden. Ist es für einen der Berechtigten erloschen oder übt einer von ihnen sein Recht nicht aus, so sind die übrigen berechtigt, das Wiederkaufsrecht im Ganzen auszuüben.§ 461 Several persons with a right of repurchaseIf several persons have a joint right of repurchase, it may be exercised only as a whole. If it has expired with regard to one of them or if one of them does not exercise his right, the others are entitled to exercise the right of repurchase as a whole.
§ 462 AusschlussfristDas Wiederkaufsrecht kann bei Grundstücken nur bis zum Ablauf von 30, bei anderen Gegenständen nur bis zum Ablauf von drei Jahren nach der Vereinbarung des Vorbehalts ausgeübt werden. Ist für die Ausübung eine Frist bestimmt, so tritt diese an die Stelle der gesetzlichen Frist.§ 462 Exclusionary periodThe right of repurchase may be exercised, in the case of land, only until the expiry of thirty years from the date of the agreement reserving the right and, in the case of other objects, only until the expiry of three years from that date. If a period is fixed for the exercise of the right, that period applies instead of the statutory period.
Kapitel 3: Vorkauf
Chapter 3: Pre-emption
§ 463 Voraussetzungen der AusübungWer in Ansehung eines Gegenstandes zum Vorkauf berechtigt ist, kann das Vorkaufsrecht ausüben, sobald der Verpflichtete mit einem Dritten einen Kaufvertrag über den Gegenstand geschlossen hat.§ 463 Preconditions of the exercise of the rightA person who has a right of pre-emption in respect of an object may exercise that right as soon as the person bound by it has concluded with a third party a contract of sale relating to the object.
§ 464 Ausübung des Vorkaufrechts(1) Die Ausübung des Vorkaufsrechts erfolgt durch Erklärung gegenüber dem Verpflichteten. Die Erklärung bedarf nicht der für den Kaufvertrag bestimmten Form.(2) Mit der Ausübung des Vorkaufsrechts kommt der Kauf zwischen dem Berechtigten und dem Verpflichteten unter den Bestimmungen zustande, welche der Verpflichtete mit dem Dritten vereinbart hat.§ 464 Exercise of the right of pre-emption(1) The right of pre-emption is exercised by declaration made to the person bound. The declaration need not be in the form required for the contract of sale.(2) Upon the exercise of the right of pre-emption a sale is made, between the person entitled and the person bound, on the terms agreed with the third party by the person bound.
§ 465 Unwirksame VereinbarungenEine Vereinbarung des Verpflichteten mit dem Dritten, durch welche der Kauf von der Nichtausübung des Vorkaufsrechts abhängig gemacht oder dem Verpflichteten für den Fall der Ausübung des Vorkaufsrechts der Rücktritt vorbehalten wird, ist dem Vorkaufsberechtigten gegenüber unwirksam.§ 465 Ineffective agreementsAn agreement between the person bound and the third party whereby the sale is made conditional on the non-exercise of the right of pre-emption or the person bound reserves a right of termination in the event of the exercise of the right of pre-emption is ineffective as against the person entitled to pre-emption.
§ 466 NebenleistungenHat sich der Dritte in dem Vertrag zu einer Nebenleistung verpflichtet, die der Vorkaufsberechtigte zu bewirken außerstande ist, so hat der Vorkaufsberechtigte statt der Nebenleistung ihren Wert zu entrichten. Lässt sich die Nebenleistung nicht in Geld schätzen, so ist die Ausübung des Vorkaufsrechts ausgeschlossen; die Vereinbarung der Nebenleistung kommt jedoch nicht in Betracht, wenn der Vertrag mit dem Dritten auch ohne sie geschlossen sein würde.§ 466 Collateral performanceIf the third party has bound himself in the contract to effect a collateral performance which the person entitled to pre-emption is unable to perform, the person entitled to pre-emption must pay the value of the collateral performance instead of effecting it. If the collateral performance cannot be estimated in money, the right of pre-emption cannot be exercised; the agreement to effect a collateral performance is, however, of no account if the contract with the third party would also have been concluded without it.
§ 467 GesamtpreisHat der Dritte den Gegenstand, auf den sich das Vorkaufsrecht bezieht, mit anderen Gegenständen zu einem Gesamtpreis gekauft, so hat der Vorkaufsberechtigte einen verhältnismäßigen Teil des Gesamtpreises zu entrichten. Der Verpflichtete kann verlangen, dass der Vorkauf auf alle Sachen erstreckt wird, die nicht ohne Nachteil für ihn getrennt werden können.§ 467 Total priceIf the third party has purchased the object to which the right of pre-emption relates together with other objects for a total price, the person entitled to pre-emption must pay a proportionate part of the total price. The person bound may demand that the pre-emption extend to all things that cannot be separated without detriment to him.
§ 468 Stundung des Kaufpreises(1) Ist dem Dritten in dem Vertrag der Kaufpreis gestundet worden, so kann der Vorkaufsberechtigte die Stundung nur in Anspruch nehmen, wenn er für den gestundeten Betrag Sicherheit leistet.(2) Ist ein Grundstück Gegenstand des Vorkaufs, so bedarf es der Sicherheitsleistung insoweit nicht, als für den gestundeten Kaufpreis die Bestellung einer Hypothek an dem Grundstück vereinbart oder in Anrechnung auf den Kaufpreis eine Schuld, für die eine Hypothek an dem Grundstück besteht, übernommen worden ist. Entsprechendes gilt, wenn ein eingetragenes Schiff oder Schiffsbauwerk Gegenstand des Vorkaufs ist.§ 468 Deferment of payment(1) If the contract allows the third party time to pay the purchase price, the person entitled to pre-emption may claim the benefit of the deferment only if he gives security for the deferred amount.(2) If a piece of land is the subject matter of the pre-emption, no security need be provided in so far as the creation of a mortgage to cover the deferred amount has been agreed or a debt secured by a mortgage on the land exists and has been accepted as payment of the purchase price. These provisions apply mutatis mutandis where the object of the pre-emption is a registered ship or ship under construction.
§ 469 Mitteilungspflicht, Ausübungsfrist(1) Der Verpflichtete hat dem Vorkaufsberechtigten den Inhalt des mit dem Dritten geschlossenen Vertrags unverzüglich mitzuteilen. Die Mitteilung des Verpflichteten wird durch die Mitteilung des Dritten ersetzt.(2) Das Vorkaufsrecht kann bei Grundstücken nur bis zum Ablauf von zwei Monaten, bei anderen Gegenständen nur bis zum Ablauf einer Woche nach dem Empfang der Mitteilung ausgeübt werden. Ist für die Ausübung eine Frist bestimmt, so tritt diese an die Stelle der gesetzlichen Frist.§ 469 Duty to give notice, period for exercising the right(1) The person bound must notify the person entitled to pre-emption without delay of the terms of the contract concluded with a third person. Notification by the third party takes the place of notification by the person bound.(2) In the case of land, the right of pre-emption may be exercised only within a period of two months after receipt of notification and in other cases only within a period of one week after receipt of notification. If a period is specified for exercise of the right, that period replaces the statutory period. 
§ 470 Verkauf an gesetzlichen ErbenDas Vorkaufsrecht erstreckt sich im Zweifel nicht auf einen Verkauf, der mit Rücksicht auf ein künftiges Erbrecht an einen gesetzlichen Erben erfolgt.§ 470 Sale to statutory heirsIn case of doubt the right of pre-emption does not extend to a sale made to a statutory heir in view of a future right of inheritance. 
§ 471 Verkauf bei Zwangsvollstreckung oder InsolvenzDas Vorkaufsrecht ist ausgeschlossen, wenn der Verkauf im Wege der Zwangsvollstreckung oder aus einer Insolvenzmasse erfolgt.§ 471 Sale in the case of judicial execution or insolvencyThe right of pre-emption is excluded If the sale is made by way of judicial execution or of assets in an insolvency.
§ 472 Mehrere VorkaufsberechtigteSteht das Vorkaufsrecht mehreren gemeinschaftlich zu, so kann es nur im Ganzen ausgeübt werden. Ist es für einen der Berechtigten erloschen oder übt einer von ihnen sein Recht nicht aus, so sind die übrigen berechtigt, das Vorkaufsrecht im Ganzen auszuüben.§ 472 Several persons entitled to a right of pre-emptionIf several persons have a joint right of pre-emption, it may be exercised only as a whole. If it has expired with regard to one of them or if one of them does not exercise his right, the others are entitled to exercise the right of pre-emption as a whole.
§ 473 UnübertragbarkeitDas Vorkaufsrecht ist nicht übertragbar und geht nicht auf die Erben des Berechtigten über, sofern nicht ein anderes bestimmt ist. Ist das Recht auf eine bestimmte Zeit beschränkt, so ist es im Zweifel vererblich.§ 473 Not assignableUnless otherwise provided, the right of pre-emption is not assignable and does not pass to the heirs of the person entitled to that right. If the right is limited to a fixed time, then, in case of doubt, it passes by inheritance.

Untertitel 3: Verbrauchsgüterkauf

Sub-Title 3: Sale of consumer goods

§ 474 Begriff des Verbrauchsgüterkaufs(1) Kauft ein Verbraucher von einem Unternehmer eine bewegliche Sache (Verbrauchsgüterkauf), gelten ergänzend die folgenden Vorschriften. Dies gilt nicht für gebrauchte Sachen, die in einer öffentlichen Versteigerung verkauft werden, an der der Verbraucher persönlich teilnehmen kann.(2) Die §§ 455 und 447 finden auf die in diesem Untertitel geregelten Kaufverträge keine Anwendung.§ 474 Meaning of sale of consumer goods(1) Where a consumer buys a moveable thing from a businessperson (sale of consumer goods), the following supplementary rules also apply. This does not apply to second-hand goods which are sold in a public auction in which the consumer may take part in person.(2) §§ 455 and 447 do not apply to the contracts of sale governed by this sub-title.
§ 475 Abweichende Vereinbarungen(1) Auf eine vor Mitteilung eines Mangels an den Unternehmer getroffene Vereinbarung, die zum Nachteil des Verbrauchers von den §§ 433 bis 435, 437, 439 bis 443, sowie von den Vorschriften dieses Untertitels abweicht, kann sich der Unternehmer nicht berufen. Die in Satz 1 bezeichneten Vorschriften finden auch Anwendung, wenn sie durch anderweitige Gestaltungen umgangen werden.(2) Die Verjährung der in § 437 bezeichneten Ansprüche kann vor Mitteilung eines Mangels an den Unternehmer nicht durch Rechtsgeschäft erleichtert werden, wenn die Vereinbarung zu einer Verjährungsfrist ab dem gesetzlichen Verjährungsbeginn von weniger als zwei Jahren, bei gebrauchten Sachen von weniger als einem Jahr führt.(3) Die Absätze 1 und 2 gelten unbeschadet der §§ 307 bis 309 nicht für den Ausschluss oder die Beschränkung des Anspruchs auf Schadensersatz.§ 475 Contrary agreements(1) A businessperson may not rely on an agreement which derogates, to the detriment of the consumer, from the terms of §§ 433 to 435, 437, 439 to 443 or from the rules of this sub-title if it is concluded before the businessperson is informed of a defect. The provisions of the first sentence also apply if they are circumvented by other arrangements.(2) The limitation period for the claims referred to in § 437 cannot be shortened by an agreement concluded before a defect is notified to a businessperson if the agreement results in a limitation period of less than two years from the beginning of the statutory period or, in the case of second-hand goods, of less than one year.(3) Notwithstanding §§ 307, 308 and 309, subsections (1) and (2) above do not apply to the exclusion or limitation of the claim for compensation.
§ 476 BeweislastumkehrZeigt sich innerhalb von sechs Monaten seit Gefahrübergang ein Sachmangel, so wird vermutet, dass die Sache bereits bei Gefahrübergang mangelhaft war, es sei denn, diese Vermutung ist mit der Art der Sache oder des Mangels unvereinbar.§ 476 Reversal of the burden of proofIf a defect appears within six months of the date on which risk passed, it is presumed that the thing was already defective when risk passed unless that presumption is incompatible with the nature of the thing or of the defect.
§ 477 Sonderbestimmungen für Garantien(1) Eine Garantieerklärung (§ 443) muss einfach und verständlich abgefasst sein. Sie muss enthalten1. den Hinweis auf die gesetzlichen Rechte des Verbrauchers sowie darauf, dass sie durch die Garantie nicht eingeschränkt werden und2. den Inhalt der Garantie und alle wesentlichen Angaben, die für die Geltendmachung der Garantie erforderlich sind, insbesondere die Dauer und den räumlichen Geltungsbereich des Garantieschutzes sowie Namen und Anschrift des Garantiegebers.(2) Der Verbraucher kann verlangen, dass ihm die Garantieerklärung in Textform mitgeteilt wird.(3) Die Wirksamkeit der Garantieverpflichtung wird nicht dadurch berührt, dass eine der vorstehenden Anforderungen nicht erfüllt wird.§ 477 Special provisions for guarantees(1) A declaration of guarantee (§ 443) must be set out in plain intelligible language. It must1. contain a statement referring to the consumer’s statutory rights and to the fact that they are not restricted by the guarantee and2. set out the contents of the guarantee and all essential particulars necessary for making claims under the guarantee, notably the duration and territorial scope of the guarantee as well as the name and address of the guarantor.(2) A consumer may demand that the declaration of guarantee be given to him in textual form.(3) The effectiveness of the guarantee obligation is not affected by a failure to fulfil any of the above requirements.
§ 478 Rückgriff des Unternehmers(1) Wenn der Unternehmer die verkaufte neu hergestellte Sache als Folge ihrer Mangelhaftigkeit zurücknehmen musste oder der Verbraucher den Kaufpreis gemindert hat, bedarf es für die in § 437 bezeichneten Rechte des Unternehmers gegen den Unternehmer, der ihm die Sache verkauft hatte (Lieferant), wegen des vom Verbraucher geltend gemachten Mangels einer sonst erforderlichen Fristsetzung nicht.(2) Der Unternehmer kann beim Verkauf einer neu hergestellten Sache von seinem Lieferanten Ersatz der Aufwendungen verlangen, die der Unternehmer im Verhältnis zum Verbraucher nach § 439 Abs. 2 zu tragen hatte, wenn der vom Verbraucher geltend gemachte Mangel bereits beim Übergang der Gefahr auf den Unternehmer vorhanden war.(3) In den Fällen der Absätze 1 und 2 findet § 476 mit der Maßgabe Anwendung, dass die Frist mit dem Übergang der Gefahr auf den Verbraucher beginnt.(4) Auf eine vor Mitteilung eines Mangels an den Lieferanten getroffene Vereinbarung, die zum Nachteil des Unternehmers von den §§ 433 bis 435, 437, 439 bis 443, sowie von den Absätzen 1 bis 3 und von § 479 abweicht, kann sich der Lieferant nicht berufen, wenn dem Rückgriffsgläubiger kein gleichwertiger Ausgleich eingeräumt wird. Satz 1 gilt unbeschadet des § 307 nicht für den Ausschluss oder die Beschränkung des Anspruchs auf Schadensersatz. Die in Satz 1 bezeichneten Vorschriften finden auch Anwendung, wenn sie durch anderweitige Gestaltungen umgangen werden.(5) Die Absätze 1 bis 4 finden auf die Ansprüche des Lieferanten und der übrigen Käufer in der Lieferkette gegen die jeweiligen Verkäufer entsprechende Anwendung, wenn die Schuldner Unternehmer sind.(6) § 377 des Handelsgesetzbuchs bleibt unberührt.§ 478 Businessperson’s right of recourse(1) If the businessperson has had to take back a newly manufactured thing because of a defect in it or the consumer has for this reason reduced the price, it is not necessary for the businessperson to fix the period of time which would otherwise be necessary in order to enforce, against a third party businessperson who had sold him the thing (supplier), his rights under § 437 on account of the defect asserted by the consumer.(2) In the case of the purchase of a newly manufactured thing the businessperson may demand that his supplier reimburse the expenditure which the businessperson had to incur in relation to the consumer under § 439 (2) if the defect asserted by the consumer already existed upon the passing of the risk to the businessperson.(3) In the case of subsections (1) and (2) above, § 476 applies, except that the period begins upon the passing of the risk to the consumer.(4) The supplier may not invoke an agreement made before notification of the defect to the supplier which derogates, to the detriment of the businessperson, from §§ 433 to 435, 437, 439 to 443 or from subsections (1) and (3) above or from § 479 if the obligee with the right of recourse is not granted another equivalent remedy. Without prejudice to § 307, sentence 1 does not apply to an exclusion or restriction of the claim for compensation. The provisions referred to in sentence 1 apply even if circumvented by other arrangements.(5) Subsections (1) to (4) above apply mutatis mutandis to claims of the supplier and of the other buyers in the supply chain against the respective sellers if the obligors are businesspersons.(6) § 377 of the Commercial Code is not affected.
§ 479 Verjährung von Rückgriffsansprüchen(1) Die in § 478 Abs. 2 bestimmten Aufwendungsersatzansprüche verjähren in zwei Jahren ab Ablieferung der Sache.(2) Die Verjährung der in den §§ 437 und 478 Abs. 2 bestimmten Ansprüche des Unternehmers gegen seinen Lieferanten wegen des Mangels einer an einen Verbraucher verkauften neu hergestellten Sache tritt frühestens zwei Monate nach dem Zeitpunkt ein, in dem der Unternehmer die Ansprüche des Verbrauchers erfüllt hat. Diese Ablaufhemmung endet spätestens fünf Jahre nach dem Zeitpunkt, in dem der Lieferant die Sache dem Unternehmer abgeliefert hat.(3) Die vorstehenden Absätze finden auf die Ansprüche des Lieferanten und der übrigen Käufer in der Lieferkette gegen die jeweiligen Verkäufer entsprechende Anwendung, wenn die Schuldner Unternehmer sind.§ 479 Limitation of claims asserting a right of recourse(1) Claims for reimbursement of expenditure referred to in § 478 (2) are time-barred two years after delivery of the thing.(2) Claims under §§ 437 and 478 (2) by the businessperson against his supplier on account of defects in a newly manufactured thing sold to a consumer are time-barred at the earliest two months after the date on which the businessperson has satisfied the consumer’s claims. That suspension of expiration of the limitation period ends at the latest five years after the time when the supplier delivered the thing to the businessperson.(3) The above subsections apply mutatis mutandis to claims of the supplier and of other buyers in the supply chain against the respective seller if the obligors are businesspersons.

Untertitel 4: Tausch

Sub-title 4: Exchange

§ 480 TauschAuf den Tausch finden die Vorschriften über den Kauf entsprechende Anwendung.§ 480 ExchangeThe provisions relating to sale apply mutatis mutandis to exchange.

Titel 2: Teilzeit­-Wohnrechteverträge

Title 2: Time-share agreements

§ 481 Begriff des Teilzeit­Wohnrechtevertrags(1) Teilzeit-Wohnrechteverträge sind Verträge, durch die ein Unternehmer einem Verbraucher gegen Zahlung eines Gesamtpreises das Recht verschafft oder zu verschaffen verspricht, für die Dauer von mindestens drei Jahren ein Wohngebäude jeweils für einen bestimmten oder zu bestimmenden Zeitraum des Jahres zu Erholungs­ oder Wohnzwecken zu nutzen. Das Recht kann ein dingliches oder anderes Recht sein und insbesondere auch durch eine Mitgliedschaft in einem Verein oder einen Anteil an einer Gesellschaft eingeräumt werden.(2) Das Recht kann auch darin bestehen, die Nutzung eines Wohngebäudes jeweils aus einem Bestand von Wohngebäuden zu wählen.(3) Einem Wohngebäude steht ein Teil eines Wohngebäudes gleich.§ 481 Time-share agreements(1) Time share agreements are contracts by which a businessperson procures or promises to procure for a consumer, in return for a global price, the right, for a period of at least three years, to use a residential building for recreational or residential purposes for a specified or specifiable period of the year. The right may be a right in rem or any other right and may also be granted inter alia by virtue of membership of an association or a share in a company.(2) The right may also consist in the right to choose to use one of a collection of residential buildings.(3) Part of a residential building is equivalent to a residential building.
§ 482 Prospektpflicht bei Teilzeit­Wohnrechteverträgen(1) Wer als Unternehmer den Abschluss von Teilzeit­Wohnrechteverträgen anbietet, hat jedem Verbraucher, der Interesse bekundet, einen Prospekt auszuhändigen.(2) Der in Absatz 1 bezeichnete Prospekt muss eine allgemeine Beschreibung des Wohngebäudes oder des Bestandes von Wohngebäuden sowie die in der Rechtsverordnung nach Artikel 242 des Einführungsgesetzes zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuche bestimmten Angaben enthalten.(3) Der Unternehmer kann vor Vertragsschluss eine Änderung gegenüber den im Prospekt enthaltenen Angaben vornehmen, soweit dies auf Grund von Umständen erforderlich wird, auf die er keinen Einfluss nehmen konnte.(4) In jeder Werbung für den Abschluss von Teilzeit-Wohnrechteverträgen ist anzugeben, dass der Prospekt erhältlich ist und wo er angefordert werden kann.§ 482 Duty to issue a prospectus in the case of time-share agreements(1) A person who, as a businessperson, offers to conclude time-share agreements must provide a prospectus to each consumer who expresses interest.(2) The prospectus referred to in subsection (1) must contain a general description of the residential building or the collection of residential buildings and the information specified in the Regulation under Article 242 of the Introductory Act to the Civil Code.(3) The businessperson may alter the information contained in the prospectus before conclusion of the contract in so far as this is necessary because of circumstances outside his control.(4) Any advertising for the conclusion of time-share contracts must indicate that a prospectus is available and where it may be obtained.
§ 483 Vertrags­ und Prospektsprache bei Teilzeit­Wohnrechteverträgen(1) Der Vertrag ist in der Amtssprache oder, wenn es dort mehrere Amtssprachen gibt, in der vom Verbraucher gewählten Amtssprache des Mitgliedstaats der Europäischen Union oder des Vertragsstaats des Übereinkommens über den Europäischen Wirtschaftsraums abzufassen, in dem der Verbraucher seinen Wohnsitz hat. Ist der Verbraucher Angehöriger eines anderen Mitgliedstaats, so kann er statt der Sprache seines Wohnsitzstaats auch die oder eine der Amtssprachen des Staats, dem er angehört, wählen. Die Sätze 1 und 2 gelten auch für den Prospekt.(2) Ist der Vertrag vor einem deutschen Notar zu beurkunden, so gelten die §§ 5 und 16 des Beurkundungsgesetzes mit der Maßgabe, dass dem Verbraucher eine beglaubigte Übersetzung des Vertrags in der von ihm nach Absatz 1 gewählten Sprache auszuhändigen ist.(3) Teilzeit­Wohnrechteverträge, die Absatz 1 Satz 1 und 2 oder Absatz 2 nicht entsprechen, sind nichtig.§ 483 Language of the contract and of the prospectus in the case of time-share agreements(1) The contract must be drawn up in the official language, or where there is more than one official language, in the official language chosen by the consumer, of the Member State of the European Union or of the Contracting State of the European Economic Area in which the consumer is resident. If the consumer is a national of another Member State, he may choose, instead of the language of the State in which he is resident, also the official language or one of the official languages of the State of which he is a national. The first and second sentences also apply to the prospectus.(2) If the contract must be authenticated before a German notary, §§ 5 and 16 of the Authentication Act apply, except that the consumer must be issued with a certified translation of the contract in the language chosen by him in accordance with subsection (1).(3) Time-share agreements not in accordance with subsections (1), sentence 1 and 2, or (2) above are void.
§ 484 Schriftform bei Teilzeit­Wohnrechteverträgen(1) Der Teilzeit­Wohnrechtevertrag bedarf der schriftlichen Form, soweit nicht in anderen Vorschriften eine strengere Form vorgeschrieben ist. Der Abschluss des Vertrags in elektronischer Form ist ausgeschlossen. Die in dem in § 482 bezeichneten, dem Verbraucher ausgehändigten Prospekt enthaltenen Angaben werden Inhalt des Vertrags, soweit die Parteien nicht ausdrücklich und unter Hinweis auf die Abweichung vom Prospekt eine abweichende Vereinbarung treffen. Solche Änderungen müssen dem Verbraucher vor Abschluss des Vertrags mitgeteilt werden. Unbeschadet der Geltung der Prospektangaben gemäß Satz 2 muss die Vertragsurkunde die in der in § 482 Abs. 2 bezeichneten Rechtsverordnung bestimmten Angaben enthalten.(2) Der Unternehmer hat dem Verbraucher eine Vertragsurkunde oder Abschrift der Vertragsurkunde auszuhändigen. Er hat ihm ferner, wenn die Vertragssprache und die Sprache des Staates, in dem das Wohngebäude belegen ist, verschieden sind, eine beglaubigte Übersetzung des Vertrags in der oder einer zu den Amtssprachen der Europäischen Union oder des Übereinkommens über den Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum zählenden Sprache des Staates auszuhändigen, in dem das Wohngebäude belegen ist. Die Pflicht zur Aushändigung einer beglaubigten Übersetzung entfällt, wenn sich das Nutzungsrecht auf einen Bestand von Wohngebäuden bezieht, die in verschiedenen Staaten belegen sind.§ 484 Requirement for writing in the case of time-share agreements(1) A time-share agreement must be in writing, except where other provisions lay down a stricter requirement. The contract may not be concluded in electronic form. The information in the prospectus referred to in § 482 provided to the consumer forms part of the contract save in so far as the parties, expressly and referring to the departure from the prospectus, agree otherwise. Such amendments must be notified to the consumer before conclusion of the contract. Notwithstanding the applicability of the information in the prospectus pursuant to the sentence 2, the contract document must contain the information referred to in the Regulation referred to in § 482 (2).(2) The businessperson must give to the consumer a contract document or copy of the contract document. Moreover, if the language of the contract differs from the language of the State in which the residential building is situated, he must provide to him a certified translation of the contract in the official language or one of the official languages of the European Union or of the Agreement on the European Economic Area, of the State in which the residential building is situated. There is no duty to provide a certified translation if the right relates to a collection of residential buildings which are situated in different States.
§ 485 Widerrufsrecht bei Teilzeit­Wohnrechteverträgen(1) Dem Verbraucher steht bei einem Teilzeit­Wohnrechtevertrag ein Widerrufsrecht nach § 355 zu.(2) Die erforderliche Belehrung über das Widerrufsrecht muss auch die Kosten angeben, die der Verbraucher im Falle des Widerrufs gemäß Absatz 5 Satz 2 zu erstatten hat.(3) Ist dem Verbraucher der in § 482 bezeichnete Prospekt vor Vertragsschluss nicht oder nicht in der dort vorgeschriebenen Sprache ausgehändigt worden, so beträgt die Frist zur Ausübung des Widerrufsrechts abweichend von § 355 Abs. 1 Satz 2 einen Monat.(4) Fehlt im Vertrag eine der Angaben, die in der in § 482 Abs. 2 bezeichneten Rechtsverordnung bestimmt werden, so beginnt die Frist zur Ausübung des Widerrufsrechts erst, wenn dem Verbraucher diese Angabe schriftlich mitgeteilt wird.(5) Eine Vergütung für geleistete Dienste sowie für die Überlassung der Nutzung von Wohngebäuden ist abweichend von § 357 Abs. 1 und 3 ausgeschlossen. Bedurfte der Vertrag der notariellen Beurkundung, so hat der Verbraucher dem Unternehmer die Kosten der Beurkundung zu erstatten, wenn dies im Vertrag ausdrücklich bestimmt ist. In den Fällen der Absätze 3 und 4 entfällt die Verpflichtung zur Erstattung von Kosten; der Verbraucher kann vom Unternehmer Ersatz der Kosten des Vertrags verlangen.§ 485 Right of revocation in the case of time-share agreements(1) Under a time-share agreement, the consumer has a right of revocation in accordance with § 355.(2) The necessary notice of the right of revocation must also indicate the costs which the consumer must pay in the event of revocation under subsection (5), sentence 2.(3) If the consumer has not been given, before conclusion of the contract, the prospectus referred to in § 482 or not been given it in the language provided for there, the period for exercising the right of revocation is, in derogation from § 355 (1), sentence 2, one month.(4) If any of the information specified by the regulation referred to in § 482 (2) is not included in the contract, the period for exercising the right of revocation does not begin until the consumer is notified in writing of that information.(5) In derogation from § 357 (1) and (3), no remuneration may be claimed for services provided and for permitting use of residential buildings. If the contract required authentication by a notary, the consumer must pay to the businessperson the costs of the authentication if this is expressly provided for in the contract. In the cases of subsections (3) and (4), there is no obligation to refund costs; the consumer may demand that the businessperson compensate him for the costs of the contract.
§ 486 Anzahlungsverbot bei Teilzeit­WohnrechteverträgenDer Unternehmer darf Zahlungen des Verbrauchers vor Ablauf der Widerrufsfrist nicht fordern oder annehmen. Für den Verbraucher günstigere Vorschriften bleiben unberührt.§ 486 Prohibition of deposits in the case of time-share agreementsThe businessperson may not request or accept payments from the consumer before expiry of the revocation period. Provisions more favourable to the consumer are not affected.
§ 487 Abweichende VereinbarungenVon den Vorschriften dieses Untertitels5 darf nicht zum Nachteil des Verbrauchers abgewichen werden. Die Vorschriften dieses Untertitels finden, soweit nicht ein anderes bestimmt ist, auch Anwendung, wenn sie durch anderweitige Gestaltungen umgangen werden.§ 487 Contrary agreementsNo derogation from the provisions of this title is permitted to the detriment of the consumer. Unless otherwise provided, the provisions of this title apply even if they are circumvented by other arrangements

Titel 3: Darlehensvertrag, Finanzierungshilfen und Ratenlieferungsverträge zwischen einem Unternehmer und einem Verbraucher

Untertitel 1: Darlehensvertrag

Title 3: Loan contract, financial accommodation and instalment supply contracts between a businessperson and a consumer

Subtitle 1: Loan contract

§ 488 Vertragstypische Pflichten beim Darlehensvertrag(1) Durch den Darlehensvertrag wird der Darlehensgeber verpflichtet, dem Darlehensnehmer einen Geldbetrag in der vereinbarten Höhe zur Verfügung zu stellen. Der Darlehensnehmer ist verpflichtet, einen geschuldeten Zins zu zahlen und bei Fälligkeit das zur Verfügung gestellte Darlehen zurückzuerstatten.(2) Die vereinbarten Zinsen sind, soweit nicht ein anderes bestimmt ist, nach dem Ablauf je eines Jahres und, wenn das Darlehen vor dem Ablauf eines Jahres zurückzuerstatten ist, bei der Rückerstattung zu entrichten.(3) Ist für die Rückerstattung des Darlehens eine Zeit nicht bestimmt, so hängt die Fälligkeit davon ab, dass der Darlehensgeber oder der Darlehensnehmer kündigt. Die Kündigungsfrist beträgt drei Monate. Sind Zinsen nicht geschuldet, so ist der Darlehensnehmer auch ohne Kündigung zur Rückerstattung berechtigt.§ 488 Standard obligations in the case of a loan contract(1) By a loan contract the lender is bound to place at the disposal of the borrower a sum of money of the agreed amount. The borrower is bound to pay the interest owed and, at the due date, to repay the loan placed at his disposal.(2) Save where otherwise provided, the agreed interest is to be paid at the end of each year and, if the loan is to be repaid before the end of a year, upon repayment.(3) If a period of time is not specified for repayment of the loan, the due date thereof depends on the lender or the borrower giving notice. The notice period is three months. If interest is not owed, the borrower is entitled to repay also without giving notice.
§ 489 Ordentliches Kündigungsrecht des Darlehensnehmers(1) Der Darlehensnehmer kann einen Darlehensvertrag, bei dem für einen bestimmten Zeitraum ein fester Zinssatz vereinbart ist, ganz oder teilweise kündigen,1. wenn die Zinsbindung vor der für die Rückzahlung bestimmten Zeit endet und keine neue Vereinbarung über den Zinssatz getroffen ist, unter Einhaltung einer Kündigungsfrist von einem Monat frühestens für den Ablauf des Tages, an dem die Zinsbindung endet; ist eine Anpassung des Zinssatzes in bestimmten Zeiträumen bis zu einem Jahr vereinbart, so kann der Darlehensnehmer jeweils nur für den Ablauf des Tages, an dem die Zinsbindung endet, kündigen;2. wenn das Darlehen einem Verbraucher gewährt und nicht durch ein Grund­ oder Schiffspfandrecht gesichert ist, nach Ablauf von sechs Monaten nach dem vollständigen Empfang unter Einhaltung einer Kündigungsfrist von drei Monaten;3. in jedem Fall nach Ablauf von zehn Jahren nach dem vollständigen Empfang unter Einhaltung einer Kündigungsfrist von sechs Monaten; wird nach dem Empfang des Darlehens eine neue Vereinbarung über die Zeit der Rückzahlung oder den Zinssatz getroffen, so tritt der Zeitpunkt dieser Vereinbarung an die Stelle des Zeitpunkts der Auszahlung.(2) Der Darlehensnehmer kann einen Darlehensvertrag mit veränderlichem Zinssatz jederzeit unter Einhaltung einer Kündigungsfrist von drei Monaten kündigen.(3) Eine Kündigung des Darlehensnehmers nach den Absätzen 1 oder 2 gilt als nicht erfolgt, wenn er den geschuldeten Betrag nicht binnen zwei Wochen nach Wirksamwerden der Kündigung zurückzahlt.(4) Das Kündigungsrecht des Darlehensnehmers nach den Absätzen 1 und 2 kann nicht durch Vertrag ausgeschlossen oder erschwert werden. Dies gilt nicht bei Darlehen an den Bund, ein Sondervermögen des Bundes, ein Land, eine Gemeinde, einen Gemeindeverband, die Europäischen Gemeinschaften oder ausländische Gebietskörperschaften.§ 489 Borrower’s ordinary right of termination(1) The borrower may, by giving notice, terminate the whole or a part of a loan contract for which a fixed rate of interest has been agreed for a specific period,1. if the stipulated fixed interest rate ends before the time specified for repayment and no new agreement concerning the interest rate has been reached, by giving at least one month’s notice expiring at the earliest on the day on which the stipulated fixed interest rate ends; if adjustment of the interest rate at specified periods of up to one year has been agreed, the borrower may only give notice expiring on the expiry of the day on which the stipulated fixed interest rate ends;2. if the loan is made to a consumer and is not secured by a mortgage or ship’s mortgage, after the expiry of six months after its receipt in full and provided he gives three months’ notice;3. in any event ten years after its receipt in full and provided that six months’ notice is given; if, after receipt of the loan, a new agreement is made concerning the time for repayment or the interest rate, the time agreed in the new agreement is substituted for the time of payment.(2) The borrower may terminate a loan agreement with a variable rate of interest at any time by giving three months’ notice of termination.(3) Termination by the borrower under subsections (1) or (2) is of no effect if the sum owed is not repaid within two weeks after the notice of termination becomes effective.(4) The borrower’s right of termination under subsections (1) and (2) above cannot be excluded or rendered more difficult by contract. This does not apply to loans to the federal government, a special fund of the federal state, a Land, a municipality, an association of municipalities, the European Communities or foreign regional or local authorities.
§ 490 Außerordentliches Kündigungsrecht (1) Wenn in den Vermögensverhältnissen des Darlehensnehmers oder in der Werthaltigkeit einer für das Darlehen eine gestellten Sicherheit eine wesentliche Verschlechterung eintritt oder einzutreten droht, durch die der Anspruch auf die Rückerstattung des Darlehens, auch unter Verwertung der Sicherheit, gefährdet wird, kann der Darlehensgeber den Darlehensvertrag vor Auszahlung des Darlehens im Zweifel stets, nach Auszahlung nur in der Regel fristlos kündigen.(2) Der Darlehensnehmer kann einen Darlehensvertrag, bei dem für einen bestimmten Zeitraum ein fester Zinssatz vereinbart und das Darlehen durch ein Grund­ oder Schiffspfandrecht gesichert ist, unter Einhaltung der Fristen des § 489 Abs. 1 Nr. 2 vorzeitig kündigen, wenn seine berechtigten Interessen dies gebieten. Ein solches Interesse liegt insbesondere vor, wenn der Darlehensnehmer ein Bedürfnis nach einer anderweitigen Verwertung der zur Sicherung des Darlehens beliehenen Sache hat. Der Darlehensnehmer hat dem Darlehensgeber denjenigen Schaden zu ersetzen, der diesem aus der vorzeitigen Kündigung entsteht (Vorfälligkeitsentschädigung).(3) Die Vorschriften der §§ 313 und 314 bleiben unberührt.§ 490 Extraordinary right of termination(1) If there is a material deterioration in the economic circumstances of the borrower or in the value of a security provided for the loan or a risk of such deterioration as a result of which the repayment of the loan is endangered even if the security is realised, the lender may, in case of doubt, terminate the loan agreement on immediate notice in any event before the loan is paid out to the borrower; once the loan has been paid out, this right exists only as a rule.(2) If his legitimate interests so require, a loan contract in which a fixed rate of interest has been agreed for a specific period and in which the loan is secured by a mortgage of land or ship’s mortgage may be terminated early by the borrower provided that he observes the notice periods in § 489 (1), No 2. Such an interest exists in particular where the borrower needs to use elsewhere the thing on which the loan is secured. The borrower must compensate the lender for the loss which he incurs as a result of this early termination (compensation for early termination).(3) The provisions of §§ 313 and 314 are unaffected.
§ 491 Verbraucherdarlehensvertrag(1) Für entgeltliche Darlehensverträge zwischen einem Unternehmer als Darlehensgeber und einem Verbraucher als Darlehensnehmer (Verbraucherdarlehensvertrag) gelten vorbehaltlich der Absätze 2 und 3 ergänzend die folgenden Vorschriften.(2) Die folgenden Vorschriften finden keine Anwendung auf Verbraucherdarlehensverträge,1. bei denen das auszuzahlende Darlehen (Nettodarlehensbetrag) 200 Euro nicht übersteigt;2. die ein Arbeitgeber mit seinem Arbeitnehmer zu Zinsen abschließt, die unter den marktüblichen Sätzen liegen;3. die im Rahmen der Förderung des Wohnungswesens und des Städtebaus auf Grund öffentlich­rechtlicher Bewilligungsbescheide oder auf Grund von Zuwendungen aus öffentlichen Haushalten unmittelbar zwischen der die Fördermittel vergebenden öffentlich­rechtlichen Anstalt und dem Darlehensnehmer zu Zinssätzen abgeschlossen werden, die unter den marktüblichen Sätzen liegen.(3) Keine Anwendung finden ferner1. die §§ 358, 359, § 492 Abs. 1 Satz 5 Nr. 2, § 495, § 497 Abs. 2 und 3 und § 498 auf Verbraucherdarlehensverträge, bei denen die Gewährung des Darlehens von der Sicherung durch ein Grundpfandrecht abhängig gemacht wird und zu Bedingungen erfolgt, die für grundpfandrechtlich abgesicherte Darlehensverträge und deren Zwischenfinanzierung üblich sind; der Sicherung durch ein Grundpfandrecht steht es gleich, wenn von einer solchen Sicherung gemäß § 7 Abs. 3 bis 5 des Gesetzes über Bausparkassen abgesehen wird;2. § 358 Abs. 2, 4 und 5 und die §§ 492 bis 495 auf Verbraucherdarlehensverträge, die in ein nach den Vorschriften der Zivilprozessordnung errichtetes gerichtliches Protokoll aufgenommen oder notariell beurkundet sind, wenn das Protokoll oder die notarielle Urkunde den Jahreszins, die bei Abschluss des Vertrags in Rechnung gestellten Kosten des Darlehens sowie die Voraussetzungen enthält, unter denen der Jahreszins oder die Kosten geändert werden können;3. §§ 358 Abs. 2, 4 und 5 und § 359 auf Verbraucherdarlehensverträge, die der Finanzierung des Erwerbs von Wertpapieren, Devisen, Derivaten oder Edelmetallen dienen.§ 491 Consumer loan contract(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3) below, the following supplementary provisions also apply to loan contracts made for remuneration between a businessperson and a consumer as borrower (consumer loan contract).(2) The following provisions do not apply to loan agreements1. in which the loan to be paid out (net loan amount) does not exceed Euro 200;2. which an employer concludes with his employee at an interest rate below the normal market rate;3. which are concluded in the framework of the promotion of housing and urban development on the basis of decisions governed by public law or on the basis of allocations made from public budgets made directly between the fund providing institution governed by public law and the borrower at rates of interest below the normal market rate.(3) Nor do the following provisions apply:1. §§ 358, 359, § 492 (1), sentence 5, No 2, § 495, § 497 (2) and (3), and § 498 to consumer loan contracts in which the grant of the loan is made dependent on the grant of security by way of mortgage of immovable property, or in which no such mortgage has been stipulated in view of § 7 (3) to (5) of the Home Savings Bank Act, and on terms which are normal for loans secured by mortgage and their interim financing;2. § 358 (2), (4) and (5) and §§ 492 to 495 to consumer loan contracts which are included in a court protocol drawn up in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure or authenticated by a notary, if the protocol or the authentication sets out the annual interest rate, the charges in connection payable upon conclusion of the contract and the conditions under which the annual interest rate or the charges may be altered;3. § 358 (2), (4) and (5), and § 359 to consumer loan contracts intended to finance the acquisition of securities, foreign currencies, derivatives or precious metals.
§ 492 Schriftform, Vertragsinhalt (1) Verbraucherdarlehensverträge sind, soweit nicht eine strengere Form vorgeschrieben ist, schriftlich abzuschließen. Der Abschluss des Vertrags in elektronischer Form ist ausgeschlossen. Der Schriftform ist genügt, wenn Antrag und Annahme durch die Vertragsparteien jeweils getrennt schriftlich erklärt werden. Die Erklärung des Darlehensgebers bedarf keiner Unterzeichnung, wenn sie mit Hilfe einer automatischen Einrichtung erstellt wird. Die vom Darlehensnehmer zu unterzeichnende Vertragserklärung muss angeben1. den Nettodarlehensbetrag, gegebenenfalls die Höchstgrenze des Darlehens;2. den Gesamtbetrag aller vom Darlehensnehmer zur Tilgung des Darlehens sowie zur Zahlung der Zinsen und sonstigen Kosten zu entrichtenden Teilzahlungen, wenn der Gesamtbetrag bei Abschluss des Verbraucherdarlehensvertrags für die gesamte Laufzeit der Höhe nach feststeht. Ferner ist bei Darlehen mit veränderlichen Bedingungen, die in Teilzahlungen getilgt werden, ein Gesamtbetrag auf der Grundlage der bei Abschluss des Vertrags maßgeblichen Darlehensbedingungen anzugeben. Kein Gesamtbetrag ist anzugeben bei Darlehen, bei denen die Inanspruchnahme bis zu einer Höchstgrenze freigestellt ist;3. die Art und Weise der Rückzahlung des Darlehens oder, wenn eine Vereinbarung hierüber nicht vorgesehen ist, die Regelung der Vertragsbeendigung;4. den Zinssatz und alle sonstigen Kosten des Darlehens, die, soweit ihre Höhe bekannt ist, im einzelnen zu bezeichnen, im Übrigen dem Grunde nach anzugeben sind, einschließlich etwaiger vom Darlehensnehmer zu tragender Vermittlungskosten;5. den effektiven Jahreszins oder, wenn eine Änderung des Zinssatzes oder anderer preisbestimmender Faktoren vorbehalten ist, den anfänglichen effektiven Jahreszins; zusammen mit dem anfänglichen effektiven Jahreszins ist auch anzugeben, unter welchen Voraussetzungen preisbestimmende Faktoren geändert werden können und auf welchen Zeitraum Belastungen, die sich aus einer nicht vollständigen Auszahlung oder aus einem Zuschlag zu dem Darlehen ergeben, bei der Berechnung des effektiven Jahreszinses verrechnet werden;6. die Kosten einer Restschuld­ oder sonstigen Versicherung, die im Zusammenhang mit dem Verbraucherdarlehensvertrag abgeschlossen wird;7. zu bestellende Sicherheiten.(2) Effektiver Jahreszins ist die in einem Prozentsatz des Nettodarlehensbetrags anzugebende Gesamtbelastung pro Jahr. Die Berechnung des effektiven und des anfänglichen effektiven Jahreszinses richtet sich nach § 6 der Verordnung zur Regelung der Preisangaben.(3) Der Darlehensgeber hat dem Darlehensnehmer eine Abschrift der Vertragserklärungen zur Verfügung zu stellen.(4) Die Absätze 1 und 2 gelten auch für die Vollmacht, die ein Darlehensnehmer zum Abschluss eines Verbraucherdarlehensvertrags erteilt. Satz 1 gilt nicht für die Prozessvollmacht und eine Vollmacht, die notariell beurkundet ist.§ 492 Written form, content of the contract(1) Save where stricter requirements as to form are laid down, consumer loan contracts must be concluded in writing. The contract may not be concluded in electronic form. The requirement for the contract to be in writing is satisfied if the offer and the acceptance are each declared separately in writing. The lender’s declaration does not have to be signed if it is prepared with the aid of automatic equipment. The contract declaration which must be signed by the borrower must indicate1. the net loan amount, or the upper limit of the loan, as the case may be;2. the total amount of all instalments to be made by the borrower in order to repay the loan and to pay interest and other charges, if at the time of conclusion of the consumer loan contract the total amount is known for the total period of the loan. In the case of loans subject to variable conditions which are repaid in instalments, a total amount based on the conditions applicable upon conclusion of the contract must be indicated. The total amount does not have to be indicated in the case of loans for which the borrower is authorised to borrow up to a maximum amount;3. the method of repayment of the loan or, if no provisions are agreed in that respect, the rules for bringing the contract to an end;4. the interest rate and all other charges applicable to the loan, which, in so far as their amount is known, must be set out individually and otherwise the reason for them indicated, together with any arrangement costs to be born by the borrower;5. the annual percentage rate of charge or if provision is made for an alteration to the interest rate or other price determining factors, the initial annual percentage rate of charge; in the same context as the annual percentage rate of charge, there must also be an indication of the conditions under which price determining factors may be altered and of the period over which charges resulting from payment of less than the full loan to the borrower or from an additional loan amount are taken into account when the annual percentage rate of charge is calculated;6. the costs of insuring the outstanding balance of the loan or of other insurance concluded in connection with the loan contract;7. security to be provided.(2) The annual percentage rate of charge is the total charge per annum expressed as a percentage of the net loan amount. The annual percentage rate of charge and the initial annual percentage rate of charge are determined in accordance with § 6 of the Price Indication Regulation.(3) The lender must provide the borrower with a copy of the contract declarations.(4) Subsections (1) and (2) also apply to an authority granted by a borrower to conclude a consumer loan contract. Sentence 1 does not apply to an authority to carry on a lawsuit or to an authority authenticated by a notary.
§ 493 Überziehungskredit(1) Die Bestimmungen des § 492 gelten nicht für Verbraucherdarlehensverträge, bei denen ein Kreditinstitut einem Darlehensnehmer das Recht einräumt, sein laufendes Konto in bestimmter Höhe zu überziehen, wenn außer den Zinsen für das in Anspruch genommene Darlehen keine weiteren Kosten in Rechnung gestellt werden und die Zinsen nicht in kürzeren Perioden als drei Monaten belastet werden. Das Kreditinstitut hat den Darlehensnehmer vor der Inanspruchnahme eines solchen Darlehens zu unterrichten über1. die Höchstgrenze des Darlehens;2. den zum Zeitpunkt der Unterrichtung geltenden Jahreszins;3. die Bedingungen, unter denen der Zinssatz geändert werden kann;4. die Regelung der Vertragsbeendigung.Die Vertragsbedingungen nach Satz 2 Nr. 1 bis 4 sind dem Darlehensnehmer spätestens nach der ersten Inanspruchnahme des Darlehens zu bestätigen. Ferner ist der Darlehensnehmer während der Inanspruchnahme des Darlehens über jede Änderung des Jahreszinses zu unterrichten. Die Bestätigung nach Satz 3 und die Unterrichtung nach Satz 4 haben in Textform zu erfolgen; es genügt, wenn sie auf einem Kontoauszug erfolgen.(2) Duldet das Kreditinstitut die Überziehung eines laufenden Kontos und wird das Konto länger als drei Monate überzogen, so hat das Kreditinstitut den Darlehensnehmer über den Jahreszins, die Kosten sowie die diesbezüglichen Änderungen zu unterrichten; dies kann in Form eines Ausdrucks auf einem Kontoauszug erfolgen.§ 493 Credit by way of overdraft(1) The provisions of § 492 do not apply to consumer loan contracts in which the credit institution grants the borrower the right to overdraw his current account by a particular amount, if, apart from interest for the loan taken up, no other charges are made and the interest is not charged in periods of less than three months. The credit institution must inform the borrower, before he takes up such a loan, of1. the maximum amount of the loan;2. the annual rate of interest then applicable;3. the conditions under which the rate of interest may be altered;4. how the contract may be terminated.The contract conditions referred to in sentence 2, Nos 1 to 4, must be confirmed in writing to the borrower at the latest after the borrower has taken up the loan for the first time. During the period in which he has taken up the loan the borrower must also be informed of any alteration in the annual rate of interest. The confirmation under sentence 3 and the notice under sentence 4 may also be in textual form; it suffices if they are indicated on a bank statement.(2) If the credit institution permits a current account to be overdrawn and the account is overdrawn for more than three months, the credit institution must inform the borrower of the annual rate of interest, the charges and any alterations in that regard; this may be in the form of a notice on a bank statement.
§ 494 Rechtsfolgen von Formmängeln(1) Der Verbraucherdarlehensvertrag und die auf Abschluss eines solchen Vertrags vom Verbraucher erteilte Vollmacht sind nichtig, wenn die Schriftform insgesamt nicht eingehalten ist oder wenn eine der in § 492 Abs. 1 Satz 5 Nr. 1 bis 6 vorgeschriebenen Angaben fehlt.(2) Ungeachtet eines Mangels nach Absatz 1 wird der Verbraucherdarlehensvertrag gültig, soweit der Darlehensnehmer das Darlehen empfängt oder in Anspruch nimmt. Jedoch ermäßigt sich der dem Verbraucherdarlehensvertrag zugrunde gelegte Zinssatz (§ 492 Abs. 1 Satz 5 Nr. 4) auf den gesetzlichen Zinssatz, wenn seine Angabe, die Angabe des effektiven oder anfänglichen effektiven Jahreszinses (§ 492 Abs. 1 Satz 5 Nr. 5) oder die Angabe des Gesamtbetrags (§ 492 Abs. 1 Satz 5 Nr. 2) fehlt. Nicht angegebene Kosten werden vom Darlehensnehmer nicht geschuldet. Vereinbarte Teilzahlungen sind unter Berücksichtigung der verminderten Zinsen oder Kosten neu zu berechnen. Ist nicht angegeben, unter welchen Voraussetzungen preisbestimmende Faktoren geändert werden können, so entfällt die Möglichkeit, diese zum Nachteil des Darlehensnehmers zu ändern. Sicherheiten können bei fehlenden Angaben hierüber nicht gefordert werden; dies gilt nicht, wenn der Nettodarlehensbetrag 50 000 Euro übersteigt.(3) Ist der effektive oder der anfängliche effektive Jahreszins zu niedrig angegeben, so vermindert sich der dem Verbraucherdarlehensvertrag zugrunde gelegte Zinssatz um den Prozentsatz, um den der effektive oder anfängliche effektive Jahreszins zu niedrig angegeben ist.§ 494 Legal consequences of formal defects(1) The consumer loan contract and the authority granted by the consumer to conclude such a contract are void if the requirement for writing is not complied with as such or if any of the information laid down in § 492 (1), sentence 5, Nos 1 to 6, is not provided.(2) Irrespective of any defect under subsection (1) above, the consumer loan contract becomes valid to the extent that the borrower receives the loan or has recourse to it. However, the rate of interest applicable to the loan contract (§ 492 (1), sentence 5, No 4) is reduced to the statutory interest rate if that rate of charge or the annual percentage rate of charge or the initial annual percentage rate of charge (§ 492 (1), sentence 5, No 5) or the total amount (§ 492 (1), sentence 5, No 2) is not indicated. The borrower does not owe any charges not indicated. Agreed instalments must be recalculated by reference to the reduced interest rate or charges. If there is no indication of conditions under which the price determining factors may be altered, they may not be altered to the detriment of the borrower. If there is no indication regarding securities, they may not be demanded; this does not apply if the net loan amount exceeds Euro 50 000.(3) If the annual percentage rate of charge or the initial annual percentage rate of charge is indicated at a rate lower than the actually stipulated rate, the interest rate applicable to the consumer loan contract is reduced by the percentage amount by which the indicated annual percentage rate of charge or the initial annual percentage rate of charge is lower than the actually stipulated rate.
§ 495 Widerrufsrecht(1) Dem Darlehensnehmer steht bei einem Verbraucherdarlehensvertrag ein Widerrufsrecht nach § 355 zu.(2) Hat der Darlehensnehmer das Darlehen empfangen, gilt der Widerruf als nicht erfolgt, wenn er das Darlehen nicht binnen zwei Wochen entweder nach Erklärung des Widerrufs oder nach Auszahlung des Darlehens zurückzahlt. Dies gilt nicht im Falle des § 358 Abs. 2. Die erforderliche Belehrung über das Widerrufsrecht muss auf die Rechtsfolge nach Satz 1 hinweisen.(3) Die Absätze 1 und 2 finden keine Anwendung auf die in § 493 Abs. 1 Satz 1 genannten Verbraucherdarlehensverträge, wenn der Darlehensnehmer nach dem Vertrag das Darlehen jederzeit ohne Einhaltung einer Kündigungsfrist und ohne zusätzliche Kosten zurückzahlen kann.§ 495 Right of revocation(1) In the case of a consumer loan contract the borrower has a right of revocation in accordance with § 355.(2) If the borrower has received the loan, he is deemed not to have revoked if he does not repay the loan within two weeks after declaration of revocation or after the loan has been paid out. This does not apply in the case of § 358 (2). The necessary notification of the right of revocation must refer to the legal consequence under sentence 1.(3) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to the consumer loan contracts referred to in § 493 (1), sentence 1, if, under the contract, the borrower may repay the loan at any time without observing a notice period and without additional charges.
§ 496 Einwendungsverzicht, Wechsel­ und Scheckverbot (1) Eine Vereinbarung, durch die der Darlehensnehmer auf das Recht verzichtet, Einwendungen, die ihm gegenüber dem Darlehensgeber zustehen, gemäß § 404 einem Abtretungsgläubiger entgegenzusetzen oder eine ihm gegen den Darlehensgeber zustehende Forderung gemäß § 406 auch dem Abtretungsgläubiger gegenüber aufzurechnen, ist unwirksam.(2) Der Darlehensnehmer darf nicht verpflichtet werden, für die Ansprüche des Darlehensgebers aus dem Verbraucherdarlehensvertrag eine Wechselverbindlichkeit einzugehen. Der Darlehensgeber darf vom Darlehensnehmer zur Sicherung seiner Ansprüche aus dem Verbraucherdarlehensvertrag einen Scheck nicht entgegennehmen. Der Darlehensnehmer kann vom Darlehensgeber jederzeit die Herausgabe eines Wechsels oder Schecks, der entgegen Satz 1 oder 2 begeben worden ist, verlangen. Der Darlehensgeber haftet für jeden Schaden, der dem Darlehensnehmer aus einer solchen Wechsel­ oder Scheckbegebung entsteht.§ 496 Waiver of defences, prohibition of bills of exchange and cheques(1) An agreement by which the borrower waives his right pursuant to § 404 to raise against an assignee of the debt defences which he has against the lender, or his right pursuant to § 406 to set off also against the assignee of the debt a claim which he has against the lender, is invalid.(2) The borrower must not be required to incur an obligation under a bill of exchange in respect of the lender’s claims arising out of the consumer loan contract. The lender may not accept a cheque from the borrower in order to secure his claims arising under the consumer loan contract. The borrower may at any time demand that the lender surrender a bill of exchange or cheque that has been issued in breach of sentence 1 or 2 above. The lender is liable for any loss which the borrower incurs as a result of the issue of such a bill of exchange or cheque.
§ 497 Behandlung der Verzugszinsen, Anrechnung von Teilleistungen (1) Soweit der Darlehensnehmer mit Zahlungen, die er auf Grund des Verbraucherdarlehensvertrags schuldet, in Verzug kommt, hat er den geschuldeten Betrag gemäß § 288 Abs. 1 zu verzinsen, es sei denn, es handelt sich um einen grundpfandrechtlich gesicherten Verbraucherdarlehensvertrag gemäß § 491 Abs. 3 Nr. 1. Bei diesen Verträgen beträgt der Verzugszinssatz für das Jahr zweieinhalb Prozentpunkte über dem Basiszinssatz. Im Einzelfall kann der Darlehensgeber einen höheren oder der Darlehensnehmer einen niedrigeren Schaden nachweisen.(2) Die nach Eintritt des Verzugs anfallenden Zinsen sind auf einem gesonderten Konto zu verbuchen und dürfen nicht in ein Kontokorrent mit dem geschuldeten Betrag oder anderen Forderungen des Darlehensgebers eingestellt werden. Hinsichtlich dieser Zinsen gilt § 289 Satz 2 mit der Maßgabe, dass der Darlehensgeber Schadensersatz nur bis zur Höhe des gesetzlichen Zinssatzes (§ 246) verlangen kann.(3) Zahlungen des Darlehensnehmers, die zur Tilgung der gesamten fälligen Schuld nicht ausreichen, werden abweichend von § 367 Abs. 1 zunächst auf die Kosten der Rechtsverfolgung, dann auf den übrigen geschuldeten Betrag (Absatz 1) und zuletzt auf die Zinsen (Absatz 2) angerechnet. Der Darlehensgeber darf Teilzahlungen nicht zurückweisen. Die Verjährung der Ansprüche auf Darlehensrückerstattung und Zinsen ist vom Eintritt des Verzugs nach Absatz 1 an bis zu ihrer Feststellung in einer in § 197 Abs. 1 Nr. 3 bis 5 bezeichneten Art gehemmt, jedoch nicht länger als zehn Jahre von ihrer Entstehung an. Auf die Ansprüche auf Zinsen findet § 197 Abs. 2 keine Anwendung. Die Sätze 1 bis 4 finden keine Anwendung, soweit Zahlungen auf Vollstreckungstitel geleistet werden, deren Hauptforderung auf Zinsen lautet.§ 497 Treatment of default interest, credit for partial performance(1) If the borrower is in default in making payments which he owes under the consumer loan contract, he must pay interest on the amount owed in accordance with § 288 (1), unless it is a consumer loan contract secured by a mortgage of land in accordance with § 491 (3), No 1. In the case of the latter contracts the default interest rate per annum is 2.5% above the basic interest rate. In individual cases the lender may prove that the loss was greater or the borrower may prove that the loss was less.(2) Interest that accrues after default occurs is to be entered in a separate account and may not be included in a current account with the amount owed or with other claims of the lender. § 289, sentence 2, applies to that interest, except that the lender may demand compensation only up to the amount of the statutory interest rate (§ 246).(3) Payments by the borrower which are insufficient to repay the entire debt due are to be set, in derogation from § 367 (1), first, against legal costs, then against the remainder of the amount owed (subsection (1)) and lastly against interest (subsection (2)). The lender may not refuse part payments. Limitation of the claims for repayment of the loan and interest is suspended from the date of default until they are established in a manner referred to in § 197 (1), Nos 3 to 5, but not for more than ten years from the date on which they arose. § 197 (2) does not apply to claims for interest. Sentences 1 to 4 do not apply in so far as payments are made in response to an instrument authorising execution which primarily relates to a claim for interest.
§ 498 Gesamtfälligstellung bei Teilzahlungsdarlehen(1) Wegen Zahlungsverzugs des Darlehensnehmers kann der Darlehensgeber den Verbraucherdarlehensvertrag bei einem Darlehen, das in Teilzahlungen zu tilgen ist, nur kündigen, wenn1. der Darlehensnehmer mit mindestens zwei aufeinanderfolgenden Teilzahlungen ganz oder teilweise und mindestens zehn Prozent, bei einer Laufzeit des Verbraucherdarlehensvertrags über drei Jahre mit fünf Prozent des Nennbetrags des Darlehens oder des Teilzahlungspreises in Verzug ist und2. der Darlehensgeber dem Darlehensnehmer erfolglos eine zweiwöchige Frist zur Zahlung des rückständigen Betrags mit der Erklärung gesetzt hat, dass er bei Nichtzahlung innerhalb der Frist die gesamte Restschuld verlange. Der Darlehensgeber soll dem Darlehensnehmer spätestens mit der Fristsetzung ein Gespräch über die Möglichkeiten einer einverständlichen Regelung anbieten.(2) Kündigt der Darlehensgeber den Verbraucherdarlehensvertrag, so vermindert sich die Restschuld um die Zinsen und sonstigen laufzeitabhängigen Kosten des Darlehens, die bei staffelmäßiger Berechnung auf die Zeit nach Wirksamwerden der Kündigung entfallen.§ 498 Repayment of the entire loan in the case of loans repayable in instalments(1) In the case of a loan repayable in instalments, the lender may give notice to terminate the consumer loan contract on account of default in payment by the borrower only if1. the borrower is in default in paying at least two successive instalments in whole or in part and at least 10% or, in the case of a loan contract period exceeding three years, 5% of the nominal amount of the loan or of the instalment purchase price, and2. the lender has, to no avail, fixed a period of two weeks within which to pay the sum in arrears and declared that if payment is not made within that period he will demand the whole of the debt outstanding. At the latest when he fixes that period, the lender is to offer to the borrower an opportunity to discuss the possibility of an agreed solution.(2) If the lender terminates the consumer loan contract, the outstanding amount is reduced by the interest and ther charges dependent on the term of the loan which, on a graduated calculation, are attributable to the period after the termination becomes effective.

Untertitel 2: Finanzierungshilfen zwischen einem Unternehmer und einem Verbraucher

Sub-title 2: Financial accommodation granted by a businessperson to a consumer

§ 499 Zahlungsaufschub, sonstige Finanzierungshilfe(1) Die Vorschriften der §§ 358, 359 und 492 Abs. 1 bis 3 und der §§ 494 bis 498 finden vorbehaltlich der Absätze 2 und 3 entsprechende Anwendung auf Verträge, durch die ein Unternehmer einem Verbraucher einen entgeltlichen Zahlungsaufschub von mehr als drei Monaten oder eine sonstige entgeltliche Finanzierungshilfe gewährt.(2) Für Finanzierungsleasingverträge und Verträge, die die Lieferung einer bestimmten Sache oder die Erbringung einer bestimmten anderen Leistung gegen Teilzahlungen zum Gegenstand haben (Teilzahlungsgeschäfte), gelten vorbehaltlich des Absatzes 3 die in den §§ 500 bis 504 geregelten Besonderheiten.(3) Die Vorschriften dieses Untertitels finden in dem in § 491 Abs. 2 und 3 bestimmten Umfang keine Anwendung. Bei einem Teilzahlungsgeschäft tritt an die Stelle des in § 491 Abs. 2 Nr. 1 genannten Nettodarlehensbetrags der Barzahlungspreis.§ 499 Extension of time for payment, other financial accommodation(1) Without prejudice to subsections (2) and (3), the provisions of §§ 358, 359, and 492 (1) to (3) and §§ 494 to 498 apply mutatis mutandis to contracts by which a businessperson grants a consumer, against remuneration, an extension of time for repayment exceeding three months or grants him other remunerated financial accommodation.(2) Without prejudice to subsection (3), the special provisions laid down in §§ 500 to 504 apply to finance leasing contracts and contracts for the supply of a specific thing or the provision of a specified other performance in return for instalment payments (instalment payment transactions).(3) The provisions of this sub-title do not apply to the extent laid down in § 491 (2) and (3). In the case of an instalment payment transaction, the cash payment price replaces the net loan amount referred to in § 491 (2), No 1.
§ 500 FinanzierungsleasingverträgeAuf Finanzierungsleasingverträge zwischen einem Unternehmer und einem Verbraucher finden lediglich die Vorschriften der §§ 358, 359, 492 Abs. 1 Satz 1 bis 4, § 492 Abs. 2 und 3 und § 495 Abs. 1 sowie der §§ 496 bis 498 entsprechende Anwendung.§ 500 Finance leasing contractsOnly the provisions of §§ 358, 359, 492 (1), sentences 1 to 4, § 492 (2) and (3) and § 495 (1) and §§ 496 to 498 apply mutatis mutandis to finance leasing contracts between a businessperson and a consumer.
§ 501 TeilzahlungsgeschäfteAuf Teilzahlungsgeschäfte zwischen einem Unternehmer und einem Verbraucher finden lediglich die Vorschriften der §§ 358, 359, 492 Abs. 1 Satz 1 bis 4, § 492 Abs. 2 und 3, § 495 Abs. 1 sowie der §§ 496 bis 498 entsprechende Anwendung. Im Übrigen gelten die folgenden Vorschriften.§ 501 Instalment payment transactionsOnly the provisions of §§ 358, 359, 492 (1), sentences 1 to 4, § 492 (2) and (3) and § 495 (1) and §§ 496 to 498 apply mutatis mutandis to instalment payment transactions between a businessperson and a consumer. Otherwise the following provisions apply.
§ 502 Erforderliche Angaben, Rechtsfolgen von Formmängeln bei Teilzahlungsgeschäften(1) Die vom Verbraucher zu unterzeichnende Vertragserklärung muss bei Teilzahlungsgeschäften angeben1. den Barzahlungspreis;2. den Teilzahlungspreis (Gesamtbetrag von Anzahlung und allen vom Verbraucher zu entrichtenden Teilzahlungen einschließlich Zinsen und sonstiger Kosten);3. Betrag, Zahl und Fälligkeit der einzelnen Teilzahlungen;4. den effektiven Jahreszins;5. die Kosten einer Versicherung, die im Zusammenhang mit dem Teilzahlungsgeschäft abgeschlossen wird;6. die Vereinbarung eines Eigentumsvorbehalts oder einer anderen zu bestellenden Sicherheit.Der Angabe eines Barzahlungspreises und eines effektiven Jahreszinses bedarf es nicht, wenn der Unternehmer nur gegen Teilzahlungen Sachen liefert oder Leistungen erbringt.(2) Die Erfordernisse des Absatzes 1, des § 492 Abs. 1 Satz 1 bis 4 und des § 492 Abs. 3 gelten nicht für Teilzahlungsgeschäfte im Fernabsatz, wenn die in Absatz 1 Satz 1 Nr. 1 bis 5 bezeichneten Angaben mit Ausnahme des Betrags der einzelnen Teilzahlungen dem Verbraucher so rechtzeitig in Textform mitgeteilt sind, dass er die Angaben vor dem Abschluss des Vertrags eingehend zur Kenntnis nehmen kann.(3) Das Teilzahlungsgeschäft ist nichtig, wenn die Schriftform des § 492 Abs. 1 Satz 1 bis 4 nicht eingehalten ist oder wenn eine der im Absatz 1 Satz 1 Nr. 1 bis 5 vorgeschriebenen Angaben fehlt. Ungeachtet eines Mangels nach Satz 1 wird das Teilzahlungsgeschäft gültig, wenn dem Verbraucher die Sache übergeben oder die Leistung erbracht wird. Jedoch ist der Barzahlungspreis höchstens mit dem gesetzlichen Zinssatz zu verzinsen, wenn die Angabe des Teilzahlungspreises oder des effektiven Jahreszinses fehlt. Ist ein Barzahlungspreis nicht genannt, so gilt im Zweifel der Marktpreis als Barzahlungspreis. Die Bestellung von Sicherheiten kann bei fehlenden Angaben hierüber nicht gefordert werden. Ist der effektive oder der anfängliche effektive Jahreszins zu niedrig angegeben, so vermindert sich der Teilzahlungspreis um den Prozentsatz, um den der effektive oder anfängliche effektive Jahreszins zu niedrig angegeben ist.§ 502 Information required, legal consequences of formal defects in the case of instalment payment transactions(1) In the case of instalment payment transactions, the contractual declaration to be signed by the consumer must indicate1. the cash price;2. the instalment payment price (total amount of the deposit and all instalments to be made by the consumer, including interest and other charges);3. the amount, number and due date of each instalment payment;4. the annual percentage rate of charge;5. the cost of insurance which is concluded in connection with the instalment payment transaction;6. the stipulation of a reservation of title or other security to be given.The indication of the cash price and of the annual percentage rate of charge is unnecessary if the businessperson supplies the goods or other performance only upon instalment payment terms.(2) The requirements of subsection (1), of § 492 (1), sentence 1 to 4, and of § 492 (3) do not apply to instalment payment transactions in distance contracts if the information in subsection (1), sentence 1 Nos 1 to 5, other than the amount of each instalment, are provided to the consumer in textual form by such a time that he is able to obtain thorough knowledge of the information before the contract is concluded.(3) The instalment payment transaction is void if the requirement for writing in § 492 (1), sentences 1 to 4, is not complied with or if one of the indications required by subsection (1), sentence 1, Nos 1 to 5, is missing. Notwithstanding a defect under sentence 1, the instalment payment transaction becomes valid if the thing is handed over to the consumer or the performance made to him. However, if the instalment payment price or the annual percentage rate of charge is not indicated, the maximum rate of interest on the cash price is the statutory rate of interest. If a cash price is not indicated, the market price is deemed to be the cash price in case of doubt. The provision of security cannot be required if no indication has been given in that regard. If the indicated annual percentage rate of charge or initial annual percentage rate of charge is indicated as lower than the actually stipulated rate, the instalment payment price is reduced by the percentage amount by which the indicated annual percentage rate of charge or the initial annual percentage rate of charge is lower than the actually stipulated rate.
§ 503 Rückgaberecht, Rücktritt bei Teilzahlungsgeschäften(1) Anstelle des dem Verbraucher gemäß § 495 Abs. 1 zustehenden Widerrufsrechts kann dem Verbraucher ein Rückgaberecht nach § 356 eingeräumt werden.(2) Der Unternehmer kann von einem Teilzahlungsgeschäft wegen Zahlungsverzugs des Verbrauchers nur unter den in § 498 Abs. 1 bezeichneten Voraussetzungen zurücktreten. Der Verbraucher hat dem Unternehmer auch die infolge des Vertrags gemachten Aufwendungen zu ersetzen. Bei der Bemessung der Vergütung von Nutzungen einer zurückzugewährenden Sache ist auf die inzwischen eingetretene Wertminderung Rücksicht zu nehmen. Nimmt der Unternehmer die auf Grund des Teilzahlungsgeschäfts gelieferte Sache wieder an sich, gilt dies als Ausübung des Rücktrittsrechts, es sei denn, der Unternehmer einigt sich mit dem Verbraucher, diesem den gewöhnlichen Verkaufswert der Sache im Zeitpunkt der Wegnahme zu vergüten. Satz 4 gilt entsprechend, wenn ein Vertrag über die Lieferung einer Sache mit einem Verbraucherdarlehensvertrag verbunden ist (§ 358 Abs. 2) und wenn der Darlehensgeber die Sache an sich nimmt; im Falle des Rücktritts bestimmt sich das Rechtsverhältnis zwischen dem Darlehensgeber und dem Verbraucher nach den Sätzen 2 und 3.§ 503 Right of return, termination of instalment payment transactions(1) The consumer may be given a right of return under § 356 instead of the right of revocation to which he entitled under § 495 (1).(2) The businessperson may terminate an instalment payment transaction on account of a default in payment by the consumer only subject to the requirements set out in § 498 (1). The consumer must compensate the businessperson also for the expenditure incurred under the contract. When calculating compensation for the benefits of a thing to be returned, account must be taken of the reduction in value that has since occurred. If the businessperson takes back the thing delivered under the instalment payment transaction, that is deemed to be the exercise of the right of termination, unless the businessperson agrees with the consumer to compensate the latter for the usual sales value of the thing at the time it is taken away. Sentence 4 applies mutatis mutandis if a contract for the supply of a thing is linked with a consumer loan contract (§ 358 (2)) and if the lender takes over the thing; in the event of termination, the legal relationship between the lender and the consumer is determined in accordance with sentences 2 and 3.
§ 504 Vorzeitige Zahlung bei TeilzahlungsgeschäftenErfüllt der Verbraucher vorzeitig seine Verbindlichkeiten aus dem Teilzahlungsgeschäft, so vermindert sich der Teilzahlungspreis um die Zinsen und sonstigen laufzeitabhängigen Kosten, die bei gestaffelter Berechnung auf die Zeit nach der vorzeitigen Erfüllung entfallen. Ist ein Barzahlungspreis gemäß § 502 Abs. 1 Satz 2 nicht anzugeben, so ist der gesetzliche Zinssatz (§ 246) zugrunde zu legen. Zinsen und sonstige laufzeitabhängige Kosten kann der Unternehmer jedoch für die ersten neun Monate der ursprünglich vorgesehenen Laufzeit auch dann verlangen, wenn der Verbraucher seine Verbindlichkeiten vor Ablauf dieses Zeitraums erfüllt.§ 504 Early payment in instalment payment transactionsIf the consumer performs his obligations under an instalment payment transaction before the due date, the instalment payment price is reduced by the interest and other term-dependent charges which, applying a graduated calculation, fall due in the period after the date of early performance. If, by virtue of § 502 (1), sentence 2, a cash price does not have to be indicated, the statutory interest rate (§ 246) is applied. However, the businessperson may demand interest and other term-dependent charges in respect of the first nine months of the term originally provided for, even if the consumer performs his obligations before the end of that period.

Untertitel 3: Ratenlieferungsverträge zwischen einem Unternehmer und einem Verbraucher

Sub-title 3: Instalment supply contracts between a businessperson and a consumer

§ 505 Ratenlieferungsverträge (1) Dem Verbraucher steht vorbehaltlich des Satzes 2 bei Verträgen mit einem Unternehmer, in denen die Willenserklärung des Verbrauchers auf den Abschluss eines Vertrags gerichtet ist, der1. die Lieferung mehrerer als zusammengehörend verkaufter Sachen in Teilleistungen zum Gegenstand hat und bei dem das Entgelt für die Gesamtheit der Sachen in Teilzahlungen zu entrichten ist, oder2. die regelmäßige Lieferung von Sachen gleicher Art zum Gegenstand hat, oder3. die Verpflichtung zum wiederkehrenden Erwerb oder Bezug von Sachen zum Gegenstand hat,ein Widerrufsrecht gemäß § 355 zu. Dies gilt nicht in dem in § 491 Abs. 2 und 3 bestimmten Umfang. Dem in § 491 Abs. 2 Nr. 1 genannten Nettodarlehensbetrag entspricht die Summe aller vom Verbraucher bis zum frühestmöglichen Kündigungszeitpunkt zu entrichtenden Teilzahlungen.(2) Der Ratenlieferungsvertrag nach Absatz 1 bedarf der schriftlichen Form. Satz 1 gilt nicht, wenn dem Verbraucher die Möglichkeit verschafft wird, die Vertragsbestimmungen einschließlich der Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen bei Vertragsschluss abzurufen und in wiedergabefähiger Form zu speichern. Der Unternehmer hat dem Verbraucher den Vertragsinhalt in Textform mitzuteilen.§ 505 Instalment supply contracts(1) Subject to sentence 2, in contracts with a businessperson in which the declarations of intention are directed at the conclusion of a contract which1. concerns the supply in instalments of several things sold as things which are connected with each other and in which the remuneration for the whole of the things is payable in instalments, or2. concerns the regular supply of things of the same kind, or3. concerns an obligation to acquire or obtain things on a recurring basis,the consumer has a right of revocation in accordance with § 355. This does not apply to the extent determined by § 491 (2) and (3). The net loan amount referred to in § 491 (2), No 1, corresponds to the sum of all instalments to be paid by the consumer up to the earliest possible date for termination by notice.(2) An instalment supply contract under subsection (1) must be in writing. Sentence 1 does not apply if the customer is given an opportunity to retrieve and save in reproducible form the conditions of the contract including standard business terms incorporated in it upon conclusion of the contract. The businessperson must supply the contract to the consumer in textual form.

Untertitel 4: Unabdingbarkeit, Anwendung auf Existenzgründer

Sub-title 4: No contrary agreements, application to start-up businesses

§ 506 Abweichende VereinbarungenVon den Vorschriften der §§ 491 bis 505 darf nicht zum Nachteil des Verbrauchers abgewichen werden. Diese Vorschriften finden auch Anwendung, wenn sie durch anderweitige Gestaltungen umgangen werden.§ 506 Contrary agreementsNo agreement derogating from the provisions of § 491 to 505 may be made to the detriment of the consumer. These provisions apply even if they are circumvented by other arrangements.
§ 507 Anwendung auf ExistenzgründerDie §§ 491 bis 506 gelten auch für natürliche Personen, die sich ein Darlehen, einen Zahlungsaufschub oder eine sonstige Finanzierungshilfe für die Aufnahme einer gewerblichen oder selbständigen beruflichen Tätigkeit gewähren lassen oder zu diesem Zweck einen Ratenlieferungsvertrag schließen, es sei denn, der Nettodarlehensbetrag oder Barzahlungspreis übersteigt 50 000 Euro.§ 507 Application to small businesses§§ 491 to 506 also apply to natural persons to whom a loan, extension of time for payment or other financial accommodation is granted for the taking up of a trade or self-employed professional activity or who conclude an instalment supply contract for that purpose, unless the net loan amount or the cash price exceeds Euro 50 000.
§§ 507-515 (entfallen)§§ 507 – 515 (repealed)
The Act makes minor amendments to §§ 523, 536, 536a, 543, 548, 563, 604.

Titel 7: Sachdarlehensvertrag

Title 7: Contract for the loan of a thing

§ 607 Vertragstypische Pflichten beim Sachdarlehensvertrag(1) Durch den Sachdarlehensvertrag wird der Darlehensgeber verpflichtet, dem Darlehensnehmer eine vereinbarte vertretbare Sache zu überlassen. Der Darlehensnehmer ist zur Zahlung eines Darlehensentgelts und bei Fälligkeit zur Rückerstattung des Empfangenen in Sachen von gleicher Art, Güte und Menge verpflichtet.(2) Die Vorschriften dieses Titels finden keine Anwendung auf die Überlassung von Geld.§ 607 Standard obligations in a contract for the loan of a thing(1) By a contract for the loan of a thing, the lender is bound to hand over to the borrower an agreed generic thing. The borrower is bound to pay remuneration for the loan and, on the due date, to return what he has received in things of the same kind, quality and quantity.(2) The provisions of this title do not apply to the loan of money.
§ 608 Kündigung (1) Ist für die Rückerstattung der überlassenen Sache eine Zeit nicht bestimmt, hängt die Fälligkeit davon ab, dass der Darlehensgeber oder der Darlehensnehmer kündigt.(2) Ein auf unbestimmte Zeit abgeschlossener Sachdarlehensvertrag kann, soweit nicht ein anderes vereinbart ist, jederzeit vom Darlehensgeber oder Darlehensnehmer ganz oder teilweise gekündigt werden.§ 608 Termination(1) If a time for the return of the thing handed over is not specified, the due date depends on the giving of notice by the lender or the borrower.(2) Unless otherwise agreed, a contract for the loan of a thing for an indefinite period may be terminated in whole or in part by the lender or the borrower at any time. 
§ 609 EntgeltEin Entgelt hat der Darlehensnehmer spätestens bei Rückerstattung der überlassenen Sache zu bezahlen.§ 609 RemunerationThe borrower must pay the remuneration at the latest upon the return of the thing loaned.
The Act makes small alterations to §§ 615 and inserts a new § 619a.

Titel 9: Werkvertrag und ähnliche Verträge

Untertitel 1: Werkvertrag

Title 9: Contract for work and similar contracts

Sub-title 1: Contract for work

§ 631 Vertragstypische Pflichten beim Werkvertrag(1) Durch den Werkvertrag wird der Unternehmer zur Herstellung des versprochenen Werkes, der Besteller zur Entrichtung der vereinbarten Vergütung verpflichtet.(2) Gegenstand des Werkvertrags kann sowohl die Herstellung oder Veränderung einer Sache als ein anderer durch Arbeit oder Dienstleistung herbeizuführender Erfolg sein.§ 631 Standard obligations in a contract for work(1) By a contract for work the contractor is bound to produce the work promised and the customer is bound to pay the remuneration agreed.(2) The subject matter of a contract for work may be the production or alteration of a thing or some other result to be brought about by labour or the performance of a service.
§ 632 Vergütung(1) Eine Vergütung gilt als stillschweigend vereinbart, wenn die Herstellung des Werkes den Umständen nach nur gegen eine Vergütung zu erwarten ist.(2) Ist die Höhe der Vergütung nicht bestimmt, so ist bei dem Bestehen einer Taxe die taxmäßige Vergütung, in Ermangelung einer Taxe die übliche Vergütung als vereinbart anzusehen.(3) Ein Kostenanschlag ist im Zweifel nicht zu vergüten.§ 632 Remuneration(1) Remuneration for work is deemed to have been tacitly agreed if in the circumstances it is to be expected that the work is to be performed only for remuneration.(2) If the amount of remuneration is not specified and a tariff exists, the tariff rate of remuneration is deemed to have been agreed; if no tariff exists, the usual remuneration is deemed to have been agreed.(3) In case of doubt, an estimate of costs is not remunerable.
§ 633 Sach­ und Rechtsmangel(1) Der Unternehmer hat dem Besteller das Werk frei von Sach­ und Rechtsmängeln zu verschaffen.(2) Das Werk ist frei von Sachmängeln, wenn es die vereinbarte Beschaffenheit hat. Soweit die Beschaffenheit nicht vereinbart ist, ist das Werk frei von Sachmängeln,1. wenn es sich für die nach dem Vertrag vorausgesetzte, sonst2. für die gewöhnliche Verwendung eignet und eine Beschaffenheit aufweist, die bei Werken der gleichen Art üblich ist und die der Besteller nach der Art des Werks erwarten kann.Einem Sachmangel steht es gleich, wenn der Unternehmer ein anderes als das bestellte Werk oder das Werk in zu geringer Menge herstellt.(3) Das Werk ist frei von Rechtsmängeln, wenn Dritte in Bezug auf das Werk keine oder nur die im Vertrag übernommenen Rechte gegen den Besteller geltend machen können.§ 633 Defects as to quality and defects of title(1) The contractor must procure the work for the customer free of defects as to quality and defects in title.(2) The work is free of defects as to quality if it is of the agreed quality. In so far as the quality is not agreed, the work is free of defects as to quality1. if it is fit for the use required by the contract,2. otherwise for the usual use and is of a quality which is usual in work of a similar kind and which may be expected by the customer according to the kind of work.If the contractor produces work different from the work ordered or work of a lesser amount than that ordered, that is equivalent to a defect as to quality.(3) The work is free of defects in title if third persons cannot assert against the customer any rights in relation to the work or can assert only such rights as are assumed in the contract.
§ 634 Rechte des Bestellers bei MängelnIst das Werk mangelhaft, kann der Besteller, wenn die Voraussetzungen der folgenden Vorschriften vorliegen und soweit nicht ein anderes bestimmt ist,1. nach § 635 Nacherfüllung verlangen,2. nach § 637 den Mangel selbst beseitigen und Ersatz der erforderlichen Aufwendungen verlangen3. nach den §§ 636, 323 und 326 Abs. 5 von dem Vertrag zurücktreten oder nach § 638 die Vergütung mindern und4. nach den §§ 636, 280, 281, 283 und 311a Schadensersatz oder nach § 284 Ersatz vergeblicher Aufwendungen verlangen.§ 634 Customer’s rights in the case of defectsWhere the requirements of the following provisions are satisfied and except as otherwise provided, if the work is defective, the customer may1. demand supplementary performance under § 635,2. remove the defect himself and demand reimbursement of the necessary expenditure under § 637;3. terminate the contract under §§ 636, 323 and 326 (5) or reduce the remuneration under § 638; and4. claim compensation under §§ 636, 280, 281, 283 and 311a or reimbursement of wasted expenditure under § 284.
§ 634a Verjährung der Mängelansprüche(1) Die in § 634 Nr. 1, 2 und 4 bezeichneten Ansprüche verjähren1. vorbehaltlich der Nummer 2 in zwei Jahren bei einem Werk, dessen Erfolg in der Herstellung, Wartung oder Veränderung einer Sache oder in der Erbringung von Planungs- oder Überwachungsleistungen hierfür besteht,2. in fünf Jahren bei einem Bauwerk und einem Werk, dessen Erfolg in der Erbringung von Planungs- und Überwachungsleistungen hierfür besteht, und3. im Übrigen in der regelmäßigen Verjährungsfrist.(2) Die Verjährung beginnt in den Fällen des Absatzes 1 Nr. 1 und 2 mit der Abnahme.(3) Abweichend von Absatz 1 Nr. 1 und 2 und Absatz 2 verjähren die Ansprüche in der regelmäßigen Verjährungsfrist, wenn der Unternehmer den Mangel arglistig verschwiegen hat. Im Fall des Absatzes 1 Nr. 2 tritt die Verjährung jedoch nicht vor Ablauf der dort bestimmten Frist ein.(4) Für das in § 634 bezeichnete Rücktrittsrecht gilt § 218. Der Besteller kann trotz einer Unwirksamkeit des Rücktritts nach § 218 Abs. 1 die Zahlung der Vergütung insoweit verweigern, als er auf Grund des Rücktritts dazu berechtigt sein würde. Macht er von diesem Recht Gebrauch, kann der Unternehmer vom Vertrag zurücktreten.(5) Auf das in § 634 bezeichnete Minderungsrecht finden § 218 und Absatz 4 Satz 2 entsprechende Anwendung.§ 634a Limitation of claims in respect of defects(1) The claims referred to in § 634, Nos 1, 2 and 4, are time-barred1. subject to No 2, after two years in the case of work the result of which consists in the production, servicing or alteration of a thing or in the provision of planning or supervisory services therefor,2. after five years in the case of a building and work the result of which consists in the provision of planning or supervisory services therefor,3. otherwise, after the standard limitation period.(2) In cases falling under subsection (1), Nos. 1 and 2, the limitation period begins when the work is accepted.(3) In derogation from subsection (1) Nos. 1 and 2, and subsection (2), claims are time-barred after the standard limitation period if the contractor fraudulently concealed the defect. However, in the case of subsection (1), No 2, claims are not time-barred before the expiry of the period there specified.(4) § 218 applies to the right of termination referred to in § 634. Notwithstanding the invalidity of termination under § 218 (1), the customer may refuse to pay the remuneration in so far as he would be entitled to do so by virtue of termination. If he makes use of that right, the contractor may terminate the contract.(5) § 218 and subsection (4), sentence 2, apply mutatis mutandis to the right of price reduction referred to in § 634.
§ 635 Nacherfüllung(1) Verlangt der Besteller Nacherfüllung, so kann der Unternehmer nach seiner Wahl den Mangel beseitigen oder ein neues Werk herstellen.(2) Der Unternehmer hat die zum Zweck der Nacherfüllung erforderlichen Aufwendungen, insbesondere Transport­, Wege­, Arbeits­ und Materialkosten zu tragen.(3) Der Unternehmer kann die Nacherfüllung unbeschadet des § 275 Abs. 2 und 3 verweigern, wenn sie nur mit unverhältnismäßigen Kosten möglich ist.(4) Stellt der Unternehmer ein neues Werk her, so kann er vom Besteller Rückgewähr des mangelhaften Werks nach Maßgabe der §§ 346 bis 348 verlangen.§ 635 Supplementary performance(1) If the customer claims supplementary performance, the contractor may, at his option, remove the defect or produce new work.(2) The contractor must bear the expenditure necessary for supplementary performance, in particular the costs of carriage, transport, labour and material.(3) Without prejudice to § 275 (2) and (3), the contractor may refuse supplementary performance if it is possible only at unreasonable cost.(4) If the contractor produces a new work, he may claim the return of the defective work from the customer in accordance with §§ 346 to 348.
§ 636 Besondere Bestimmungen für Rücktritt und SchadensersatzAußer in den Fällen der §§ 281 Abs. 2 und 323 Abs. 2 bedarf es der Fristsetzung auch dann nicht, wenn der Unternehmer die Nacherfüllung gemäß § 635 Abs. 3 verweigert oder wenn die Nacherfüllung fehlgeschlagen oder dem Besteller unzumutbar ist.§ 636 Special provisions for termination and compensationIn addition to the cases of §§ 281 (2) and 323 (2), there is also no need for a period to be fixed if the contractor refuses supplementary performance under § 635 (3) or if supplementary performance has been unsuccessful or is unreasonable for the customer.
§ 637 Selbstvornahme(1) Der Besteller kann wegen eines Mangels des Werks nach erfolglosem Ablauf einer von ihm zur Nacherfüllung bestimmten angemessenen Frist den Mangel selbst beseitigen und Ersatz der erforderlichen Aufwendungen verlangen, wenn nicht der Unternehmer die Nacherfüllung zu Recht verweigert.(2) § 323 Abs. 2 findet entsprechende Anwendung. Der Bestimmung einer Frist bedarf es auch dann nicht, wenn die Nacherfüllung fehlgeschlagen oder dem Besteller unzumutbar ist.(3) Der Besteller kann von dem Unternehmer für die zur Beseitigung des Mangels erforderlichen Aufwendungen Vorschuss verlangen.§ 637 Self-help(1) If there is a defect if the work, the customer may remove the defect himself after the expiry to no avail of a reasonable period fixed by him for supplementary performance and claim reimbursement for the necessary expenditure, unless the contractor rightly refuses supplementary performance.(2) § 323 (2) applies mutatis mutandis. Nor does a period have to be fixed if supplementary performance has been unsuccessful or is unreasonable for the customer.(3) The customer may claim from the contractor advance payment of expenditure necessary to remove the defect.
§ 638 Minderung(1) Statt zurückzutreten, kann der Besteller die Vergütung durch Erklärung gegenüber dem Unternehmer mindern. Der Ausschlussgrund des § 323 Abs. 5 Satz 2 findet keine Anwendung.(2) Sind auf der Seite des Bestellers oder auf der Seite des Unternehmers mehrere beteiligt, so kann die Minderung nur von allen oder gegen alle erklärt werden.(3) Bei der Minderung ist die Vergütung in dem Verhältnis herabzusetzen, in welchem zur Zeit des Vertragsschlusses der Wert des Werks in mangelfreiem Zustand zu dem wirklichen Wert gestanden haben würde. Die Minderung ist, soweit erforderlich, durch Schätzung zu ermitteln.(4) Hat der Besteller mehr als die geminderte Vergütung gezahlt, so ist der Mehrbetrag vom Unternehmer zu erstatten. § 346 Abs. 1 und § 347 Abs. 1 finden entsprechende Anwendung.§ 638 Price reduction(1) Instead of terminating the contract, the customer may, by declaration to the contractor, reduce the remuneration. The exclusion under § 323 (5), sentence 2, does not apply.(2) If several persons constitute the customer or the contractor, price reduction may be declared only by or to all persons.(3) In the case of price reduction, the remuneration is reduced in the ratio which the value of the work free of defects would, at the time of the conclusion of the contract, have had to the actual value. Where necessary, the price reduction is to be estimated.(4) If the customer has paid more than the reduced remuneration, the contractor must refund the excess amount. § 346 (1) and § 347 (1) apply mutatis mutandis.
§ 639 HaftungsausschlussAuf eine Vereinbarung, durch welche die Rechte des Bestellers wegen eines Mangels ausgeschlossen oder beschränkt werden, kann sich der Unternehmer nicht berufen, wenn er den Mangel arglistig verschwiegen oder eine Garantie für die Beschaffenheit des Werks übernommen hat.§ 639 Exclusion of liabilityThe contractor may not rely on an agreement by which the customer’s rights in respect of a defect are excluded or restricted, if he fraudulently concealed the defect or if he has guaranteed the quality of the work.
§ 640 Abnahme(1) Der Besteller ist verpflichtet, das vertragsmäßig hergestellte Werk abzunehmen, sofern nicht nach der Beschaffenheit des Werkes die Abnahme ausgeschlossen ist. Wegen unwesentlicher Mängel kann die Abnahme nicht verweigert werden. Der Abnahme steht es gleich, wenn der Besteller das Werk nicht innerhalb einer ihm von Unternehmer bestimmten Frist abnimmt, obwohl er dazu verpflichtet ist.(2) Nimmt der Besteller ein mangelhaftes Werk gemäß Absatz 1 Satz 1 ab, obschon er den Mangel kennt, so stehen ihm die in § 634 Nr. 1 bis 3 bezeichneten Rechte nur zu, wenn er sich seine Rechte wegen des Mangels bei der Abnahme vorbehält.§ 640 Acceptance of work(1) The customer is bound to accept the work produced in accordance with the contract save where the nature of the work precludes such an acceptance. Acceptance may not be refused on account of immaterial defects. A failure by the customer to accept the work within a period of time specified by the contractor even though he is under an obligation to do so has the same effect as an acceptance of the work.(2) If the customer accepts a defective work under subsection (1), sentence 1, even though he is aware of the defect, he has the rights referred to in § 634 Nos. 1 to 3 only if, upon accepting the work, he reserves his rights in respect of the defect.
§ 641 Fälligkeit der Vergütung(1) Die Vergütung ist bei der Abnahme des Werkes zu entrichten. Ist das Werk in Teilen abzunehmen und die Vergütung für die einzelnen Teile bestimmt, so ist die Vergütung für jeden Teil bei dessen Abnahme zu entrichten.(2) Die Vergütung des Unternehmers für ein Werk, dessen Herstellung der Besteller einem Dritten versprochen hat, wird spätestens fällig, wenn und soweit der Besteller von dem Dritten für das versprochene Werk wegen dessen Herstellung seine Vergütung oder Teile davon erhalten hat. Hat der Besteller dem Dritten wegen möglicher Mängel des Werks Sicherheit geleistet, gilt dies nur, wenn der Unternehmer dem Besteller Sicherheit in entsprechender Höhe leistet.(3) Kann der Besteller die Beseitigung eines Mangels verlangen, so kann er nach der Abnahme die Zahlung eines angemessenen Teils der Vergütung verweigern, mindestes in Höhe des Dreifachen der für die Beseitigung des Mangels erforderlichen Kosten.(4) Eine in Geld festgesetzte Vergütung hat der Besteller von der Abnahme des Werkes an zu verzinsen, sofern nicht die Vergütung gestundet ist.§ 641 When remuneration is due(1) Remuneration must be paid when delivery of the work is accepted. If the work is to be delivered in parts and the remuneration is specified for the individual parts, the remuneration is to be paid for each part when it is accepted.(2) The remuneration of a contractor for a work whose production the customer has promised to a third person is due at the latest when and to the extent that the customer has received from the third person in full or in part his remuneration for the promised work. If the customer has given the third person security in respect of possible defects in the work, this applies only if the contractor gives the customer security of a corresponding amount.(3) If the customer can claim removal of a defect, he may, after he has accepted the work, refuse to pay a reasonable part of the remuneration, namely at least three times the necessary cost of removing the defect.(4) Unless payment of remuneration has been deferred, the customer must, from acceptance of the work, pay interest on remuneration which is expressed in money.
§ 641a Fertigstellungsbescheinigung(1) Der Abnahme steht es gleich, wenn dem Unternehmer von einem Gutachter eine Bescheinigung darüber erstellt wird, dass1. das versprochene Werk, im Falle des § 641 Abs. 1 Satz 2 auch ein Teil desselben, hergestellt ist und2. das Werk frei von Mängeln ist, die der Bestellung gegenüber dem Gutachter behauptet hat oder die für den Gutachter bei einer Besichtigung feststellbar sind, (Fertigstellungsbescheinigung). Das gilt nicht, wenn das Verfahren nach den Absätzen 2 und 4 nicht eingehalten worden ist oder wenn die Voraussetzung des § 640 Abs. 1 Satz 1 und 2 nicht gegeben waren; im Streitfall hat dies der Besteller zu beweisen. § 640 Abs. 2 ist nicht anzuwenden. Es wird vermutet, dass ein Aufmaß oder ein Stundenlohnabrechnung, die der Unternehmer seiner Rechnung zugrunde legt, zutreffen, wenn der Gutachter dies in der Fertigstellungsbescheinigung bestätigt.(2) Gutachter kann sein1. ein Sachverständiger, auf den sich Unternehmer und Besteller verständigt haben, oder2. ein auf Antrag des Unternehmens durch eine Industrie- und Handelskammer, eine Handwerkskammer, eine Architektenkammer oder eine Ingenieurkammer bestimmter öffentlich bestellter und vereidigter Sachverständiger.Der Gutachter wird vom Unternehmer beauftragt. Er ist diesem und dem Besteller des zu begutachtenden Werkes gegenüber verpflichtet, die Bescheinigung unparteiisch und nach bestem Wissen und Gewissen zuerteilen.(3) Der Gutachter muss mindestens einen Besichtigungstermin abhalten; eine Einladung hierzu unter Angabe des Anlasses muss dem Besteller mindestens zwei Wochen vorher zugehen. Ob das Werk frei von Mängeln ist, beurteilt der Gutachter nach einem schriftlichen Vertrag, den ihm der Unternehmer vorzulegen hat. Änderungen dieses Vertrages sind dabei nur zu berücksichtigen, wenn sie schriftlich vereinbart sind oder von der Vertragsteilen übereinstimmend gegenüber dem Gutachter vorgebracht werden. Wenn der Vertrag entsprechende Angaben nicht enthält, sind die allgemein anerkannten Regeln der Technik zugrunde zu legen. Von Besteller geltend gemachte Mängel bleiben bei der Erteilung der Bescheinigung unberücksichtigt, wenn sie nach Abschluss der Besichtigung vorgebracht werden.(4) Der Besteller ist verpflichtet eine Untersuchung des Werkes oder von Teilen desselben durch den Gutachter zu gestatten. Verweigert er die Untersuchung, wird vermutet, dass das zu untersuchende Werk vertragsmäßig hergestellt worden ist; die Bescheinigung nach Absatz 1 ist zu erteilen.(5) Dem Besteller ist vom Gutachter eine Abschrift der Bescheinigung zu erteilen. In Ansehung von Fristen, Zinsen und Gefahrenübertragung treten die Wirkungen der Bescheinigung erst mit ihrem Zugang bei Besteller ein.§ 641a Completion certificate(1) Work is deemed to have been accepted if an expert issues a certificate to the contractor to the effect that1. the promised work, or in cases falling under § 641 (1), sentence 2, a part of it, has been produced and2. the work is free of defects alleged by the customer to the expert or which are ascertainable by the expert upon an inspection (completion certificate). That does not apply if the procedure under subsections (2) and (4) has not been complied with or if the requirements in § 640 (1), sentences 1 and 2, were not satisfied; in case of dispute, the customer must prove this. § 640 (2) is not to be applied. It is presumed that a calculation of areas or volumes or a calculation based on an hourly rate on which the contractor has based his invoice are correct if the expert confirms this in the completion certificate.(2) The expert may be1. an expert on whom the contractor and the customer have agreed, or2. a publicly appointed and sworn expert determined, upon the contractor’s application, by a chamber of commerce and industry, a chamber of crafts, a chamber of architects or a chamber of engineers.The expert is appointed by the contractor. He is under a duty to him and to the customer of the work on which he is to give his opinion to issue the certificate impartially and to the best of his knowledge and belief.(3) The expert must carry out at least one inspection; an invitation to the inspection, indicating the reason, must reach the customer at least two weeks in advance. The question whether the work is free of defects is to be determined by the expert in accordance with a written contract which the contractor must present to him. Amendments to that contract are to be taken into account only if they are agreed in writing or submitted to the expert in the same terms by the parties to the contract. If the contract does not indicate particulars, generally accepted technical rules are to be applied. Defects asserted by the customer are not considered in the issuing of the certificate if they were raised only after the conclusion of the inspection.(4) The customer is bound to allow the expert to inspect the work or parts of it. If he refuses to allow the inspection, it is presumed that the work to be inspected has been produced in accordance with the contract; the certificate under subsection (1) above is to be issued.(5) The expert must issue a copy of the certificate to the customer. With respect to time limits, interest and the passing of risk, the certificate takes effect only when received by the customer.
§ 642 Mitwirkung des Bestellers(1) Ist bei der Herstellung des Werkes eine Handlung des Bestellers erforderlich, so kann der Unternehmer, wenn der Besteller durch das Unterlassen der Handlung in Verzug der Annahme kommt, eine angemessene Entschädigung verlangen.(2) Die Höhe der Entschädigung bestimmt sich einerseits nach der Dauer des Verzugs und der Höhe der vereinbarten Vergütung, andererseits nach demjenigen, was der Unternehmer infolge des Verzugs an Aufwendungen erspart oder durch anderweitige Verwendung seiner Arbeitskraft erwerben kann.§ 642 Co-operation of the customer(1) If an act by the customer is necessary when the work is being produced, the contractor may claim reasonable compensation if the customer, because of his failure to perform the act, defaults in accepting the work.(2) The amount of the compensation is determined, on the one hand, by reference to the period of the delay and the amount of the agreed remuneration and, on the other, by reference to the amount which, as a result of the delay, the contractor saves in expenditure or can achieve by employing his workforce elsewhere.
§ 643 Kündigung bei unterlassener MitwirkungDer Unternehmer ist im Falle des § 642 berechtigt, dem Besteller zur Nachholung der Handlung eine angemessene Frist mit der Erklärung zu bestimmen, daß er den Vertrag kündige, wenn die Handlung nicht bis zum Ablaufe der Frist vorgenommen werde. Der Vertrag gilt als aufgehoben, wenn nicht die Nachholung bis zum Ablaufe der Frist erfolgt.§ 643 Termination for failure to co-operateIn cases under § 642 the contractor is entitled to set a reasonable period of time within which the customer is subsequently to perform his act, combined with the declaration that he will terminate the contract if the act is not performed by the end of the period. The contract is deemed terminated if the act is not performed by the end of the period.
§ 644 Gefahrtragung(1) Der Unternehmer trägt die Gefahr bis zur Abnahme des Werkes. Kommt der Besteller in Verzug der Annahme, so geht die Gefahr auf ihn über. Für den zufälligen Untergang und eine zufällige Verschlechterung des von dem Besteller gelieferten Stoffes ist der Unternehmer nicht verantwortlich.(2) Versendet der Unternehmer das Werk auf Verlangen des Bestellers nach einem anderen Orte als dem Erfüllungsorte, so finden die für den Kauf geltenden Vorschriften des § 447 entsprechende Anwendung.§ 644 Risk(1) The contractor bears the risk until the work is accepted. If the customer is in default through his non-acceptance of the work, the risk passes to him. The contractor is not liable for any accidental loss or accidental deterioration of material supplied by the customer.(2) If, at the customer’s request, the contractor dispatches the work to a place other than the place of performance, the provisions of § 447 applying to sale apply mutatis mutandis.
§ 645 Verantwortlichkeit des Bestellers(1) Ist das Werk vor der Abnahme infolge eines Mangels des von dem Besteller gelieferten Stoffes oder infolge einer von dem Besteller für die Ausführung erteilten Anweisung untergegangen, verschlechtert oder unausführbar geworden, ohne daß ein Umstand mitgewirkt hat, den der Unternehmer zu vertreten hat, so kann der Unternehmer einen der geleisteten Arbeit entsprechenden Teil der Vergütung und Ersatz der in der Vergütung nicht inbegriffenen Auslagen verlangen. Das gleiche gilt, wenn der Vertrag in Gemäßheit des § 643 aufgehoben wird.(2) Eine weitergehende Haftung des Bestellers wegen Verschuldens bleibt unberührt.§ 645 Customer’s liability(1) If, prior to the acceptance, the work has been destroyed or has deteriorated or cannot be completed because of a defect in a substance supplied by the customer or because of an instruction given by him and if no circumstance has contributed to this for which the contractor is responsible, the contractor is entitled to a part of the remuneration which corresponds to the work performed as well as to reimbursement of those expenses which are not included in the remuneration. The same applies if the contract is terminated under § 643.(2) Any more extensive liability of the customer which is based on fault is unaffected. 
§ 646 Vollendung statt AbnahmeIst nach der Beschaffenheit des Werkes die Abnahme ausgeschlossen, so tritt in den Fällen des § 634a Abs. 2 und der §§ 641, 644 und 645 an die Stelle der Abnahme die Vollendung des Werkes.§ 646 Completion instead of acceptanceIf the nature of the work precludes its acceptance, this is replaced in the cases of § 634a (2) and §§ 641, 644 and 645 by the completion of the work.
§ 647 UnternehmerpfandrechtDer Unternehmer hat für seine Forderungen aus dem Vertrag ein Pfandrecht an den von ihm hergestellten oder ausgebesserten beweglichen Sachen des Bestellers, wenn sie bei der Herstellung oder zum Zwecke der Ausbesserung in seinen Besitz gelangt sind.§ 647 Contractor’s lienBy way of security for his claims arising out of the contract, the contractor has a lien on moveable things of the customer produced or repaired by him if they have come into his possession in the course of the production or for the purposes of the repair.
§ 648 Sicherungshypothek des Bauunternehmers(1) Der Unternehmer eines Bauwerkes oder eines einzelnen Teiles eines Bauwerkes kann für seine Forderungen aus dem Vertrage die Einräumung einer Sicherungshypothek an dem Baugrundstücke des Bestellers verlangen. Ist das Werk noch nicht vollendet, so kann er die Einräumung der Sicherungshypothek für einen der geleisteten Arbeit entsprechenden Teil der Vergütung und für die in der Vergütung nicht inbegriffenen Auslagen verlangen.(2) Der Inhaber einer Schiffswerft kann für seine Forderungen aus dem Bau oder der Ausbesserung eines Schiffs die Einräumung einer Schiffshypothek an dem Schiffsbauwerk oder dem Schiff des Bestellers verlangen; Absatz 1 Satz 2 gilt sinngemäß. § 647 findet keine Anwendung.§ 648 Building contractor’s charge as security for existing claims(1) A contractor who constructs a building or an individual part of a building may demand the grant of a charge over the customer’s building plot as security for his claims arising under the contract. If the work has not yet been completed, he may demand the grant of the charge as security for a part of the remuneration proportionate to the labour performed and for expenses not included in the remuneration.(2) The owner of a shipbuilding yard may demand the grant of a ship’s mortgage over the customer’s ship or ship under construction by way of security for his claims arising out of the construction or repair of the ship; subsection (1), sentence 2, applies mutatis mutandis. § 647 does not apply.
§ 648a Bauhandwerkersicherung(1) Der Unternehmer eines Bauwerks, einer Außenanlage oder eines Teils davon kann vom Besteller Sicherheit für die von ihm zu erbringenden Vorleistungen einschließlich dazugehöriger Nebenforderungen in der Weise verlangen, daß er dem Besteller zur Leistung der Sicherheit eine angemessene Frist mit der Erklärung bestimmt, daß er nach dem Ablauf der Frist seine Leistung verweigere. Sicherheit kann bis zur Höhe des voraussichtlichen Vergütungsanspruchs, wie er sich aus dem Vertrag oder einem nachträglichen Zusatzauftrag ergibt, sowie wegen Nebenforderungen verlangt werden; die Nebenforderung sind mit 10 vom Hundert des zu sichernden Vergütungsanspruchs anzusetzen. Sie ist auch dann als ausreichend anzusehen, wenn sich der Sicherungsgeber das Recht vorbehält, sein Versprechen im Falle einer wesentlichen Verschlechterung der Vermögensverhältnisse des Bestellers mit Wirkung für Vergütungsansprüche aus Bauleistungen zu widerrufen, die der Unternehmer bei Zugang der Widerrufserklärung noch nicht erbracht hat.(2) Die Sicherheit kann auch durch eine Garantie oder ein sonstiges Zahlungsversprechen eines im Geltungsbereich dieses Gesetzes zum Geschäftsbetrieb befugten Kreditinstituts oder Kreditversicherers geleistet werden. Das Kreditinstitut oder der Kreditversicherer darf Zahlungen an den Unternehmer nur leisten, soweit der Besteller den Vergütungsanspruch des Unternehmers anerkennt oder durch vorläufig vollstreckbares Urteil zur Zahlung der Vergütung verurteilt worden ist und die Voraussetzungen vorliegen, unter denen die Zwangsvollstreckung begonnen werden darf.(3) Der Unternehmer hat dem Besteller die üblichen Kosten der Sicherheitsleistung bis zu einem Höchstsatz von 2 vom Hundert für das Jahr zu erstatten. Dies gilt nicht, soweit eine Sicherheit wegen Einwendungen des Bestellers gegen den Vergütungsanspruch des Unternehmers aufrechterhalten werden muß und die Einwendungen sich als unbegründet erweisen.(4) Soweit der Unternehmer für seinen Vergütungsanspruch eine Sicherheit nach den Absätzen 1 oder 2 erlangt hat, ist der Anspruch auf Einräumung einer Sicherungshypothek nach § 648 Abs. 1 ausgeschlossen.(5) Leistet der Besteller die Sicherheit nicht fristgemäß, so bestimmen sich die Rechte des Unternehmers nach den §§ 643 und 645 Abs. 1. Gilt der Vertrag danach als aufgehoben, kann der Unternehmer auch Ersatz des Schadens verlangen, den er dadurch erleidet, daß er auf die Gültigkeit des Vertrags vertraut hat. Dasselbe gilt, wenn der Besteller in zeitlichem Zusammenhang mit dem Sicherheitsverlangen gemäß Absatz 1 kündigt, es sei denn, die Kündigung ist nicht erfolgt, um der Stellung der Sicherung zu entgehen. Es wird vermutet, dass der Schaden fünf Prozent der Vergütung beträgt.(6) Die Vorschriften der Absätze 1 bis 5 finden keine Anwendung, wenn der Besteller1. eine juristische Person des öffentlichen Rechts oder ein öffentlich-rechtliches Sondervermögen ist oder2. eine natürliche Person ist und die Bauarbeiten zur Herstellung oder Instandsetzung eines Einfamilienhauses mit oder ohne Einliegerwohnung ausführen läßt; dies gilt nicht bei Betreuung des Bauvorhabens durch einen zur Verfügung über die Finanzierungsmittel des Bestellers ermächtigten Baubetreuer.(7) Eine von den Vorschriften der Absätze 1 bis 5 abweichende Vereinbarung ist unwirksam.§ 648a Building trade security(1) A contractor for a building, external installation or a part thereof may demand from the customer security for what he has to perform in advance, including ancillary claims, by fixing for the customer a reasonable period of time within which to provide the security and declaring that he will refuse to perform after the expiry of that period. Security may be demanded up to the likely amount of the claim for remuneration arising under the contract or subsequent supplementary contract and on account of ancillary claims; ancillary claims are to be estimated at 10% of the claim for remuneration to be secured. It is to be regarded as sufficient even if the giver of security reserves the right, in the event of a material deterioration in the financial circumstances of the customer, to revoke his promise as regards claims for remuneration for building work which the contractor has not yet performed when the declaration of revocation is received.(2) The security may also be provided by means of a guarantee or other promise of payment by a credit institution or credit insurer authorised to conduct business within the geographical sphere of application of this Act. The credit institution or credit insurer may make payments to the contractor only to the extent that the customer acknowledges the contractor’s claim to remuneration or has been ordered by provisionally enforceable judgment to pay the remuneration, and the conditions for the commencement of judicial execution are satisfied.(3) The contractor must pay to the customer the usual costs of providing security up to a maximum rate of 2% per annum. That does not apply in so far as the security has to be maintained in force because of the existence of defences by the customer against the contractor’s remuneration claim and the defences prove to be unfounded.(4) The claim for grant of a charge under § 648 (1) is excluded in so far as the contractor has obtained security for his claim for remuneration under subsections (1) and (2) above.(5) If the customer does not provide security within the period fixed, the contractor’s rights are determined in accordance with §§ 643 and 645 (1). If, by virtue of those provisions, the contract is deemed terminated, the contractor may also claim compensation for the loss which he has incurred as a result of his reliance on the validity of the contract. The same applies if the customer terminates at or around the time of the demand for security under subsection (1) above, unless the termination was not declared in order to avoid the provision of security. The loss is presumed to amount to 5% of the remuneration.(6) The provisions of subsections (1) to (5) above do not apply if the customer is1. a legal person governed by public law or a special fund governed by public law or2. is a natural person and the building work is performed for the construction or repair of a single-family house with or without an apartment for rent incorporated in it; this does not apply where the building project is supervised by a building supervisor who has authority to dispose of the customer’s financial resources.(7) Any agreement derogating from the provisions of subsections (1) to (5) above is invalid.
§ 649 Kündigungsrecht des BestellersDer Besteller kann bis zur Vollendung des Werkes jederzeit den Vertrag kündigen. Kündigt der Besteller, so ist der Unternehmer berechtigt, die vereinbarte Vergütung zu verlangen; er muß sich jedoch dasjenige anrechnen lassen, was er infolge der Aufhebung des Vertrags an Aufwendungen erspart oder durch anderweitige Verwendung seiner Arbeitskraft erwirbt oder zu erwerben böswillig unterläßt.§ 649 Customer’s right of terminationAt any time until completion of the work the customer may terminate the contract on notice. If he terminates the contract, the contractor is entitled to demand the agreed remuneration; he must, however, give credit for expenses which he saves by virtue of the termination or for that which he obtains by using his workforce elsewhere or that which he maliciously fails to obtain.
§ 650 Kostenanschlag(1) Ist dem Vertrag ein Kostenanschlag zugrunde gelegt worden, ohne daß der Unternehmer die Gewähr für die Richtigkeit des Anschlags übernommen hat, und ergibt sich, daß das Werk nicht ohne eine wesentliche Überschreitung des Anschlags ausführbar ist, so steht dem Unternehmer, wenn der Besteller den Vertrag aus diesem Grunde kündigt, nur der in § 645 Abs. 1 bestimmte Anspruch zu.(2) Ist eine solche Überschreitung des Anschlags zu erwarten, so hat der Unternehmer dem Besteller unverzüglich Anzeige zu machen.§ 650 Estimate of costs(1) If an estimate of costs is the basis for the contract and the contractor has not guaranteed the correctness of the estimate and it becomes apparent that the work cannot be completed without exceeding the estimate by a material amount, the contractor is entitled, if the customer terminates the contract on that ground, only to the claim specified in § 645 (1).(2) If it is likely that the estimate of costs will be exceeded, the contractor must notify the customer immediately.
§ 651 Anwendung des KaufrechtsAuf einen Vertrag, der die Lieferung herzustellender oder zu erzeugender beweglicher Sachen zum Gegenstand hat, finden die Vorschriften über den Kauf Anwendung. § 442 Abs. 1 Satz 1 findet bei diesen Verträgen auch Anwendung, wenn der Mangel auf den vom Besteller gelieferten Stoff zurückzuführen ist. Soweit es sich bei den herzustellenden oder zu erzeugenden beweglichen Sachen um nicht vertretbare Sachen handelt, sind auch die §§ 642, 643, 645, 649 und 650 mit der Maßgabe anzuwenden, dass an die Stelle der Abnahme der nach den §§ 446 und 447 maßgebliche Zeitpunkt tritt.§ 651 Application of sales lawThe provisions concerning the sale of goods apply to a contract for the supply of moveable things that are to be produced or manufactured. § 442 (1), sentence 1, also applies to these contracts if the defect is caused by the material supplied by the customer. Where the moveable things to be produced or manufactured are specific goods, §§ 642, 643, 645, 649 and 650 apply, except that the relevant time under §§ 446 and 447 replaces the time of acceptance of the work.
The Act makes some amendments to §§ 651a, 651d, 651g, 651e, 651l (travel contracts).

Titel 10: Maklervertrag

Untertitel 1: Allgemeine Vorschriften

Untertitel 2: Darlehensvermittlungsvertrag zwischen einem Unternehmer und einem Verbraucher

Title 10: Brokerage contract

Sub-title 1: General provisions

Sub-title 2: Loan brokerage contract between a businessperson and a consumer

§ 655a Darlehensvermittlungsvertrag Für einen Vertrag, nach dem es ein Unternehmer unternimmt, einem Verbraucher gegen Entgelt einen Verbraucherdarlehensvertrag zu vermitteln oder ihm die Gelegenheit zum Abschluss eines Verbraucherdarlehensvertrags nachzuweisen, gelten vorbehaltlich des Satzes 2 die folgenden Vorschriften. Dies gilt nicht in dem in § 491 Abs. 2 bestimmten Umfang.§ 655a Loan brokerage contractSubject to the second sentence hereof, the following provisions apply to a contract under which a contractor undertakes to a consumer, for remuneration, to broker a consumer loan contract or to provide information about an opportunity for him to conclude a consumer loan contract (loan brokerage contract). This does not apply to the extent specified in § 491 (2).
§ 655b Schriftform(1) Der Darlehensvermittlungsvertrag bedarf der schriftlichen Form. In dem Vertrag ist vorbehaltlich sonstiger Informationspflichten insbesondere die Vergütung des Darlehensvermittlers in einem Prozentsatz des Darlehens anzugeben; hat der Darlehensvermittler auch mit dem Unternehmer eine Vergütung vereinbart, so ist auch diese anzugeben. Der Vertrag darf nicht mit dem Antrag auf Hingabe des Darlehens verbunden werden. Der Darlehensvermittler hat dem Verbraucher den Vertragsinhalt in Textform mitzuteilen.(2) Ein Darlehensvermittlungsvertrag, der den Anforderungen des Absatzes 1 Satz 1 bis 3 nicht genügt, ist nichtig.§ 655b Written form(1) The loan brokerage contract must be in writing. Without prejudice to other obligations to provide information, the contract must indicate in particular the loan broker’s remuneration as a percentage of the loan; if the loan broker has also agreed with the businessperson that the loan broker is to receive remuneration, this remuneration must also be indicated. The contract must not be linked to the application for the grant of the loan. The loan broker must notify the consumer in textual form of the terms of the contract.(2) A loan brokerage contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (1), sentence 1, 2 and 3, is void.
§ 655c VergütungDer Verbraucher ist zur Zahlung der Vergütung nur verpflichtet, wenn infolge der Vermittlung oder des Nachweises des Darlehensvermittlers das Darlehen an den Verbraucher geleistet wird und ein Widerruf des Verbrauchers nach § 355 nicht mehr möglich ist. Soweit der Verbraucherdarlehensvertrag mit Wissen des Darlehensvermittlers der vorzeitigen Ablösung eines anderen Darlehens (Umschuldung) dient, entsteht ein Anspruch auf die Vergütung nur, wenn sich der effektive Jahreszins oder der anfängliche effektive Jahreszins nicht erhöht; bei der Berechnung des effektiven oder des anfänglichen effektiven Jahreszinses für das abzulösende Darlehen bleiben etwaige Vermittlungskosten außer Betracht.§ 655c RemunerationA consumer is bound to pay the remuneration only if, as a result of the brokering or provision of information by the loan broker, a loan is made to the consumer and revocation by the consumer under § 355 is no longer possible. Where the loan broker is aware that the consumer loan contract is intended for the early repayment of another loan (debt restructuring) a claim for remuneration arises only if the annual percentage rate of charge or the initial annual percentage rate of charge is not increased; when the annual percentage rate of charge or initial annual percentage rate of charge is calculated for the loan to be repaid, any brokerage charges are not taken into account.
§ 655d NebenentgelteDer Darlehensvermittler darf für Leistungen, die mit der Vermittlung des Verbraucherdarlehensvertrags oder dem Nachweis der Gelegenheit zum Abschluss eines Verbraucherdarlehensvertrags zusammenhängen, außer der Vergütung nach § 655c Satz 1 ein Entgelt nicht vereinbaren. Jedoch kann vereinbart werden, dass dem Darlehensvermittler entstandene, erforderliche Auslagen zu erstatten sind.§ 655d Additional remunerationA loan broker may not agree, for services connected with brokering a consumer loan contract or providing information about an opportunity to conclude a consumer loan contract, any remuneration other than the remuneration under § 655c, sentence 1. However, the reimbursement to the loan broker of necessary expenses incurred may be agreed.
§ 655e Abweichende Vereinbarungen, Anwendung auf Existenzgründer(1) Von den Vorschriften dieses Untertitels darf nicht zum Nachteil des Verbrauchers abgewichen werden. Die Vorschriften dieses Untertitels finden auch Anwendung, wenn sie durch anderweitige Gestaltungen umgangen werden.(2) Dieser Untertitel gilt auch für Darlehensvermittlungsverträge zwischen einem Unternehmer und einem Existenzgründer im Sinne von § 507.§ 655e Contrary agreements; application to start-up businesses(1) No derogation from the provisions of this sub-title may be made to the detriment of the consumer. The provisions of this sub-title apply even if they are circumvented by other arrangements.(2) This sub-title applies also to loan brokerage contracts between a businessperson and a start-up business within the meaning of § 507.
The Act makes amendments to §§ 675a, 695, 696, 700, 771, 778, 786, 802, 813.

Titel 27: Unerlaubte Handlungen

Title 27: Delict

§ 852 Herausgabeanspruch nach Eintritt der VerjährungHat der Ersatzpflichtige durch eine unerlaubte Handlung auf Kosten des Verletzten etwas erlangt, so ist er auch nach Eintritt der Verjährung des Anspruchs auf Ersatz des aus einer unerlaubten Handlung entstandenen Schadens zur Herausgabe nach den Vorschriften über die Herausgabe einer ungerechtfertigten Bereicherung verpflichtet. Dieser Anspruch verjährt in zehn Jahren von seiner Entstehung an, ohne Rücksicht auf die Entstehung in 30 Jahren von der Begehung der Verletzungshandlung oder dem sonstigen, den Schaden auslösenden Ereignis an.§ 852 Claim for restitution after a time barIf as a result of a delict a person liable to pay compensation has acquired something at the expense of the injured party, he is bound to surrender it in accordance with the provisions on restitution of unjust enrichment even after the claim for compensation for loss arising as a result of the delict is time-barred. This claim is time-barred ten years after it arises or, irrespective of the date on which it arises, 30 years from the date on which the injurious act was committed or on which the other event causing the loss occurred.

  1. literally: “injury to life”. ↩︎
  2. See §§ 1896-1908k BGB. ↩︎
  3. Official Journal for government announcements. ↩︎
  4.  literally: “injury to life”. ↩︎
  5. Drafting error; this should read “Titel”, not “Untertitel” on both occasions.. ↩︎

City of Gotha and Federal Republic of Germany v. Sotheby’s and Cobert Finance S.A.


Note: What makes this judgment so extraordinary is that it combines, with great perception, lucidity, and wit, a fascinating crime story with the novelty of a High Court judgment becoming the first judicial authority on a provision of the German Civil Code.

The crime story centres around a priceless painting in Dutch mannerist style. The setting includes treasure looting in Soviet occupied Germany immediately after the Second World War and the murky circles of Moscow art smugglers in the last years of Communist rule. The painting links the Dukal family of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha with the Soviet secret service, “Big Mamma” (the wife of the Togolese Ambassador to Moscow), shady dealings of a Panamese company, paid informants, and one of the world’s leading auction houses.

Comparative and conflicts lawyers will be thrilled by the fact that this English judgment is the first reported court decision on § 221 of the German Civil Code on limitation of proprietary actions when a third party acquires possession of the property. In spite of its age (almost exactly one hundred years) and obvious relevance to the recovery of stolen art, not a single decision by any German court on this provision seems to have been reported. Thus, a decision by the High Court of England and Wales, which includes a full discussion of German academic writing on the subject, becomes the first judicial authority on a section of this venerable codification of Civil Law.

Follow this link for a full index to the judgment. You can also download a German translation.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICECase No: 1993 C 3428
QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISIONCase No: 1997 G 185
BEFOREMR JUSTICE MOSES
BETWEENCITY OF GOTHA
(A Body Corporate)
Plaintiff
– and-
(1) SOTHEBY’S
(an unlimited company)
Defendants
(2) COBERT FINANCE S.A.
AND BETWEENTHE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANYPlaintiff
– and –
(1) SOTHEBY’S
(an unlimited company)
Defendants
(2) COBERT FINANCE S.A.

Mr Alexander Layton QC and Miss Monica Carss-Frisk (instructed by Messrs Frere Cholmeley Bischoff ) appeared on behalf of the Plaintiffs.

Mr Michael Brindle QC and Mr Bankim Thanki (instructed by Messrs Herbert Smith) appeared on behalf of the second Defendants.

Date of Judgment: 9 September 1998

Headnote*

Main issues in German law:

Limitation of actions/prescription (Verjährung) for proprietary claims; whether misappropriation triggers fresh period for limitation of proprietary restitution claim (yes); confiscation and expropriation by Soviet Military Administration in Germany; administrative law regulations and decisions (Verordnung and Verfügung); private law foundation (privatrechtliche Stiftung), seat and dissolution; effect on extraterritorial property.

Main German statutes referred to in the judgment:

Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Civil Code, BGB) §§ 80, 87 (foundations), 195, 198, 221 (limitation of actions), 858, 861, 868 (possession), 986 (possession and proprietary claim for restitution)

The judgment contains full or partial translations of §§ 87 (1), 221, 858 (1) and (2), 868, 986 BGB.

Main issues in English law:

Conflict of laws; whether dissolution of private law foundation amounts to expropriation (depends on intention); whether extraterritorial passing of property within universal succession of property under German law can be recognized in England (yes); whether English or German limitation of action rules apply to proprietary claim when title is subject to German law but property locaced in England (German limitation rules); whether in conflict of limitation of action rules in cases of double actionability English tort claim limitation rules supersede German proprietary claim limitation rules (no); whether Defendant deliberately concealing Plaintiff’s right to action would override limitation of actions under foreign law on grounds of public policy (yes); incidental question; proprietary restitution, tracing of title.

Main English statutes referred to in the judgment:

Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984 Sec. 1, Sec. 2, Sec. 4
Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, Sec. 10
Limitation of Actions Act 1980, Sec. 4
Return of Cultural Objects Regulations 1994 (SI 1994 No 501), based on Council Directive 93/7/EEC of 15th March 1993 on the Return of Cultural Objects Unlawfully Removed from the Territory of a Member State.

The following cases are cited in the judgment:

Adams v. National Bank of Greece and Athens S.A. [1958] 2 QB 59
Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim [1993] 1 Lloyds Rep. 543
Attorney-General of New Zealand v. Ortiz [1984] 1AC 20
Bank Voor Handel En Scheepvaart N.V. v. Slatford [1953] 1 QB 248
Bumper Corporation v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1991] 1WLR 1362
Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler (No.3) [l979] Ch.506 at 528
The Cintas Foundation Incorporated v. Sotheby’s Unlimited and Fondarm International Establishment (Unreported, 11 February 1995)
Durham v. T & N PLC and others (unreported, 1 May 1996, CA)
The Estate of Fuld, decd. (No. 3) [1968] P. 675
Jones v. Trollope Colls Cementation Overseas Ltd (Times Law Reports 26 January 1990)
National Bank of Greece and Athens S.A v. Metliss [1958] A.C. 509
Oppenheimer v. Cattermole [1976] AC 249
Pirelli General Cable Works Ltd. v. Oscar Faber & Partners [1983] 2 AC 1
Princess Paley Olga v. Weisz [1929] 1 KB 718
Sheldon v. R.H.M. Outhwaite (Underwriting Agencies) Ltd [1996] 1 AC 102
United States v. Inkley [1989] QB 255
Williams & Humbert Ltd v. W & H Trade Marks(Jersey) Ltd [1986] AC 369
Winkworth v. Christie Manson and Woods Limited and anr. [1981] Ch. 496

Reported by Dr. Michael Carl, Solicitor and Rechtsanwalt.

Introduction

In 1603 Joachim Wtewael painted The Holy Family with Saints John and Elizabeth; at their side are three angels playing music. A young callipygian St John supports a book read by his mother, St Elizabeth. Flaunting the style of Correggio which, like other Dutch artists before him, the painter had admired during his travels in Italy, he crowds the copper surface of only 21 x 16 cm. with descending putti, fragments of a Corinthian column and classical ruins in the background. The picture is a notable example of Dutch mannerism, a style which Wtewael adopted when he returned to Utrecht in parallel to others in Haarlem who had responded to the Italian influence.

The size of the painting is not merely such as to permit its owner to enjoy its sensuous and spiritual delights by holding it for closer examination. A cabinet painting attracts the thief and smuggler. As in the pillage of Rome, so Gibbon records, “just preference” was given to that which “contained the greatest value in the smallest compass and weight”. At the end of the Second World War it disappeared from the collection in the gallery of the Ducal Family of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha in the city of Gotha. It was smuggled from Moscow in the mid 1980s, emerged briefly in West Berlin in 1987, and disappeared, only to reappear when offered for sale by Sotheby’s in 1992.

The plaintiffs claim the return of the painting in conversion against a Panamanian Corporation, Cobert Finance S.A. (“Cobert”). An earlier action was brought by the City of Gotha against Sotheby’s. The two actions have been consolidated. Sotheby’s has taken no further part in the proceedings pending resolution of the dispute between the plaintiffs and Cobert. The Federal Republic of Germany claims ownership of the painting. The City of Gotha asserts a possessory title to it. The plaintiffs claim declaratory relief, an order for delivery up and/or damages on the grounds that Cobert converted the painting by taking constructive delivery of it in March 1989, by consigning it to Sotheby’s for sale at that time, by offering it for sale through Sotheby’s to the City of Gotha in October 1991 and/or by demanding its return from Sotheby’s in August 1993.

The case is as packed with different characters and issues as the images in the painting. I have been introduced to SMERSH, trophy brigades, the art smugglers of Moscow and “Big Mamma” in order to resolve disputes of fact and to the learning of commentators on the German civil code in order to resolve disputes of German law. The two crucial disputes are:-

(I) Whether the Federal Republic of Germany can establish title to the painting; and

(II) Whether, if it can, its claim is time-barred under the German law of limitation. Under Section I relating to the Federal Republic of Germany’s claims to title, the following issues arise:-

I.1 Whether as a matter of fact it can be established that the painting was in Thüringia in 1945 and 1946;

I.2 Whether title to the painting passed to the Land of Thüringia by virtue of the confiscation police order of 6 July 1945 read with the expropriation Law of 9 October 1945 or, if the painting was still in Thüringia in July 1946, by the operation of the Law of 24 July 1946;

I.3 Whether title to the painting passed to the Land of Thüringia by virtue of the dissolution of the Art Foundation on 14 October 1950;

I.4 Whether an English Court will recognise or enforce the Federal Republic of Germany’s title to the painting under German law;

I.5 Whether the arrival of the painting in West Berlin, allegedly via East Germany in 1987 perfects an inchoate expropriation;

I.6 Whether the City of Gotha has a right to possession of the painting. Under Section II in relation to limitation, the following issues arise:-

II.1 (dealt with in this judgment after the findings of fact in relation to title) Whether as a matter of fact the painting was misappropriated by a subsequent possessor after it had been stolen from Gotha;

II.2 Whether the German limitation period is relevant pursuant to Section 1 of The Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984;

II.3 Whether, if German law is relevant, the right to recovery is statute barred under German law;

II.4 Whether pursuant to Section 2(1) of the Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984 I should disapply German law, if it bars the claim, on the grounds that it conflicts with English public policy.

Background Facts

The following facts are not in dispute. Duke Ernst the Pious started to buy paintings in 1656. The painting was in the possession of the Ducal Family of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha for many years. It appears in the 1826 catalogue of the paintings in the Ducal gallery in Gotha. In 1855 by a settlement between the reigning Duke and His Royal Highness the Prince Albert, by then married and abroad, and the Ducal State Ministry of Gotha, the art collection was acknowledged as property of the Dynastic House of the Duke. The painting remained in the Ducal picture gallery at Schloss Friedenstein, the history of which was described in a catalogue in 1883. It appears that the painting was available for public view at least from the time when the museum was opened in 1879. In July 1905, pursuant to an Act partitioning state property and a related settlement between the Duke and the Duchy, the art collection was declared part of the entailed estate.

On 9th November 1918 the workers’ and soldiers’ council of Gotha deposed the Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha. The constitution of the German Reich of 11th August 1919 required the dissolution of entailed estates, the assets of which included the art collection.

Faced with the revolutionary zeal of the socialist Weimar Republic, the entailed estate was voluntarily dissolved. In November 1927 a settlement agreement between the Ducal House and the Land of Thüringia provided for the establishment of:-

“The Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha Foundation for Art and Science”. The Foundation (to which I will refer as the “Art Foundation”) was to have its seat in the city of Gotha. Its purpose was to be the perpetual preservation and further enhancement of, amongst other things, the Art Collection. Since subsequent documents may confuse in their references to Ducal Foundations it is important to note that a distinct Foundation was formed known as the Family Foundation. That Foundation was obliged to pay annuities to the Art Foundation. In January 1928, a Thüringian law gave effect to the agreement of November 1927 and in March 1928 the Art Foundation was established.

The charter of the Art Foundation stated that it was located in Gotha (section 1). It was to preserve and enlarge the collections and to further art, science and national education. It was stated that the collections would be made available for public use to the same extent and in the same manner as previously (Section 3). The Ministry for National Education and Justice was responsible for supervision. (Section 4).

On mobilisation the museum was closed and the most valuable and irreplaceable pieces were brought to a place of safety at Reinhardsbrunn, a hunting lodge about fourteen kilometres east of Gotha. Baron Dr. von Schenk zu Schweinsberg, the museum director, reported in the annual report for the Art Foundation (July 1938 to 31st December 1939) that the selection had to be “considerably restricted”. Further paintings were stored and protected from splinters in a ground level room at the home of the museum, Schloss Friedenstein. It is clear from the catalogue that the painting was one of the more distinguished pieces within the Art Collection. It continued to attract interest even during the war and, in 1942, in reply to a correspondent in Holland who wanted a photograph of the painting, it was reported that it was in safe keeping. A reply, in May 1942, to a further inquiry from the editor of the artist lexicon in Leipzig stated that:-

“The picture by Wtenwael (an alternative spelling) is, as ever, located in the Ducal Museum. … I believe to have seen the pictures and will keep you informed. Heil Hitler”. Thus the painting was still within the collection during the war although it is not clear whether it had been moved to Reinhardsbrunn.

I.1 The location of the painting in 1945 and 1946 (facts in issue relating to title).

It is not disputed that the painting was taken from Gotha to the Soviet Union in the 1940s. Nor is there now any dispute that the painting was stolen from the art collection which had formerly belonged to the Ducal Family. The issue is: when did it leave Thüringia? This issue is central to the resolution of the question whether the Federal Republic of Germany is the owner of the painting, because, in order to establish its ownership, it must rely upon laws which only had effect within Thüringia or, although there is no relevant difference, in the territory over which the Soviet Military Administration had jurisdiction. It is only if the Federal Republic of Germany can rely upon the dissolution of the Foundation that the location of the painting in the Soviet Union may not matter.

Cobert submits that such was the chaos in Germany both before the arrival of the American army in Gotha in April 1945 and after Thüringia was ceded to Soviet occupation, in consequence of the Allies agreement at the Yalta Conference in July 1945, that the Federal Republic of Germany is unable to prove that the painting was within the Soviet occupied zone even in July 1945, let alone in July 1946. The evidence relevant to this issue consists of documents, vividly illustrating the situation within Thüringia at the time, evidence from Professor Erickson Honorary Fellow in Defence Studies and Professor Emeritus at the University of Edinburgh, an expert in Soviet Military History, called on behalf of the plaintiffs, and historical material produced by a recognised expert on the fate of European art in the Third Reich, a respected academic, Lynn Nicholas. The Federal Republic of Germany contends that the painting did not leave the Soviet occupied zone until after July 1946 and probably not until about 1947 to 1948. The significance of the dates will become apparent when I examine the legislation upon which the Federal German Republic relies to prove its title.

Even before Allied Forces crossed the Rhine wandering bands of foreign workers scoured the countryside, looting. But I accept Professor Erickson’s evidence that it is pure speculation whether the painting was looted by foreign workers or casually by a local German. Contemporary documents show that some items belonging to the Art Foundation were taken to Coburg by the Americans when they were in occupation in Thüringia. However, there is evidence that, at least the important items from the collection which had been removed to Coburg, were properly recorded. A note from Rentmeister Doetschel in Coburg, dated 27th March 1945, records that three Rubens, one Hals and nine manuscripts were handed to him for safe keeping. That items taken to Coburg arrived safely was also confirmed in a letter to the Lord Mayor in Gotha dated 4 July 1945. Although American Forces were guilty of looting, (soldiers stole two Dürers from a castle in Thüringia), in relation to the Art Foundation it appears that the Americans acted with a sense of responsibility and concern, all the more remarkable in the light of the military situation. A memorandum of 16 July 1945 recorded that the author had been ordered by the American Military Administration to take an inventory and to note possible damage. He said that an American officer visited the exhibition rooms at the palace shortly before the Russian occupation. By chance, the former Duchess of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha was also there with the Director von Schenk. The Duchess asked that the American Military Administration provide two freight trains to transport some of the collection to Coburg, to save them before the Russians moved in. The American officer refused. The Duchess said she would approach the General. There is no evidence he was more compliant. Further, when a Canadian physician, Morton Shulman, with a particular interest in the museum of the Art Foundation, heard of the painting in 1982 he spoke to Dr von Schenk and asked him what had happened to the contents of the museum. Dr von Schenk replied that when the Russians had arrived nothing was missing. Dr von Schenk is no longer alive but wrote in June 1982 that he had left his books and papers in Gotha saying:-

“We were glad enough to save our souls!” Much later, on 12th June 1950, it was stated that approximately one hundred and twenty-six large crates of art objects stored at Schloss Reinhardsbrunn were not opened before 1945 and when the Americans opened them they removed nothing from the crates but re-closed them properly.

For these reasons I agree with the conclusion of Heinz Wiegand, museum director until 1986, that the painting did not go missing during the occupation of Thüringia by the American forces. It thus remained, probably in Reinhardsbrunn, until the arrival of Russian forces on 2nd or 3rd July 1945. Moreover, if it had been taken by a member of the American forces it is unlikely to have been taken to Moscow. It is speculation to suggest that a member of the American forces took it to Berlin. By 26th April 1945, as Professor Erickson points out, Germany had been cut in half, after Soviet and American troops had met at Torgau on the Elbe the day before, and it would have been virtually impossible to travel from Gotha to Berlin.

Soviet Military Occupation 3rd July 1945 to 24th July 1946

The most serious losses from the museum occurred when “official” trophy brigades, probably under the control of Professor Major Alexeyev, looted the museum in January 1946. According to Professor Erickson it is unlikely that unofficial looting occured earlier. From the very outset of Soviet occupation in July 1945 members of SMERSH were in Thüringia. SMERSH was the pre-cursor of the KGB; it was formed in 1942/3 by Stalin and represented the most formidable and dangerous element in the Soviet military structure. It had power of life and death over all ranks in what was then the Red Army. The effectiveness of its control was such, says Professor Erickson, that it is unlikely that any Soviet soldier, even if he had been interested in a painting, which is to be doubted, would have risked severe punishment or death by looting an art treasure which would have been regarded as state property. Thus, Professor Erickson concludes that the painting is likely only to have been taken either as part of an official consignment or by a senior officer with the agreement of SMERSH. The trophy brigades set out from the beginning of their occupation not only to recover Soviet treasures but also to seize paintings and other “cultural artefacts” as trophies of war. Russian historians, Akinsha and Kozlov, record that, under the control of the operational representative of the counter-intelligence department of SMERSH, art valuables were removed from Schloss Friedenstein on 4th March 1946 and that Alexeyev received authorisation from the main trophy department of the Red Army, to confiscate the castle’s “museum objects” at the end of January 1946. Professor Erickson thought that the removals had occurred earlier in the year and that the trophy brigade assignment in Thüringia and Saxony was probably completed by January 1946. According to Akinsha and Kozlov, the “rich haul” included fifty-three paintings from Danzig and Reinhardsbrunn. They were taken to Leipzig where they remained for some ten days, during which sixty soldiers filled nineteen carriages with two hundred tons of objects and books. The train left Leipzig on 11th March 1946. Major Alexeyev accompanied the train. This account by those historians is confirmed in contemporary documents referring to the “official” looting in January 1946. On 16th January 1946 the director Dr. von Schenk wrote:-

“On Monday 7.1.1946, about midday, Major and Professor Alexeyev and 1st Lieutenant Lutscheweit … appeared at the library, with directives from the Commandant of Gotha, to look over the museum, castle and library premises. On Wednesday, I was called to the museum, where I was informed of the directive of General Kolesnitschenko that all the objects from the museum that were already packed up were to be taken away.” The director complains that receipts he was promised were not given. On 28th January 1946 the Director of Administration requested orders from the Presidential Chancellery at Weimar to prevent the depredation saying that if that was not successful total loss would be unavoidable. No inventory of the heavy losses was made until 1965 when the “Verlorene Werke der Malerei” identified lost works and paintings including the missing Wtewael Holy Family.

The Federal German Republic, however, deny that this painting was part of the rich haul taken from the museum in January 1946. Professor Erickson’s view is that it is unlikely that it was taken other than as part of that haul or by a senior officer with the agreement of SMERSH. His reasons are the same as those which applied in relation to the period before the beginning of 1946. Casual theft was unlikely under the watchful eye of SMERSH. If the painting was taken as a trophy of war, it would have left the area of Soviet military occupation and been taken to Russia at the beginning of 1946. I must, therefore, consider whether there is any evidence that it did not form part of the official collection of trophies.

According to Akinsha and Kozlov, the Gotha collections were shared between the Committee on Cultural Education or Institutions of the Council of Peoples Commissars of the Russian Federation and the Arts Committee, which received the best works of art. There is no evidence of this painting forming any part of their collection. Of particular importance is the list of thirty-seven paintings which had been in the Soviet Union and which were returned to the museum at Gotha in December 1958. Although I received no expert evidence from an art historian or curator, I think it is open to me to observe that, whilst amongst the paintings returned were a Jan Brueghel and a Cranach, some of those returned were of no greater distinction than the Wtewael. Yet the Wtewael was not returned on that occasion. Moreover, whatever account of the history of how the painting came to light in the 1980s is accepted, both sides assert that the painting was transferred from the possession of a Russian officer. If the painting was not part of the official haul, then I accept Professor Erickson’s evidence that it is likely it could only have been taken by a senior officer who had made an arrangement with SMERSH or even a senior officer who was a member of SMERSH. Professor Erickson’s evidence is that it is unlikely that an officer in the Red Army could have left Thüringia until late 1946 at the earliest. I accept Professor Erickson’s evidence on this point. Thüringia was of particular importance to the Soviet Union because of uranium deposits. The Soviet Army was and remained in a state of operational readiness to protect that area from attack. It would only be under special circumstances, on orders, that Soviet officers would have been allowed to leave Thüringia in 1946. Soviet officers remained in that area as the army changed from the Red Army to the Soviet Army in 1946 because they were being prepared for admission to higher military academies. Attestation took place in the area of Soviet military occupation; movement was very restricted and carefully controlled. In those circumstances I conclude that only in rare circumstances would a senior officer have left the area of Soviet military occupation in 1946 and the chance that, among the few officers directed to return to the Soviet Union, there was one who had taken the painting is, in my judgment, remote.

But that, of itself, does not establish that the painting remained in the area of Soviet military occupation during 1946. There is no evidence that the painting was taken by a senior officer other than as part of the official collection of trophies. Nor is there any clear evidence as to what happened to all the paintings taken as part of the official collection in January 1946. I am unable to conclude that because the painting was not returned to Gotha in 1958 that it was not part of the official collection of trophies sent to the Soviet Union from Leipzig at the beginning of 1946. I conclude that the most likely explanation for the loss of the painting is that it was taken at the time the trophy brigade, under Alexeyev, was collecting trophies of war from Gotha. By July 1946 the painting had gone.

II.1 Facts relating to Limitation; the arrival of the painting in West Berlin from Moscow, 1987-1989

The following facts are common ground:-

i. The painting was taken from the Soviet Union to West Berlin in the 1980s;

ii. The painting was acquired by Mina Breslav in 1988 and received by Sotheby’s in London on 29th November 1988.

iii. It was bought by Cobert from Mina Breslav in March 1989. There is a substantial difference between the accounts given by the witnesses on behalf of the plaintiffs and those on behalf of Cobert as to when and how the painting arrived in West Berlin and as to who was involved. The important dispute is whether, after it came into the hands of the person who smuggled it out of the Soviet Union (a Mrs Sunguza or a Mrs Dikeni), she misappropriated the painting or whether it was misappropriated by a subsequent possessor. The issue is of importance because the plaintiffs argue that, if there was a misappropriation, the claim is not barred by effluxion of time under the German law of limitation, if it applies. Cobert contends that even if its account of how the painting came into Mina Breslav’s hands is not accepted, the plaintiffs’ account is so flawed and inconsistent that I should not be satisfied that any misappropriation took place. There is little of the Mannerist chiaroscuro to be expected in the world of art contraband, more a prevailing gloom.

Cobert’s account of how the painting came to West Berlin

Cobert’s account of how the painting came into the hands of Mina Breslav has an unpromising start. Until the first day of this trial it was Cobert’s case that a German family had given the painting as a gift in return for food and other assistance to a colonel in the Soviet Army, Adolf Kozlenkov. He had taken it to Latvia. From 1955 it was in the possession of the Nowakowski family, friends of the Kozlenkovs. In March 1982, when Adolf Kozlenkov died, a Mrs Gambourger, a member of the Nowakowski family, gave the painting to Kozlenkov’s son Alexander. In March or April 1985, Alexander Kozlenkov sold the painting in Moscow to Itela Sunguza an engineer, who was resident in Berlin in 1989 but who had lived in Moscow with his Soviet wife. In 1985 an African diplomat, Mrs Mukoko, took the painting at Sunguza’s request to West Berlin.

In 1987 the painting was given to an acquaintance of Mr Sunguza in West Berlin, Holger Martin, for valuation purposes. Martin, anxious to defend his reputation as a serious arts dealer, made a statement in March 1987 saying he had been asked by Wolosow, who owned an antiques and art shop, to have the painting valued. It is not disputed that Martin took the painting to the Dahlem Museum on 24th March 1987. There it was confiscated whilst the police investigated its ownership. In September 1987 it was released to Martin. Thereafter the account of what happened to the painting is, again, in dispute. Cobert conceded, on the first day of the trial, that neither it nor anyone else acquired the painting in good faith.

It is important to record that Cobert’s concession was limited. Its concession was made, so I was told by Mr Brindle QC, on the basis that it would accept that it and its predecessors knew or suspected that the painting might be stolen but made no inquiries to allay such suspicion. However, Cobert persisted in relying upon the evidence in witness statements and of the witnesses whom it called to give oral evidence to demonstrate that the account given by the plaintiffs’ witnesses was incorrect. In those circumstances it is necessary to make findings about the evidence called on behalf of Cobert before I turn to consider the evidence upon which the plaintiffs rely.

The story that the painting was a gift was not only implausible for reasons I have given in relating the facts concerning the whereabouts of the painting in 1945 and 1946 but the witnesses’ statements recounting the story were inconsistent. I do not rely upon the absence of any reference to a Colonel or General Adolf Kozlenkov in central archives, but it is of note that the statements of Mrs Gambourger nee Nowakowski and Alexander Kozlenkov as to what was sold are inconsistent with the receipt and the statement of Itela Sunguza. Moreover there is no explanation as to why the painting was not valued until March 1987 if it had been brought to Berlin as Cobert alleges in the summer of 1985. Sunguza’s statement and that of Mrs Breslav are inconsistent as to how much was paid for the painting. Sunguza says he was paid in cash the sum of DM300,000, Mina Breslav says she agreed an initial payment of DM20,000 and was to pay further sums after she had disposed of the painting. There is a receipt dated 23rd November 1988, signed by a Mohammed Gerard, showing the receipt of cash of DM20,000 saying that the painting was sold by him on behalf of a female African owner to Mina Breslav. There is a second receipt signed by Mohammed Gerard, dated 28th November 1988, showing the figure of DM20,000 crossed out and a purchase price of DM200,000. Mina Breslav does not explain why the first receipt is not signed by Itela Sunguza and says she cannot recall the significance of the second.

There is no explanation of the part played by a Larissa Leontiew who was to receive a proportion of the purchase price of the painting pursuant to the purchase agreement between Mina Breslav and Cobert, nor any explanation of a payment to a Lola Minchin of DM25,000. Mina Breslav’s son was called to give evidence; I shall deal with his evidence when I consider the plaintiffs’ account but Mina Breslav was not available to give evidence. Not even her son knew where she was. Some light may have been thrown upon the purchase of the painting by Cobert by a Mr Douglas Montgomery who has some involvement in the activities of Cobert. He was present during part of the hearing but left, not to return, after evidence was given as to his presence at a time when money was offered to one of the plaintiffs’ witnesses.

I accept that Itela Sunguza existed. Ülo Salm, a German lawyer and notary public, took an affirmation from him. Apart from confirming the existence of Mr Sunguza, Mina Breslav, Alexander Kozlenkov and Mrs Gambourguer, Mr Salm’s evidence was not of further assistance. I also accept that Sugunza worked for a Peter Rohde, a dealer in Russian icons. But on the evidence before me I do not accept that he bought the painting in the Soviet Union or arranged for it to be smuggled into West Berlin in 1985. If he played some part in the transactions thereafter, that part was of no significance to the question I have to decide.

The Plaintiffs’ Evidence as to how the Painting came to West Berlin

The plaintiffs’ account depends on the evidence of witnesses involved in smuggling art from the Soviet Union. They were Makhin, Greshnikov and a German national, Helmut Fürst. Makhin and Greshnikov were convicted by the Leningrad Criminal Court for smuggling works of art, including the painting, and sentenced to five years imprisonment. The milieu of their trade was so murky that their evidence should not be relied upon unless it withstands the closest scrutiny.

Makhin gave oral evidence through an interpreter. He described seeing the painting at the flat of Bishkinsky where he learnt that Bishkinsky and his partner Bezuevsky were selling the painting on behalf of a Russian owner. He does not say he ever met that owner but he did say he knew his name but did not want to risk his own life by revealing it. He says he can confirm that the owner was an officer in the Soviet army. Makhin asked Greshnikov to make enquiries because Makhin did not know whether the painting was an original. Greshnikov contacted Fürst who was able to smuggle works of art under the cloak of his tourist business, taking groups to St Petersburg. According to Makhin, Fürst telephoned to confirm that the painting was authentic. He said that it was a war loss and would, as a result, be difficult to sell in the West. According to Makhin, Fürst said that he was not sure whether he wanted to buy it. Several days later he agreed to do so. Makhin then contacted a Mrs Mariouena Dikeni, the wife of the Togo ambassador in Moscow, who had in the past smuggled works of art including icons on behalf of Makhin. He persuaded her to meet Fürst. A meeting took place, according to Makhin, in an embassy car. He says that, afterwards, Fürst explained that he had proposed to Mrs Dikeni that she should pay DM50,000 and that Fürst would repay her with a commission of DM30,000. Alternatively, if she was not willing to invest DM50,000, her commission would be DM10,000. Apparently Fürst had already given Greshnikov DM50,000. Mrs Dikeni, having taken time to think about the proposal, later agreed to act as a courier but would not invest any money.

According to Makhin, in early February 1987 he handed 130,000 roubles to Bezuevsky in Bishkinsky’s flat and agreed to pay 20,000 roubles commission, after Fürst had disposed of the painting. He says he handed over the painting to Mrs Dikeni late one night in Moscow, and returned to St Petersburg. He says Greshnikov told Fürst that Fürst would receive the painting in a week. A week later Fürst rang to say he had not received the painting. Makhin was unable to contact Mrs Dikeni. In March 1987, two or three weeks later, she telephoned him, saying she had been unwell and unable to take the painting to Berlin. Three days later she said that she was well again and ready to take it to Berlin. Makhin says he left a message on Fürst’s telephone answering machine and later learnt that Fürst was in the USA. Mrs Dikeni, on her return to Moscow, said that she had left the painting with a relative in Berlin. He learnt that Fürst never recovered the painting. Greshnikov, who also gave oral evidence before me but without a translator, supports Makhin’s account.

Fürst, who gave oral evidence, says that he had given DM50,000 to Greshnikov in anticipation of making a purchase. But he was clearly a part of the organisation which smuggled works of art from the Soviet Union. He accepted that he was not doing this in order to earn a medal. He says Greshnikov offered to sell the painting which he identified from the signature as being an Wtewael. He instructed Greshnikov to secure the painting for him using the DM50,000 towards the purchase. The offer price was 150,000 roubles (approximately DM100,00 at black market rates). He confirms meeting Mrs Dikeni who was referred to as “Big Mamma”. According to him she said she needed to discuss the matter with her husband. He says that the arrangement was to pay her DM80,000 when he took possession of the painting in Berlin.

Fürst says that he returned to Germany and learnt that the painting had been taken from the Schlossmuseum Gotha when he saw a copy of the Verlorene Werke der Malerei in Munich. He telephoned Greshnikov in Leningrad asking him to cancel the transaction because he did not want to be involved with art works looted from East Germany. He says that Greshnikov told him the painting had already been handed over by Makhin to “Big Mamma”. In March and April 1987 he telephoned Greshnikov on several occasions to find out about “Big Mamma’s” visit to Berlin. Greshnikov told him that “Big Mamma” had said to Makhin that her children were ill and her trip to Berlin was delayed. Fürst says he heard nothing throughout the summer of 1987 and then learnt that Makhin and Greshnikov had been arrested by the KGB for their black market activities. In March 1993, shortly after Greshnikov’s release from prison, he learnt that “Big Mamma” had only paid half the agreed amount namely DM25,000 and that they had never seen her again.

By means of a somewhat labyrinthine route which it is unnecessary to detail, Fürst met Peter Rohde in November 1988 in Berlin. As I have recorded, Rohde dealt in Russian icons. According to Fürst Rohde eventually agreed that he had the painting in his possession and offered him the opportunity to recoup the money he had lost in marketing the painting. He says he saw the painting at Rohde’s shop in December 1988. Negotiations with Rohde broke down. He says that he visited the museum in Gotha, and spoke to the director in January 1990. The museum was unable to pay the price Rohde was asking of DM400,000. He says that in autumn 1989 Rohde had told him that he had given the painting away against a down payment but would be able to retrieve it. In June or July 1990, when the painting had not been retrieved, Fürst says he told Rohde that he could no longer accept his excuses and required payment of some money. He says he eventually received DM25,000. Dr Hebecker, the specialist director of the Schlossmuseum, confirmed that he was approached by Fürst but was unable to raise the DM400,000.

In a written statement made to the cultural attaché to the German Embassy in Togo on 23rd June 1993 Mrs Dikeni says that she did take the painting to Berlin at the request of Fürst. There she contacted Rohde who advised her to have the painting examined. She says Rohde gave the painting to Martin and that it was never returned to her. She says that she lost the possession of the painting against her will.

Findings of Fact as to Misappropriation

The crucial issue is whether either Mrs Dikeni or Rohde, once they had acquired possession of the painting, misappropriated the painting; in other words whether they kept it or dealt with it contrary to the wishes of the person by whom the painting was transferred to them. But, since the story of the misappropriation depends upon the credibility of particularly Fürst and, in part, Makhin and Greshnikov, it has been necessary to set out their account and I must make findings as to their credibility.

I did not think that Makhin was a witness upon whose evidence I could rely. Stephanie Burras, who was at the time employed by the plaintiffs’ solicitors, stated that at a meeting in February 1993 Makhin had asked what he would be offered in return for making a statement. She also recalls that Fürst raised the question as to whether he might be entitled to a finder’s fee. Makhin denied that he asked for money but said he asked for political asylum in return for assistance. He also admitted that he had accepted $10,000 from Solomon Breslav, Mina’s son. Solomon Breslav was called, mainly to provide a basis for an attack on the credibility of Makhin. He said that Makhin had asked for money and that he had given $10,000 to Makhin in the foyer of the Savoy Hotel in February 1998. He denied that that was with the agreement of Montgomery although apparently Montgomery had been present in the building shortly before he handed the money over. At the same time he passed him a list of questions. Those questions came from Montgomery and were headed “Queries Breslav should put to Makhin”. They were questions designed to test Makhin’s evidence and, coupled with the payment, were calculated to try to use Makhin to bolster Cobert’s account. There was no reference to payment of money in Solomon Breslav’s written statement. Nor was there any reference to the questions. Indeed, in my judgment paragraph 20 of Breslav’s written statement was designed to conceal the fact that Montgomery had been present on the occasion that money was paid to Makhin. I did not believe Breslav’s attempts to distance Montgomery from the payment of what I regard as a bribe to Makhin. Montgomery did not remain in court for long enough to give his explanation for the questions. Whilst that, quite apart from my observations of Breslav, destroyed Breslav’s credibility, it provides no support for the plaintiffs’ account let alone for the credibility of Makhin. At the end of his evidence when asked whether he was prepared to sell his evidence to the highest bidder he replied:-

“What else would you expect from a person who has spent five years in prison, became an invalid while behind bars in the camp and invested 150,000 Roubles?” I have sympathy for anyone serving a sentence at that time in the Soviet Union. But I cannot reflect that sympathy in any finding as to credibility. His own evidence contained unexplained inconsistencies. I do not believe him when he said he discovered the identity of the painting from the “Verlorene” when, as he accepted, he does not speak German. His attempts to persuade me that he was acting merely to ensure that the painting returned to its rightful owner were unsuccessful. Like the others, he was not engaged in this venture “to earn a medal”.

Greshnikov’s evidence was more convincing. I accept his evidence as to how Fürst came by the painting from Bishkinsky and Bezuevsky and as to the introduction to Mrs Dikeni. His evidence is of importance in assessing the evidence of Fürst because he says that Fürst exhibited no reluctance in buying the painting although he did say that it would be difficult to sell. Moreover, he says that after the painting had been given to Mrs Dikeni, Fürst telephoned to say that he had not received the painting. Those two pieces of evidence were inconsistent with the account of Fürst. Greshnikov denied that he was ever given a deposit of DM50,000 to show the painting.

It is Fürst’s evidence which is central to the plaintiffs’ contention that there was a misappropriation once the painting came into Mrs Dikeni’s hands. There are ample grounds for suspecting his credibility. He was heavily involved in smuggling works of art from the Soviet Union. In 1993 Fürst was claiming that the courier was called Mrs Sunguza (according to an affidavit sworn in September 1993 by Dr Carl a partner in the plaintiffs’ solicitors). His evidence that he was reluctant to sell the painting finds no support in the evidence of Greshnikov. Importantly, Fürst accepted that he expected a fee for assisting the plaintiffs in the litigation. Notwithstanding these considerations which taint his evidence, having seen and heard Fürst, I believe him when he says that he gave the painting to Mrs Dikeni and, contrary to his instructions, that it was never returned to him. It was argued on behalf of Cobert that his familiarity with Rohde’s business, and the facts that he was paid DM25,000 and that Mrs Dikeni was a courier who acted on behalf of Rohde show that Fürst expected Rohde to be involved in the sale of the painting all along and that the subsequent sale to Mina Breslav was with Fürst’s connivance. Thus, there was no misappropriation.

I do not think that Fürst’s evidence that he accepted DM25,000 from Rohde supports the conclusion that Rohde’s possession was with the permission or connivance of Fürst. On the contrary it seems to me that Fürst’s admission that he did receive DM25,000 from Rohde provides an indication that he was telling the truth. I see no reason why it was necessary for Fürst to reveal that he had received any payment from Rohde. I accept that Fürst would have a motive for concealing any part which he played in transferring the painting to Rohde and any responsibility he might bear for the painting coming into the hands of Cobert. By distancing himself from those transactions he might expect to be viewed more favourably by the plaintiffs and increase his chances of a fee. But if that was a motive underlying his evidence, I do not see why he should have revealed as much as he did about his negotiations with Rohde and the acceptance of DM25,000. Although I have viewed his evidence with suspicion, I do believe him in relation to his dealings with Mrs Dikeni.

Accordingly I find that the painting was handed to Mrs Dikeni in 1987 and misappropriated by her. If she herself had been the victim of a misappropriation, I would have expected her to tell Fürst at the time. In any event, for the purposes of the limitation issue, it matters not whether she, or a succeeding possessor, misappropriated the painting.

I.2 Approach to Foreign Law

In resolving the disputes as to foreign law, I must be guided by the following principles:-

(1) When faced with conflicting evidence about foreign law I must resolve differences in the same way as in the case of other conflicting evidence as to facts. (Bumper Corporation v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1991] 1WLR 1362, 1368G).

(2) Where the evidence conflicts I am bound to look at the effect of the foreign sources on which the experts rely as part of their evidence in order to evaluate and interpret that evidence and decide between the conflicting testimony (Bumper Corporation at 1369H)

(3) I should not consider passages contained within foreign sources of law produced by the experts to which those experts have not themselves referred. (Bumper Corporation 1369D-G)

(4) It is not permissible to reject uncontradicted expert evidence unless it is patently absurd (Bumper Corporation 1371B).

(5) In considering foreign sources of law I should adopt those foreign rules of construction of which the experts have given evidence (this principle underlies the principle that an English court must not conduct its own researches into foreign law).

(6) Whilst an expert witness may give evidence as to his interpretation of the meaning of a statute it is not for the expert to interpret the meaning of a foreign document. His evidence will be limited to giving evidence as to the proper approach, according to the relevant foreign rules of construction, to that document. There is no dispute as to the approach the German Court would take to issues in respect of which there is no judicial precedent. It would have regard to commentaries on the German Civil Code (“BGB”). It would not feel bound by the mere fact that the majority of commentators took a particular view or by the most recent statement of opinion. It would take into account the quality of arguments, the consistency of the statements and the reputation of the authors. German Courts adopt a teleological approach, interpreting a statute according to its purpose.

Law Applicable to the Transfer of Title to the Painting.

There is no dispute between the parties but that I must apply German domestic law in order to trace the title to the painting. Both sides agree that:-

“the validity of a transfer of a tangible, movable and its effect on the proprietary rights of the parties thereto and of those claiming under them in respect thereof, are governed by the law of the country where the movable is at the time of the transfer. ( Lex Situs ). ( See Rule 118 Dicey and Morris Conflict of Laws 1993 Edn. Page 965 and Winkworth v. Christie Manson and Woods Limited and anr. [1981] Ch. 496 at 513 ). ” No-one has suggested that any of the five exceptions to which Slade J. referred at pages 501 and 514 A-B. apply. Accordingly, the Federal Republic of Germany must establish that it has title to the painting under German law. There was no argument before me as to the effect of Soviet law on proprietary rights whilst the painting was within Soviet territory. Under Soviet law if the transfer of possession occurred without lawful consent of the owner, no subsequent possessor could acquire title. No-one has suggested that Soviet law is relevant to the issue of title.

Title to the Painting under German Law

The question whether the Federal Republic of Germany can prove title to the painting turns on the effect of legislative provisions passed between 6 July 1945 and 24 July 1946 and the location of the painting during that period. Whilst not admitted in the pleadings, Cobert was prepared to assume The Art Foundation acquired ownership of the painting in 1928.

The Orders and Laws passed in the period July 1945 to July 1946 concerned confiscation, sequestration and expropriation of property within the area covered by the Soviet Military Administration in Germany. It is important, therefore, to distinguish between confiscation, sequestration and expropriation. It is accepted by both Professor Werner and Professor Brunner, the experts in German Law, that:-

(i) Confiscation merely had the effect of placing the property under the control of the state. It did not have the effect of altering ownership.

(ii) Sequestration was concerned with the administration of the confiscated property; to secure confiscation by preventing interference by the owner whose rights were restricted by confiscation. Sequestration did not, therefore, alter ownership in the property.

(iii) It is only expropriation which has the effect of depriving a former owner of his title to the asset. Confiscation and sequestration may therefore be regarded as measures preliminary to expropriation, designed to prevent subsequent expropriation from being frustrated by the former owner.

Confiscation of the painting on 6th July 1945

In order to determine whether the painting was expropriated in October 1945 it is necessary to determine whether the painting was confiscated in July 1945. Three or four days after Russian troops arrived in Thüringia, the President of the Government of Thüringia passed a Polizeiverfügung (called in these proceedings a police order) and a Polizeiverordnung (called in these proceedings a police regulation) concerning confiscation of certain assets. It is accepted by both Professor Werner and Professor Brunner that, as a matter of general law, the legal validity of a Verfügung depends upon a Verordnung. The Verfügung of 6 July, 1945 purports to confiscate assets of the former reigning royal house of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha.

“Based on paragraph 1ff of the Polizeiverordnung (regulation) concerning the confiscation of assets of former members of the national socialist German workers’ party, the assets of the Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha and of his house … are confiscated”

“In particular also in so far as assets have been transferred to the “Foundation of the Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha’s Family” and the “Foundation for the Arts and Sciences” (see para 2 of Polizeiverordnung (police regulation) dated 6th July 1945)” The Polizeiverordnung appears on its face, to be inconsistent with the Verfügung which purported to confiscate all the assets which had formally belonged to the Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha. The Verordnung provided in paragraph 1 for the confiscation of assets of former members of the national socialist German workers’ party, its organisations and affiliated bodies. The Foundation for Art and Science was not such a body. But by paragraph 2 of the Verordnung:-

“Such confiscation of assets also applies to third persons to whom individuals named in paragraph 1, have transferred, after 30th January 1933, ownership, possession or other entitlements in relation to such items.” Although the Duke fell within paragraph 1, the assets of the Art Foundation and in particular the painting were not transferred after 30th January 1933. There is no evidence that any assets were transferred by the Duke to the Art Foundation after that date. Thus, the problem arises as to whether the Verfügung had the legal effect of confiscating the painting or whether, because the painting was transferred to the Foundation before 30th January 1933, the Verordnung prevails and had the effect that the painting was not confiscated.

Although at one point Professor Brunner expressed some doubt, in general both experts agreed that, although the confiscation of all the assets of the Art Foundation whether or not they had been transferred after 30th January 1933 lacked a legal basis, the confiscation under the Verfügung was not null and void (“nichtig”) but was merely open to be challenged by appropriate legal remedies and was effective unless and until such legal remedies were taken to have the Verfügung declared invalid (“rechtswidrig”). In other words, the Verfügung was, to put it loosely in English terms, only voidable and not void and had legal effect until successfully challenged in court. No such challenge took place.

Professor Brunner took the view that there was no conflict between the Verfügung and the Verordnung. It was necessary to read them together. Read together, all that was confiscated by the Verfügung and Verordnung were those assets transferred to the Art Foundation after 30th January 1933. But there is no evidence that any assets were transferred to the Foundation after that date. Nor is there any basis for supposing that the Verfügung was passed in the mistaken belief that the assets were transferred to the Foundation for Art and Science after 30th January 1933. (A memorandum for the file dated 24 June 1949 asserts that the Foundation for Art and Science was created in 1934, but the same memorandum refers to Foundation Statutes 23rd March 1928 at its head and contradicts such a belief in the following page). In my judgment the Verfügung and the Verordnung are inconsistent. Nevertheless I accept that the consequences are that the Verfügung, which was never challenged, was legally effective; in other words was not “nichtig” but only “rechtswidrig”. Accordingly the painting, which was in Thüringia on 6th July 1945, was confiscated.

The Law of 9th October 1945

On 9th October 1945 the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAD) passed a law (“Gesetz”) concerning the securing and expropriation of Nazi property. By paragraph 19:-

“The confiscation orders (Verfügung) made pursuant to the police regulations (Verordnung) concerning the confiscation of assets of former members of the national socialist German workers party on 6th July 1945 (Government Gazette page 3) are valid as expropriation orders within the meaning of this Act, even if such orders had not been published.” The effect of the paragraph was to expropriate the assets of the Art Foundation. Both Professors agree that if the picture was confiscated by virtue of the Verfügung, as I have already concluded, the consequence of the law of 9 October 1945 was to expropriate it. Thus, title to the painting passed to the Land of Thüringia in October 1945 because the painting was at that time within the territory covered by the Soviet Military Administration.

Order No 124 (SMAD) The Law of 4 December 1945, Order No 38 (SMA) and the Law of 24 July 1946

Even if the painting was expropriated by the Law of 9 October 1945, Cobert contend that the October 1945 Law was repealed by the Law of 4 December 1945 and the painting was no longer the subject of expropriation. That issue turns on the proper construction of those two laws and the effect of Orders (SMAD) passed by the Soviet Military Administration for Germany pursuant to which local Orders (SMA) were made by the Soviet Military Adminstration in Thüringia and the two local Thüringian laws were passed. Both Professors accepted that, after October 1945, the Soviet Military Administration appreciated that the German authorities may have been over-eager in their confiscation and expropriation of assets, in the belief that their owners may have belonged to organisations forbidden or disbanded by the Soviet Military Command. The overall policy of the Soviet Military Administration between October 1945 and July 1946 was to secure assets located in areas under its jurisdiction which might, on due consideration, fall to be expropriated and to allow time for considering whether all the assets previously confiscated and expropriated should be subject to expropriation. Accordingly, on 30th October 1945 by Order 124 (SMAD) assets located in the zone occupied by the Red Army were declared the subject of sequestration if they belonged to persons listed in that order. That order did not itself cover the Foundation. The instructions to the Order did not assist me. By a Law (Gesetz) of 4 December 1945 concerning the repeal of the Law of 9 October 1945 by order of the Soviet Military Administration for the Land of Thüringia :-

“Paragraph 1.

In view of the exhaustive regulations contained in orders of the Supreme Chief of Soviet Military Administration in Germany concerning the sequestration and temporary administration of some categories of assets in Germany (Order No 124 of 30th October) … the Thüringian law of 9th October 1945 concerning securing and expropriation of nazi assets … is hereby repealed.

Paragraph 2.

All matters pending at the time of this Act coming into force with authorities responsible pursuant to the Thüringian expropriation law of 9th October 1945 are as far as they are subject to the provisions of Orders No 124 and 126 in their current state handed over to the authorities appointed, according to these Orders and to existing and future execution regulations” The translation probably does not do justice to the original.

Order No 38 (SMA), of 25 January 1946, of the Soviet Military Administration in Thüringia was passed in order to carry out Order No 124 within the region of Thüringia. It imposed sequestration upon the museum at Gotha (item 134) and the castle at Reinhardsbrunn (item 173). It is agreed that the sequestration, which referred only to buildings and installations, covered their contents.

Professor Werner takes the view that the effect of Paragraph 2 of the Law of 9 December 1945, is to maintain the expropriation under the Law of 9 October 1945 because the painting was covered by Order No 124 when read with its consequential local Order No 38.

Was the Expropriation by the Law 9 October 1945 Repealed by the Law of 4 December 1945?

The question whether the Law of 4 December 1945 had the effect that the painting was no longer the subject of expropriation turns on the proper interpretation of Paragraph 2 of that Law. I do not think that any reliance can be placed upon the fact that the repeal purported to be retrospective. Professor Werner took the view that the Law of October 1945 was effective despite its retrospective effect and appeared to accept in cross-examination that a repeal of such expropriation was possible even if it was retrospective.

Cobert contends that Paragraph 2 is a merely procedural, transitional measure which has nothing to do with the substance of expropriation repealed by Paragraph 1. Professor Brunner’s evidence was that Order 124 (SMAD) and Order 38 (SMA) merely provide for sequestration, and not expropriation, for the purposes of deciding whether subsequent expropriation might take place later.

In my judgment, detailed analysis of the Law of October 1945 and Paragraph 2 of the Law of 4 December 1945 leads to the conclusion that the expropriation of the painting by the Law of 9 October 1945 remained effective.

In order to establish that the expropriation of the painting under the Law of 9 October 1945 remained effective despite the Law of 4 December 1945, the plaintiffs must establish:-

(1) that the expropriation was one of the “matters pending at the time of this Act (Law of 4 December 1945) coming into force with authorities responsible pursuant to the Thüringian expropriation Law of 9 October 1945″.

(2) that the painting was subject to the provisions of Order No 124. If those conditions were satisfied then, pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Law of 4 December 1945 the painting was handed over to the authorities appointed in its “current state”; in other words its legal status was maintained.

The scheme of the Law of 9 October 1945 was:-

(1) Assets liable to be expropriated were to be registered with Honorary Commissions established to check lists of assets and ensure compliance with the Law (Articles 13 and 14).

(2) The President of the Land of Thüringia was to decide which assets were to be expropriated (Article 7). Notice was to be served on former owners, if necessary by substituted service (Articles 7 and 8).

(3) A decision of expropriation had the effect of confiscation (Article 9).

(4) Land expropriations were to be notified to the Land Registry so that the appropriate changes could be entered (Article 10).

(5) The President of the Land had power to order temporary confiscation pending a decision as to expropriation (Article 12)

(6) Objections by third parties, other than spouses, claiming the assets could be lodged within 6 months (Article 17). Matters would be pending, within the meaning of Paragraph 2, under those Articles when the Law of 4 December 1945 came into force.

It is important to emphasise that the painting, having been confiscated by the Verfügung of 6 July 1945 was treated as expropriated under the Law of 9 October 1945 without the need for the procedure under Articles 7, 8, 13 and 14. By Article 19 (which suffered from a number of translations):-

“The confiscation orders made pursuant to the police regulation concerning the confiscation of assets of former members of the National Socialist German Workers Party of 6 July 1945 … are valid as expropriation orders within the meaning of this Act, even if such orders have not been published.” The closing paragraph of Article 19 read:-

“Assets which have been confiscated by the Occupation Authorities, or which will be confiscated in future are considered to be expropriated under the provisions of this Law. In such cases an expropriation decree by the President of the Land of Thüringia is not required.” Thus expropriation of the painting under the October Law did not depend upon any decision of the President of the Land but was effected by Article 19.

In my judgment, although expropriations falling within Article 19 had effect without the need for any further decision by the President of the Land such expropriations did fall within the meaning of “matters pending” under Article 2. They were still subject to the six month period for objection under Article 17 of the Law of October 1945.

Order 124 made provision for similar procedures under a fresh regime. The assets listed in Paragraphs 1 and 2 of that Order were to be notified to Local Administrations (Paragraph 3). Those Administrations were required to find and take into custody assets which were then to be registered and notified to military commanders (Paragraph 4).

It is to be noted that Order 124 itself made no provision for confiscation of assets. The function of confiscation was delegated to the local administrations by Paragraph 4.

The collection previously owned by the Art Foundation fell within Order 124 by virtue of Order 38. It is true that Order 38 was only enacted pursuant to Order 124 on 25 January 1946. It was faintly argued that the painting did not, therefore, fall within Order 124 as at the date of the Law of 4 December 1945. But, in my judgment, it is clear that for the purposes of Paragraph 2 of the Law of 4 December 1945 Order 38 must be read with Order 124 (the letter dated 16 January 1946 from the Director to the Trustee of the confiscated assets copied to the State Commission for the execution of Orders No 124/126 and the letter dated 17 November 1947 support that view).

I accept Mr Layton QC’s submission that it makes no sense if confiscations which had already been carried out by local authorities pursuant to the Verfügung of 6 July 1945 were no longer legally effective but were to be subject to the regime under Order 124 of notification and decision by the local administrations under Paragraph 4 of that Order. The correct view, in my judgment, is that the legal effect of previous confiscations remained effective under Paragraph 2 of the Law of 4 December 1945. The status of the collection confiscated by the Verfügung of 6 July 1945 was preserved by Paragraph 2 without the need for the procedures under Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Order 124; the collection remained subject to confiscation. If, moreover, the legal status of the collection was preserved by Paragraph 2 it follows that the collection remained subject not only to confiscation but also to expropriation. It is difficult to see how assets such as the collection, including the painting, retained their status as confiscated assets but not their status as expropriated assets. There was, after all, no provision for returning assets which had been expropriated to their original owners such as the Art Foundation. In my judgment, therefore, Professor Werner is correct in his opinion that the painting remained subject to expropriation. The effect of the Law of 4 December 1945 was to replace the regime which had previously existed under the Law of 9 October 1945 with the regime under Order 124 but not to repeal the confiscations which had been carried out prior to the Law of 9 October 1945 and which took effect as expropriations under that Law.

Contemporary documents l945 to l947

Both sides rely upon documents written between l945 and l947 to support their rival contentions as to the effect of the legislation passed in l945 and l946. Those documents provide a glimpse of the difficulties of administration in the post-war turmoil in Germany. They demonstrate the increasing confusion of those responsible for administering the Art Foundation. The Laws governing the legal status of the Art Foundation were not drafted with the precision to be expected in times of peace and stability. They are primarily concerned with difficulties in administration and not with legal status. But in my judgment those documents do at least support three propositions:-

(1) The assets of the Art Foundation had been confiscated with effect from July l945;

(2) The trustee (Treuhänder in German has been loosely translated as trustee) appointed in l945, acted under the authority of the Land and reported to the Land.

(3) There was no reference to expropriation by the Law of 9 October l945. Anton Etthoefer was appointed as trustee to administer the confiscated assets on 16 July l945. On 9th January l946 the Vice-President of the Land wrote to the Soviet Military Administration in Weimar warning that troops were taking away property of the House of the Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, which, he asserted, was under the supervision of the State Office for Public Education. He asked for immediate intervention to prevent removal of the museum objects which, he said, belonged to the Land of Thüringia. On 16th January l946 the Director von Schenk wrote to the trustee of the confiscated assets complaining that objects had been removed by, amongst others, Professor Alexeyev. The letter was copied to the State Commission for the Execution of Orders 124/126 at Weimar. On 28th January l946 Geithner, the Director of Administration, sought orders to stop removal of objects from the Museum from the Presidential Chancellery at Weimar. On 16 February l946 the trustee of the confiscated assets sought to prevent release of the confiscated assets of the Family Foundation asserting that, by Order 124, they had been confiscated for the benefit of the Soviet Military Administration. He referred to confiscation pursuant to the Government Gazette dated 16 July l945. On 6th May l947 the Vice-President of the Land wrote to the Department of the President requesting that the trusteeship pursuant to 124 be assigned to the Ministry of Finance. On 16 September l947 a draft Memorandum from the Ministry of Finance recorded confiscation of the Duke’s assets under the Order of 6 July l945. It recorded that the assets were affected by Order No.124 and that the trustee was Etthoefer under the supervision since May l947, of the Ministry of Finance. On 17th November l947 the Ministry of Justice addressed a review to the Officer in Charge for the execution of Order 124. Apparently that Officer had taken the view that the assets of the Duke had been confiscated on the strength of the Police Order of 6th July l945. The author of that review asserted that the Order of 6th July l945 had been rendered redundant (there was, I accept, a mis-translation which originally translated redundant as invalid). He stated that the Law of 9 October l945 had replaced the previous order and had itself been repealed by the Law of 4 December l945. He said that the assets of the former Duke had been sequestered and expressed astonishment that the person responsible for Order 124 had not been informed. Later, the review says that Etthoefer is under the direct jurisdiction of the First Vice-President and receives his instructions from him. The review concludes:-

“Considering the importance and political implications, irrespective of the possibility that huge claims for damages may be lodged against persons involved in this matter, we consider it a matter of urgency to clarify, as precisely as possible, the legal situation of individual cases, and to keep precise documentation on them.” I doubt whether the author of that letter could have imagined that his plea for clarification, as a matter of urgency, would remain unanswered at least for another 50 years. I observe, that this review cited a letter from the State Commission dated 19 January l946, 11 days before Order 38 was enacted, which like the letter from von Schenk three days before regarded the assets as falling under Order 124 despite the fact that Order 38 had not yet been passed.

As I have already noted, none of these documents refers to the expropriation of 9 October l945. Further documents, on which Cobert relied, do not provide any greater clarification. They demonstrate the increasing confusion. On 2nd July l946, the trustee of the confiscated assets in a letter to the State Commission for the execution of Orders No.124 and 126 under the heading “Assets of the Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha” stated that he had been made personally responsible for the preservation and protection of all confiscated assets of the Duke which had been sequestered. He said he would undertake the preliminary work to effect the handover. A Memorandum dated 4 February l947 concerning a discussion with the trustee of the former Duke’s assets on 27 January l946, refers to the fact that the Family Foundation’s assets had been confiscated by the Police Order of 6th July l945. It continued:-

“The art treasures remaining at Friedenstein Palace and the Library which formerly contained 300,000 volumes, have been severely decimated through war events and actions of the Occupation Forces. There is, however, still a sizeable portion of art treasures remaining, which have not yet been catalogued…..further art treasures, approximately worth Reichsmark 30 million, have been taken to Coburg (American Occupation Zone).” A letter dated 28 April l947 to the Ministry for Public Education referred to former state art collections at Gotha and spoke of the difficulty of making an inventory. This had been locked away, with all the art objects, by the Soviet Military Administration. The current Administration of the State collections could not obtain access. An undated letter, thought to have been written in l947, spoke of the museums being under the authority of the Soviet Military Administration. It warned of a Russian Major appearing at the Museum, looking for art objects. Geithner was asked to inform the state authorities if anyone tried to remove anything. On 18 September l947 the Director of the Institutes for Art and Science Gotha (the organ through which the Land administered the art foundation), complained of lack of funds to the trustee. On 28 July l948 the Land gave instructions for payment to the Institute, the funds to be taken from the confiscated assets of the Duke.

In my judgment, these documents do not support Cobert’s contention that control of the assets had not been passed to the Land. Etthoefer was trustee of the confiscated assets and the repeated pleas to departments in Weimar either to prevent removal of assets or for money, demonstrate, to my mind, that control of the assets had passed to the Land. This material was concerned with problems of administration. The authors were not, in the main, concerned with the true legal status of the assets. In those circumstances I can place no reliance upon the fact that they make no reference to the law of 9 October l945. It is not surprising, given the political upheaval in the ruin of Germany, that they cast no light on the ownership of the collection. If they shed little light now that is not surprising after the shadows of the past 50 years.

Order No.154/181 of 21st May l946 and the Law of 24th July l946

In the light of my conclusion that the painting was taken out of the territory under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Military Administration in January, l946, the Law of 24 July l946 cannot assist the plaintiffs. However, since the effect of the Order No.154/181 of 21 May l946 and the Law at 24 July l946 which followed that Order were the subject of evidence from Professors Werner and Brunner, I should record the issues between them and my conclusions based upon their evidence.

By Order No.154/181 dated 21 May l946 (“concerning utilisation of sequestered and confiscated assets based on Order 124″):-

It was ordered that:-

  • “1. Sequestrated assets which belonged to the Hitler state and to its central authorities and which are located within the Soviet occupation zone, are to be put under the authority of competent German administrative authorities in the Soviet occupation zone of Germany…2 .Sequestrated and confiscated assets which belonged to the Nazi party and its organisations or to Nazi party leaders, are to be transferred to the possession and disposal of German local government authorities of the Laender and Federal territories wherein such assets are located…3. The transfer of the respective assets into the possession and disposal of German local government of laender of federal territories is to be carried out accompanied by appropriate legally binding lists”

(The translation in the plaintiffs’ supplementary bundle at 27 was corrected during the course of the hearing).

By the Law of 24 July l946,

“Concerning the delivery of sequestered and confiscated assets by the Soviet Military Administration to the Land of Thüringia” :-

“Article 1.

The assets …. which were confiscated or sequestered by the Soviet Military Administration according to Orders No.124 … of 30 October l945, and which are to be delivered to the state of Thüringia based on Orders No 154/181 … 21st May l946 … are upon such delivery expropriated without compensation for the benefit of the state of Thüringia”.

Article 4:-

“Any sequestered assets which do not come under the Orders No.124 .. of 30 October l945 are to be returned to their original owners, without delay”.
Professor Brunner took the view that expropriation could only be effected by a four-stage procedure:-

1) that the assets fell within Order 124 (read with Order 38)

2) that the assets fell within Order 154

3) that the assets fell within the law of 24 July l946 and

4) that there should be a physical handing over of control to the Land of Thüringia following the passing of the Law of 24 July l946. Professor Brunner did not take the view that it was necessary that each and every item in the Art Foundation’s collection should be physically handed over but, he asserted, physical control had to be passed to the Land of Thüringia following and in consequence of the Law of 24 July l946. Cobert contend that no such physical control passed to the Land following the Law of 24 July l946. The trustee was the trustee of confiscated assets but his control was not the control of the Land. Cobert rely upon the documents to which I have already referred demonstrating that physical control remained with the Soviet Military Administration and not with the Land. It refers in particular to a copy of a document sent to the State Office for Public Education in Weimar dated 26 June l946 referring to art works under lock and key at Friedenstein Palace and Castle Reinhardsbrunn in which it was said that it would be advisable to make an application to the Soviet administration at Potsdam in relation to the fate of the art works. The letter, to which I have already referred, from Etthoeffer, dated 2nd July l946, said that he had been made personally responsible for the preservation and protection of all confiscated assets of the Duke which had been sequestered by Order of the Chief of Administration of the Soviet Military occupation for Thüringia, Major General of the Guards Kolesnitschenko. By Memorandum dated 27 January l946 in relation to developed real estate confiscated pursuant to Order 124/126, the trustee said he could not hand over that property to the state. I have already referred to the District Education Office letter dated 28 April l947 which spoke of the difficulties of making inventories when the lists had been locked away by the Soviet Military Administration. The letter from the Central Administration Office for Public Education in Berlin spoke of the Museum at Gotha being under the authority of the Soviet Military Administration.

The difficulty with Professor Brunner’s views is that, if he is correct, the art collection was not expropriated as a result of the Law of 24 July l946 and thus should have been returned to the Foundation pursuant to Article 4 of that Law. I find that conclusion surprising. It is plain that it was the intention of Order 154/181 and Article 1 of the Law of 24 July l946, that assets confiscated or sequestered by Order 124 were to be transferred to the Land of Thüringia. I am unable to envisage any reason why the art collection, which undoubtedly fell within Order 124 (read with Order 38) should have formed an exception to this process of expropriation. The scheme of Order 154/181, and of the Law of 24 July l946 was that assets which fell within Order 124 were to be handed over pursuant to Order 154/181 and upon handover expropriation took effect by virtue of the Law of 24 July l946. But that does not mean that assets which had already been handed over fell outwith the scope of the expropriation of the Law of 24 July l946. It was not, in my judgment, the intention of the legislation that assets which fell within Order 124 and which had already been handed over should not be expropriated. As Mr Layton Q.C. submitted, Order 154/181 provided the mechanism for handover in respect of those assets which had not yet been handed over. Expropriation took place with effect from the time of handover.

I do not regard the documents upon which Cobert relied as demonstrating anything more than the reality of the influence exerted by the presence of the Soviet Military Command in that part of Germany. In my judgment the trustee had been in physical control of the assets of the Art Foundation under the supervision of the Land ever since l945. If the painting had been within the territorial jurisdiction of the Soviet Military administration in July l946 and had not hitherto been expropriated, then the Law of July l946 would have effectively expropriated that painting as part of the collection of the Art Foundation.

I.3 Dissolution of the Foundation on 14th October l950

The plaintiffs now contend, by an amendment during the course of the trial, that when the Minister of Justice of the Land Thüringia purported to dissolve the Art Foundation on 14th October 1950 the painting passed to the Land Thüringia by universal succession. When the Länder were dissolved in 1952, the property of the Länder devolved to the German Democratic Republic [East Germany] and on unification to the Federal Republic of Germany. Cobert accepts that if dissolution had the effect for which the plaintiffs contend then, on unification, title devolved either to the Federal Republic of Germany or to the City of Gotha.

The importance of this contention is that, if it is right, the whereabouts of the painting in 1950 is irrelevant. The Land Thüringia became owner even though the painting was not in its possession but was in the Soviet Union.

The contention raises two fundamental issues.

(1) Did the dissolution pronounced by the Minister of Justice of the Land Thüringia have extra-territorial effect as a matter of German law?

(2) Will an English Court recognise or enforce a claim to title based upon the purported dissolution?

Was the Dissolution Effective to Transfer Title to the Painting to the Land?

I should record, at the outset, that the Federal Republic of Germany’s reliance upon the dissolution of the Art Foundation to trace their title came very late in the day. There was no reference to it in the original pleadings or in the evidence of Professor Werner exchanged before trial. My comments are not meant as a criticism; inevitably during the course of this case the focus on particular issues changed and new material arrived throughout the trial. Nevertheless the lateness of the submission meant that it was difficult for Cobert fully to deal with it. In particular, criticisms of Professor Brunner’s evidence on this point, which I shall detail later, were not warranted; Professor Brunner’s evidence did not deal with this point in full at the outset because the point had not been made. He was compelled, through no fault of his own or that of Cobert, to deal with the point at the last minute. It would, therefore, be unfair to criticise any omissions in his evidence. Rather, the lateness of the submission requires the evidence on behalf of the Federal Republic of Germany on this point to be scrutinised with particular rigour.

By Article 87 (1) of the BGB:-

“If the fulfilment of the object of the foundation has become impossible, or if it endangers the public interest, the competent authority may give the foundation another stated object or may dissolve it.” By Article 88 of the BGB, on the dissolution of a foundation the assets pass to the person specified in the constitution.

This Article was implemented in Thüringia by Article 14 of the Thüringian Implementation Regulation 16 May l923.

According to Professor Brunner, in his original report (paragraph 149):-

“According to Article 14 of the then applicable Thüringian Implementation Regulation to the German Civil Code dated 16 May 1923 upon its abolition, a foundation’s property passed to the state of Thüringia.” There was no translation of Article 14 in evidence before me although the plaintiffs asserted that it provides:-

“The property of the foundation falls upon its dissolution to the state, if its constitution does not otherwise provide”. Since Professor Brunner agrees that that is the effect of Article 14, I do not think that the absence of a translation matters.

By a decision of 26 June 1941 of the Oberlandesgericht in Jena, Paragraph 10 of the Art Foundation Statutes was altered so as to provide that:-

“Changes in statutes affecting the purposes of the Foundation and its assets, as well as decisions about the application of assets in the case of dissolution of the Foundation requires the unanimous consent of the Board of Directors. The latter is also required for the dissolution of the Foundation.” (The previous Statute made no specific reference to dissolution and referred to a majority of at least two thirds).

Paragraph 11 was altered so as to provide:-

“Should the Foundation be dissolved or its former purposes no longer be applicable, its assets, as far as taxation laws do not provide any restrictions, are to be used for public and charitable benefits …” On 17th July l998, before I had given judgment, I received further written evidence from Professor Brunner as to the effect of the amendment of 26th June l941 and written evidence from Professor Werner in response.

Professor Brunner takes the view that this provision in the Foundation’s Statutes was disregarded when the Foundation was dissolved; there was no resolution of the Board of the Art Foundation, nor was approval of the Family Foundation obtained. The founder’s wishes were to take priority over the provisions of Article 88 of the BGB and Article 14 of the Thüringian Implementation Regulation.

By the time of the dissolution there was no Board of Directors in Thüringia. They had, so far as I am aware, moved to Coburg in West Germany. They made no resolution to specify a beneficiary. In those circumstances, the assets passed to the Land of Thüringia pursuant to Article 14 (Professor Werner relied upon the commentator Seifart in support of that proposition).

Professor Brunner did not dissent from the proposition that if the dissolution was valid and no beneficiary was specified, then Article 14 of the Thüringian Implementation Regulation of 16 May l923 would have the effect that property passed to the Land. However, of more significance was his view that the failure of the Directors to specify the beneficiary confirmed that the dissolution pronounced by the Minister of Justice was in substance an act of expropriation. The absence of any reference to the Board of Directors, either in relation to dissolution or in relation to the specification of the beneficiary on dissolution, merely confirms that the dissolution was a unilateral sovereign act of expropriation. It is to that contention I now turn.

Expropriatory Intention lying behind the Dissolution

Cobert contend that, although in form the Ministry of Justice purported to dissolve the Art Foundation, in substance this was an expropriation because the Foundation was dissolved for the purpose of expropriating its assets and with the intention that those assets should pass to the Land. This submission is of importance in relation to both the first and second issues (identified at the beginning of this Section). Under German law it is accepted that an act of expropriation will not have extra-territorial effect. Moreover, if, in substance, the dissolution amounted to expropriation, it would not be recognised by the English courts, because, at the time of dissolution, the painting was not in the possession of the Land Thüringia.

Cobert rely on documents leading up to the dissolution in support of the contention that the act of dissolution was in substance an act of expropriation. On 28th July l948, the Ministry of Finance in Weimar requested an examination whether:-

“1. The Foundation of the Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha’s family;

2. The Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha’s Foundation for Art and Science are still existent and to be considered valid entities” A file memorandum from the Ministry for Public Education dated 21 March l949 said:-

“Nothing has come to the attention of the Ministry of Public Education concerning a dissolution of the two Foundations as legal persons under private law by the Ministry of Justice under paragraph 87 (mistranscription in translation) of the Civil Code, due to their inability to fulfil the Foundation purpose. As a matter of fact, the Foundation’s purpose can still be carried out in relation to both foundations. …(the memorandum then refers to expropriation of private assets in December l948).

The memorandum concludes in a handwritten note:-

“Also to the Arts Department with a request for information whether these two Foundations are to become state property”. On 19 August l949, Dr Thiemann from the Ministry of Education wrote to the Ministry of Finance:-

“As there are no moneys available, and without touching on the valuable items in the Collection, not even the salaries of the Foundation employees can be paid, it will be correct to also dissolve this Foundation as per paragraph 87 of Civil Code. As the Foundation Statutes do not contain guidelines as to what is to be done with the assets in such a case, the Land of Thüringia will become the owner as per paragraph 14 of the … (Regulation 16.5.1923)” The letter continues:-

“The Land of Thüringia would also need to examine the question which of the former Foundation employees could be re-deployed in the State Museum and the State Library.” By letter dated 9 December l949 from the Ministry of Public Education to the Ministry of the Interior, Dr Thiemann wrote:-

“In case of dissolution of the Art Foundation under paragraph 87 of the Civil Code, the Foundation assets would – as per paragraph 14 of the Thüringian Order of Execution of Civil Code of 16 May l923 – transfer to the Land of Thüringia, because the Foundation Statutes do not nominate who should receive the assets upon dissolution.

In addition, we refer to our letter of 19.8.l949 whereby the legal situation of the Art Foundation is made perfectly clear.” Whilst I do not accept Dr Thiemann’s claim to clarity, in my judgment this correspondence does not establish that the act of dissolution was an act merely concerned to ensure the transfer of the assets of the Art Foundation to the Land. In my judgment, they support the conclusion that the Land was of the opinion that the Foundation was no longer able to fulfil its purposes and, accordingly, should be dissolved under Article 87 of the BGB. This had the effect of passing the assets of the Art Foundation to the Land, but in my judgment that effect was not the intention lying behind the act of dissolution. Dr Thiemann’s statement that the Foundation Statutes did not nominate the beneficiary (letter 9 December l949) was correct. It is apparent that he was unaware of the amendment of l941. This was not surprising but, in my judgment, it does not reveal an intention to disregard the wishes of the Board. It merely reflects the reality that there was no Board of Directors in Gotha. The fact that the Board of Directors had moved from Gotha to Coburg in West Germany leads to Cobert’s next submission relating to the seat of the Foundation.

The Foundation Seat

Professor Brunner was also of the opinion that the purported dissolution of the Foundation by the Minister of Justice of the Land Thürigia was ineffective, because the Land had no jurisdiction to do so. He said that its jurisdiction depended upon the location of the seat of the Foundation. By 1950 he says that the actual management and seat could only have been in Coburg. His reasoning depends upon the facts relating to management of the Art Foundation in the late 1940s and upon his interpretation of Article 80 of the BGB.

The facts relating to the Art Foundation’s Seat

A report from the Ministry of Finance of the Land Thüringia complained that records of the Art Foundation’s assets were held in Coburg and that both the Family and Art Foundations were managed in Coburg and refused to hand over documents. (This document was not translated). It is apparent from a letter from Oberlandesgericht Bamberg (in West Germany) to the Oberlandesgericht Erfurt in Thüringia dated 16 March 1950 that the Oberlandesgericht Bamberg was prepared to take over supervision of the Foundation. By a decision of the Oberlandesgericht Bamberg dated 30 June 1951 it was recorded that, in relation to the Family Foundation the supervisory authority formerly exercised by the Oberlandesgericht Gera (in Thüringia) had been moved by the Board of Directors from Gotha to Coburg in accordance with the Foundation Statutes. By a decree of 7 December 1960 the court in Bamberg stated that the Art Foundation should not be left without supervisory authority and recorded that:-

“As the Family Foundation as well as the Art Foundation must not be left without a supervisory authority, and the Administrative Seat for both Foundations is at Coburg, the Bamberg Court of Appeals entailed estate senate will, effective from 1.1.1961, assume supervisory authority also of the Art Foundation”. This was recalled in a letter dated 5 February 1968.

The formal decision of the Oberlandesgericht Bamberg recording relocation of the Art Foundation’s seat was recorded by a decision of the Oberlandesgericht Bamberg on 30 March 1976.

In the light of the evidence that the management of both Foundations was being carried out in Coburg from the 1940s onwards Professor Brunner’s view was that the seat of the Foundation was in Coburg at the time of the purported dissolution and accordingly the Land Thüringia had no authority to dissolve the Art Foundation.

I do not agree that the Land Thüringia had no authority to dissolve the Art Foundation. It is true that it would only have authority while the seat of the Art Foundation remained within Thüringia. But in my judgment, whatever the reality as to the actual management of the Foundation, its seat, under German law, by virtue of Article 80 of BGB remained in Thüringia. By Article 80:-

“The seat of the Foundation is deemed, unless otherwise provided, to be the place where its management is carried on.” I accept Professor Brunner’s evidence that, in reality, management of the Art Foundation was carried out in Coburg. It could hardly be otherwise since the Art Foundation itself had no control over its property insofar as that property was situated in Thüringia. But I accept Professor Werner’s evidence that the seat of the Foundation remained, as a matter of German law, in Thüringia and that that seat was not changed until 30 March 1976. Pursuant to Article 80 of the BGB the place of the Foundation’s management was not its seat because the Statutes otherwise provided. In those circumstances the competent authority, namely the Land Thüringia, did have power to dissolve the Art Foundation.

Did the Property of the Art Foundation including the Painting situated then in the Soviet Union Pass to the Land Thüringia?

The Federal Republic of Germany contend that once it is established that the seat of the Foundation was in Gotha and the competent authority was the Ministry of Justice of Thüringia, then property passed to the Land Thüringia by universal succession. The meaning of universal succession, foreign to English law, was explained by Lord Keith of Avonholm in National Bank of Greece and Athens S.A v. Metliss [1958] A.C. 509. He cites one passage from Stair:-

“Heirs in law are called universal successors quia succedunt in universum jus quod defunctus habuit, they do wholly represent the defunct, and are as one person with him, and so they do both succeed to him active, in all the rights belonging to him, and passive in all the obligations and debts due by him. …. the extinction of a corporation under statute or decree and the passing of all its rights and liabilities to a successor exhibits, in my view, all the features of a universal succession.” (530-531) The importance of this contention is that, if there was universal succession, the property of the Art Foundation passed to the Land even if that property, including the painting was situated within the Soviet Union.

Cobert contend, on the basis of Professor Brunner’s evidence, that the doctrine of universal succession cannot apply because at the time the Art Foundation was in fact being managed in West Germany in Coburg. It cannot be said that the act of dissolution had any effect on the Art Foundation in Coburg or works of art under its effective control in West Germany at that time. Mr Brindle QC says that there is no room for the application of universal succession in relation to the Art Foundation once it is accepted that the dissolution did not have the effect of transferring title to works of art in West Germany to the Land Thüringia in East Germany. He submits that either there is universal succession in which event title to all the property passes to the successor wherever it is situated or there is expropriation which will only have effect in relation to assets within the territorial jurisdiction of the expropriating authority.

I do not accept the evidence of Professor Brunner on this point. His proposition that the dissolution did not have extra-territorial effect depended firstly on his view that because the dissolution was an act, in substance, of expropriation it had, like expropriation, no extra-territorial effect. Secondly his views were based on what he described as “German practice concerning the property in Bavaria”. The dissolution had no effect on property in Bavaria, and because there was no reason to distinguish between assets in Bavaria and assets in the Soviet Union, it had no effect upon assets within the Soviet Union.

I have already considered whether the dissolution amounted to an act of expropriation. In my judgment it did not and its effect is not therefore to be limited to the territorial jurisdiction of the dissolving authority as it would have to be if that dissolving authority must be regarded as an expropriating authority. As to his second ground, it seems to me that the reason why the dissolution had no effect upon title to the assets in West Germany is not because the doctrine of universal succession did not apply but because West Germany did not recognise the extra-territorial effect of dissolution within East Germany in relation to assets in West Germany. It was the very problem of the effect of dissolution on assets in both parts of a divided Germany which led to the passing in West Germany of the Law for the Supplementation of the Law for the Amendment of Provisions concerning Entailed Estates and Foundations dated 3 August 1967. The problem is familiar to the courts of this country because of the Carl Zeiss Stiftung litigation. (None of the authorities in relation to that litigation were cited to me, but Buckley J.’s review of the history of that action in Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler (No.3) [l979] Ch.506 at 528 to 536 has a certain resonance in this action).

Article 1 of the Act of 3 August l967 amends paragraph 2a of the previous Act dated 28 December 1950 as follows:-

“If the Civil Law Foundation formed on the basis of German legal provisions had its seat on 8 May 1945 outside the territory over which this law has validity (in other words outside West Germany) and if it had assets within the territory of validity of this Act (West Germany) a duly competent superior state authority of the land in which the assets are located can exercise the supervisory function. It can hereby take all decisions which it regards as necessary in order to keep the Foundation alive or continue. In particular it may move the seat of the Foundation without being bound by provisions of the Statutes. The superior state authority may transfer the exercise of its competence to another authority.” The law of 1967 was necessary because West Germany did not recognise acts relating to a Foundation in East Germany or that any of those acts had any effect on assets of that Foundation in West Germany The reason why the dissolution of the Art Foundation in East Germany had no effect on the assets in West Germany is not because the doctrine of universal succession did not apply but because West Germany did not recognise the dissolution in East Germany and consequently did not recognise its effect.

Conclusion as to Dissolution

For the reasons I have given I am satisfied:-

  • 1. that the seat of the Art Foundation was in Gotha in 1950;

2. that the Ministry of Justice of Thüringia was the competent authority with power to dissolve the Art Foundation pursuant to Article 87 of the BGB;

3. that the dissolution was not an act of expropriation;

4. that by universal succession, title to the property of the Art Foundation, save insofar as that property was in West Germany, which did not recognise the dissolution, passed to the Land Thüringia. In the light of those conclusions I must now turn to the question as to whether an English Court recognises the Plaintiffs’ title either in relation to expropriation or in relation to dissolution of the Art Foundation.

I.4 Recognition or Enforcement in an English Court of FRG’s Title to the Painting Under German Law

If, under German law, title to the painting passed to the Federal Republic of Germany, the question arises whether an English court should recognise or enforce that title. Cobert, firstly, relies upon the principle that English Courts will not recognise a governmental act affecting private property rights when the property is situated outside the territory of that government. (Rule 122 in Dicey & Morris, q.v.supra). Secondly, Cobert invokes the principle that English courts will not entertain an action to enforce the penal, revenue or other public laws of a foreign state. (Rule 3 in Dicey & Morris).

These contentions have no bearing on my conclusion that title passed to the Land Thüringia (and thence to the Federal Republic of Germany ) by the expropriatory Law of 9 October 1945 and that the expropriation of the art collection was not repealed by the Law of 4 December 1945. That expropriation was effective and will be recognised by our courts because, at that time, on my findings of fact, the painting was within the territory over which the Soviet Military Administration had jurisdiction (see Princess Paley Olga v. Weisz [1929] 1 KB 718 at 725) and was in the possession of the trustee. The Federal Government of Germany is merely seeking to protect rights of property which had vested prior to this action and to enforce those rights under the general law of property. Professor Mann states in Further Studies in International Law (1990):

“It should also be accepted that if a State confiscates a chattel situated within its territories, but it does not obtain possession, it cannot recover it by action in a foreign country to which its original owner may have been able to take it.” (356-7). These contentions are, however, of particular importance in relation to my alternative conclusion that on dissolution, in 1950, title to the painting passed to the German Democratic Republic nothwithstanding that the painting was in the Soviet Union.

Was the dissolution a governmental act?

The principle, on which Cobert relies, is summarised as Rule 122 in Dicey & Morris:-

“A governmental act affecting any private proprietary right in any movable or immovable thing will be recognised as valid and effective in England if the act was valid and effective by the law of the country where the thing was situated (lex situs) at the moment when the act takes effect, and not otherwise.” It is important to emphasise that the submission of Cobert is wider than its earlier submission, in relation to German law, that the dissolution was in substance an expropriation. The act of dissolution of the Art Foundation was, it is said, a governmental act which affected private property rights. In those circumstances the effect of the dissolution namely the transfer of the title to the painting, from the Art Foundation to the German Democratic Republic will not be recognised by the English Court.

The issue turns on the question whether the pronouncement of dissolution by the Minister of Justice of the Land Thüringen was in substance a pronouncement relating to the status of the Art Foundation or was in substance a governmental act transferring property rights to the Land.

It is plain that, in order to make the distinction, I must consider the substance of the action of the Minister of Justice and not merely have regard to its form (see Diplock J in Adams v. National Bank of Greece and Athens S.A. ([1958] 2 QB 59 at 75 and 77). In Studies in International Law(Oxford 1973) Professor Mann writes:-

“It is equally certain that in these matters the court will not allow itself to be misled by appearances: on the contrary, it will investigate whether what the plaintiff asserts is in substance a prerogative right the direct or indirect enforcement of which is being sought. (page 502)” Governmental acts which transfer property rights, fall within that class of case, which Nourse J, in Williams & Humbert Ltd v. W & H Trade Marks(Jersey) Ltd [1986] AC 369 at 378-379, described as those which English courts will not enforce on grounds of public policy ( Class II laws). They are those :-

“whose validity and effect within the territory of the foreign state are recognised but which will not be directly or indirectly enforced in England. This can now be seen to be an application of the wider rule that English law will not enforce foreign laws which purport to have extra-territorial effect :see

Bank Voor Handel En Scheepvaart N.V. v. Slatford [1953] 1 QB 248″ (379E). In that case, Devlin J. held that the decree of a foreign government would not be effective to transfer property situated in this country whether or not the law was confiscatory or penal (see page 263). In the House of Lords in Williams & Humbert (q.v. supra) Lord Templeman stated the principle as:-

“The public law of a sovereign state cannot change the title to property which never comes within the jurisdiction of that state.” (431G) Such public laws are to be contrasted with those acts which, in substance, are merely concerned with the status of a corporation or foundation. Such acts fall within the principle described as Rule 155 :

“The existence or dissolution of a foreign corporation duly created or dissolved under the law of a foreign country is recognised in England.” The contrast may be made between Adams (q.v.supra) and The National Bank of Greece and Athens S.A v. Metliss [1958] AC 509. Metliss affords an example of the English court recognising that a foreign decree was an act relating to the status of a corporation and recognising, accordingly, the consequences of that status. It concerned a decree of 1953 whereby two banks were amalgamated into a third. The effect of the amalgamation was to put the new bank in exactly the same position as the former bank before amalgamation. Since English law recognised the status of the new bank so also it recognised the consequences of its status, namely the assumption of the former bank’s liabilities (see Viscount Simonds at 525 and Lord Tucker at 529).

In Adams (q.v.supra) the Greek Government, by legislative decree of 1956, with retrospective effect, sought to absolve the defendant bank from the obligations of the original guarantor bank in respect of bonds. Diplock J held that the law of 1956 was not a law of succession or a law relating to capacity or status but in substance discharged liabilities and altered rights which had vested in English law. Under English rules of private international law that decree was not effective to discharge the liability of the bank as guarantors under the bonds.

In my judgment the Federal Republic of Germany is correct in its contention that the pronouncement by the Ministry of Justice of the dissolution of the Art Foundation was merely a pronouncement which concerned the status of the Foundation. It was a decision made because:-

“The fulfilment of the object of the Foundation has become impossible” (pursuant to Article 87 of the BGB.) In those circumstances the dissolution should be recognised by this court pursuant to Rule 155 and its consequences ought to be recognised. Those consequences included the transfer of the property of the Art Foundation, pursuant to paragraph 14 of the Land Thüringen Implementation Regulation of 16 May 1923. In my judgment the act of dissolving the Art Foundation was not an act done under that which Lord Templeman describes as “the public law of a sovereign state” or that which is described by Professor Mann as an exercise of a prerogative right or analogous to a foreign decree transferring property. It was, in my judgment, an act concerned solely with the status of the Art Foundation. The Art Foundation was dissolved in accordance with the German Civil Code. The Art Foundation was duly dissolved under the law of its place of creation. English law should, therefore, recognise the effects, under that law, of the dissolution.

Is This Action an Action for the Enforcement directly or indirectly of a Penal Revenue or other Public Law of a Foreign state?

Cobert contend that even if the act of dissolution fell outwith Rule 122 nevertheless the action in this case is the direct or indirect enforcement of a public law of a foreign state. Rule 3 in Dicey & Morris (page 97) provides:-

“English courts have no jurisdiction to entertain an action:

(1) for the enforcement, either directly or indirectly, of a penal revenue or other public law of a foreign State; or

(2) founded upon an act of state.” The rationale of the Rule is that to enforce a claim based upon a penal, revenue or other public law of a foreign state is to permit an assertion of sovereign authority by one state within the territory of another.

Mr Brindle QC contends that the claim, insofar as it relies upon title derived from the dissolution decree of 1950, falls foul of Rule 3. Even though the law is not penal or a revenue law, it is a public law of a foreign state. It will not be enforced in relation to property that was not within the territory of the Land at the time of dissolution. In support of the proposition that there is a third category of laws, other than penal and revenue laws, which will not be enforced by an English court. Mr Brindle QC relies upon the judgment of Lord Denning MR in AG of New Zealand v. Ortiz [1984] 1AC 20 to 21, a reference to Rule 3 by Lord Mackay in Williams & Humbert at 437C and in particular the decision of the Court of Appeal in United States v. Inkley [1989] QB 255 at 264 to 265. Whilst there remains some doubt as to whether a residual category of public law exists (see Dicey & Morris page 105), in this case I do not think it matters. It is clear that the touchstone of the third category is an act done by a state by virtue of its sovereign authority. (see Lord Denning in AG of New Zealand v. Ortiz at 21A). Acts which do not amount to an exercise of sovereign authority outside that authority’s own territorial limits fall outwith Rule 3. Even if one recognises a third catagory of public law, in addition to penal and revenue laws, it must, at least be eiusdem generis to those laws. It must be an act de jure imperii and not de jure gestionis.

For the reasons I have already given, the act of dissolution by the Ministry of Justice was an act concerned solely with the continuing existence of the Foundation. The decision to dissolve was dictated solely by the condition of the Foundation. It was not an exercise of sovereign authority. Thus, to bring an action which seeks to protect rights which trace their origin to the dissolution is not an attempt to exercise sovereign authority in this country. In my judgment English courts can and should recognise a title derived from the dissolution of 1950 and enforce an action which seeks to protect those rights.

I.5 Return of the Painting to the German Democratic Republic in 1987

The Federal German Republic’s contention that the painting must have entered the German Democratic Republic in 1987, on its way to West Berlin, led to a spirited argument as to whether that itself had in law the effect of perfecting an inchoate expropriation. Sadly, it is unnecessary to resolve the question whether the fact that the painting may have passed over or through the territory of the German Democratic Republic had that legal effect. No such fact has been established. There is no evidence as to how the painting came into West Berlin. In those circumstances there is no factual basis upon which to found a conclusion, if such a conclusion could be reached, that as a matter of law title was thereby perfected.

I.6 City of Gotha’s Claim to Possession

This issue arises only if the Federal Republic of Germany fails to establish title to the painting and it is owned by the Art Foundation. It is based upon a short passage in Professor Werner’s supplementary opinion. The Schlossmuseum in Gotha is owned and operated by the City of Gotha. The Schlossmuseum’s right to possession arises, it is said, under Paragraph 3 of the Statutes of the Art Foundation which provide that the collection should be made available for public use. A possessor has the right to demand restitution of possession from:

“the person whose possession is defective relative to him” (See Article 861 of the BGB).

The museum was assigned to the City of Gotha from 1952 (see paragraph 177 of Professor Brunner’s opinion). However, I accept Professor Brunner’s evidence that it does not follow that the art collection was in the possession of the museum. The museum was an establishment of the Art Foundation; it was not itself a separate legal entity capable of holding independent legal rights to possession. The fact that the museum was located within the City of Gotha does not establish any legal right. Nor could a right to possession in the City of Gotha be derived from the purpose of the Foundation. The purpose merely establishes obligations in the representative bodies of the Foundation, the statute does not create any independent right to possession in the City of Gotha. I conclude, in accepting Professor Brunner’s evidence on this point, that the City of Gotha has no right to possession. Even if it could be said to have had the right of possession once the museum was assigned to the City of Gotha in 1952 the painting itself had long since ceased to be in that city. For those reasons, if the Federal Republic of Germany’s claim had failed the City of Gotha’s claim would have suffered a similar fate.

Mr Layton QC on behalf of the City of Gotha contended that Professor Brunner had, in cross-examination, conceded that the city had a claim for recovery. The concession, such as it was, was made in the context of a question concerning the right to bring an action after unification and related to possession of the collection now. Professor Brunner’s answers, placed in their proper context, cannot be understood as undermining his previous opinion.

II.2 Is the German Limitation Period relevant?

I turn now to consider whether the Federal Republic of Germany’s claim is time-barred.

The plaintiffs contend that German law is irrelevant. If they are right the action is not time-barred. Now that it is accepted by Cobert that there has been no good faith purchase of the painting, under English law the claim is not time barred nor is the Federal Republic of Germany’s title treated as extinguished pursuant to Section 3 of the Limitation Act 1980. Section 4 provides a special time limit in the case of theft. No thief nor persons taking the stolen chattel from the thief, may take advantage of the limitation period provided for in Section 3. The period of limitation only starts if and when the stolen painting was purchased in good faith.

The dispute as to whether the German limitation period applies turns on a proper interpretation of the Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984. Section 1 provides:-

“(1) Subject to the following provisions of this Act, where in any action or proceedings in a court in England and Wales the law of any other country falls (in accordance with rules of private international law applicable by any such court) to be taken into account in the determination of any matter:-

(a) the law of that other country relating to limitation shall apply in respect of that matter for the purposes of the action or proceedings; and

(b) except where that matter falls within subsection (2) below, the law of England and Wales relating to limitation shall not so apply.

(2) A matter falls within this subsection if it is a matter in the determination of which both the law of England and Wales and the law of some other country fall to be taken into account.

(3) The law of England and Wales shall determine for the purposes of any law applicable by virtue of subsection (1)((a) above whether, and the time at which, proceedings have been commenced in respect of any matter; and accordingly, section 35 of the Limitation Act 1980 (new claims in pending proceedings) shall apply in relation to time limits applicable by virtue of subsection (1)(a) above as it applies in relation to time limits under that Act.

(4) A court in England and Wales, in exercising in pursuance of subsection (1)(a) above any discretion conferred by the law of any other country, shall so far as practicable exercise that discretion in the manner in which it is exercised in comparable cases by the courts of that other country.

(5) In this section “law”, in relation to any country, shall not include rules of private international law applicable by the courts of that country or, in the case of England and Wales, this Act. Section 4 provides:-

“(1) Subject to subsection 3 below, references in this Act to the law of any country (including England and Wales) relating to limitation shall, in relation to any matter, be construed as references to so much of the relevant law of the country as (in any manner) makes provision with respect to a limitation period applicable to the bringing of proceedings in respect of that matter in the courts of that country and shall include:-
(a) references to so much of that law as relates to, and to the effect of, the application, extension, reduction of interruption of that period; and

(b) a reference, where under that law there is no limitation period which is so applicable, to the rule that such proceedings may be brought within an indefinite period.
(2) In subsection (1) above “relevant law”, in relation to any country, means the procedural and substantive law applicable, apart from any rules of private international law, by the courts of that country.” It is plain from Section 1 and Section 4 of the 1984 Act that the Act has no application unless German law falls, in accordance with the rules of English private international law, to be taken into account:-

“in the determination of any matter.” Mr Layton QC, on behalf of the plaintiffs, contends that German law is irrelevant to the plaintiffs’ claim for wrongful interference in England with goods acquired in England. There is no connecting factor to link the claim with Germany. The rules of English international law are rules which apply to foreign law if:-

“The issue before the court affects some fact, event or transaction that is sufficiently closely connected to a foreign system of law to necessitate recourse to that system …” (Cheshire & North Private International Law (12th Edition) page 5). The tort has been committed in England by a Panamanian company which acquired the painting in England.

I cannot accept this submission, attractive though its simplicity be. The claim under Section (2)(1) of the Torts (Interference With Goods) Act [1977] is classified in Goff & Jones The Law of Restitution (4th Edition) (pages 75 to 76) as a restitutionary proprietary claim. It is a claim to protect and enforce rights deriving from the plaintiffs’ ownership of the painting. Assertion of those rights depends upon the plaintiffs’ assertion of title which, it is accepted, must be determined under German law.

But Mr Layton QC ‘s proposition that the 1984 Act has no application relies upon a more subtle submission. That submission requires a distinction to be made between the issues relating to title and limitation. German limitation law has no relevance to the issue whether the Federal Republic of Germany can trace its title by establishing the painting was expropriated or that title passed on dissolution of the Art Foundation. Once it has successfully traced its title to the painting, title is no longer in issue and German law is no longer relevant. The sole issue remaining is one of English law relating to the conversion of a painting in England. German law applies to the question of title because English conflict rules apply the lex situs, but it has no application in relation to limitation.

Mr Layton QC supports that contention by consideration of how the issue would have been resolved before the 1984 Act. German limitation law would not have been relevant because if it had been applicable it would have been regarded as procedural; it did not extinguish title. English limitation law would have governed the claim.

At the core of the 1984 Act lies the principle that the period of limitation applicable under the lex causae should be applied. (see The Law Commission’s Report Classification of Limitation in Private International Law 1982 No.114 paragraphs 4.3 and 4.11). The principles of international law are permeated with that which in earlier days was the lingua franca of international law jurists. But the Latin does not illuminate. The lex causae is the law governing the question (see Dicey & Morris page 30). But what is the question? In the language of Section 1 (1) and Section 4(1), of the 1984 Act: what’s the matter?

The problem arises because Section 1(1) appears to suggest that any law which is to be applied on any substantive issue should also apply to limitation, thus giving rise to many cases where Section 1(2) would apply. Several laws would be applicable to various aspects of a dispute. In his article on time limitation in English law (1985 LMCLQ 497) P.A. Stone amply demonstrates how this approach is contrary to the purposes of the Act particularly in relation to breach of contract. It is clear that the Act intended limitation to be governed by the proper law of the contract (see Law Commission Report 3.9, 4.4 and 4.6). That is likely to have been the law chosen by the parties. Yet if Section 1 means that any law applied in relation to any substantive issue should also apply to limitation that principle cannot be followed. There are many cases where the issue of validity or capacity may have to be considered and where those laws differ from the proper law of the contract. Mr Stone’s solution is to apply the limitation rules applicable to the proper law of the contract; he does not elucidate the process of statutory construction which permits so sensible a conclusion.

I was referred by both parties to passages in Chapter III of Dicey & Morris dealing with the “incidental or preliminary question”. The chapter opens with the dispiriting observation that:-

“It is a technical problem of considerable difficulty which was first noticed by academic writers on the Continent.” The authors of Dicey & Morris suggest a flexible approach taking into account policy considerations. (see page 55). I can well understand such an approach in relation to the problems identified by P.A. Stone in relation to contract. It provides an uncertain guide in the instant case.

Unless it is possible to say the “matter” is only the claim for wrongful interference with the painting and not the issue of title, Section 1(2) governs this action and both German and English limitation law applies. It is agreed that if Section 1(2) applies, the effective limitation period is which ever is the shorter (see e.g. Dicey & Morris page 187). Section 1(2) was directed to the double actionability rule relating to tort, (pursuant to which there are two leges causae). The Law Commission Report No. 114 said:-

“… the general rule requires the court to take into account both the lex loci delicti and our law. Normally, therefore, there are in effect two leges causae governing such cases, one of which will always be English law; in regard to limitation the effective period will be the one described by either the relevant foreign law or by its English equivalent, whichever should be the shorter.

4.15 We recommend … that the rules of limitation in force in England and Wales should not be excluded in cases where both the foreign and the law of England and Wales are to be taken into account under the rules of private international law in the determination of any issue by the court;” It seems clear that but for the dual actionability rule Section 1(2) would not have been enacted. It derogates from the principle that where foreign law falls to be applied, that country’s law of limitation should also be applied. Such a rule resolves the difficulties which had arisen from the need to distinguish between procedural and substantive law. The long title makes it clear that the Act sought to remove the need to consider whether a foreign limitation law was merely procedural or was a matter of substance:-

“An Act to provide for any law relating to the limitation of actions to be treated, for the purposes of cases in which effect is given to foreign law or to determinations by foreign courts, as a matter of substance rather than as a matter of procedure.” Thus, it seems to me, consistent with the statutory principles contained in the 1984 Act, a court should strive to identify one law as governing the issue to be determined rather than two. The plaintiffs’ submissions have the merit of achieving that objective by restricting Section 1(2) to cases where the double actionability rule applies. No significance is to be attached to the continuing existence of Section 1(2); the double actionability rule was abolished by Section 10 of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 but that rule still applies in relation to the determination of issues arising in any defamation claim (Section 13).

It is tempting to follow the approach contended for by Mr Layton QC and to regard the issues relating to title as distinct from the action for conversion in order to fulfil the purpose of the 1984 Act and to isolate one law as governing the issue. By that means Section 1(2) is confined merely to the one remaining tort where the double actionability rule survives. There is, however, in my judgment an insuperable difficulty to this approach. There seems no particular difficulty in adopting that approach in a case such as this, where the German law of limitation is merely procedural and does not affect the plaintiffs’ title to the painting. In such circumstances, adopting the flexible approach suggested by Dicey & Morris, there seems no good reason why the German law of limitation should affect a tort committed in this country in relation to a painting in this country. But, in my judgment, there would be far greater difficulty if the foreign law of limitation was substantive, in other words if the foreign law extinguished property rights. In such a case it would be difficult to say that there were not two laws governing the matter in issue. That was the conclusion of Waterhouse J in The Cintas Foundation Incorporated v. Sotheby’s Unlimited and Fondarm International Establishment(Unreported) 11 February 1995. In that case questions arose as to two paintings by a Spanish impressionist. Under Cuban law, after the expiry of the limitation period, title was extinguished. Waterhouse J concluded that there were two leges causae and accordingly section 1(2) applied. (see page 63). The Judge’s reasoning was not set out in full because, in the light of his decision on other issues, it was obiter. That decision exposes the difficulty in adopting the approach advanced by Mr Layton QC. If, as he was disposed to suggest, there may be two leges causae where the foreign limitation law is substantive then it becomes necessary for a court in this country to consider whether the foreign law is procedural or substantive. To do so seems to me to run counter to one of the fundamental purposes of the 1984 Act which is to avoid the necessity for making such decisions. Whilst I accept that it is desirable, consistently with the purpose of the 1984 Act, to identify one lex causae, in my judgment that consideration is outweighed by the importance of avoiding the need to distinguish between foreign substantive and foreign procedural laws. The arguments relating to the policy of the Act do not permit me to ignore the plain words of section 1(2). In my judgment the laws of both Germany and England govern the matter before the court; they both fall to be taken into account in the determination of a matter which involves issues as to title as well as to the protection of the rights which flow from that title. Accordingly Section 1(2) of the 1984 Act applies. Thus German limitation law applies.

II.3 Limitation Under German Law.

I have had evidence on this issue from Professor Siehr on behalf of the plaintiffs and from Professor Brunner on behalf of Cobert. The following propositions of German law are not in dispute:-

i. The right to recovery is statute barred after a period of thirty years (Article 195 of the “BGB”).

ii. No title is transferred to the person in possession by the expiry of the limitation period of thirty years.

iii. The limitation period begins when the claim arises ( Article 198 BGB ).

iv. The thirty year period continued to apply even when the painting was outside Germany within the Soviet Union.

v. Time runs irrespective of whether the claimant is aware of the existence of the claim or the identity of his opponent.

vi. A new claim for recovery arises against each new possessor. It follows from that proposition that a new thirty year limitation period began to run each time the picture changed hands. But a succeeding possessor can take advantage of the period of time which elapsed while his predecessor was in possession pursuant to Article 221.

The legal dispute depends upon the effect of paragraph 221 BGB which provides:-

“If a thing, with regard to which a claim in rem exists, comes by succession (Rechtsnachfolge) into the possession of a third party, the time of prescription which elapsed during the time of possession by the predecessor in title is reckoned in favour of (translated before me as benefits) the successor in title.” (Articles 195, 198 and 221 of the BGB refer to “Verjährung”. This has been translated as “prescription” but has been called “limitation” in evidence before me to distinguish it from prescription in the sense of usucaption.)

If Article 221 applies, the last acquirer of possession benefits from all periods of the limitation period which have expired in the hands of his predecessors (see e.g. von Feldmann 1993 Marginal Note 2). Thus all the periods of possession which have elapsed during the period of previous possessors can be credited to Mrs Breslav (see Professor Brunner paragraph 117).

Under German law there is a basic distinction between an original acquisition of possession and a derivative acquisition of possession. Derivative possession arises where possession is obtained from a previous possessor.

Professor Siehr says that the 30 year period of limitation provided by German law has not expired for two reasons:-

(1) Article 221 has no application to a transfer from the person who may loosely be described as a bailor to a bailee. The person who in English law would be described as a bailee is regarded, under German law, as being in direct possession. The bailor is in indirect possession. When possession of the painting was handed to Mrs Dikeni by Fürst, Fürst became the indirect possessor and Mrs Dikeni the direct possessor. Article 221 has no application to that transfer.

(2) Even if, contrary to that proposition, Article 221 does have effect, it has no effect where a direct possessor misappropriates the asset. In such a case the direct possessor cannot take the benefit of any previous limitation period and cannot pass that benefit on to any successor. Thus when Mrs Dikeni, in breach of her obligation to Fürst, misappropriated the painting when she transferred it to Rohde, the art dealer in Berlin, or alternatively Rohde himself misappropriated it, time will only have started to run from the date of that misappropriation.

The Application of Article 221 to a Transfer from Bailor to Bailee

Professor Siehr’s proposition is that there is no ‘Rechtsnachfolge’ between a bailee, i.e. someone in direct possession, and a bailor (who, after transfer, is in indirect possession). This was a proposition only raised fully in a supplemental opinion delivered after the trial started. There may have been some indirect reference to the proposition in his earlier report at paragraphs 24 to 26 but his opinion previously concentrated upon the effect of a misappropriation. Professor Brunner’s view is that the distinction between possession as bailee and proprietary possession has no bearing upon the applicability of Article 221(see paragraph 108 of his report). His view is that the decisive consideration is how direct possession has been established. If direct possession was obtained by voluntary transfer then Article 221 applies (see paragraph 109). Although in cross-examination he appeared to suggest that a bailee could not rely upon Article 221, looking at his evidence as a whole and particularly his replies in re-examination I became satisfied that he had not changed his view and did not agree with Professor Siehr.

The concept of indirect possession is explained in Article 868 BGB:-

  • “If a person possesses a thing as usufructuary, pledgee, … lessee, depository or in a similar relationships by virtue of which he is as against another, entitled or obliged for a time to have possession, the other person is also a possessor” (indirect possession).”

By virtue of Article 986 the direct possessor may rely upon any rights the indirect possessor has to refuse delivery as against the owner. Article 986 (1) provides:-

“The possessor can refuse the delivery of the thing, if he, or the indirect possessor from whom his right of possession derives, is entitled to the possession as against the owner. If the indirect possessor does not have the authority as against the owner to hand over the property to the possessor, the owner may demand the delivery of the thing to the indirect possessor or, if the latter cannot or will not accept the possession again, to himself.” The proposition that a bailee cannot take advantage of Article 221 because there is no ‘Rechtsnachfolge’ between indirect and direct possessor finds support in a number of commentaries. Coing states:-

“In respect of the cases of Article 868 it will have to be taken into account that the (direct) possession obtained with the consent of the predecessor on the basis of one of the legal relationships set out in Article 868 does not exclude simultaneous (indirect possession) of the predecessor, i.e. the limitation period continues to run against the claim against the indirect possessor and that, if the indirect possessor is entitled to possession against the owner on the basis of the completion of any limitation period in his favour, also the direct possessor (the tenant, borrower, bailee etc.) may refuse the return of the object on the basis of 986 subsection (1). The application of section 221 is therefore excluded in the cases of letting agreements (Miete), leases (Pacht), loans, bailments etc.”(Marginal Note 5). (My emphasis). Further support can be found in Dilcher at paragraph 7(c) and Walter (paragraph 4) who says:-

“There is no succession into possession between the direct and the indirect possessor. Pursuant to Article 868 the indirect possession exists in parallel. However the time of possession of the indirect possessor must be taken into account for the benefit of the direct possessor insofar as the direct possessor can refuse the return of the object pursuant to Article 986 sub-paragraph (1) where the limitation period against the indirect possessor has expired.” Johanssen in his commentary on Article 221 at Marginal Number 3 may support that proposition although I have difficulty in understanding it due to problems with the translation (rechtsbeständige was originally translated as “in a valid manner” then subsequently as “non-dependent” but it is difficult to understand what is meant by “whereby proprietary possession is not necessary”). (Nobody explained to me how there could be a non-derivative possession which was not proprietary).

There are commentaries on Article 221 which take the contrary view. Peters states at Marginal Note 7:-

“The provision is applicable to the succession in relation to direct possession as well as in relation to indirect possession. If the previous direct possessor creates indirect possession by handing the object over to a third party, the previously running limitation period continues to run against him (i.e. against the previous direct and now indirect possessor), and Article 221 is applicable for the benefit of the direct possessor with the consequence that he can rely upon the period which has expired during the possession of the previous possessor, who is now the indirect possessor even if this period was itself not yet sufficient to create a limitation of the action. Article 221 remains applicable where the direct possessor creates proprietary possession (possession as an owner – Eigenbesitz).” Heinrichs states:-

“Article 221 provides that in the case of derivative change of possession the time which has expired during the possession of the predecessor benefits the successor. In the case of multiple transfers of possession the time which has expired during the possession of all predecessors benefits the last possessor (prevailing opinion)”. Von Feldmann supports that view. Some reliance was placed upon Bund and Joost in their commentaries on Article 869 but the translations are so opaque that it is difficult to understand the relevance of what they are saying to this issue.

There is no decision in a German court on this issue. A German court would not be bound by the fact that the majority of commentators took a particular view or by the most recent statement of opinions. Where, as here, the reputation of the authors cannot be impugned it would look at the quality of the arguments. I must adopt a similar approach, guided by the evidence of Professors Siehr and Brunner.

The difficulty with Professor Siehr’s views are that they were elucidated so late in the day. That is not designed as a criticism but it has led to a conflict which appears to me to be more a matter of legal theory and has little practical effect in this case. The proposition that Article 221 has no application in relation to a derivative possession is too broadly stated. Coing, on whom the plaintiffs rely states:-
“In the sense of Article 221 one will be able to speak about a “succession” where the new possessor’s possession (an amendment to the translation) is based upon a consensus with the previous possessor; this is true even in cases where the right to possession is derived from an unauthorised person, insofar as the provisions of the German civil code provide that rights can be derived from an unauthorised party.” (Marginal Note 5). Walter states:-

“Article 221 stipulates an exception from this rule for a derivative obtaining of possession by allowing the possessor to benefit from the periods of a limitation period which have expired during the possession of his predecessor. Since the successor is to take over the legal position of his predecessor this provision does not only apply to the possession of the direct predecessor.” (Marginal Note 1). As a matter of machinery it may well be that a direct possessor does not obtain the benefit of periods of limitation which have elapsed during the possession of his predecessor by virtue of Article 221 but rather by virtue of Article 986(1). The essential point is that indirect possession exists “in parallel” to direct possession. As Coing comments, the limitation period continues to run in favour of the indirect possessor (see also Peters q.v. supra). It is the indirect possessor who obtains the benefit of lapse of time by virtue of Article 221 whereas the direct possessor obtains that benefit by virtue of Article 986(1). It does not seem to me that the machinery matters. Subject to Professor Siehr’s second point in relation to Unterschlagung, whilst Mrs Dikeni was in possession as a direct possessor time continued to run in favour of her predecessor the indirect possessor Fürst. Fürst obtained the benefit of previous lapses of time through Article 221 and Mrs Dikeni by virtue of 986(1). Similarly, when the painting was transferred to Rohde subject to the effect of any misappropriation by either Mrs Dikeni or Rohde. In cross-examination (day 6 page 31 to 32 and 33 to 34 ) Professor Siehr appeared to me to accept that that was the case. He accepted that if after a thirty year period a bailment occurred, both bailee and bailor would be able to rely upon the thirty year period and that the one in direct possession could raise the same objections to a claim by the owner as the bailor; it was, as he accepted, the bailor’s limitation period which the bailee could rely upon. Professor Siehr’s first point does not assist the plaintiffs.

Subsequent Misappropriation (“Unterschlagung”) by the succeeding Possessor.

Professor Siehr is of the opinion that if a succeeding possessor, who has taken possession with the consent of his predecessor, subsequently misappropriates the object, Article 221 is not applicable. Professor Brunner takes the view that the key to the application of Article 221 is voluntary transfer of possession and subsequent misappropriation is irrelevant. Both experts agree that Article 221 is excluded where possession is acquired by unlawful interference with direct possession (Verbotene Eigenmacht) (see paragraph 100 of Professor Brunner’s report)). By paragraph 858 BGB:-

“(1) The person who against the will of the possessor deprives him of possession or interferes with his possession, acts unlawfully …

(2) Possession obtained by unlawful interference is protected. The successor in possession must admit the defect against himself …” Both agree that theft (Diebstahl) is an example of “Verbotene Eigenmacht”. The dispute centres on whether Article 221 is inapplicable where the succeeding possessor obtains possession with the consent of the preceding possessor but subsequently misappropriates the asset. The effect of a subsequent misappropriation is the subject of dispute not only between the experts but also in the commentaries on Article 221. Coing, accepted by both Professors to be of particular eminence states in his commentary to the 1957 edition of Staudinger:-

“Article 221 is not applicable where there is an original acquisition of possession by the succeeding possessor e.g. in the case of prescription, occupation, robbery or theft (Diebstahl). Pursuant to the purpose of the provision its application is also excluded where the possession of the succeeding possessor may have come about with the consent of the preceding possessor but its continuation is based upon a tort (misappropriation (Unterschlagung)) of the succeeding possessor” (Marginal Note 5). Succeeding commentators have either omitted to deal with the question or have disagreed. Dilcher in his commentary in 1980 in the 12th edition of Staudinger says:-

“There is no possessory succession where the possession is acquired unlawfully; otherwise the tortious act would be benefited by the possessory succession pursuant to Article 221″. Peters in the 13th edition makes no specific reference to this point but relies upon Article 858 in support of the proposition that Article 221 has no application where the obtaining of possession is without the consent of the previous possessor. The last sentence of Marginal Note 7 (q.v. supra) seems to favour Professor Brunner’s view.

Walter confirms that Article 221 is not applicable where the original acquisition was unlawful (Verbotene Eigenmacht) and records Coing’s commentary which I have already cited. He makes no comment upon Coing (no weight can be placed upon his use of the word “however” which precedes his reference to Coing; it is unlikely to have been an accurate translation).

It is von Feldmann’s Munich commentary (3rd Edn. 1993) which provides the strongest support for Professor Brunner’s view:-

“On the other hand the expiry of the limitation period is not affected where the succeeding possessor, who has obtained possession in accordance with the will of his predecessor, subsequently misappropriates (unterschlägt) the object or continues his possession based upon another tort, regardless of the fact that a different provision would be extremely unpracticable due to the practical difficulty of determining the exact point in time (of the intentions of the misappropriating party) and it would also not be justifiable to restart the limitation period merely upon a change of possession based upon consensus.” There is no preponderance of reasoned views which contradict those expressed by Coing. My conclusion must be based on my judgment of the cogency of the arguments advanced by the experts and the commentaries upon which they rely.

Despite the need for judicial comity the justification of von Feldmann (a judge) for the view that subsequent misappropriation has no effect on the application of Article 221 seems to me unpersuasive. He speaks of the practical difficulty of determining the exact point in time when one in possession forms the intention to misappropriate. That change of intention is, in law, decisive (see Professor Brunner paragraph 105). If during the course of a bailment a bailee intends to keep the object for himself he becomes a proprietary possessor. Whilst that may be the position in law, as a matter of evidence that change of intention will not be manifest until the bailee does an act inconsistent with the terms of the bailment. In other words, whilst legally the nature of the possession changes at the moment the intention is changed, in reality that change of intention can only be identified when there is some outward manifestation of the change. Professor Brunner agreed that some manifestation would be needed in order to be able to say there had been a misappropriation (day 6 page 48). It does not seem to me that there is any practical difficulty in determining the time of misappropriation when absent some observable act of misappropriation, a change of mind will never be revealed.

Professor Brunner relied upon the importance of a third party being able to rely upon the outward appearance of legality. The justification for the rule that Article 221 applies despite a misappropriation is said to be protection of an innocent third party who should be able to rely upon the outward appearance of the lawful nature of the transaction. I did not find this a persuasive rationale for the distinction between theft and misappropriation. An innocent third party is just as likely to be duped by one who has misappropriated property as by the thief. Neither are likely to reveal their dishonesty. A third party is no more likely to be able to discover a misappropriation than a theft.

Dilcher’s justification for the rule that there is no possessory succession where the possession is acquiredunlawfully namely that a tortious act should not have the benefit of Article 221 applies, it seems to me, with equal force to misappropriation. (see Professor’s Siehr’s Supplemental Opinion paragraph 3(b)).

Mr Brindle QC relies upon the very concept of unlawful interference (Verbotene Eigenmacht) as providing the key to the problem. One who has obtained possession by consent cannot commit an unlawful interference in relation to the indirect possessor (Professor Brunner paragraph 109). Professor Brunner’s view relies upon the commentaries to which I have already referred (paragraphs 113 to 116). In my judgment none of the commentaries provide a convincing rebuttal of Coing’s views. Once misappropriation has occurred the nature of possession changes; it is a proprietary possession. In such circumstances it does not seem to me rational that a direct possessor who changes the nature of his possession by misappropriation should be able to pass to a transferee the benefit of the limitation period which elapsed during the time he was a direct but not a proprietary possessor. It seems to me logical that the chain of non-proprietary possession has been broken. Accordingly, on this point, I accept Professor Siehr’s view based upon the commentary of Coing. That is not to say that no benefit of lapse of time will pass to the transferee. The transferee will obtain, by virtue of Article 221, the benefit of such time which has elapsed whilst the object was in the possession of the transferor who was guilty of misappropriation (see Professor Siehr day 6 page 10). The transferee will not obtain the benefit of any lapse of time prior to the misappropriation.

In those circumstances I conclude that the German limitation period had not expired at the time proceedings were commenced by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1997 or the City of Gotha in 1993. The period started to run either when Mrs Dikeni misappropriated the painting in 1987 or when, in that year, it was misappropriated by Rohde. The plaintiffs’ claim does not fail by reason of the operation of the thirty year German limitation period.
Notes (GD)
J. von Staudingers Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, Berlin. Quotations relate to the commentary on § 221 BGB by Coing (10th ed. 1957), Dilcher (12th ed. 1980) and Peters (13th ed.).
Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, Vol. I, 3rd ed. München 1993.
Palandt, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, München (edition and year not specified, presumably 57th ed. München 1998).

II.4 Public Policy

Had I concluded that the plaintiffs’ claim was barred under German Law, it would have been necessary to consider whether that law conflicted with English public policy. I set out my conclusions on that issue; it may provide a framework for further debate and I make further findings of fact relevant to that issue.

Section 2(1) of the Foreign Limitation Periods Act l984 provides:-

“(1) In any case in which the application of section 1 above would to any extent conflict (whether under sub section (2) below or otherwise) with public policy, that section shall not apply to the extent that its application would so conflict.

(2) The application of section 1 above in relation to any action or proceedings shall conflict with public policy to the extent that its application would cause undue hardship to a person who is, or might be made, a party to the action or proceedings.” The plaintiffs contend that if the German limitation period has expired it should be disapplied pursuant to section 2(1) because it conflicts with English public policy. I shall determine whether to disapply the German limitation period according to the following principles.

(1) Public policy should be invoked for the purposes of disapplying a foreign limitation period only in exceptional circumstances. Too ready a resort to public policy would frustrate our system of private international law which “exists to fulfil foreign rights not destroy them” (see Law Commission Report No 114 3.2(ii), 4.35, and Evans J in Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim [1993] 1 Lloyds Rep. 543 at 592 (referring to the Law Commission’s view that it should only apply “in most unusual circumstances” (paragraph 4.39)).

(2) Foreign law should only be disapplied where that law is contrary to a “fundamental principle of justice”. (see Law Commission Report No. 114 4.43 and 4.44). In The Estate of Fuld, decd. (No. 3) [1968] P. 675 Scarman J said:-

“an English court will refuse to apply a law which outrages its sense of justice or decency” (698). In Oppenheimer v. Cattermole [1976] AC 249 the House of Lords refused to recognise racially discriminatory legislation on the grounds of public policy; so too our courts would refuse to recognise discriminatory limitation law.

(3) The fundamental principle of justice with which it is said foreign law conflicts must be clearly identifiable. The process of identification must not depend upon a judge’s individual notion of expediency or fairness but upon the possibility of recognising with clarity a principle derived from our own law of limitation or some other clearly recognised general principle of public policy (see paragraphs 4.35 and 4.45 of Law Commission Report No 114).

English courts should not invoke public policy save in cases where foreign law is manifestly incompatible with public policy. The Law Commission expected that that approach would be adopted and thus did not recommend the use of the word “manifestly” in its proposed Bill. (Paragraph 4.38).

(4) The English law of limitation serves the purpose of providing protection for defendants from stale claims, encouraging claimants to institute proceedings without unreasonable delay and conferring on a potential defendant confidence that after the lapse of a specific period of time he will not face a claim (Paragraph 4.44 of Law Commission Report 114).

(5) A foreign limitation period will not be disapplied as being contrary to public policy merely because it is less generous than the comparable English provision (see Durham v. T & N PLC and others (unreported decision of the Court of Appeal dated 1st May 1996 per Sir Thomas Bingham MR at page 12)). Some reason other than mere length must be identified for invoking public policy (see Law Commission Report 114 Paragraph 4.46).

The plaintiffs rely upon the fact that under German law no account is taken of the plaintiffs’ state of knowledge, no account is taken of the fact that the painting was stolen, the defendants were not bona fide purchasers and the defendants were guilty of deliberately and unconscionably concealing Cobert’s identity and address.

It is true that there are special rules whereby time does not begin to run in English law until relevant facts could have reasonably been discovered. But those rules only apply in respect of actions for personal injuries (Sections 11 to 14), in respect of latent damage (Section 14(a)), in respect of disability (Section 28), and where there has been fraud or deliberate concealment by the defendant or the action is for relief from the consequences of a mistake (Section 32). It seems to me that the proposition that a foreign limitation period which fails to take account of a plaintiff’s state of knowledge is likely to be contrary to public policy is too broad. If a foreign limitation period relevant to, for example, a personal injury action takes no account of a plaintiff’s state of knowledge that arguably would be contrary to our public policy or at least cause a plaintiff undue hardship and thus conflict with English public policy (see per Sir Thomas Bingham MR in Durham (q.v. supra pages 11 to 12). Our law in respect of latent damage affords another example. Prior to The Latent Damage Act 1986 the law that time started to run when damage came into existence was described as “unjustifiable in principle” and “harsh and absurd” (see Pirelli General Cable Works Ltd. v. Oscar Faber & Partners[1983] 2 AC 1 at 19F).

It is said that it would be contrary to public policy to apply a German limitation period when Cobert deliberately and unconscionably concealed facts relevant to the plaintiffs’ claim. The plaintiffs rely upon the fact that Cobert through Mr Montgomery had been told by Mina Breslav that the painting had disappeared from Gotha (see Mina Breslav paragraph 26). Mr Montgomery knew, at least by November 1991, that the painting had been stolen because that is what he told Mr Feigen an art dealer in New York (see Feigen paragraph 4). Mr Montgomery told him that he believed that the statute of limitations had run out in Russia and Germany and would run out in the United Kingdom in approximately two years from the time of their meeting. (see Feigen paragraph 5). When the City of Gotha was contacted by Sotheby’s by letter on 16th December 1991 they were told that Sotheby’s had been commissioned by a third party to auction the painting. Sotheby’s recorded that the painting was listed as lost and stated that it was their policy not to auction objects without first offering them to the previous owner. They made an offer to sell the painting for £700,000 left open until 15 January 1992. Despite requests for the identity of Cobert twice in April 1992 and twice in June 1992, its identity was not disclosed until 19th June 1992 and the address was not disclosed until 16 July 1992. When the painting appeared in Sotheby’s catalogue in April 1992 no reference was made to the theft of which Mr Montgomery had spoken to Mr Feigen back in November 1991. I record these facts not in any criticism of Sotheby’s, which has not appeared, but of Cobert who through Mr Montgomery had stated that the painting had been stolen back in November 1991 but subsequently asserted that it was a gift.

Mr Brindle QC, on behalf of Cobert, contends that any deliberate concealment by Cobert has no relevance to the fact that under German law the limitation period had expired. It had expired long before Cobert acquired the painting.

By Section 32:-

“(1) Subject to subsections (3) and (4A) below, where in the case of any action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act, either

… (b) any fact relevant to the plaintiff’s right of action has been deliberately concealed from him by the defendant; …the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the … concealment … or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it. References in this subsection to the defendant include references to the defendant’s agent ….” In my judgment Cobert did deliberately conceal facts relevant to the plaintiffs’ right of action. It concealed its identity, address, its knowledge of the loss of the painting in l989 when the painting was acquired, and its knowledge of the theft, exposed by the evidence of Feigen in November 1991. In Sheldon v. R.H.M. Outhwaite (Underwriting Agencies) Ltd [1996] 1 AC 102 the House of Lords ruled that the words of Section 32(1)(b) of the 1980 Act applied where the concealment relevant to the facts occurred after the accrual of the cause of action, even if that concealment occurred after the period of limitation had elapsed. In the course of his speech Lord Keith pointed out that a construction which led to the conclusion that the concealment must be contemporaneous with the accrual of the cause of action would mean:-

“concealment occurring one month or even one day, after the accrual would afford the plaintiff no protection at all. Perhaps a more cogent argument against the construction is that if it is correct even a concealment taking place more than six years after accrual of the cause of action would bring section 32(1) into play. But that is not a realistic objection, since it is not conceivable that a potential defendant would set out to conceal facts relevant to a cause of action when more than six years had elapsed since its accrual.” Yet it is that inconceivable event which has occurred in this case; Cobert set out to conceal facts long after the time when it believed the German limitation period had elapsed.

Lord Browne-Wilkinson identified the underlying rationale as being that the defendants should not be entitled:-

“to benefit from their own alleged unconscionable behaviour by deliberately concealing the facts relevant to the plaintiffs’ cause of action.” (145H). Lord Nichols thought that both arguments produced unattractive alternatives.

“If initial concealment should stop time running so equally should subsequent concealment. The underlying mischief is the same.” (152E) But he pointed out the absurdities of the contrary argument that:-

“The statutory consequence of concealment is to deprive the defendant of the benefit of time, however short or long, which has already run in his favour before there is any question of concealment”. He concluded that, forced to make a choice, he should adopt the approach of Lord Keith and Lord Browne-Wilkinson. (155A to B).

English law, therefore, provides that time will not run in favour of a defendant who is guilty of deliberate concealment whenever that deliberate concealment takes place until the plaintiff has discovered the concealment or could with reasonable diligence have done so.

Notwithstanding the decision in Sheldon, I do not think that it is possible to identify with sufficient clarity a public policy which deprives a defendant of the benefit of time which has already run in his favour before he is guilty of deliberate concealment. Accordingly, it is not possible to disapply a foreign law of limitation merely because that foreign law does not recognise the same consequences of concealment as those which the House of Lords has recognised to be the consequences of Section 32(1)(b). It may be that one can discern a public policy that a defendant should not be entitled to obtain the benefit of deliberate concealment where that concealment has resulted in an action becoming time barred. But a foreign law which ignores deliberate concealment which has no causative effect upon the expiry of a period of limitation does not seem to me to conflict with any fundamental principle of justice. The decision in Sheldonwas, in my view, a decision dictated by the wording of the statute and resulted from a process of construction of that statute.

The plaintiffs also rely upon the fact that the painting was stolen from its rightful owner and that the current possessor, Cobert, does not even assert that it or that any of its predecessors purchased the painting in good faith or that Cobert has title to the painting. If English limitation law applied, this action would not be subject to the time limits under section 2 and section 3 of the Limitation Act 1980. Section 4 provides:-

“(1) The right of any person from whom a chattel is stolen to bring an action in respect of the theft shall not be subject to the time limits under sections 2 and 3(1) of this Act, but if his title to the chattel is extinguished under section 3(2) of this Act he may not bring an action in respect of a theft preceding the loss of his title, unless the theft in question preceded the conversion from which time began to run for the purposes of section 3(2).

(2) Subsection (1) above shall apply to any conversion related to the theft of a chattel as it applies to the theft of a chattel; and except as provided below, every conversion following the theft of a chattel before the person from whom it is stolen recovers possession of it shall be regarded for the purposes of this section as related to the theft.

If anyone purchases the stolen chattel in good faith neither the purchase nor any conversion following it shall be regarded as related to the theft.

(3) Any cause of action accruing in respect of the theft or any conversion related to the theft of a chattel to any person from whom the chattel is stolen shall be disregarded for the purpose of applying section 3(1) or (2) of this Act to his case.

(4) Where in any action brought in respect of the conversion of a chattel it is proved that the chattel was stolen from the plaintiff or anyone through whom he claims it shall be presumed that any conversion following the theft is related the theft unless the contrary is shown.

(5) In this section “theft” includes:-

(a) any conduct outside England and Wales which would be theft if committed in England and Wales; and references in this section to a chattel being “stolen” shall be construed accordingly.”
The conversion in this case followed the theft and was, therefore, “related to the theft” for the purposes of Section 4.

It does seem to me possible to identify, from that legislation, a public policy in England that time is not to run either in favour of the thief nor in favour of any transferee who is not a purchaser in good faith. The law favours the true owner of property which has been stolen, however long the period which has elapsed since the original theft. If German limitation law is not disapplied the result will be to favour a purchaser with no title to the painting who does not even contend that it or its predecessors purchased the painting in good faith. To permit a party which admits it has not acted in good faith to retain the advantage of lapse of time during which the plaintiffs had no knowledge of the whereabouts of the painting and no possibility of recovering it, is, in my judgment, contrary to the public policy which finds statutory expression in Section 4. To allow Cobert to succeed, when, on its own admission it knew or suspected that the painting might be stolen or that there was something wrong with the transaction or acted in a manner in which an honest man would not, does touch the conscience of the court. Moreover, to recognise such a public policy does not in any way undermine the purposes of a law of limitation; there is no reason why a defendant in the position of Cobert should be protected from this claim nor does the recognition of such a public policy discourage claimants from instituting proceedings without unreasonable delay. I can discern no conflict with the essential public interest in a law of limitation by recognising that the victim of a theft who had no opportunity of bring the claim earlier should be entitled to assert his rights however long the time which has elapsed since the original theft. It is true, as Mr Brindle QC submits, that rather than providing that no limitation period will apply where an action is brought in respect of a stolen chattel, German law provides a lengthy period of limitation. But that consideration seemed to me to be insufficient to subordinate the rights of the victim of the theft in favour of one who has acted without good faith. Nor does it seem to me to matter that the plaintiff in this case is the Federal Republic of Germany, whose own laws it is seeking to disapply. It does not seem to me that the question whether a foreign law should be disapplied on grounds of English public policy can depend upon the nature of the plaintiff seeking to disapply that law. I should, however, make it clear that if the victim of the theft had itself delayed once it had discovered the facts relevant to its cause of action that might well be a ground for not disapplying the foreign law. (see Law Commission Report No 114 paragraph 4.47)

The Federal Republic of Germany has not been guilty of “forum-shopping”. It had no control whatever as to where it could bring its action; it was Cobert which chose to buy the painting in England and convert it here.

I should emphasise that my view as to public policy is not founded upon the fact that the chattel in question is a painting which had been on public display in Gotha since the second half of the 19th century. There has been some debate, instigated I fear in part, by my own observations, as to public policy in relation to stolen works of art. I have been referred in relation to public collections of art to Council Directive 93/7/EEC of 15th March 1993 on “the Return of Cultural Objects Unlawfully Removed from the Territory of a Member State.” Article 7 provides a time limit of thirty years after the object was unlawfully removed in which to bring proceedings, a period extended to seventy-five years in the case of objects forming part of public collections. The Directive and in particular Article 7 has been given legislative force in this country in the Return of Cultural Objects Regulations 1994 (SI 1994 No 501) but it is to be noted that the Regulations apply only to cultural objects unlawfully removed from a territory of the Member State on or after 1st January 1993 (see Regulation 1(3)). This country did not give retrospective effect to the regulations as it would have been entitled to do under Article 14.2 of the Directive. I cannot identify from those Regulations any public policy in relation to a painting stolen after the war. Moreover, attractive though it would be to apply some special consideration to a work of art when there exists a possibility of it being displayed, once again, to public view such a consideration should not weigh with me at all. If I had allowed those circumstances to prevail, my observations would have to be numbered amongst “the idiosyncratic inferences of a few judicial minds” (see the unattributed quotation in “The Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984″ PB Carter (1985) 101 LQR 68 at 71).

The plaintiffs rely also upon Section 2(2) of the 1984 Act contending that they would be caused undue hardship if German limitation law was applied. In Jones v. Trollope Colls Cementation Overseas Ltd (Times Law Reports 26 January 1990). Farquharson LJ said that:-

“the word undue added something more than just hardship. It meant excessive or greater hardship than the circumstances warranted.” In AMF v. Hashim (q.v. supra) Evans J emphasised that the provision was intended to have a narrow application (page 592). Moreover he said:-

“It cannot be said that the three year period for claims of this sort (under Gulf law) is so short that the plaintiffs suffer undue hardship merely by reason of the fact that it is imposed. There must be some additional factors which make the hardship excessive in this case” That additional factor might have arisen if the plaintiffs had been defeated because of transitional provisions which were not easy to apply (see page 593 and Saville L.J. in the Court of Appeal at page 600). In the instant case the additional circumstance upon which reliance is placed over and above the mere impact of a limitation period of thirty years, is that the plaintiffs were the victims of theft and between that theft and 1991, they had no means of discovering the facts which would have enabled them to identify the possessor of the painting and its whereabouts. But it is difficult to see how that additional fact would justify invoking Section 2(2) in circumstances where Section 2(1) did not apply. Either the public policy which I have already identified exists or it does not. If it does not, then all the plaintiffs are, in essence, complaining about is the length of the German limitation period. That by itself is not enough, and in those circumstances had I not been prepared to disapply German law under Section 2(1), I would not have done so under Section 2(2).

Conclusions

This judgment would remain incomplete without a proper tribute to the skill and industry of all counsel involved, ably supported as they were by other members of their respective ateliers, particularly Pamela Kiesselbach, solicitor for Cobert and Dr Michael Carl, solicitor for the plaintiffs. Their submissions, translations and guidance through unfamiliar territory shone as if they had been painted on copper.

For the reasons I have given I conclude that:-

I.1 The painting was taken from Thüringia in January 1946;

I.2 Title passed to the Land Thüringia by virtue of the law of 9 October 1945, the expropriatory effect of which was not repealed by the law of 4 December 1945;

I.3 Had not title passed in 1945 it would have passed to the Land by virtue of the dissolution of The Art Foundation on 14 October 1950;

I.4 English Courts will recognise and enforce the Federal Republic of Germany’s title to the painting whether derived from the law of October 1945 or the dissolution in 1950;

I.5 It has not been proved that the painting entered the territory of the German Democratic Republic in 1987;

I.6 The City of Gotha cannot claim possession to the painting;

II.1 The painting was misappropriated in 1987;

II.2 The German law limitation period is relevant;

II.3 The claim is not statute barred under German Law;

II.4 Had the claim been time-barred, German law conflicts with public policy.
In her monograph and catalogue raisonné “Wtewael and Dutch Mannerism” published in 1986, Dr Anne Lowenthal recorded that between 1975 and 1986 eighteen paintings by Wtewael had been recovered from obscurity. She foresaw that more would appear. She recorded that the location of the painting of The Holy Family was unknown. That is no longer correct. For the time being putti blush unseen within an envelope in an office at Sotheby’s (where I had the privilege of a judicial peep). Whether my conclusions will result in a greater opportunity for those who enjoy Dutch mannerism or wish to cultivate their antipathies, others will have to decide.
Note (GD)
Fuld is the rare example of a case for which both German and English judgments have been reported each. The German decisions in the Fuldcase are OLG Frankfurt 22.9.1965, IPRspr. 1966/67 Nr. 168a p. 530 and and BGH 19.6.1967, IPRspr. 1966/67 Nr. 168b p. 537.

Notes © 1999 by Gerhard Dannemann

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ZfJ 84 no. 11/97 p.433 | OLG Hamm Judgment of 20th November 1996 – 11 U 61/9

This case is first published in the German Law Archive courtesy of: Translated German Cases and Materials Under the direction of Professors P. Schlechtriem, B. Markesinis and S. Lorenz

Translated by Mr Raymond Youngs, Southampton Institute


Facts:

K was born in February 1976. The plaintiff was her mother and the sole person entitled to look after her.

In November 1992 K presented herself at the Youth Welfare Department of the defendant district and told them about recent domestic difficulties with the plaintiff. (K had already been accommodated for a time by the Youth Welfare Department in the children’s home B in M, in early 1991). She explained to the officer in charge, Me, that she could not stand things at home any more. She refused a mediation interview with the plaintiff. But K and the plaintiff had a conversation of at least one and a half hours on the morning of the 17th November 1992. Me was present for part of the time. No settlement was reached.

The Youth Welfare Department applied to the Guardianship Court C, which arranged a hearing on the afternoon of the 17th November 1992. K was heard first, and she repeated to the judge her statements contained in the report of the Youth Welfare Department, and said she did not want to go back home. Then the plaintiff was heard. The Guardianship Court tried to arrange a settlement between K and the plaintiff, but failed. It made a temporary order taking away the plaintiff’s right to determine K’s place of residence, and transferring this to the Youth Welfare Department as guardian.

K was then accommodated by the Youth Welfare Department at first in the Youth Protection Centre in D and from the 10th December 1992 in the children’s home B in M. On the 5th September 1993 K left the home of her own accord and returned to the plaintiff.

On the 27th September 1993 the Guardianship Court transferred full custody rights back to the plaintiff. But because of a new argument, the plaintiff finally excluded K from home on the 11th November 1993. The two have since lived separately from one another.

The plaintiff lodged a complaint against the decision of the Guardianship Court. This was rejected by the Landgericht M on the 2nd July 1993 because K’s wish not to return home had to be respected.

The plaintiff claimed compensation from the defendant district including damages for distress because the Youth Welfare Department deprived her of K in a manner contrary to their official duty.

The action and the appeal were unsuccessful.

Reasons:

The prerequisites for a claim for official liability under §§ 839 and 847 of the BGB in combination with Art 34 of the GG, which is the only for basis a claim to be considered here, are not present.

I. The work and tasks of youth assistance – and along with this the official duties of the Youth Welfare Department – arise from § 2 of the KJHG. This work includes amongst other things educational assistance and supplementary services (§§ 2 (2) nos. 4, 27-37, 39 and 40 KJHG), and the other tasks include amongst other things taking children and young people into care (§§ 2 (3) Nos. 1 and 42 KJHG SGB VIII).

On this basis, the Youth Welfare Department of the defendant district has not violated any official duties which could be the cause of the plaintiff’s alleged harm.

1. The decision of the Youth Welfare Department to take K into care on the 16th November 1992 and to seek a decision of the Guardianship Court on the 17th November 1992 was in accordance with their official duty.

a) According to § 42 (2) of the KJHG the Youth Welfare Department is under a duty to take a young person into care if he or she asks for this. It has to inform the person having custody about the taking into care without delay.

These prerequisites are fulfilled in the present case. K asked to be taken into care by the Youth Welfare Department of the defendant district on the 16th November as a so-called “voluntary admission”. The duty of the Youth Welfare Department to take into care applies without any limitation, regardless of the grounds on which the young person asks for care and of whether these grounds are convincing; the requirements to be placed on the content of these grounds must not be too high [references omitted].

The plaintiff as the person having custody had unquestionably been notified of the taking into care, and in this connection it does not matter for the purpose of the decision whether this notification was based on her own initiative or on that of the Youth Welfare Department.

b) According to § 42 (2) sentence 3 of the KJHG the Youth Welfare Department must, if the person having custody challenges the taking into care, either hand the young person over to the person having custody (option 1) or obtain a decision by the Guardianship Court about the necessary measures for the welfare of the young person (option 2). These steps must take place without delay.

aa) Unquestionably, the plaintiff challenged the taking into care in the conversation on the morning of the 17th November 1992. She accuses the Youth Welfare Department of not having kept the appointment arranged at 12 o’clock for the continuation of the discussion, but it is not evident that this would have made a difference in the context of the plaintiff’s challenge. On the evidence of the memorandum of the hearing before the Guardianship Court, the plaintiff still stated to the court that she did not agree with the taking into care – at any rate not unconditionally.

bb) In this situation, the Youth Welfare Department was under a duty to make an “immediate” decision. No objection can be raised to the fact that it chose, out of the two alternatives to be considered, not to hand K over to the plaintiff, but to invoke the Guardianship Court. This was in accordance with their official duty.

In the literature [reference omitted] the view is taken that when a person having custody challenges a taking into care, the Youth Welfare Department is always obliged to bring in the Guardianship Court even if the Department considers there is no danger to the child’s welfare. According to another view [reference omitted] the Youth Welfare Department only needs to obtain a decision of the Guardianship Court (and also must, without there being any discretion) if the welfare of the young person is endangered. Both opinions lead here to the same conclusion.

In making its decision, the Youth Welfare Department could (and had to) take into account that help for K’s upbringing had already been necessary (in January / February 1991), that there were unquestionably school, alcohol and drug problems and that again K absolutely refused to go back home. As K was at that time already nearly 17 years old, the Youth Welfare Department could take this refusal seriously.

Assuming a danger to the child’s welfare in this situation, and bringing in the Guardianship Court, were not contrary to the Youth Welfare Department’s official duty. It could regard the decisions of the Guardianship Court and of the Landgericht based on §§ 1666 and 1666a of the BGB (endangering of child’s welfare) as retrospectively confirming this assumption. The urgency of the measures to be taken by the Youth Welfare Department also did not permit – contrary to the view of the plaintiff – the making of further enquiries, in particular the hearing of the witnesses who were later heard by the Guardianship Court. The necessary elucidation of the matter was ensured because the Guardianship Court was under a duty to investigate of its own motion (§ 12 of the FGG).

2. The Youth Welfare Department would certainly have acted contrary to its official duty if it had “wangled” the right to determine K’s accommodation by – as the plaintiff claims – influencing K by insinuation to make untrue statements to the Guardianship Court.

But the plaintiff has not substantiated this sweeping accusation in any greater detail, either in writing or at her examination in accordance with § 141 of the Civil Procedure Code at the Senate’s hearing; so taking evidence did need to be considered here. The plaintiff has merely asserted that the Youth Welfare Department stated to K that she must only stick to her point of view and say that she did not want to return home in any circumstances. The Senate cannot see any improper influencing of K in this.

The decision of the Guardianship Court is based in substance on K’s wish, as stated to it, that she did not want to go back home. This stated wish was not however inconsistent with the truth.

The plaintiff herself admitted on her personal examination before the Senate that K, at the point in time in question, did not in fact want to go back home and that even in the conversation on the morning of the 17th November 1992 there were no prospects of this. Moreover, K stated this wish approximately eight months later to the Complaints Chamber of the Landgericht. There is no allegation that the facts of the case were presented to the Guardianship Court in some other way which was inconsistent with the truth and based on improper influence by the Youth Welfare Department.

3. The Youth Welfare Department has also not violated its official duties by accommodating K after the decision of the Guardianship Court, at first in the Youth Protection Centre Ka in D and afterwards in the children’s home B in M.

a) On the basis of the decision of the Guardianship Court, the right to determine K’s place of residence was provisionally transferred to the Youth Welfare Department as guardian (§§ 1631 (1), 1666 and 1666a of the BGB). The Youth Welfare Department could therefore decide on K’s place of residence without the agreement of the plaintiff [reference omitted]. The right to determine a place of residence also includes the authority to exercise care of the person concerned to the extent necessary for a parent. This includes entrusting the person to a family or – as here – the houseparents in a home. This authority is part of the right to determine the place of residence.

b) Besides this, the plaintiff shows no alternative to accommodation in a home – which was in any case only provisional for the period of the temporary order – especially as she and K could not agree at the hearing before the Guardianship Court on accommodation with another appropriate care person. Accommodation with the plaintiff herself was out of the question as a serious alternative after the Guardianship Court had just taken this aspect of guardianship away from her.

4. Finally it cannot be established that the Youth Welfare Department violated its official duty just because it did not, following the decision of the Guardianship Court, provide any services – additionally to accommodation in the home – under § 2 (2) of the KJHG.

a) In this connection, the Senate can leave open the question of whether the Youth Welfare Department, under the given circumstances of the plaintiff, ought to have offered such services, namely educational assistance (§ 27 of the KJHG) educational advice (§ 28 of the KJHG) or socio-pedagogical family assistance (§ 31 of the KJHG). The Senate can therefore also leave open the question of whether it was due to lack of readiness on the part of the Youth Welfare Department or on the part of the plaintiff that this did not occur; even at the Senate hearing this could not be resolved by examination of the parties on both sides.

b) But this does not need to be resolved in order to decide the legal dispute; that is why it is not necessary to go into the question of whether the memoranda submitted by the defendant district were – as the plaintiff asserts – made out after the event or not. Because even if the Youth Welfare Department breached its duty in not offering to the plaintiff and K services in accordance with § 2 (2) of the KJHG, it cannot be established within the framework of the necessary examination of causality that matters would then have taken such a course that the harm which is the subject of the plaintiff’s claim would not have arisen.

aa) Even according to the plaintiff’s own allegation, no sufficient grounds were present for saying that if services under § 2 (2) of the KJHG had been obtained the relationship between the plaintiff and K would have improved. The plaintiff herself described K as a “very egocentric girl with a very strongly demanding nature”. K’s behaviour, in so far as this is of importance for the resolution of the legal dispute, confirms the plaintiff’s own assessment. Within the framework of § 287 of the Civil Procedure Code, which is to be applied here, success from services under § 2 (2) of the KJHG cannot in any case be established or even assumed; demonstrating this is the responsibility of the plaintiff who is under a duty of explanation and proof in respect of causality.

bb) Even if a different view is taken, there is nothing to indicate within the framework of § 287 of the Civil Procedure Code that services under § 2 (2) of the KJHG would have succeeded so quickly that the harm which is the subject of the plaintiff’s claim would thereby have been avoided or at least reduced; demonstrating this also falls to the plaintiff who is under a duty of explanation and proof in respect of it.

The harm to her reputation which the plaintiff asserts – and the sale of her house in H associated with this – is based only on the taking into care under § 42 (2) of the KJHG, the ensuing deprivation of the right to determine the place of residence by the Guardianship Court and the subsequent accommodation of K in the Youth Protection Centre Ka and in the children’s home B. Even the legal costs and the costs of visits and telephone calls arose exclusively in connection with the taking into care, the deprivation of the right of determination of the place of residence and the accommodation. This harm would therefore also not have been avoided by additional services by the Youth Welfare Department under § 2 (2) of the KJHG. The same applies for the impairment which the plaintiff claimed occurred to her health. Apart from the fact that, according to the statements of the plaintiff to the expert D, this impairment must for the most part have existed previously, there is nothing to indicate that it would have been avoided or even significantly reduced by services by the Youth Welfare Department under § 2 (2) of the KJHG.

© 1989 University of Oxford. Since 2002: © Translation The University of Oxford and Professor Markesinis 1999. HTML edition by Lawrence Schäfer. © 1999 Gerhard Dannemann.

OLG Hamm FamRZ 1993, 704

This case is first published in the German Law Archive courtesy of: Translated German Cases and Materials Under the direction of Professors P. Schlechtriem, B. Markesinis and S. Lorenz

Translated by Mr Raymond Youngs, Southampton Institute (Submitted by Judge Müller, OLG Hamm)

Facts:

The plaintiff married couple and their adopted son, the former third plaintiff, sought compensation from the defendant town because of violation of official duty in connection with an adoption placement.


Grounds

The appeal of the defendant is permissible, but unsuccessful.

I.

The Landgericht was correct in accepting the plaintiffs’ claims for official liability against the defendant on the basis of § 839 of the BGB in combination with Art 34 of the GG and allowed the demands for payment and a declaration.

1. The appropriate officials who were involved in preparing and carrying out an adoption by the plaintiffs have negligently violated their official duties owed to the plaintiffs by not informing them that there was a suspicion that the child N, who was very disturbed, was mentally retarded.

a) It is necessary to proceed on the basis that the actions of the Youth Welfare Department in the area of adoption placement, even according to the legal situation in the years 1981 to 1983 (which is the relevant period here), are the exercise of public office in the sense of Art 34 of the GG [reference omitted]. Action in exercise of public office occurs if the real objective in the context of which the official is acting is part of the area of sovereign activity of a public body. There must also be an internal and external connection between this objective and the act (or omission) which causes the damage, so that the act (or omission) must also be regarded as belonging to this area of sovereign activity [reference omitted]. Such a connection exists for the actions of the Youth Welfare Department in the framework of adoption placement. According to § 2 (1) sentence 1 of the Adoption Placement Act in its 2nd July 1976 version [reference omitted] adoption placement is a task for the Youth Welfare Department (and for the State (Land) Youth Welfare Department). Adoption placement is bringing together children under the age of majority and persons who want to adopt a child (adoption applicants) with the object of adopting it as well as providing the evidence of adoption (§ 1 of the Adoption Placement Act). Leaving exceptions aside, the Youth Welfare Departments who have set up an Adoption Placement Office and the State Youth Welfare Departments have a placement monopoly (§§ 2 (1) sentence 2 and 5 (1) of the Adoption Placement Act). The actions of the Youth Welfare Department in the area of adoption placement are accordingly a public task, the purpose of which is to find appropriate and suitable parents who are prepared to adopt for a child who does not have the care of its natural parents. These actions are therefore to assist the young.

b) The employees of the Youth Welfare Department of the defendant acted contrary to their official duty because they neglected to inform the plaintiffs as adoption applicants about the suspicion of mental retardation due to brain damage which was known to them and not dispelled. The content and scope of the official duties of a public employee are determined by the provisions regulating the area of his tasks and duties, whether they are statutes, regulations, administrative provisions or individual directions in the context of employment; and from the kind of tasks to be carried out [reference omitted]. The duty to inform the plaintiffs about the suspicion which existed arose in the present case from the kind of tasks to be carried out by the officials within the framework of the adoption placement.

The Adoption Placement Act itself admittedly contains no express regulations which make it a duty of the Adoption Placement Office to inform the adoption applicants about the state of health of the child to be adopted. However, according to § 7 (1) sentence 1 of the Adoption Placement Act, the Adoption Placement Office must make without delay the enquiries which are necessary for preparing for a placement, and these must also extend to the state of health of the child. Admittedly the implementation regulations provided for in § 7 (2) of the Adoption Placement Act have not so far been made. But the Working Group of the State Youth Welfare Departments has worked out guidelines which at that time applied in the version of the 3rd edition of 1966 and which provided in para 2.22 that the physical as well as the mental and psychological state of health of the child was to be ascertained by a doctor experienced in these areas – if possible a paediatrician or a psychiatrist specialising in the young. Further, it says in para 2.23 (1) that an investigation by a specialist, if necessary even in-patient observation, was to be arranged if inquiries revealed that the child has educational difficulties, suspicion of illness or unexplained abnormalities. Even if these guidelines (which were replaced in the meantime by the “Recommendations of the Federal Working Group of State Youth Welfare Departments and Non-local Education Committees on Adoption Placement” – Version of the 28th November 1988) were merely for practical work assistance, and they therefore did not represent legal or administrative provisions, they nevertheless express what a proper individual adoption placement requires. This is that the adoption applicants should be able to decide to adopt a child in the knowledge of all important facts, so that a successful parent-child relationship which is free from anxiety can come into existence for the welfare of the child. § 9 (1) of the Adoption Placement Act which makes it a duty of the Adoption Placement Office to give detailed advice and support not only to the child and its natural parents but also to the adopters is in harmony with this. It follows from the duty of inquiry mentioned above (§ 7 (1) of the Adoption Placement Act) as well as from the duty of advice owed by the Adoption Placement Office (§ 9 (1) of the Adoption Placement Act) that the adoption applicants have a right to be notified of all the relevant circumstances affecting the child, and especially of suspicion of an illness [reference omitted]. The guidelines of the Working Group of the State Youth Welfare Departments, if and so far as they required that the state of health of the child was to be established by medical examination, therefore corresponded with these requirements. Admittedly the adoption of children with physical or mental peculiarities should also be facilitated. But that can only be considered if the adopters feel they are ready for this in the knowledge of all the circumstances and the consequences of their decision (para 2.23 (2) of the Guidelines).

c) The defendant’s officials knew of the suspicion of mental retardation on the basis of brain damage parentally or in early childhood.

That emerges clearly from the memorandum by the witness N dated 7th October 1981, in which the possibility of mental retardation on the basis of inborn brain damage was expressly taken into consideration. Even the official doctor, Dr M, who had examined the child, regarded the mental retardation as so significant that, according to the memorandum of the witness M referred to above, she thought a “very meticulous examination” in a hospital was necessary. Arrangements were consequently made to examine the child in the children’s clinic B; but this did not happen. But the doctors at the children’s clinic at the St V hospital in P, according to their letter of the 11th November 1981, of which the defendant’s Youth Welfare Department received a copy, diagnosed not only wildness and behavioural disturbance in the child but also the suspicion of mental retardation, which could have meant that this retardation had its cause in brain damage. The appropriate officials could not regard this suspicion of mental retardation as dispelled by the interim report of the 8th December 1981 by the witness T. The only thing which emerged from this report was that a particular positive development had occurred on the basis of psychotherapeutic treatment by the witness T. No grounds for saying that N had been subjected to a detailed specialist examination were revealed by the interim report. T made no comment at all in it on the question of mental retardation based on brain damage. From the outcome of the evidence taken by the Senate, it is not possible to proceed on the basis that the witness T (who in any case was not a neurologist or a psychiatrist, but a psychologist) explained to the witness M (as it says in her memorandum of the 4th December 1981) that the child had a normal intelligence and no mental handicap could be established. The witnesses T and M who were heard on this issue made contradictory statements. The witness T denied having expressed himself in this way to the witness M. But even if T had so expressed himself to the witness M, as she describes, the employees of the defendant cannot reassure themselves by saying that the suspicion of mental retardation was dispelled. This is because the statement by T did not in any case mean anything more than that he – as a psychologist – had not established any such damage.

d) The employees of the defendant did not tell the plaintiffs about the suspicion which existed of mental retardation.

The witness M has stated that she did not speak about this with the plaintiffs. According to her testimony, the witness Ü had had nothing to do with the adoption placement. The claim by the defendant that the plaintiffs had been advised in detail by the witness T as well as by the Adoption Placement Office is unsubstantiated, as it cannot be deduced from this allegation whether the plaintiffs were also informed about the suspicion which existed of mental handicap. According to the account of the defendant’s representative in the hearing before the Senate of the 15th May 1992, nothing was known to the witness B who was summoned to this hearing of the suspicion of mental handicap, so she could not explain about this to the plaintiffs. As the witness M was at least informed by the defendant’s Youth Welfare Department about the suspicion which existed, she would have had to take care that the plaintiffs were correctly, clearly, unequivocally and completely informed about this suspicion. That did not happen.

2. This duty to inform was also owed to the plaintiffs as third parties in the sense of § 839 (1) sentence 1 of the BGB. This follows – for the reasons given more precisely above – from the fact that the adoption applicants should have been able to make their decision to adopt in the knowledge of all the important facts and that this is not ensured if such facts – even if it is only a question of suspicion of a serious illness – are not communicated to them.

3. The employees of the defendant culpably, ie negligently, did not inform the plaintiffs about the suspicion which existed of the child N being mentally handicapped, although they must have realised that the knowledge of this suspicion was of fundamental importance for the plaintiffs as adoption applicants. They ought not, without arranging a detailed specialist examination to make matters clear, to have proceeded on the basis that the suspicion was dispelled by the interim report of the witness T, a qualified psychologist, or in some other way. Without satisfying themselves in this respect, they ought not to have relied on T informing the plaintiffs about a suspicion of mental retardation. It is true that the employees of the Youth Welfare Department cannot be assumed to have the knowledge of a doctor or a psychologist. But they had medical statements before them about the child N, from which it was to be inferred that there was suspicion of mental retardation. They ought to have informed the plaintiffs about this, so that they could then freely decide whether they wanted nevertheless to adopt the child.

4. The violation of official duty was also the cause of the harm which is the subject of the claim.

a) It has to be asked here what course things would have taken if the official had acted in accordance with his duty and what the financial position of the injured parties would have been if the official had not committed the breach of official duty, but had acted in accordance with it [reference omitted]. This question is to be decided in accordance with § 287 of the Civil Procedure Code. If – as here – the violation of official duty consists in an omission, then there is only a causal connection with the harm if action according to duty would have prevented the occurrence of the harmful consequences [reference omitted].

b) If the appropriate officials had informed the plaintiffs about the suspicion which existed, they would not have adopted the child N. This follows from the fact that the plaintiffs had stated with sufficient clarity in the application form that they did not want to adopt a mentally handicapped child. This is not changed by the fact that they had made this declaration subject to limitations which did not affect its essential content.

c) It would certainly have been possible for the plaintiffs, after receiving information about the suspicion of mental retardation, to have made the adoption dependent on a prior detailed neurological or psychiatric examination. Such an examination could not be expected to have dispelled the suspicion which existed, in the face of the child’s evident behavioural symptoms. Such an examination would either have – as in the case of the later examinations in the children’s hospital O and in the University clinic – revealed the presence of childhood brain damage or would have had an outcome which was admittedly unclear, but which would not have dispelled the suspicion. But even in the latter case, the plaintiffs would have refrained from adopting the child N because of the risk of adopting a mentally handicapped child. As they did not want to adopt such a child, they would also not have taken the risk of possibly having to bear the responsibility and burdens of such a child.

5. a) The plaintiff can claim from the defendant compensation for her loss of earnings in the undisputed sum of 30,610.44 DM. The plaintiffs have, without being contradicted, argued that the plaintiff giving up her job had been a prerequisite for the adoption placement. According to the testimony of the plaintiff, which likewise remained uncontradicted, when she gave evidence at the Senate hearing of the 15th July 1992, she had given up her job on the 16th December 1981, when the plaintiffs took N into their care. The plaintiff would have not have suffered loss of earnings if the defendant’s officials had fulfilled the duty to inform which they owed to the plaintiffs; because then no adoption would have taken place and the plaintiff would not have needed to give up her job for the time being. The defendant, in this respect under a duty of explanation, has not substantiated that the plaintiffs, who certainly wanted to adopt a child, would have had the actual opportunity before the lapse of 19 months – reckoned from the 16th December 1981 – to adopt another child, and that the loss of earnings would therefore still have arisen in whole or in part.

b) On the same grounds the court costs and notarial expenses borne by the plaintiff in the undisputed sum of 91.59 DM are to be compensated.

6. The claim for a declaration by the plaintiffs in relation to the duty of the defendant to compensate for possible future harm is also well founded. The prerequisite for the issue of a declaratory judgment is merely that there is a certain probability that claims have arisen or could arise from the legal relationship which is to be established [reference omitted]. The prerequisite is fulfilled in this case. The future harm exists predominantly in the expenditure on maintenance which the plaintiffs must provide for the handicapped child, possibly for the whole of its life. The duty to compensate for harm is not limited to the additional expenditure on maintenance which arises through the special needs of a mentally handicapped child. The defendant must instead reimburse the plaintiffs for the whole of the expenditure on maintenance. The provision of information about all the important facts and circumstances of the adoption to the adoption applicants which was due from the employees of the Youth Employment Department is not only to protect them from the additional expenditure which they incur for the maintenance of a handicapped or sick child. The fulfilment of the duty to give information is also to ensure freedom of decision by the adoption applicants, and this consists of not adopting a mentally handicapped child at all. If such a child is adopted, the risk of providing full maintenance has been realised, and fulfilment of the duty to provide information should protect the adopters from this. In this respect the legal situation is similar to the one which arises when a doctor advises a pregnant woman during early pregnancy incorrectly or incompletely about the possibilities on early recognition of damage to the foetus which would have provided legal justification for the wish of the mother to terminate the pregnancy. Even in this case, the BGH has not limited the claim of the parents to compensation for harm to the additional expenditure on maintenance, but extended it to the complete maintenance requirement for the child who has been harmed [reference omitted]. In this case, the issue cannot be decided otherwise.

II.

No contributory fault for the origination of the harm can be laid at the door of the plaintiffs in connection with the adoption of the child N (§ 254 (1) of the BGB).

III.

The appeal is accordingly rejected.

© 1999 University of Oxford. Since 2002: © Translation The University of Oxford and Professor Markesinis 1999. HTML edition by Lawrence Schäfer. © 1999 Gerhard Dannemann.

OLG Oldenburg VersR 1991, 306, (175) | OLG Oldenburg, Judgment of 20 May 1988 (6 U 28/88)

OLG Oldenburg VersR 1991, 306, (175)
OLG Oldenburg, Judgment of 20 May 1988 (6 U 28/88).

This case is first published in the German Law Archive courtesy of: Translated German Cases and Materials Under the direction of Professors P. Schlechtriem, B. Markesinis and S. Lorenz

Translated by Mr Raymond Youngs, Southampton Institute

Facts

On the 22nd December 1982, the plaintiff was committed to the secure section of the state (Land) hospital X at the request of the defendant. On the same day the defendant applied for committal of the plaintiff in accordance with §§ 10 ff. of the PsychKG ND. The medical opinion supporting the application diagnosed “paranoia (delusions of jealousy and persecution)”. It said the illness was a risk to the plaintiff and others. Dr D, the defendant’s medical officer, signed the opinion after telephone conversations with the doctor in attendance, Dr F, who also signed it. Dr D did not personally examine the plaintiff.

The Amtsgericht (district court) decided on the 23rd December 1982 to commit the plaintiff for a maximum of six weeks for observation. From the 29th December 1982 to the 4th January 1983 the hospital gave him leave of absence. He lodged a complaint, and the Landgericht quashed the committal decision on the 13th January 1983.

By a letter of the 18th July 1983 the defendant’s road traffic division asked the plaintiff to submit a medico-psychological report about his fitness to drive. He did not reply, so the defendant withdrew his driving licence on the 29th August 1983. It did not order immediate implementation of this decision. The Oberverwaltungsgericht (upper administrative court) quashed the defendant’s decision, because the plaintiff had not been proved unfit to drive. No severe mental illness had been shown for the period from the end of 1982 to the beginning of 1983. The plaintiff was justified in refusing to undergo the examination demanded.

The plaintiff now claimed from the defendant payment of compensation for distress estimated at 100,000 DM, and payment of loss of earnings of 140,626.60 DM. He also wanted a declaration that the defendant was obliged to compensate for future material harm.

The plaintiff claimed that the medical officer, who had approved the committal without making his own investigation, and the official in the administrative office, who had ordered the committal without a previous court decision, had violated their official duties. There was no risk to either to the plaintiff himself or others. This was not the typical consequence of a paranoia, and the official would have realised this if he had shown proper care. Even the withdrawal of the driving licence had been a breach of duty because it had been based on the unlawful provisional committal (or the temporary committal) without a proper investigation. The withdrawal of the driving licence had resulted in the plaintiff losing his job.

(The Bundesgerichtshof in its decision of the 29th March 1990 (III ZR 160/88) (BGH VersR 1991, 308) rejected the plaintiff’s appeal in law against the judgment set out here).

Reasons

The plaintiff has a claim against the defendant for compensation for distress in the sum of 5000 DM for unlawful deprivation of freedom. On the other hand he cannot ask for compensation for his loss of earnings because it cannot be established that the loss claimed was caused by a culpable violation by the defendant of official duty. The plaintiff’s claim for a declaration in relation to his future harm is accordingly likewise unfounded.

1. The prerequisites for the granting of compensation for distress in accordance with § 847 of the BGB are present. The plaintiff has been deprived of freedom by a tort by the defendant in the sense of § 839 of the BGB in combination with Art 34 of the Basic Law. The medical officer in the service of the defendant, Dr D has violated an official duty owed by him to the plaintiff in that he signed a medical certificate for the instigation of the committal procedure, without making it sufficiently clear that the findings of Dr F which formed the basis of it had been made several days before the submission of the opinion. Therefore a provisional committal of the plaintiff on this basis in accordance with § 16 of the PsychKG ND could not be considered. The opinion which was sent to the administrative section of the defendant on the 22nd December 1982 contains no date. Nor can it be deduced from the text of the opinion when the plaintiff was examined and when the findings which were decisive for the opinion were ascertained.

And yet the opinion form signed by the medical officer gives the impression that it was filled up immediately after the ascertaining of the findings. This is because in the first line (which contains the word “Urgent” in bold) and in the text of the request before the signatures of the doctors (which asks for an immediate decision) it is made clear that the committal procedure could not be postponed and that the medical experts had also taken that into acount.

But actually the plaintiff had last spoken with the doctor in attendance, Dr F, on the 15th December 1982, as the medical officer indicated in his testimony in the investigatory proceedings. Further contacts after this point in time, for instance on the 21st December 1982, indisputably broke down. The medical officer himself did not examine the plaintiff at any time.

The medical officer was under a duty to provide appropriate explanations in his area of work and therefore in particular in the content of the opinion. It was true that it was not part of the responsibility of the medical officer to arrange directly for the committal of the person affected or to apply to the court. It should however have been obvious to him that the competent official in the administrative section of the defendant would rely on the statement by the doctors and because of the urgency of the matter would very probably first of all arrange for a provisional committal in accordance with § 16 of the PsychKG ND. It was therefore a duty of the medical officer, which he owed to the person affected, to ensure that this foreseeable unlawful provisional committal did not take place.

The violation of duty by the medical officer led with adequate causality to the unlawful deprivation of the plaintiff’s freedom. The responsible officer in the administrative office relied on the statements in the opinion without himself investigating at what point in time the findings were ascertained and he arranged for a provisional committal of the plaintiff in accordance with § 16 of the PsychKG ND.

It is true that the defendant has not expressly issued a formal administrative act in respect of the committal. The plaintiff was however indisputedly moved to the state hospital X with the official assistance of the police before the issuing of the judicial committal decision. This amounts to conclusive conduct (schlüssiges Handeln) on the part of the defendant which was made known to the plaintiff when it was carried out. If the point in time when the findings were ascertained had been known to the official of the administrative office, the provisional committal would not have taken place, since it must be assumed that the authorities would act in accordance with their duties.

It can be left open whether the plaintiff, had the medical officer acted lawfully, would possibly on the 22nd December 1982 have been examined again, perhaps compulsorily, whether the diagnosis would have been confirmed and whether he then would likewise have been provisionally committed. This is because the defendant cannot rely on the fact that it could have achieved the deprivation of freedom in a lawful manner which would have not formed the basis of a duty to compensate (reliance on lawful alternative action).

When a person causes harm by a breach of duty, the question of the extent to which the consequences of his conduct can rightly be assessed as attributable to him is to be answered according to the protective purpose of the violated norm involved [references omitted]. In the present case, there has been a violation of the conditions laid down in § 16 of the PsychKG ND. This provision is the expression of a constitutional guarantee according to which the state is only permitted to limit the freedom of a person on the basis of a formal statute and only if it takes into account the provisos described in it (Arts 2 and 104 of the Basic Law).

The protective purpose of the statute thus lies in permitting a deprivation of freedom only under the conditions prescribed in it. In this particular case it should also be ensured that, up to a point directly before the decision to commit, the state of health of the person concerned has not improved to such an extent that deprivation of freedom is no longer justified. The special urgency of immediate deprivation of freedom must thus be accepted in each case. Unless it is certain that the state of health will continue, the deprivation of freedom must not occur.

It is therefore a question of a fundamental protective norm to guarantee the rights of the citizen, which is not allowed to lose its significance in the context of compensation law just because some form of alternative action would have been lawful [references omitted].

On the same basis the argument of the Landgericht that the Amtsgericht, if it had been in a position to make a decision on the relevant day, would have ordered the committal cannot exonerate the defendant either. Here also the protective purpose of the violated norm excludes appeal to lawful alternative action.

The medical officer has also acted culpably. By using the required care, he could recognise and foresee that the official of the administrative section would see himself as compelled, on the basis of the dangerous situation for the plaintiff and other third parties as certified in the opinion, not only to arrange for a judicial committal but also to order immediately a provisional committal in accordance with § 16 of the PsychKG ND to avert the danger. (Details are given).

The defendant must therefore pay to the plaintiff compensation for distress for the non-material detriments suffered in consequence of the deprivation of freedom. In this connection, when calculating the amount of the damages for distress not only must the length of time of the provisional committal to be taken into account, but also that of the judicial committal. This is because it can be assumed that the court also would have come to another conclusion in its decision in accordance with § 15 of the PsychKG ND if it had known that the last examination of the plaintiff by the medical expert had taken place a week ago.

Taking into account all the circumstances, damages for distress of 5000 DM seem fair but also sufficient to the Senate. The plaintiff was committed from the 22nd to the 29th December 1982. According to his own account he was given leave of absence on the 29th December 1982 so that the consequences of the deprivation of freedom did not continue beyond this point in time. At the most the possibility remained of the further detriment of revocation of the leave of absence. This however did not happen. Long term harm to the plaintiff did not therefore occur.

Even if freedom is to be regarded as a legal interest worthy of the highest protection, the plaintiff’s ideas about compensation (100,00 DM) for distress seem greatly exaggerated. They bear no relationship to the compensation which is payable for unjustified criminal arrest. Admittedly the plaintiff was temporarily arrested by the police in order to implement the committal order, and these circumstances and the fact of committal in his home town have been talked about and have had a disadvantageous effect on his social relationships and his reputation. But even bearing these matters in mind compensation for distress in the approved sum is the most that should be considered.

The claim of the plaintiff is not excluded by § 839 (1) sentence 2 of the BGB. Firstly Dr D has disregarded the protective provisions of PsychKG ND not merely negligently but (at least) grossly negligently. Besides this the plaintiff has no other option for compensation available.

The issue of whether a possibility exists of obtaining compensation from the state can remain open, as this is also a public law body and the claim would therefore likewise be directed against the public sector; and it is necessary to proceed on the basis of the unity of the public sector [reference omitted]. The plaintiff can also not claim against the other medical expert, Dr F. (Details are given).

II. On the other hand the plaintiff has no claim against the defendant under § 839 of the BGB and Art 34 of the Basic Law to compensation for his loss of earnings nor to a declaration that the defendant is obliged to compensate for future harm. This is because it can neither be established that the defendant has culpably violated an official duty in taking proceedings for withdrawal of the driving licence nor that the alleged harm to the plaintiff arose as a consequence of the measures taken by the defendant.

In the present case no blame, as the Landgericht has already pertinently explained, attaches to the defendant in any case, since in relation to this measure, a collegial court in which three professional judges sat, namely the Verwaltungsgericht, has adjudged its conduct to be objectively justified. The conditions developed in this respect for justifying a denial of the culpability of the office holder are present. The Verwaltungsgericht in its decision used the right facts as a basis, evaluated these carefully and in its assessment of the legal situation neither misjudged clear and unambiguous rules nor blatantly falsely interpreted unambiguous rules.

With reference to the grounds of the court decision of the 27th November 1984 the Verwaltungsgericht proceeding on the basis of the relevant provisions (§§ 4 (1) of the Implementation of Punishment Act (StVG) and 15b (1) of the Road Traffic Licences Order (StVZO)) looked carefully at the documents which were available about the plaintiff’s psychological condition and came to the conclusion that they justified doubts about the fitness of the plaintiff to drive.

It accepted that this, together with the plaintiff’s lack of preparedness to dispel the doubts by producing a medico-psychological opinion, justifies the conclusion that the plaintiff wanted to conceal defects which made him unfit to drive a vehicle. One must therefore, so it explained, proceed on the basis of his unsuitability to drive vehicles. These considerations of the Verwaltungsgericht do not violate rules of logic. The legal views referred to are at least defensible, taking into consideration the provisions cited.

Beside this it is not evident that the withdrawal of the driving licence was the cause of the harm claimed by the plaintiff. (Details are given).

©1999 University of Oxford. Since 2002: © Translation The University of Oxford and Professor Markesinis 1999. HTML edition by Lawrence Schäfer. © 1999 Gerhard Dannemann.